Radicalization 2025: The New Face of Extremism in Europe

by Chiara Sulmoni, President, START InSight

Abstract
In November 2025, Europe observed the tenth anniversary of the Paris attacks, with the Bataclan now standing as the enduring symbol of an era defined by organized terrorism. Back then, the threat was clear and structured: hierarchical networks, trained cells, and operations largely directed by the Islamic State. Today, the picture has changed dramatically. Radicalization processes and various strands of extremism have become far harder to map or predict. They are increasingly fueled by loose, fluid digital subcultures and ideologies drawn from many different sources – often remixed, blended, or reshaped through imitation and viral spread. What emerges is a sprawling, decentralized constellation of violent impulses, symbols, and narratives that drift along the internet’s fringes, steadily pulling in more and more adolescents.

Teenagers and Radicalization: An Uncontainable Phenomenon?
‘Switzerland’s Security 2025’- the Situation Report from the Federal Intelligence Service (FIS) – states that “the number of cases of minors and young adults becoming radicalised online and developing terrorist intentions will continue to increase (1).”
For at least six years, the phenomenon of teenagers engaging in various forms of violent extremism has been widespread across Europe, while also affecting other countries such as the United States and Australia. Moreover, several Asian nations—including the Philippines and South Korea—have recorded a rise in right-wing and misogynistic ideologies (2). Youth radicalization thus emerges as a social epidemic that transcends borders, cultures, and ideological lineages.
In Michigan and New Jersey, in November 2025, several youth in contact with one another were arrested and charged with planning a terrorist attack in the name of ISIS over the Halloween weekend (3). In the same period, in Canberra (Australia), a seventeen-year-old was detained on suspicion of planning attacks inspired by racist and extremist ideologies; he reportedly wrote in a private chat that these plans provided him a sense of purpose during a period of depression (4).
In a February 2025 speech, the head of Australian intelligence highlighted a disturbing set of cases: minors allegedly sharing videos of beheadings in school courtyards, and a twelve-year-old reportedly expressing the intent to blow up a place of worship. Today, the average age at which minors first come onto the radar of Australian intelligence services is 15. He further emphasized how a generation raised entirely online will soon reach the age most vulnerable to radicalization, and how for many of these young people, the digital world has become the primary reference point for identity formation, belonging, and perception of reality (5).
In the United Kingdom, similar trends have been observed earlier than elsewhere. Between April 2024 and March 2025, in England and Wales, the 11–15 age group continued to be the most frequently referred for suspected radicalization (6). In 2024, the categories used to classify cases were updated to include entries such as “fascination with extreme violence or mass casualty attacks,” designed to capture situations where no clear underlying ideology can be identified, but an obsessive interest in violent acts emerges. Most cases fall precisely into this gray area, characterized by a general vulnerability to radicalization. The fact that only a limited number of these referrals are subsequently selected for further, structured intervention suggests that they may reflect psychological or personal distress more than the onset of genuine trajectories toward violent extremism.
However, the case of Axel Rudakubana -the seventeen-year-old who, in 2024, killed three young girls at a dance school in Southport (UK)- highlighted the limits of risk assessments based solely on the presence, or absence, of ideology. Despite being flagged multiple times for his interest in violence, he was not taken on by the prevention system because no clear ideological motive emerged—a decision that, in hindsight, proved inadequate.
In the Czech Republic as well, radicalization of minors occurs primarily online and does not necessarily involve ideological adherence. Police intervene on average ten times a week in response to violence in schools (7).
Across the EU in 2024, approximately one third of those arrested for terrorism-related offenses were under 20 years of age. In Belgium, roughly one third of individuals who planned attacks over the past three years were minors (8); in Italy, in July 2025, State Police carried out twenty-two searches targeting adolescents aged 13 to 17 linked to various extremist milieus (9).
Between January and November 2025, France recorded 17 minors charged with terrorism-related offenses, two of whom allegedly planned attacks against the Eiffel Tower and Parisian synagogues (10); meanwhile, three young women aged 18–20 were arrested on charges of preparing a jihadist attack in the capital (11). In response to this troubling trend, at the beginning of 2025 the National Anti-Terrorism Prosecutor’s Office considered establishing a section dedicated to minors, in order to study and prevent early radicalization more effectively (12).
The list can continue. In Germany, in May 2025, five young people aged 14–21 were arrested for belonging to the far-right terrorist group Letzte Verteidigungswelle (“Last Line of Defense”), which allegedly seeks to overthrow the democratic system by targeting political representatives and facilities housing asylum seekers (13). Membership reportedly requires proof of having committed ideologically motivated crimes, such as assaults on migrants or violent symbolic acts (14).
More broadly, right-wing extremism in Germany is increasingly visible. Racist and antisemitic attitudes, swastikas, and Nazi salutes are on the rise among young people, even within schools (15). Symbols and aesthetics associated with the far right are being absorbed into youth culture, contributing to gradual normalization (16). The neo-Nazi milieu reinforces this dynamic by organizing informal events that promote white supremacist music and merchandise, thereby rendering its symbols publicly visible and transforming them into markers of recognition, identity, and belonging (17).
Switzerland is grappling with similar dynamics. In spring 2025, a suspected Islamist-inspired knife attack planned by an eighteen-year-old was thwarted (18). In the Canton of Vaud, data from the Unit for the Prevention of Radicalization (UPRAD) indicate that nearly half of the most complex cases involve minors (45%), including children as young as ten (19). Notably, girls are affected to the same extent as boys, contrary to trends elsewhere (20). According to Serge Terribilini, head of UPRAD since January 2026, the most concerning cases involve “13–14-year-olds with a marked propensity for violence, homophobic, antisemitic, or misogynistic discourse, and a high level of engagement on social media and in online video games”(21). In Bern in 2024, the mentoring service supported twelve radicalized individuals aged 11–20 (22). #ReaCT2024 had already mentioned that the then head of Swiss intelligence observed how Switzerland experienced jihadist radicalization among minors to an even greater extent than other European countries (23); more recently, Attorney General Stefan Blättler has described it as a fundamentally social problem (24).
While jihadism remains the most lethal form of extremist violence, an investigation by Republik magazine sheds light on an equally alarming, emerging phenomenon, in Switzerland and elsewhere: that of adolescent gangs self-identifying as “pedophile hunters.” By posing as minors online, they lure victims to isolated locations, assault them, and film the attacks (25). Often, the perpetrators are themselves minors -for instance, in Ticino in 2024, a group of 19 youths aged 13-18 was apprehended- (26). These groups may exhibit attitudes, symbols, narratives, and role models associated with the far right, a rhetoric of hate, vigilante justice, and, at times, purely criminal intent. Experts regard this combination as a significant risk to public security and a potential pathway to youth radicalization.

The Intersecting Trajectories of Crime and Extremism
The risks outlined above form part of a broader dynamic: in recent years, the entanglement of criminality and extremism has intensified, alongside an increasing exploitation of young people and minors. Of particular concern is the notorious “764,” an international network—classified by Europol among so-called digital cult communities—active on gaming platforms and social media such as Telegram, Discord, and Roblox. The network is fragmented into countless decentralized cells whose members nonetheless share the same forms of deviance and modus operandi: they manipulate young and vulnerable individuals through psychological pressure, threats, and online stalking, coercing them into filming themselves in sexually explicit and humiliating situations. This material then becomes a tool of blackmail: under the threat of its dissemination, victims are progressively forced into ever more extreme behaviors directed at themselves or others, including self-harm and suicide attempts. Children as young as nine have become ensnared in this spiral (27).
Conceived by a fifteen-year-old from Texas but now spread globally, 764 is described by U.S. authorities as a “nihilist” group with accelerationist traits. It does not pursue a coherent political ideology but seeks to generate chaos, suffering, and destruction as a form of domination, combining this aim with satanistic and apocalyptic symbolism. Within the network, graphic images and videos are traded as a form of “currency” to gain influence. In this context, violence becomes embedded in dynamics of power and domination, often exercised by adolescents themselves. In its 2025 annual Report, Europol mentions the growing presence of far-right elements within these violent, occultist communities.
In Italy, in early 2025, a fifteen-year-old was stopped by the Anti-Terrorism Section of the Bolzano Provincial Police Authority on suspicion of being affiliated with the network, and of intending to kill a homeless person or a person with disabilities in order to disseminate the video online (28). In the United States, a 21-year-old arrested in November 2025 allegedly not only blackmailed teenagers but also contemplated carrying out jihadist attacks and possessed bomb-making manuals (29). The Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) observed Telegram chats with up to 15,000 users (30). As of November 2025, the FBI was investigating more than 350 individuals believed to have connections to these networks (31). On October 30, 2025, the U.S. authorities indicted for terrorism a young man who had been active in the group since his teenage years and who, among other things, published an online guide on how to identify, groom, and blackmail vulnerable minors with mental health issues (32).
Because of the complexity of its dynamics and the fusion of abuse, psychological manipulation, and pseudo-ideological references, 764 is now considered an emerging threat at the intersection of online crime and youth extremism, marked by the centrality and glorification of violence (33).
Other transnational networks likewise seek to involve minors, pushing them to commit serious crimes, including assaults and killings (34). These criminal organizations have given rise to a phenomenon known as violence-as-a-service, whereby the execution of illegal activities and violent acts is outsourced to teens, with financial compensation, operational instructions, and logistical support provided. “Recruiters” lure “operatives” via social networks, gaming platforms, and encrypted messaging services, exploiting the language and dynamics of digital youth culture and framing violent acts as missions to be completed, challenges to overcome, or levels to be cleared—much like video games. This mechanism, known as gamification, dulls the perception of real-world risks. Consequently, many adolescents become involved in organized crime without fully grasping the concrete and irreversible consequences of their actions.
Criminal networks deliberately target minors, who are more easily influenced and whose involvement minimizes the organisation’s exposure. At the same time, many young people show a strong willingness to participate, drawn by the promise of quick money, visibility, and power—a lure that, though illusory, strongly appeals to those seeking identity and immediate gratification. These dynamics are neither marginal nor episodic. Europol data reveal that minors are now present in more than 70% of criminal domains (35); a Telegram channel dedicated to recruiting underage hitmen had, before its shutdown, amassed around 11,000 users (36).
Across all these contexts, violence is progressively normalized within everyday digital environments, fostering the emergence of unstructured forms of radicalization. A major contributing factor is exposure to so-called “gore” content—graphic material depicting terrorist acts, torture, killings, war scenes, and abuse, particularly against women. Such content is often accessible even without actively searching for it, thanks to viral dynamics and algorithmic recommendation systems. It can circulate both on dedicated platforms and mainstream services, appearing in feeds or being shared within private groups. To give an idea of the scale of the phenomenon: an analysis conducted by Human Digital across 24 such websites found that between April 2023 and March 2024, average monthly visits increased by 28.5%, from 29.5 million to 37.9 million (37). Research commissioned by the Australian digital security authority (e-security) indicates that 22% of children aged 10–17 have been exposed online to scenes of real-world violence.
While further research is needed in order to clarify the long-term effects of repeated exposure, and its potential links to violent behavior, existing studies show that such exposure can have a significant impact on the psychological well-being of children and adolescents. Potential consequences include anxiety, habituation or desensitization, and avoidance behaviors (38). Internalization of such material can also foster a fixation on violence—now recognized as a relevant factor in pathways to youth radicalization (39). Some perpetrators of school attacks or mass shootings were consumers of gore content, and Europol observes that minors’ interest in this type of action—school massacres in particular—is increasing.
A central challenge in examining these dynamics lies in recognizing that, while many young people emerge from psychologically, socially, or familially vulnerable environments that increase their susceptibility to manipulation or exploitation, they may also exercise agency and become conscious perpetrators of violent acts.

Understanding the Epidemic of Extreme Violence in the Age of Lone Actors

Well-being and Mental Health: The New Frontier in the Prevention of Radicalization
According to Europol, the combination of social isolation, psychological vulnerabilities and intensive use of digital technologies now constitutes one of the most fertile grounds for early radicalization. In this context, mental health is far from a secondary issue: conditions such as anxiety, depression, loneliness, a sense of worthlessness, or traumatic experiences can make some young people more receptive to polarizing narratives that offer simple, immediate answers to deep-seated needs—such as the desire for revenge, power, recognition, or an outlet for personal frustration.
As Clare Allely observes in The Psychology of Extreme Violence, “violence often arises from an individual’s attempt to recover a sense of personal value or meaning that has been lost or threatened”(40). The rapid and violent forms of radicalization we face today are therefore not merely a matter of ideology, but function as mechanisms of psychological compensation.
Emerging research and statistical data also point to the presence of neurodivergent conditions—such as autism spectrum disorders—in specific radicalization contexts (notably among lone actors and cases of online self-radicalization). These conditions are neither direct nor causal risk factors for extremism. However, in situations of vulnerability, certain associated traits—such as difficulties in interpreting implicit social norms or other people’s emotions, rigid or categorical thinking, and a strong need for clarity and structure—may increase the appeal of groups and virtual environments characterized by clear rules, sharp boundaries, defined identities, simple language, and an immediate sense of belonging.
For this reason, there has long been debate over adopting a public-health approach to preventing radicalization -one that integrates security measures with preventive interventions aimed at promoting mental well-being, supporting vulnerable individuals, and strengthening society’s capacity to safeguard its members, particularly young people.
In practical terms, this involves building a flexible and resilient network with those already working on the ground: psychologists, social workers, educators, schools, families, associations/organizations that engage with young people in their daily lives. Strengthening local ties and coordination among these actors enables the early identification of distress and timely interventions, providing support and guidance to vulnerable youths before they drift toward extreme pathways. For such a system to function effectively, it must rest on a shared foundation: up-to-date knowledge of the evolving phenomena, a clear understanding of early warning signs and protective factors, continuous professional training, a common analytical vocabulary, and sustained interinstitutional dialogue. Absent these conditions, coordination remains fragmented, information flows are inconsistent, and the overall capacity for timely and effective intervention is significantly weakened.
This approach also requires fostering a culture that views youth distress as a collective responsibility, rather than an individual issue to be handled in isolation by fragmented or stand-alone services.

The digital ecosystem as an identity lab
Contemporary extremism increasingly manifests as an “autonomous and emancipated” phenomenon, untethered from hierarchical leadership, traditional organizational structures, or centralized propaganda (41). Extremist narratives -understood as frameworks which define the world, identify enemies and victims, and assign individuals a heroic role, a salvific mission, or an exclusive sense of belonging- now circulate horizontally within digital ecosystems, propelled by the active participation of ordinary users. Often informally and without coordination, these users contribute to the production, dissemination, and gradual normalization of ideas rooted in polarizing, implicitly or explicitly anti-democratic and violent worldviews.
The strength of these narratives lies in their ability to operate directly at the level of identity, intercepting deep individual needs and offering vulnerable, crisis-ridden or marginalized individuals -or those in transitional life stages- a sense of power and agency that their everyday lives may fail to provide. This dynamic of collective participation and amplification is facilitated both by platform algorithms—which tend to privilege emotionally intense, controversial, and highly engaging content—and by fluid digital subcultures: virtual communities whose members share not only interests, but also aesthetic codes, language, and behavioral norms.
These communities are particularly prevalent on platforms frequented by teens and young adults—such as TikTok, Instagram, Discord, Telegram, Reddit, or 4chan—and often emerge around seemingly ordinary themes: fitness, self-help, relationships, lifestyle, or personal development. While not explicitly extremist, through algorithmic recommendation systems, user interaction, and cross-pollination between adjacent environments, these spaces can trigger gradual processes of cognitive and discursive radicalization, without necessarily translating into direct mobilization or violent action.
The case of a fourteen-year-old in Singapore illustrates this phenomenon. Within less than a year, he developed self-radicalization across diverse online environments, ranging from jihadist content to far-right material, the incel subculture, misogyny, and antisemitism. Researchers Yasmine Wong and Antara Chakraborthy highlight how online communities that may appear distinct are in fact porous and interconnected; this interconnection stems from convergent narrative themes, emotional framings, and algorithmic mechanisms that facilitate movement between different content domains. These overlapping spaces act like communicating vessels: exposure to one environment increases receptivity to extremist narratives from others, multiplying and diversifying pathways into extremism that often bypass traditional channels of political socialization (Wong and Chakraborthy, 42).
Recurring examples of digital communities that may radicalize include those promoting models of dominant masculinity (the “alpha male”), which can evolve toward radical misogyny; trad wives communities, whose narratives idealizing domestic roles may drift toward antifeminist or supremacist positions; and true crime niches, where fascination with criminal cases can slide into the spectacle of violence and the idolization of perpetrators. The fluidity of these subcultures is reinforced by the absence of rigid ideological boundaries: symbols and language cross-contaminate, mix, and can migrate rapidly across platforms.

TikTok and Radicalization as an Emotional Experience
Within this digital universe, TikTok represents a paradigmatic case. Political, religious, and identitarian content circulates alongside motivational or survivalist material, often perceived as harmless or even positive. Messages rarely call for violence directly; instead, they evoke themes of strength, self-defense, dignity, and tradition, portraying the outside world as hostile. Videos emphasizing resilience, personal growth, a “winning mindset,” pride, values, or redemption present themselves as genuine inspiration, tapping into real insecurities—including physical ones—to establish an immediate bond.
These materials operate primarily at an emotional level rather than stimulating rational reflection. Short, viral formats, polished aesthetics, evocative music —such as nasheeds in Islamic contexts or remixed popular hits in secular ones— and AI-enhanced creative iconography generate instant attraction. Before viewers fully comprehend the content, identification may occur: they feel energized and inspired without questioning the deeper meaning of the messages conveyed.
Symbols, emojis, colors, gestures, and postures function as markers of belonging, readily understood by younger audiences but often opaque to adults. In many cases, ideology is conveyed without being named, using allusion, irony, or ambiguity. Violence is often symbolic, enabling content to evade platform moderation. These materials are not primarily designed to recruit ready-to-act perpetrators; rather, they gradually normalize radical narratives, making them familiar, shareable ‘for fun,’ or attractive as expressions of coolness. Serious intent and operational planning rarely originate on mainstream social platforms; instead, they develop and consolidate in private, encrypted spaces.
Although the concept of ‘TikTok jihad’ and the phenomenon of accelerated radicalization on social media reflect genuine concerns, digital platforms themselves do not act as autonomous ideological agents. As tools designed to maximize engagement, they lower the barriers to emotionally intense content and amplify dynamics of imitation and virality. Adolescents, in their turn, are not merely passive recipients; through often unconscious interaction, they can shape their own algorithmic bubbles, but may lack the tools to understand these mechanisms. It is precisely this opacity which constitutes the main risk: content framed as positive or motivational draws users in emotionally, gradually introducing worldviews steeped in antagonism and hostility. In this way, TikTok facilitates radicalization via emotional immersion rather than critical engagement.

Symbolic Violence, Emulation, and Lone Actors
Digital platforms thus become spaces for alternative socialization, where radicalization arises less from established ideological frameworks and more from online interaction, emulation, and participation in hybrid communities. Prof. Kevin McDonald observes that “ideologies give way to imaginaries; (…); nowadays, radi-calization is less about joining an organization and more a process of immersion in a networked, multi-authored narrative— increasingly taking the form of a conspiracy or a game—shaped by aestheticization, gamification, and performative staging” (43). Almost like a theatrical space, open to everyone.
Ideology does not disappear, but transforms into a framework that allows young people to make sense of their own experience. Personal vulnerabilities and psychosocial stresses -such as social isolation, rejection, discrimination, perceived injustice, lack of recognition, or even burnout (44)- can render individuals especially receptive to simplified narratives.
Within these contexts, violence takes on a symbolic role. It shifts from an expression of individual frustration to a narrative tool through which identity, status, and social roles are constructed. Perpetrators may become figures with whom others identify and, in some cases, objects of admiration or even veneration.
The case of Luigi Mangione, who in 2024 killed a United Healthcare executive in New York, illustrates this process. A small segment of American Generation Z turned him into a pop icon -‘Saint Luigi’-, interpreting his act of violence as a form of alternative justice and as a response to collective frustration and institutional distrust. John Richardson writes that “pinning down Luigi’s motive misses the point. Luigi’s elusiveness is what matters. For a growing number of Americans who seem to be vibrating with existential anxieties, he became a screen onto which they projected their fears and dreams”(45).
Such cases show that violence increasingly takes on a meaning-making function once attributed to ideology: it generates shared significance within fragmented yet interconnected communities. Ideology functions primarily as a framework for rationalizing and legitimizing the act, while violence, through its mediated circulation, operates as a collective mechanism for producing identity and meaning.
The 2025 arrest of two British youths, each suspected of attempting to emulate Axel Rudakubana’s attack (46), exemplifies how violence can now spread through imitation, with isolated, shocking acts turning into blue-prints for troubled others.

Conclusion
Youth radicalization today is not merely ideological; it is symptomatic of a broader crisis permeating the lives of many young people. Contemporary extremism no longer presents in clear, recognizable forms; instead, it manifests as a fragmented constellation of experiences, emotions, and identities, fueled by loneliness, loss of trust in institutions and in the future, and an online world increasingly serving as the primary reference frame.
In this context, ideology does not disappear; it loses its role as a structured collective project and instead becomes a framework that provides immediate personal meaning. Radicalization pathways are increasingly individualized: the collective dimension persists, but often emerges later, representing the point of arrival—rather than the point of departure—of trajectories shaped by experiences of marginalization, frustration, or the search for recognition. Within digital ecosystems, violence can function as a symbolic resource for constructing identity, status, and belonging, taking on a value that extends beyond the act itself.
Prevention cannot be limited to content control; it must also engage with the conditions that make these narratives appealing and address the deep emotional and identity-based needs they exploit.

Implications for Prevention and the Public Debate

1. Legislators and Policymakers
   -Repression and content removal alone are insufficient. Laws focusing solely on punitive measures or the deletion of online content fail to address the emotional and identity-based roots of contemporary radicalization.
   -Radicalization is complex, often beginning before a structured ideology emerges or a crime is committed. Understanding the process requires examining the relationship with violence—symbolic, aestheticized, or performative—which can be detectable in online behavior or early warning signals.
   -Multidimensional risk assessment is essential. Criteria should consider emotional vulnerabilities, fascination with violence, engagement with mythologized or vigilante figures, and early signs of imitation, rather than relying solely on explicit ideological adherence.
   -Policies benefit from integration across sectors. Mental health, education, local communities, platform regulation, and security measures work best when coordinated to support early interventions.
   -Prevention before criminality is valuable. Early support and guidance can interrupt trajectories toward extremism, reducing the burden on the justice system and limiting potential harm.
   Practical Reminder:
   Laws and repression alone are not enough: investing in early prevention, psychosocial support, and integrated policies enhances overall effectiveness.
2. Prevention Practitioners (educators, social workers, schools, youth associations)
   -Early stages often precede explicit ideological adherence. Many radicalization pathways begin with emotional or symbolic signals before ideological conviction emerges.
   -Weak or ambiguous signals may be present: fascination with violence, aestheticization of violent acts, ambiguous irony, or shared symbols within digital subcultures (memes, reels, challenges).
   -“Motivational” content can carry hidden risks. Narratives framed as positive or empowering may construct hostile, dichotomous worlds (e.g., “victim → revenge,” “injustice → opposition”).
   -Addressing emotional vulnerabilities and the need for recognition is critical. Supporting affective resilience, positive belonging, and critical thinking before violence becomes a “narrative resource” helps reduce risk.
   -Distinguishing between youth violence and violent radicalization is important. Pathways may overlap, but causes, dynamics, and solutions differ; not all youth attracted to violence are radicalized.
   Practical reminder:
   Early attention to pre-ideological signals can reduce the risk of escalation and prevent the transformation of violence into shared identity.
3. The media and Public Debate
   -Avoid moralistic readings. Reducing everything to “monsters,” “deviance,” or “bad apples” oversimplifies and obscures the underlying social and emotional dynamics.
   -Avoid technological panic. Platforms do not “create terrorists,” but they can amplify pre-existing vulnerabilities; attention should focus on the conditions that make violent narratives appealing.
   -Shift the central question. Rather than asking only “Where does the hate come from?” it is also important to ask, “Why do these narratives resonate so strongly today?” This involves examining existential voids, the search for meaning, and the role of algorithms.
   -Narrative responsibility: Reporting or framing violence can mythologize it, encourage imitation, or turn it into a symbolic resource.
   Practical reminder:
   Every public account has the potential to reinforce or weaken the symbolic value of violence. Careful choices in words, images, and framing can help prevent imitation and normalization.

Note

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6. https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/individuals-referred-to-prevent-to-march-2025/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2024-to-march-2025
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