Italy: the 2025-2027 Defence White Paper

Strategic Priorities and Challenges for Italy’s Security

by Andrea Molle

The 2025–2027 Multi-Year Defense Policy Document (DPP) is set against a backdrop of profound geopolitical and strategic transition for both Italy and Europe. Following NATO’s consolidation in Eastern Europe and the growing instability across Africa and the broader Mediterranean, Italy’s Defense Ministry seeks to strengthen the country’s overall deterrence, interoperability, and resilience. The 2025 DPP does not mark a break from previous years but rather consolidates an already established trajectory—one of gradual modernization, technological sophistication, and increasing integration with the national defense industry.

The document emphasizes the need to maintain a credible and autonomous posture within the European framework while reaffirming the centrality of the Atlantic alliance. Its dual objective is to enhance Italy’s participation in EU defense programs (such as the EDF and PESCO) while ensuring alignment with NATO’s operational requirements. This dual membership entails a rise in capital expenditure—not through new funding, but through the stabilization of already authorized resources—directed toward high-tech platforms, cyber and space capabilities, and integrated command-and-control infrastructures.

From an economic standpoint, the DPP confirms a defense budget exceeding €31 billion in 2025, with a distribution that prioritizes investment over current expenditures. Yet behind this apparent consolidation lies a tension between financial sustainability and strategic ambition. Military spending growth remains bound by overall fiscal constraints, and much of the programming depends on maintaining Parliament-approved funding. The goal of reaching NATO’s 2 percent of GDP benchmark is invoked as a political aspiration, but still appears more a trajectory than an imminent target.

A distinctive feature of the document is its emphasis on digital transformation. The Armed Forces are portrayed as actors in an “operational digitalization” process that includes advanced C4ISR systems, cyber-defense capabilities, and the integration of space and maritime domains. In this respect, the DPP continues to advance the concept of multi-domain integration, both technological and doctrinal: the future of Italian defense lies in the ability to operate simultaneously across land, sea, air, cyber, cognitive, and space domains with coherent doctrine and coordination.

Politically, the 2025 DPP aligns closely with the government’s strategic priorities in the Mediterranean and Africa. Italy aims to reinforce its military and diplomatic presence in the “enlarged Mediterranean” — from Gibraltar to the Red Sea — as a vital area for energy security, trade routes, and regional stability. Missions in Lebanon, Iraq, the Sahel, and the Horn of Africa are confirmed, though with gradual rebalancing depending on the availability of forces and resources.

Still, the document is not without ambiguities. Several analyses note that the 2025 DPP is less transparent than its predecessors, offering fewer details on specific budget allocations and providing less granularity regarding individual weapons programs. While some interpret this as an effort to simplify public communication, others see it as a step backward in the democratic accountability of military spending.

The Technical Annex, an integral part of the DPP, provides a detailed mapping of ongoing and future programs. It includes development plans for the Army (new combat vehicles and anti-drone capabilities), the Navy (modernization of FREMM frigates, U212NFS submarines, new patrol vessels, and amphibious units), and the Air Force (upgrades to the F-35 fleet, MALE drones, and air-defense assets). It also lists space programs — particularly in surveillance and satellite positioning — through which Italy seeks to consolidate a limited but meaningful degree of strategic autonomy.

In terms of guiding philosophy, the 2025 DPP confirms the Italian Defense establishment’s tendency to view itself not merely as a military instrument but as a national security infrastructure, capable of operating in civilian domains such as civil protection, public health, and environmental emergencies. This dual-use approach responds both to internal efficiency goals and to the political need to build social consensus around defense spending by presenting it as an investment in collective security.

Overall, the 2025–2027 DPP is a document of continuity and consolidation rather than rupture—ambitious in intent, cautious in allocation, and aimed at keeping Italy within Europe’s leading group in terms of defense technology and industrial capacity. Yet questions of transparency and democratic oversight remain open, as spending reaches structurally high levels increasingly justified by a narrative of permanent emergency in international affairs.

The DPP 2025–2027 thus confirms the tendency of Italian defense policy to be both reactive and conservative, rather than fully strategic. It is reactive insofar as it adapts to new threats—hybrid warfare, cyberattacks, and competition in space and maritime domains—but conservative in its decision-making structures and resource-allocation mechanisms. Planning remains largely incremental, adjusting existing multi-year programs rather than redefining strategic priorities. In this sense, the DPP 2025 is more a management document than a visionary one.

Strategically, Italian defense continues to operate on two parallel tracks: full integration within NATO’s deterrence posture against Russia on the one hand, and preservation of a distinct Mediterranean identity on the other, enabling Italy to remain a key player in North Africa and the Middle East. This dual orientation sometimes produces a dispersive effect: forces and budgets are divided among distant theaters and heterogeneous missions (projection, stabilization, deterrence, and civilian support). The result is a globally coherent posture, but not always an efficient one in terms of focus and concentration of effort.

From an industrial perspective, the DPP continues the strategy of integrating the military system with the national production base. The defense complex is portrayed as a technological ecosystem in which major firms — Leonardo, Fincantieri, MBDA, and Iveco Defence — act as bridges between operational capability and industrial innovation. While consistent with the European logic of EDF and PESCO, this approach carries a growing risk of political dependency on industrial-chain maintenance needs rather than genuine strategic priorities. In other words, planning risks being driven more by industrial supply logic than by clear operational demand.

A second critical issue, implicit throughout the DPP 2025–2027, is the persistent absence of a “total defense” or integrated national security paradigm, similar to those found in Nordic countries. Despite growing awareness of hybrid threats—cyber, infrastructural, cognitive, and social—the document continues to frame resilience almost exclusively in military or institutional-technical terms, neglecting the social and civic dimensions of defense. In other words, Italy still lacks a vision that treats citizens, businesses, and local communities as active participants in the national security system. Investments remain heavily concentrated on the armed instrument and its external projection, with limited effort to build a societal resilience capable of reducing Italy’s vulnerability to energy, informational, and logistical crises. The reference point should be the Nordic “total defense” model—as in Sweden, Finland, or Norway—where defense, civil protection, strategic communication, and civic education are integrated into a single framework. Italy remains anchored instead to a vertical conception of security, entrusted to the state rather than shared with society. The risk is that of a modern, dual-use defense system, yet one isolated from its civilian fabric and unable to translate security into a collective civic culture.

A third area of concern involves transparency and democratic legitimacy. Compared to previous DPPs, the 2025 edition reduces public detail on expenditures and programs, making parliamentary and civil oversight more difficult. This may stem from technical reasons — simplifying communication — but politically it signals a broader trend: the normalization of high-level defense spending justified by geopolitical necessity but increasingly insulated from public debate or from a broader resilience strategy. Thus, defense risks becoming a “protected” sector of the national budget, where consensus is built more through the rhetoric of security than through measurable results.

At the European level, the 2025 DPP reflects an effort to align with the emerging “ReArm Europe” paradigm but remains hesitant to promote genuine industrial or operational integration. Italy positions itself as a reliable contributor rather than a conceptual leader, following the Franco-German trajectory while adapting it to its Mediterranean focus and strengths in naval and aerospace industries.

In conclusion, the DPP expresses a pragmatic balance — a compromise between fiscal constraints, interoperability requirements, and aspirations for strategic autonomy. Yet it still lacks a coherent vision of Italy’s role in the international security system. Increased spending, digitalization, and industrial cooperation are means, not ends. The 2025 DPP, though technically sound, does not convincingly articulate the ultimate political purpose—whether deterrence, regional stability, global projection, or mere institutional continuity.

In this sense, the 2025–2027 DPP is a necessary but not yet sufficient document: it marks the consolidation of a modern, technologically advanced, and European-integrated defense policy, but it leaves open the deeper question—what kind of power does Italy aspire to be in a world increasingly defined by permanent competition among great actors?

NATO’s 5% spending target and the implications for Italy

by Andrea Molle in the United States

The adoption of the new NATO spending objective of 5% of GDP at the Hague Summit on June 24–25 is not merely a budgetary adjustment—it marks a strategic shift that redefines the very concept of defense. The 3.5% + 1.5% formula—three and a half points for classic “hard defense” and one and a half for dual-use investments supporting national resilience—encapsulates the central lesson of the war in Ukraine: without reinforced transportation routes, secure energy reserves, and protected cyberspace, tanks won’t reach the front and drones won’t take off.

For Italy, the challenge is twofold. On one hand, the Government has pledged to meet the new target while remaining on a path of fiscal consolidation; on the other, it starts from a “pure” defense spending level of roughly 1.57%, well below the 3.5% required for the traditional military component. In concrete terms, this means securing an additional €32 to €42 billion annually over ten years for weapons, training, and operational readiness—on top of investments in infrastructure and cyber resilience. NATO itself has made clear that the 5% goal is to be reached gradually: 3.5% for military defense and 1.5% for civil security, both spread over a decade. The effective increase is therefore modest, amounting to no more than 0.3% of GDP annually. It is a demanding but not unmanageable commitment.

The Ministry of Defense will no longer be able to spread increases evenly across the three branches. For the Army—long relegated to third place behind the Navy and Air Force—this is a once-in-a-generation opportunity: to close gaps in armored vehicles, long-range artillery, precision munitions, and counter-UAS capabilities; to modernize training ranges and maintenance infrastructure; to acquire strategic sensor systems currently monopolized by the United States. Without this shift, Italy’s commitments on NATO’s eastern flank will remain purely nominal.

The 1.5% portion opens the door to industrial policy. Ports like Gioia Tauro, TEN-T rail corridors, and Italy’s 5G/quantum backbone can be co-financed by the EU under the “Military Mobility” framework, channeling investments that benefit both defense and national logistics competitiveness. Here the Army can become a bridge between Civil Protection and critical infrastructure, redefining its role as a territorial force within the broader design of total defense.

The 2035 horizon offers a gradual implementation that softens the budgetary impact, but should not create illusions: procurement cycles are measured in decades. Contracts for the Ariete, Dardo, PzH 2000, and SAMP/T NG must be signed now to avoid another decade of half-measures. This is also a political test: if Rome fails to turn the 5% target into an opportunity for industrial modernization and credible deterrence, it risks becoming just another symbolic benchmark—like the old 2%—never truly met.

What’s at stake is not just appeasing Washington or avoiding future tariff threats; it is proving to allies that an Italy with five million virtual reservists, but no ammunition and no roads navigable by a Leopard tank, is a weak link. If the country can instead combine European ambition, fiscal realism, and renewed investment in its Army, the 5% goal could become a catalyst for a security architecture finally integrated across barracks, factories, and bridges.

This new paradigm also calls for a rethinking of the relationship between the Armed Forces and civil society, after decades of cultural and institutional separation. Investment in national resilience, in the protection of critical infrastructure, and in countering hybrid threats gives the military a renewed role—visible, concrete, and embedded in the nation’s fabric. No longer just professionals deployed in missions overseas, they can become central actors in collective security, guardians of the homeland, and partners to citizens. It is a historic opportunity to rebuild that bond—one based not on rhetoric, but on strategic utility and democratic transparency.

“From Russia with Love”: New threats to Italy and Russia’s role in cyberspace, public health, disinformation, and espionage.

by Claudio Bertolotti.

Abstract

The article examines the main threats to Italian national security attributed to Russia, focusing on three strategic areas: cyber security, disinformation, and espionage. Russia emerges as one of the primary challenges for Italy in the cyber domain due to its ability to carry out targeted attacks aimed at acquiring sensitive information or disrupting critical infrastructure. Similarly, Moscow’s systematic use of disinformation serves as a tool to influence public opinion and political decisions in Italy, leveraging social media and traditional media to disseminate false or manipulated content. The issue of espionage is framed within the context of bilateral cooperation initiatives such as the 2020 operation “From Russia with Love,” during which risks related to the collection of sensitive information under the guise of healthcare assistance came to light. This aspect ties into emblematic cases such as the arrest of Walter Biot, an officer of the Italian Navy, accused of espionage on behalf of Russia. The article highlights the need for multidimensional counterstrategies to address these threats, combining advanced technologies, international cooperation, and enhanced institutional resilience.

Emergency situations, crises, and vulnerabilities: the perfect ground for emerging threats

The dynamics of international relations and global policies profoundly affect the competition between state and non-state actors, influencing political, social, and economic sectors. The assertiveness demonstrated by certain countries in the international arena is also contributing to redefining power balances at both regional and global levels. Events such as the COVID-19 pandemic, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, and the energy crisis are already leaving a lasting impact, both for Italy and many other nations, with significant effects in economic and social spheres.

The COVID-19 pandemic severely tested Italy, exposing systemic vulnerabilities and latent critical issues. It triggered an unprecedented health crisis, with an exponential increase in infections and deaths, coupled with an overload on the healthcare system. This was accompanied by an economic and social crisis characterized by rising unemployment and a contraction in consumer spending, direct consequences of restrictive measures such as lockdowns, which led to the closure of numerous productive activities.

Before the full effects of the pandemic could be absorbed, the conflict in Ukraine broke out on February 24, 2022, initiated by the Russian invasion. This war sparked a new economic crisis, exacerbated by rising raw material costs and reduced trade flows. At the same time, it caused an international political crisis, with the imposition of sanctions against Russia and challenges in energy supplies for many European countries.

The resulting energy crisis further worsened the economic situation, leading to a significant increase in the prices of primary resources and challenges in energy access. These factors directly impacted the Italian economy, reducing the competitiveness of national businesses.

This context highlights the complexity of international relations and the volatility of alliances and rivalries, underscoring the unpredictability of events capable of disrupting access to energy resources and influencing their availability and prices. Such dynamics have substantial repercussions across social, political, and economic domains, underscoring the need for careful and strategic management of these global phenomena (Bertolotti, 2023).

Emerging threats to Italy’s security and Russia’s capabilities (and lines of action).

Italy’s security and defense are increasingly challenged by a range of emerging threats that manifest across various domains within the global context. Among these, cybercrime stands out as one of the most critical challenges. With the growing reliance on digital technologies, Italy’s critical infrastructure and businesses have become increasingly vulnerable to cyberattacks. These attacks, often executed using sophisticated methods, aim to steal sensitive information or compromise systems, causing significant damage. Russia, in particular, is considered one of the primary sources of these threats, leveraging cyberspace for espionage activities and interference in strategic infrastructure.

Industrial espionage poses an additional risk, targeting the flagship sectors of Italy’s production system and national expertise. In a highly competitive global environment, industries such as automotive, aerospace, defense, and energy are particularly exposed to such practices. Advanced technologies and cutting-edge innovations are frequently targeted by these attacks, with strategic consequences for the country’s competitiveness.

Italy’s national healthcare system is also vulnerable. Cyberattacks in this sector can disrupt essential services, jeopardize the personal data of patients and staff, and result in significant economic losses for healthcare organizations. These actions can have a devastating impact on public health, further exacerbating emergency situations.

Disinformation and propaganda represent another emerging threat, with the potential to manipulate public opinion through the dissemination of false or distorted information. Social media and traditional media are often exploited to create confusion and uncertainty, influencing political decisions and hindering crisis management. In an already fragile context, marked by the effects of the pandemic and the energy crisis, such dynamics can deepen social divisions, undermining stability and national cohesion.

Finally, the energy crisis emerges as a significant threat. Dependence on external resources and rising raw material prices have a direct impact on the Italian economy and the competitiveness of its businesses, complicating emergency management and decision-making processes for authorities (Bertolotti, 2023).

Russia’s Role

Russia positions itself as a key actor in the landscape of emerging threats to Italy. With extensive capabilities in cyber operations, Moscow employs advanced technologies to conduct hacking activities, deploy sophisticated malware, and exploit phishing and social engineering techniques. These tools, often supported by Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups linked to the Russian government, enable interference with protected systems and the acquisition of strategic information.

In the geopolitical arena, Russia has developed an integrated approach to strategic communication and digital diplomacy. As described by President Vladimir Putin in 2012, soft power is used to achieve foreign policy objectives without direct reliance on military tools. Organizations such as the “Russian World” and the “Gorchakov Fund of Public Diplomacy,” along with the Rossotrudnichestvo agency, play a central role in this strategy, operating through the dissemination of targeted information and alternative narratives on social networks.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia intensified its propaganda efforts through the delivery of humanitarian aid to various countries, including Italy. These initiatives, communicated strategically through social media, were used to consolidate Russia’s influence on the international stage. This approach enabled the Kremlin to gain favor in strategic regions such as the Balkans, the Middle East, and Latin America, as well as within the European Union.

The combination of disinformation, propaganda, and cyber capabilities makes Russia a central actor in the dynamics of emerging threats, with significant impacts on global security and stability. For Italy, addressing these challenges requires coordinated and targeted strategies to protect critical infrastructure, safeguard social cohesion, and strengthen national resilience.

Inviting the spy into the house: the “From Russia with Love” operation. An analysis of dynamics and implications.

During the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Italian Army’s 7th Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense Regiment “Cremona” (CBRN) was engaged, between March and May 2020, in sanitization and decontamination activities. This effort included supporting reception centers for individuals arriving from abroad and sanitizing over 180 facilities in Lombardy. These operations also involved a Russian contingent sent as part of the “From Russia with Love” operation, which led to the creation of nine joint Italian-Russian task forces (Senate of the Republic, Doc. CLXIV no. 31, p. 85). Initially focused on the Bergamo province, the operation revealed vulnerabilities related to information collection by external actors, raising concerns that the aid offered could be used as a pretext to breach national security boundaries.

The Russian mission involved 104 personnel, including prominent epidemiologists Natalia Y. Pshenichnaya and Aleksandr V. Semenov. However, the Russian presence was subject to limitations: the original proposal of 400 personnel was reduced to 100 by the then-Minister of Defense, Lorenzo Guerini. Additionally, General Luciano Portolano, Commander of the Joint Operations Command, rejected requests to extend Russian operations to strategic sites such as military bases and government offices, including the Ghedi base (Brescia), used by NATO. The operations were restricted to hospitals and care facilities. During these activities, the Russian contingent made multiple attempts to collect virus samples and offered financial incentives to Italian researchers to obtain scientific data. A notable example was an offer of €250,000 to a director at Rome’s Spallanzani Hospital, which promoted the Russian vaccine “Sputnik” at the expense of the Italian “Reithera” project (Jacoboni, 2022).

The Context and Controversies.

The agreement between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte was reached via telephone on March 21, 2020. However, the Russian intervention, perceived by Italy as a “blank check,” was carried out in an uncoordinated manner without adequately consulting the Italian government. The Russian contribution included military experts, specialists in biological and chemical threats, and technical units for the study of pathogens, but it lacked equipment specifically designed to detect COVID-19.

The sites chosen by the Russian contingent for sanitization raised concerns, as many were located near sensitive infrastructure, such as NATO bases housing nuclear arsenals. These factors led the Italian government to prematurely terminate the operation, viewing it as a potential national security risk.

Role of Russian Epidemiologists.

A notable aspect of the operation was the unauthorized presence of two Russian epidemiologists, Pshenichnaya and Semenov, both affiliated with Rospotrebnadzor, the Russian agency responsible for pandemic management. The two had previously worked in Wuhan and stated that their mission’s objective was to gain insight into how COVID-19 was being managed in other countries. However, two months after their departure from Italy, they published a report highly critical of Italy’s pandemic management (Santarelli, 2022), raising questions about the true purpose of their presence (Bertolotti, 2023).

Final considerations.

The “From Russia with Love” operation raises questions about the management of international aid in emergency contexts and the risks associated with national security. While the Russian intervention was officially presented as a humanitarian contribution, multiple actions suggest it may have also served as a tool for gathering strategic information and consolidating Moscow’s geopolitical influence. These dynamics highlight the importance of rigorous coordination and careful risk assessment in international cooperation during crisis situations.

Analysis of the Russian operation in Italy: a hybrid warfare strategy. 

The Russian military intervention in Italy during the COVID-19 pandemic represents a practical example of the application of so-called “hybrid warfare,” employed by Moscow to gain a temporary strategic advantage within the context of the global health emergency (Santarelli, 2022). Unlike China, which limited its support to consultations via videoconference, Italy welcomed and granted significant operational freedom to Russian military personnel. This allowed them to gather valuable information on the management and spread of the virus, which was later utilized for both domestic and international propaganda campaigns, including the promotion of the Russian vaccine “Sputnik V.”

The Russian operation appeared to pursue three main objectives. First, the acquisition of strategic information through espionage activities, aiming to develop a pandemic management strategy based on knowledge obtained in Italy. Second, domestic and international propaganda, designed to showcase Russia’s progress and promote the adoption of the “Sputnik” vaccine by other countries, including Italy. Third, an “information warfare” campaign aimed at discrediting Italy’s handling of the health crisis, leveraging contributions and statements from prominent Russian epidemiologists.

Implications for National Security.

The “From Russia with Love” operation underscores the need for a thorough assessment of national security implications in emergency situations. This case provides a concrete example of how external actors can exploit critical contexts to infiltrate intelligence networks, gather strategic data, or penetrate national security systems. Under the guise of humanitarian assistance, such operations can undermine internal stability and bolster the geopolitical influence of third countries.

Italy’s experience highlights the importance of maintaining strict oversight and establishing clear boundaries in international collaborations during emergencies to mitigate risks to the integrity and security of the state (Bertolotti, 2023).

Bibliography

Bertolotti, C. (2023). Le minacce emergenti per l’Italia e il ruolo della Russia (cyber, sanitaria, disinformazione, spionaggio), in “La Russia nel contesto post-bipolare (RUSPOL). I rapporti con l’Europa tra competizione e cooperazione”, 2° Geopolitical Brief, Geopolitica.info, la Sapienza, Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale, Roma.

Bērziņš, J. (2014). Russia’s New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defense Policy, Policy Paper No 02, (Riga: National Defence Academy of Latvian Center for Security and Strategic Research), 5.

Putin, V. (2012). Russia and the Changing World. Rossiyskaya Gaseta, 29 febbraio 2012.

Santarelli, M., (2022). Dalla Russia con amore. Aiuti covid o spionaggio dalla Russia? Cosa c’è dietro la missione dell’esercito russo a Bergamo, Agenda Digitale, 17 gennaio 2022.

Senato della Repubblica (2020), XVIII Legislatura, Doc. CLXIV n. 31, “Relazione sullo stato della spesa, sull’efficacia nell’allocazione delle risorse e sul grado di efficienza dell’azione amministrativa svolta dal ministero della Difesa, corredata del rapporto sull’attività di analisi e revisione delle procedure di spesa e dell’allocazione delle relative risorse in bilancio”, p. 85.

Tsvetkova, N., Rushchin D. (2021). Russia’s Public Diplomacy: From Soft Power to Strategic Communication. Journal of Political Marketing, 20(1), 50-59.

Europe’s Defense Conundrum: Why PESCO and Other Initiatives Always Fall Short.

by Andrea Molle.

The European Union has long aspired to bolster its collective security and strategic autonomy. Over the past decade, initiatives such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the European Defence Fund (EDF), and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) have been launched to strengthen European defense capabilities. However, these initiatives, while symbolically significant, have failed to provide Europe with a coherent and effective security framework. As geopolitical tensions rise, particularly with an increasingly aggressive Russia and ongoing instability in the Middle East and North Africa, it is time for Europe to acknowledge the fundamental flaws in its current defense approach and consider more radical solutions.

As of March 2025, Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) continues to serve as the European Union’s framework for deepening defense collaboration among its member states. Since its inception in 2017, PESCO has expanded to include 26 participating countries, collectively working on 68 collaborative projects aimed at enhancing military capabilities and interoperability. In November 2024, the Council of the European Union approved conclusions on the PESCO Strategic Review, reaffirming PESCO’s pivotal role in advancing defense cooperation. This review emphasized the need to adapt PESCO to the evolving geopolitical landscape and underscored the importance of addressing existing challenges to bolster its effectiveness.

Despite these efforts, PESCO continues to face significant hurdles. Many projects have encountered delays due to inadequate financial and practical planning, leading to discussions about reviving or retiring underperforming initiatives. Furthermore, divergent national interests and varying interpretations of strategic autonomy among member states have impeded cohesive progress. For instance, Poland has expressed concerns that PESCO could potentially undermine NATO or weaken security cooperation with the United States, both of which are vital for the security of NATO’s Eastern Flank.

To enhance the effectiveness of PESCO, the EU has opened certain projects to third-party participation. Notably, Canada, Norway, and the United States have been involved in the “Military Mobility” project since December 2021, with the United Kingdom joining in November 2022. Canada has also been invited to participate in the “Network of Logistic Hubs in Europe and Support to Operations” project as of February 2023. This inclusion aims to leverage external expertise and resources to strengthen PESCO initiatives. In August 2024, Switzerland received approval to participate in two PESCO projects: “Military Mobility” and “Cyber Ranges Federation.” This move is intended to enhance Switzerland’s national defense capabilities while adhering to its neutrality obligations.

Looking ahead, the ongoing PESCO Strategic Review, set to conclude by the end of 2025, offers an opportunity to reshape the framework to better address contemporary security challenges. The review aims to reinvigorate PESCO by refining its objectives, improving project management, and ensuring that collaborative efforts yield tangible military advancements. In summary, while PESCO has made strides in fostering defense cooperation within the EU, it continues to grapple with bureaucratic inefficiencies, divergent national priorities, and varying levels of commitment among member states. The outcomes of the current strategic review and the inclusion of third-party participants will be crucial in determining PESCO’s future efficacy in enhancing Europe’s defense posture.

Similarly, the European Defence Fund (EDF), established in 2017, serves as a pivotal instrument in bolstering the European Union’s defense research and innovation. For the 2021-2027 period, the EDF has been allocated a budget of approximately €8 billion, with €2.7 billion dedicated to collaborative defense research and €5.3 billion earmarked for capability development projects. Recognizing the need for enhanced defense capabilities, the European Commission has proposed a substantial increase in defense funding. In March 2025, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced plans for a €150 billion defense fund, aiming to encourage member states to invest in military capabilities with the support of EU-backed loans. This initiative underscores the EU’s commitment to strengthening its defense posture in response to evolving geopolitical challenges.

The Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) is another crucial mechanism designed to harmonize national defense planning and investments among EU member states. CARD provides a comprehensive overview of the EU defense landscape, identifying collaborative opportunities and facilitating cooperation. However, the 2024 CARD report indicates that, despite progress in defense spending and cooperation, significant room for improvement remains. Member states are encouraged to take decisive actions to sustain investments and enhance the efficiency of their armed forces.

In addition to the EDF and CARD, several other key European defense initiatives and agencies contribute to enhancing the European Union’s defense capabilities. Established in 2004, the European Defence Agency supports EU member states in improving their defense capabilities through European cooperation. Acting as a facilitator for collaborative defense projects, the EDA serves as a hub for European defense cooperation, covering a broad spectrum of defense-related activities.

The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is the EU’s framework for defense and crisis management, forming a main component of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The CSDP enables the EU to undertake operational missions outside its borders, utilizing both civilian and military assets to ensure peacekeeping, conflict prevention, and strengthening international security. The EU is also exploring the development of a new satellite network to reduce dependence on U.S. military intelligence. This initiative aims to enhance the EU’s capability to detect threats and coordinate military actions, providing more frequent updates and greater autonomy in intelligence gathering. These initiatives and agencies collectively contribute to a more integrated and robust European defense framework, addressing both current and emerging security challenges.

Compounding the challenges faced by these initiatives is the EU’s continued reliance on NATO as its primary security guarantor. While European leaders often speak of “strategic autonomy,” the reality is that Europe remains dependent on American military power. The war in Ukraine has underscored NATO’s irreplaceable role in European security, with the United States providing the bulk of military aid and strategic coordination. This reliance on NATO creates a paradox: while the EU desires greater defense independence, it is unwilling or unable to develop the necessary capabilities to make that independence meaningful. Attempts to establish a credible European defense identity, such as the European Intervention Initiative (EI2) led by France, have made little progress due to the competing priorities of member states.

To address these shortcomings, Europe must reconsider its defense strategy with bold, pragmatic solutions. First, a genuine commitment to defense spending is necessary. The EU should set binding defense investment targets akin to increasing NATO’s GDP requirement. ReArm Europe is a step in the right direction, but a common European military budget, funded through EU-wide mechanisms, could help overcome fragmentation in defense procurement and capability development.

Secondly, we must understand that establishing a fully integrated EU army has long been considered politically unfeasible due to concerns over national sovereignty and the complexity of aligning diverse military structures. However, recent developments indicate a shift toward more cohesive European defense capabilities. In March 2022, the EU introduced the Strategic Compass, outlining the creation of a Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) by 2025. This modular force aims to mobilize up to 5,000 personnel, incorporating modified EU battlegroups and additional forces from member states.

French President Emmanuel Macron has also been a vocal proponent of strengthening EU defense mechanisms. In April 2024, he proposed the establishment of a European Rapid Reaction Force by 2025, emphasizing the need for a “European Defense Initiative” to develop strategic concepts and capabilities, particularly in air defense and long-range operations. Despite these initiatives, several challenges persist. Nations like Germany face difficulties in recruiting and preparing their armed forces, particularly among younger generations who may prioritize work-life balance over military commitments.

Finally, enhancing Europe’s security necessitates a comprehensive approach that integrates institutional military frameworks and civilian preparedness. While the idea of an EU-wide right to self-defense akin to the United States’ Second Amendment is culturally and legally complex, Europe has been advancing initiatives to bolster civilian resilience and preparedness. In conclusion, Europe’s security environment is deteriorating, and its current defense initiatives are ill-equipped to handle the challenges ahead. PESCO, the EDF, and CARD have failed to deliver a credible path toward strategic autonomy. If Europe is serious about defending itself, it must embrace more ambitious solutions, including increased defense spending, operational integration, and a legal framework that empowers both states and citizens in matters of security. Without such measures, European defense will remain a fragmented and ineffective patchwork, leaving the continent vulnerable in an increasingly hostile world.

Macron’s call to rearm and the redefinition of Europe’s identity

by Andrea Molle

(Cover photo by Guillaume Périgois on Unsplash)

French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent call for Europe to rearm is not just a wake-up call; it is a defining moment for the continent’s security and its role in global geopolitics. By declaring that Europe can no longer “live off the dividends of peace,” Macron has acknowledged a reality that many European leaders have long preferred to ignore. The world has changed, and the post-Cold War assumption that European security could be outsourced to the United States is no longer viable. The time for mote strategic autonomy has arrived.

At the heart of Macron’s message is the growing threat posed by Russia. The ongoing war in Ukraine, combined with broader Russian efforts to destabilize Europe, underscores the urgency of the situation. The U.S. has been a crucial ally, but its political landscape is shifting, and future administrations may not be as committed to European security as in the past. Macron’s suggestion that France’s nuclear deterrence could be extended to European allies represents a fundamental shift in strategy—one that could redefine the European security framework. Not a free gift, and of course not the sharing of operational control, but a bid to the leadership of such a framework.

This shift is particularly interesting given France’s historical posture on defence. Since Charles de Gaulle’s presidency, France has pursued an independent defence strategy, emphasizing national sovereignty over reliance on NATO. In 1966, de Gaulle withdrew France from NATO’s integrated military command, asserting that France should control its own military policy rather than be subordinate to U.S. leadership. Though France rejoined NATO’s command structure in 2009 under President Nicolas Sarkozy, its nuclear deterrence has always remained strictly under national control. Macron’s willingness to even discuss extending France’s nuclear umbrella marks a significant departure from this traditional stance, signaling a new era in European defence, but at the same time is a return to the Gaullist paradigm.

The implications of this shift extend beyond France. The European Union is already exploring massive investments in defence, potentially mobilizing hundreds of billions of euros. This move signals an intent to reduce reliance on NATO, or at the very least, to establish a stronger European pillar within the alliance. If successful, this transformation could alter the balance of global power, making Europe a more independent actor on the world stage.

Italy finds itself at a crossroads in this new paradigm, and the clock is ticking. Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has stressed the importance of Western unity, warning that division would be “fatal for everyone.” Italy, historically cautious in its defence spending, may now be compelled to significantly increase its military budget. Furthermore, as discussions around European nuclear deterrence evolve, Italy could be forced to reconsider its own strategic policies. Should it align itself more closely with France’s vision, will it maintain its traditional reliance on US’s nuclear umbrella, will Rome opt to create its own “Deterrence Force”?

Regardless, Macron’s speech was not just about military spending; it was about reshaping Europe’s identity. The era of European complacency in defence matters is over. The question now is whether European leaders, particularly in Italy, are willing to rise to the occasion and assume the responsibilities that come with true strategic autonomy. If they fail to act, the cost may not only be Europe’s security but its place in the world order itself.

Europe at a Crossroads: Can It Defend Itself Without the U.S.?

by Andrea Molle.

As geopolitical tensions mount and the possibility of a U.S. partial or complete withdrawal from NATO looms, Europe faces an urgent question: Can it defend itself without American support? The answer, while not impossible, comes with staggering costs and a long, uncertain road to military independence.

For decades, Europe has free-ridden on the United States as the backbone of its defense strategy. Washington provides not only nuclear deterrence but also logistical, technological, and intelligence capabilities that European nations struggle to replicate on their own. A U.S. exit from NATO would leave Europe with a security void requiring a dramatic increase in military spending and political cohesion—both of which are far from guaranteed.

The numbers are sobering. Today, the combined defense budgets of the European Union and the United Kingdom stand at roughly $380 billion per year. Yet, experts estimate that to compensate for the loss of U.S. capabilities, Europe would need to invest an additional $300-$400 billion upfront in military expansion. To sustain this, European countries would have to increase their annual defense spending to 3-4% of GDP, up from the current 1.5-2%.

For Italy, the challenge is particularly stark. Currently allocating around 1.5% of GDP to defense, approximately €30 billion per year, Rome would likely need to double its spending to €60 billion annually to maintain a credible security posture. This is no small feat for a nation with a debt-to-GDP ratio exceeding 140%, where defense spending has historically taken a backseat to social and economic priorities.

Nonetheless, Italy is a crucial NATO player, given its strategic position in the Mediterranean. However, without U.S. support, it would face serious gaps in naval power, air superiority, and intelligence capabilities. Italy would need to expand its fleet, requiring investments of at least €20-30 billion in additional aircraft carriers, submarines, and destroyers to safeguard Mediterranean security. Rome relies heavily on U.S.-built F-35s and missile systems, and a post-NATO scenario would necessitate either an expensive push for indigenous production or deeper reliance on France and Germany. Additionally, Italy currently hosts U.S. nuclear weapons under NATO’s sharing program. If that ends, it faces the difficult decision of whether to invest in its own nuclear deterrent—an economically and politically fraught prospect—or depend on France’s arsenal for protection. Relying on France’s nuclear arsenal would be a precarious option for Italy, as the two countries do not share many strategic interests, and such dependence could subordinate Rome to Paris, undermining Italy’s autonomy in defense matters and limiting its ability to act independently on the international stage. This would further complicate Italy’s foreign policy, as it would have to align more closely with French priorities, which may not always coincide with its own.

Beyond the financial and technological hurdles, the issue of personnel looms large. European armed forces have shrunk significantly since the end of the Cold War, with many nations shifting toward smaller, professional armies rather than mass conscription. Italy, like much of Europe, would need to rapidly expand its military ranks to meet the demands of a self-sufficient defense. This means not only recruiting more soldiers but also training and retaining skilled personnel in key areas such as cyber warfare, intelligence, and logistics. Without the manpower to operate and maintain an expanded military infrastructure, even the most advanced weapons systems would be of little use. Conscription, once abandoned, may need to be reconsidered—a politically sensitive but perhaps necessary step if Europe is to sustain long-term military readiness.

Moreover, building an autonomous European defense system would take decades. In the short term, the first five years would require a rush to increase budgets and reconfigure alliances, though Europe would remain highly vulnerable. In the medium term, within five to ten years, a functional but weaker alternative to NATO could emerge, with expanded joint operations and rapid procurement of new defense assets. Over the long term, within ten to twenty years, a fully independent European defense force could be operational, though fragmentation, inefficiencies, and economic strains would remain challenges.

Beyond financial constraints, European nations—Italy included—struggle with political division on military issues. Germany has only recently begun reversing decades of defense underinvestment, while Italy has long faced public skepticism over military expansion. Without strong political will and decisive leadership, Europe’s path to defense autonomy will be slow and disjointed. The economic burden is another major concern. While France and Germany might absorb higher defense costs, countries like Italy, Spain, and Greece may find it nearly impossible without significant sacrifices in other areas, such as infrastructure, social programs, and energy investment.

Another possibility is for Rome to ensure continued American military and strategic support. However, an alignment with Washington would alienate some of Italy’s European partners who may favor a more autonomous defense framework, potentially dooming European unity. Furthermore, it would reinforce Italy’s dependence on the U.S. for security, leaving it vulnerable to the shifting priorities of U.S. foreign policy while limiting its influence within the European Union on defense and security issues. Regardless of the chosen option, this would mark a radical shift in military strategy, involving increased defense spending, naval expansion, and a potential reassessment of its role in nuclear deterrence.

In conclusion, political fragmentation and economic limitations could make replacing NATO’s capabilities an uphill battle. Europe must now decide: Will it take defense into its own hands, or will it remain vulnerable in an increasingly volatile world? One thing is certain—without U.S. support, the cost of security will skyrocket, and for nations like Italy, the stakes have never been higher.