The Enemy in the Cockpit. The Flydubai Case and the Internal Vulnerability
by Claudio Bertolotti.
What happened on 30 September 2026 aboard Flydubai flight FZ1073, which departed from Dubai bound for Tel Aviv, calls for reflection that goes beyond the dramatic nature of the incident and beyond its still uncertain classification as a terrorist act. What emerges from the dynamics of the event, even before any possible ideological motive, is the existence of a structural vulnerability: the internal threat, the insider threat, when the potentially hostile actor is someone to whom the system itself grants access, trust and operational capabilities.
While the fundamental question of motive remains open, the information currently available allows for a more precise reconstruction of what happened. According to the Israeli authorities, the co-pilot of the Boeing 737 MAX 8, an Omani national, allegedly attacked the captain with a knife. The captain was identified by Indian sources as Smit Machchhar, an Indian national and a Flydubai captain since 2022. According to the Israeli reconstruction, the co-pilot then attempted to take control of the aircraft and cause it to crash. The airline confirmed that a violent altercation occurred inside the cockpit, although it has not publicly attributed any motive to the attacker.
Flight data add a particularly significant element. The aircraft, which was flying at more than 30,000 feet, reportedly lost over 14,000 feet of altitude in approximately thirty seconds. Flightradar24 then recorded transponder code 7700, indicating a general emergency, followed by code 7500, internationally used to signal unlawful interference aboard an aircraft. The signal subsequently returned to 7700 during the diversion to Saudi Arabia.
It is within those few seconds that the nature of the incident appears to have changed, shifting from the hypothesis of a mere violent confrontation between two crew members to a situation in which violence inside the cockpit directly endangered the aircraft and everyone on board.
According to testimonies collected by Reuters, the injured captain reportedly managed to open the cockpit door before collapsing. At that point, several passengers intervened and succeeded in restraining the co-pilot. A reserve Flydubai crew travelling on board subsequently took control of the aircraft and landed it safely at Tabuk Airport in Saudi Arabia. Videos recorded after the attack, again according to Reuters, show both pilots injured and covered in blood.
Terrorism or something else?
The alleged attacker, who survived and was arrested by the Saudi authorities, is the key element from which any analysis of the incident must begin, in order to determine whether this was terrorism or another form of individually motivated violence. The motive has not been made public by the Saudi authorities, and Flydubai has not confirmed the existence of a political, religious or ideological motivation.
Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz, however, described the incident as a jihadist terrorist attack, a hypothesis also supported by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Such an interpretation is certainly possible, although no evidence currently available through open sources is sufficient to confirm it. It remains under examination by the Israeli authorities.
The central question is therefore not whether the co-pilot attempted to cause the aircraft to crash, but why he might have wanted to do so.
The fact that the flight was bound for Tel Aviv, that more than 170 Israeli citizens were reportedly on board, and that the attacker was a citizen of Oman, a country that does not maintain diplomatic relations with Israel, are elements of relevance to the analysis. They are even more significant from an investigative perspective. They may suggest an ideological motivation of a jihadist or anti-Zionist nature, but they are not concrete evidence capable of proving it. At the same time, nothing can yet be excluded.
We currently have no information indicating whether the attacker was in any way connected to terrorist organisations, whether he had previously expressed clearly defined ideological positions, or whether he was undergoing a process of radicalisation. Nothing at all. But not because nothing has been found; rather, because it is simply too early. No message, no claim of responsibility. It should also be recalled that the Islamic State claims only successful terrorist operations, and this operation was not successful.
To attribute the attack prematurely to the Islamic State, al-Qa’ida or to a more generic form of jihadism would therefore mean confusing a hypothesis with a fact. This does not exclude such a possibility, but neither does it confirm it.
What is certain is that, regardless of any hypothesis concerning ideological adherence, what we have witnessed is a clear example of an insider threat, in which the security system is bypassed from within. If the intentional nature of the action were confirmed, the most important strategic element would not be the knife itself, but the identity of the person holding it, because the attacker was not a passenger who had unlawfully passed through airport security controls. He was the co-pilot. And it is precisely this fact that exposes the most significant vulnerability.
Since 11 September 2001, much of the Western aviation-security architecture has been built around the principle of separation between passengers and the cockpit, through reinforced doors, access procedures, passenger checks, restrictions on the carriage of objects and liquids, and increasingly sophisticated screening systems. The purpose has always been to prevent an attacker from reaching the aircraft’s operational and decision-making centre.
In the Flydubai case, the dynamic is reversed. The hostile individual was already inside the cockpit. He had access to the controls, knew how the aircraft functioned, understood the procedures and operational vulnerabilities, and had no need to cross a barrier, because that barrier was already behind him and, in effect, protected him from external attempts to stop his action. The very physical barrier designed to protect the aircraft from an external aggressor may therefore have contributed, at least initially, to separating the attacker from those who could have prevented him from acting.
This is precisely the paradox of the insider threat: the greater the level of trust attributed to a given function, the greater the potential damage when that trust is betrayed. The system is therefore not penetrated from the outside; it is turned against itself.
And what if it really was terrorism?
In that case, the incident would be entirely consistent with the now well-established evolution of the threat posed by contemporary terrorism, in which the tactical and operational complexity required to generate potentially strategic consequences has progressively decreased. This has been evident for many years and is now a consolidated analytical assumption, highlighted over time through the annual report on radicalism and counter-terrorism produced by the #ReaCT Observatory.
An attack on a commercial aircraft does not necessarily require sophisticated explosives, structured cells, infiltrated operational teams or months of preparation when a single individual may be sufficient. In this particular case, one individual placed in the right position, at the right time, with privileged access to a complex system.
Here we encounter the concept of maximising effects while minimising resources: a dynamic that can be observed in many manifestations of contemporary terrorism and that I have associated with the progressive individualisation of violence. The organisation tends to lose operational centrality while the individual increasingly gains the capacity to transform ordinary tools, professional access or simple opportunities into offensive capabilities.
This does not mean that organised terrorism has disappeared. It means, rather, that the relationship between organisation, ideology and operational actor has become more flexible and, in most cases, less tangible. An organisation may direct an attack, facilitate it, inspire it, or have no direct relationship with the perpetrator at all, limiting itself to providing a sense of belonging, an ideological imaginary within which the individual independently legitimises his own actions, identifies with the organisation or the ideology, and is in turn recognised by the organisation as one of its “soldiers”, a mujaheddin: in other words, a testimonial. It is precisely this relationship that the investigation into the co-pilot will have to clarify.
The target: Israel?
Why that particular flight?
If it were demonstrated that the co-pilot deliberately selected flight FZ1073 because it was bound for Tel Aviv and because most of its passengers were Israeli citizens, the ideological component would acquire an entirely different significance. The target would no longer simply be a civilian aircraft, but an Israeli target by virtue of its destination and the composition of its passengers. The fact that the airline itself was Emirati would become only a secondary element.
In such a scenario, the aircraft would assume a dual function: both a material and a symbolic target.
The symbolic dimension is essential to understanding and defining terrorism. A terrorist does not strike only what he intends to destroy; he strikes what he intends to represent.
Civil aviation, twenty-five years after 11 September, still retains extraordinary symbolic value because an aircraft is an enclosed space, beyond the control of those travelling inside it, technologically complex and potentially vulnerable to the actions of very few individuals. Above all, it is a means through which a limited number of potential victims can be transformed into a global audience of millions of spectators.
From this perspective, the attack becomes an instrument of communication and psychological conditioning, with obvious consequences in terms of threat perception, fear and even overreaction.
The strategic effect of a failed attack: functional blockade
When terrorism fails, it still achieves a result. Whatever that result may be, it contributes to the production of fear.
The fact that the aircraft did not crash does not mean that the possible attack, should its terrorist nature be confirmed, was entirely ineffective. The success or failure of a terrorist act cannot be measured solely by the number of casualties. It is necessary to observe the effects it produces, whose outcome is the “functional blockade”, a concept I have sought to introduce into the analysis of terrorism and which increasingly appears to be a determining factor, perhaps even the real result that terrorism seeks and achieves.
Functional blockade is the effect through which a terrorist action, regardless of its tactical success, causes a reduction, interruption or alteration of the normal functions of the system under attack, imposing costs, behavioural changes, new security measures and a reallocation of resources.
The incident triggered emergency procedures, the deployment of Israeli military aircraft, the involvement of the Saudi authorities, intervention by Israeli security services, a potentially complex diplomatic and operational crisis and, above all, an immediate review of security procedures. Israel has already announced its intention to strengthen checks on pilots operating flights bound for the country.
And this is precisely functional blockade: the ability of an act of violence to impose changes in behaviour, protocols and resource allocation even without fully achieving its tactical objective.
Terrorism works when it forces the targeted system to react.
Every new control has a cost, just as every additional procedure requires personnel, time and infrastructure. Likewise, every perception of vulnerability changes the behaviour of the public. In this sense, even an attack that materially fails may still produce a functional outcome.
There is, however, an opposite effect as well: a disproportionate response may indirectly amplify the impact of the attack. One of the major challenges of contemporary security is precisely to strengthen preventive capacity without transforming every exposed vulnerability into a permanent multiplier of fear.
This brings us to the growing importance of cognitive vulnerability, which operates on the informational and communicative level.
In the first hours after the incident, widely different interpretations circulated: a fight between two pilots, one Russian and one Ukrainian; an attempted hijacking; a suicide attack; jihadist terrorism.
This is predictable when information travels faster than investigation. And when an event contains highly symbolic elements — an aircraft, Israel, a Muslim attacker, the possibility of an attempted crash — the process through which public opinion constructs an explanation inevitably tends to precede the process through which investigators gather evidence.
This cognitive vulnerability shifts the centre of gravity from control of the aircraft to control of the narrative.
From this perspective, immediately accepting the perpetrator’s identity as that of a “jihadist terrorist” before his motivations are known may be understandable in terms of political expediency — or political opportunism — or emotional reaction, but analytically it risks anticipating the conclusions. Yet caution must also apply in the opposite direction: ruling out terrorism a priori would be equally methodologically incorrect, and could represent a serious mistake in terms of preventing and countering the terrorist threat.
The answer perhaps lies in the ability to keep three dimensions separate: what we know, what we consider probable and what still needs to be demonstrated.
What we know is that a co-pilot violently attacked the captain of a flight bound for Tel Aviv; that the aircraft experienced an extremely rapid loss of altitude; that the transponder code indicating unlawful interference was transmitted; that the attacker was restrained; that a reserve crew regained control of the aircraft; and that the man is now in Saudi custody.
What the Israeli authorities claim is that the man deliberately attempted to crash the aircraft and that the incident may have been an act of jihadist terrorism.
We await confirmation.
The question, therefore, is not simply how a knife could have been brought into a cockpit. It is something more complex: how can the long-term reliability of an individual entrusted with the control of a system capable, if deliberately used in a hostile manner, of being transformed into a weapon be guaranteed?
Perhaps it is time to begin seriously considering that question.
The Department of Defense’s 2025 reissue of
DoD Instruction 3000.07 marks a decisive step in making Irregular Warfare
(IW) a standing, resourced, and assessed function of the U.S. military—on
par with conventional warfighting. By converting the 2014 directive into an instruction,
the document moves beyond broad guidance to assign concrete responsibilities,
establish governance, and formalize the Irregular Warfare Center (IWC)
as a hub for knowledge, education, and partner engagement. Below is a
practitioner-focused read on what it is, how it works, and why it matters.
What DoDI 3000.07 does
At its core, the instruction:
Defines IW as the realm where state and non-state actors pursue coercion and assurance primarily through indirect, often non-attributable, and asymmetric activities—complementing rather than replacing conventional operations.
Enumerates the IW portfolio, spanning unconventional warfare; foreign internal defense; counterterrorism and counterinsurgency; stabilization; DoD support to counter-threat finance and counter-transnational organized crime; military information support operations; civil affairs; and portions of security cooperation, security force assistance, civil-military operations, and operations in the information environment.
Positions IW in strategic competition, emphasizing whole-of-government synchronization and allied/partner integration to erode adversary legitimacy and influence while bolstering that of partners.
Creates durable governance for planning, resourcing, education, readiness assessment, and lesson sharing—anchored by a reinvigorated Irregular Warfare Center.
The policy logic: IW as competitive
statecraft
The instruction treats IW as a principal way to compete short of large-scale combat. Rather than measuring success only by enemy attrition, it prioritizes shifts in legitimacy, influence, access, and partner capacity—the intangible but decisive features of contested security environments. Importantly, it embeds IW within law and policy (e.g., Law of War; civilian-harm mitigation), and acknowledges the interagency realities that sometimes place certain activities under authorities outside Title 10.
Governance and roles: who does what
USD(P) (Under Secretary of Defense for Policy) is the policy integrator and convenor—aligning IW with national strategy, leading interagency and international policy engagement, and ensuring that operations, activities, and investments (OAIs) map to prioritized problems.
ASD(SO/LIC) provides day-to-day policy development and supervision across the special operations and irregular warfare enterprise, including oversight of the IWC and progress reporting.
Irregular Warfare Center (IWC) serves as the coordinating brain and central repository for IW knowledge: doctrine and concepts, education and curricula, research and lessons learned—supporting DoD components, other U.S. agencies, and foreign partners.
DSCA acts as Executive Agent for the IWC—providing staffing, budgeting, agreements, and contracting muscle—and links IW to the broader security cooperation ecosystem.
CJCS and Joint Staff assess joint IW readiness and gaps, guide global integration, and translate findings into programming and force-development advice.
Combatant Commands identify theater-specific IW requirements, training, and language/region needs; craft partner-building approaches that enable allied-led missions with a light U.S. footprint; and drive DOTMLPF-P change requests from the field.
Military Departments institutionalize IW as a core competency, run training and readiness programs, and maintain sufficient capabilities across formations—conventional and SOF.
USSOCOM ensures SOF-peculiar IW capabilities (including clandestine and non-attributable options) integrate with the joint force.
USCYBERCOM and USSPACECOM ensure the IW enterprise can leverage cyber and space access, effects, and protection; STRATCOM and USTRANSCOM contribute specialized capabilities (non-nuclear strategic effects, non-standard lift), while DIA/Defense Intelligence refine analytic tools, tradecraft, and training tailored to IW problems.
Education, readiness, and knowledge
management
A major thrust of the instruction is human
capital. Services and joint schools must embed IW into PME and
pre-deployment training, with attention to language, regional expertise, and
culture; interagency fluency; and partner-building competencies. The IWC
curates and disseminates curricula and lessons, reducing duplication and
speeding adaptation. Annual assessments connect IW outcomes and capability gaps
to the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution cycle so that IW
is not an afterthought when resources get tight.
Domains and enablers: cyber, space,
information
DoDI 3000.07 explicitly integrates cyberspace,
space, and operations in the information environment into IW
campaigning. The point is not to militarize every problem, but to ensure the IW
planner can gain access, protect force and partners, shape audiences, expose
malign activity, and contest adversary narratives with joint, allied, and
interagency tools. This is as much about defending partner legitimacy as
about degrading adversary networks.
What’s new versus 2014—and why it
matters
Three changes are most consequential:
From directive to instruction. This shifts IW from guidance to tasking: named leads, timelines, assessments, and integration into resource decisions.
Institutionalizing the IWC. The Center becomes the connective tissue of a previously fragmented enterprise—linking policy, research, education, and partner engagement.
Deeper integration of cyber/space and information. The instruction reflects the reality that modern IW depends on persistent presence and access—physical, virtual, and cognitive.
Together, these changes are designed to make IW persistent, predictable, and measurable, rather than episodic and personality-driven.
For planners and operators: Expect greater emphasis on campaigning—sequencing diverse OAIs to create strategic effects over time, not one-off events. Measures of effectiveness will look at influence, legitimacy, and partner capacity, not just kinetic outputs.
For Services and force developers: IW skills and formations will be planned and programmed rather than ad hoc. Training pipelines must blend regional expertise, influence operations, and partner enablement with the ability to integrate SOF and conventional forces.
For the interagency: The instruction invites tighter alignment with diplomacy, development, law enforcement, and financial authorities. DoD is signaling it will show up as a team player in complex competitions where military instruments are necessary but not sufficient.
For allies and partners: Expect renewed investment in Security Force Assistance and Institutional Capacity Building that aim for partner-led, sustainable outcomes—especially where U.S. strategic aims are best served by enabling others.
For analysts and educators: The IWC’s knowledge function should make it easier to access quality curricula, case studies, and lessons learned, and to bridge research and practice.
Risks and open questions
Measuring the intangible. Legitimacy and influence are hard to quantify. The success of the instruction hinges on building credible, decision-useful assessment frameworks that avoid perverse incentives.
Authority seams. Activities at the edge of Title 10/Title 50 or between DoD and civilian agencies can create friction. Clear processes and shared campaign plans will be vital.
Resource competition. In tight budgets, IW must prove its value without cannibalizing essential conventional readiness. The instruction’s tie-in to the programming cycle is promising—but only if leaders enforce it.
Partner politics. Building the capacity of others is inherently political and sometimes controversial. The instruction presumes strong governance, oversight, and human-rights due diligence to protect U.S. interests and values.
Bottom line
DoDI 3000.07 is not about glamorizing the “shadow” side of conflict. It is about normalizing the United States’ ability to campaign with allies and partners in contested spaces where legitimacy, influence, and access decide outcomes long before major combat. By hard-wiring governance, education, assessments, and domain integration—and by elevating the Irregular Warfare Center—the instruction gives practitioners a realistic blueprint to compete and, when necessary, fight irregularly with rigor and accountability.
West Africa: a hybrid conflict zone
by Andrea Molle
Over the past decade, West Africa has reemerged as one of the critical frontiers in the geography of global instability. Once viewed primarily through the lens of underdevelopment and humanitarian crises, it is now a pivotal arena where transnational non-state actors intersect with great-power ambitions. The region’s chronic institutional fragility, pervasive corruption, and unresolved ethnic and social fractures have created the perfect conditions for external manipulation. Two actors epitomize this dynamic transformation: Hezbollah and the Wagner Group (now reorganized as the Africa Corps under the Russian Ministry of Defense). Despite their ideological and operational differences, both embody a shared strategic logic—the outsourcing of influence and the use of hybrid, deniable instruments of power projection.
Hezbollah’s “Silent Colonization”
Unlike the Middle East, West Africa is not a direct battlefield for Hezbollah’s military arm. Instead, it functions as a logistical and financial ecosystemsustaining the organization’s global activities. Leveraging the extensive Lebanese diaspora—particularly in countries such as Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, and Senegal—Hezbollah has built a network of front companies and illicit trade routes that generate substantial revenues. Through money laundering, diamond smuggling, art trafficking, and coerced donations, it channels funds back to Lebanon, compensating for declining Iranian patronage and the economic collapse at home.
Hezbollah’s African operations reveal a new
form of strategic adaptation. The group has refined its capacity to
operate under the radar by using honorary consulates, dual citizenships, and
diplomatic covers, which provide legitimacy and insulation from scrutiny.
This approach corrodes local economies by fusing political patronage with
criminal enterprise, effectively blurring the boundary between state and
non-state activity. While Hezbollah does not seek territorial control, it
effectively colonizes African financial systems, embedding itself within the
informal economy. The consequences are corrosive: institutions weakened,
political elites compromised, and sovereignty diluted.
Wagner and the Militarization of
Influence
If Hezbollah’s penetration is stealthy and
economic, the Wagner Group’s is overtly coercive and militarized.
Operating from Sudan to Mali, the Russian private military contractor
represents the Kremlin’s mechanism of “plausible deniability”—a way to
reassert geopolitical influence without formal state accountability. Through
the promise of counterterrorism assistance, regime protection, and
disinformation campaigns, Wagner has embedded itself in the security
architecture of fragile African states. Its contracts often include mining
concessions and strategic resource rights, creating a self-financing cycle
of exploitation.
Wagner’s activities in Mali, for instance, demonstrate how counterterrorism rhetoric masks predatory behavior. The infamous Moura massacre in 2022—where hundreds of civilians were executed—illustrates the brutality accompanying this partnership. Far from stabilizing the Sahel, Russian involvement has deepened conflicts, alienated local communities, and provided jihadist movements with powerful narratives of foreign occupation and repression. The group’s rebranding as Africa Corps following Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death indicates Moscow’s determination to institutionalize this model of semi-official imperialism, using mercenaries as instruments of geopolitical leverage.
Screenshot of an article investigating Wagner’s crimes, published by Jeune Afrique on 24th June 2025
A Hybrid Battleground
Together, Hezbollah and Wagner transform
West Africa into a hybrid conflict zone—a space where terrorism,
organized crime, and great-power competition converge. Hezbollah’s economic
infiltration and Wagner’s militarized presence feed off the same
vulnerabilities: weak governance, the absence of rule of law, and the
marginalization of local populations. The result is a multidimensional
destabilization process that undermines both national and regional security
architectures.
The implications extend far beyond Africa. Hezbollah’s
money-laundering networks connect to banks and shell companies in Europe,
the Gulf, and Latin America, while Russia’s African expansion
provides Moscow with strategic leverage over global supply chains of gold,
uranium, and rare minerals. These dynamics expose Europe’s southern flank
to a new form of geopolitical pressure—one that operates below the threshold of
conventional war but erodes resilience from within.
The Need for a Paradigm Shift
Traditional Western responses—whether development
aid or military cooperation—have proven insufficient. Initiatives
like Italy’s Mattei Plan, while well-intentioned, risk remaining
superficial if not anchored in structural reforms that address governance,
transparency, and institutional capacity. The challenge posed by Hezbollah and
Wagner is not only one of security but also of state capture and financial
sovereignty.
A credible European strategy must therefore
integrate security, governance, and finance. This means empowering
African judicial systems, reinforcing anti–money laundering mechanisms,
enhancing intelligence-sharing, and regulating the diplomatic loopholes
exploited by illicit actors. Only by addressing the root causes of
vulnerability—economic dependency, political fragility, and lack of
oversight—can external manipulation be contained.
Italy’s Strategic Opportunity
For Italy, this crisis presents both
a threat and an opportunity. Given its geographical proximity, colonial legacy,
and diplomatic credibility, Rome is well placed to shape a new European
approach based on genuine partnership rather than paternalism. Italian
defense cooperation, already active through the Missione Bilaterale di
Supporto in Niger and other initiatives, can be expanded to include training,
infrastructure, and judicial support. More importantly, Italy can champion
the idea that African security is inseparable from European security—an
interdependence that must guide the EU’s external policy for the coming
decades.
Ultimately, West Africa is a microcosm
of the emerging global order. The interplay of armed networks, criminal
economies, and foreign interventions demonstrates how instability has become
both a weapon and a market. Hezbollah and Wagner reveal the porous boundaries
between terrorism, organized crime, and geopolitical ambition. To remain
relevant and resilient, Europe must recognize this new reality—not merely
reacting to crises but shaping the norms and partnerships that can prevent
them. Africa’s instability is not a distant problem; it is the mirror of
Europe’s own strategic complacency.
Italy: the 2025-2027 Defence White Paper
Strategic Priorities and Challenges for Italy’s Security
by Andrea Molle
The 2025–2027 Multi-Year Defense Policy
Document (DPP) is set against a backdrop of profound geopolitical and
strategic transition for both Italy and Europe. Following NATO’s consolidation
in Eastern Europe and the growing instability across Africa and the broader
Mediterranean, Italy’s Defense Ministry seeks to strengthen the country’s
overall deterrence, interoperability, and resilience. The 2025 DPP does not
mark a break from previous years but rather consolidates an already established
trajectory—one of gradual modernization, technological sophistication, and
increasing integration with the national defense industry.
The document emphasizes the need to
maintain a credible and autonomous posture within the European framework while
reaffirming the centrality of the Atlantic alliance. Its dual objective is to
enhance Italy’s participation in EU defense programs (such as the EDF and
PESCO) while ensuring alignment with NATO’s operational requirements. This dual
membership entails a rise in capital expenditure—not through new funding, but
through the stabilization of already authorized resources—directed toward
high-tech platforms, cyber and space capabilities, and integrated
command-and-control infrastructures.
From an economic standpoint, the DPP
confirms a defense budget exceeding €31 billion in 2025, with a
distribution that prioritizes investment over current expenditures. Yet behind
this apparent consolidation lies a tension between financial sustainability and
strategic ambition. Military spending growth remains bound by overall fiscal constraints,
and much of the programming depends on maintaining Parliament-approved funding.
The goal of reaching NATO’s 2 percent of GDP benchmark is invoked as a
political aspiration, but still appears more a trajectory than an imminent
target.
A distinctive feature of the document is
its emphasis on digital transformation. The Armed Forces are portrayed
as actors in an “operational digitalization” process that includes advanced
C4ISR systems, cyber-defense capabilities, and the integration of space and
maritime domains. In this respect, the DPP continues to advance the concept of multi-domain
integration, both technological and doctrinal: the future of Italian
defense lies in the ability to operate simultaneously across land, sea, air,
cyber, cognitive, and space domains with coherent doctrine and coordination.
Politically, the 2025 DPP aligns closely
with the government’s strategic priorities in the Mediterranean and Africa.
Italy aims to reinforce its military and diplomatic presence in the “enlarged
Mediterranean” — from Gibraltar to the Red Sea — as a vital area for energy
security, trade routes, and regional stability. Missions in Lebanon, Iraq, the
Sahel, and the Horn of Africa are confirmed, though with gradual rebalancing
depending on the availability of forces and resources.
Still, the document is not without
ambiguities. Several analyses note that the 2025 DPP is less transparent
than its predecessors, offering fewer details on specific budget allocations
and providing less granularity regarding individual weapons programs. While
some interpret this as an effort to simplify public communication, others see
it as a step backward in the democratic accountability of military spending.
The Technical Annex, an integral
part of the DPP, provides a detailed mapping of ongoing and future programs. It
includes development plans for the Army (new combat vehicles and anti-drone
capabilities), the Navy (modernization of FREMM frigates, U212NFS submarines,
new patrol vessels, and amphibious units), and the Air Force (upgrades to the
F-35 fleet, MALE drones, and air-defense assets). It also lists space programs
— particularly in surveillance and satellite positioning — through which Italy
seeks to consolidate a limited but meaningful degree of strategic autonomy.
In terms of guiding philosophy, the 2025
DPP confirms the Italian Defense establishment’s tendency to view itself not
merely as a military instrument but as a national security infrastructure,
capable of operating in civilian domains such as civil protection, public
health, and environmental emergencies. This dual-use approach responds
both to internal efficiency goals and to the political need to build social
consensus around defense spending by presenting it as an investment in
collective security.
Overall, the 2025–2027 DPP is a document of
continuity and consolidation rather than rupture—ambitious in intent,
cautious in allocation, and aimed at keeping Italy within Europe’s leading
group in terms of defense technology and industrial capacity. Yet questions of
transparency and democratic oversight remain open, as spending reaches
structurally high levels increasingly justified by a narrative of permanent
emergency in international affairs.
The DPP 2025–2027 thus confirms the
tendency of Italian defense policy to be both reactive and conservative,
rather than fully strategic. It is reactive insofar as it adapts to new
threats—hybrid warfare, cyberattacks, and competition in space and maritime
domains—but conservative in its decision-making structures and
resource-allocation mechanisms. Planning remains largely incremental,
adjusting existing multi-year programs rather than redefining strategic
priorities. In this sense, the DPP 2025 is more a management document
than a visionary one.
Strategically, Italian defense continues to
operate on two parallel tracks: full integration within NATO’s
deterrence posture against Russia on the one hand, and preservation of a
distinct Mediterranean identity on the other, enabling Italy to remain a key
player in North Africa and the Middle East. This dual orientation sometimes
produces a dispersive effect: forces and budgets are divided among distant
theaters and heterogeneous missions (projection, stabilization, deterrence, and
civilian support). The result is a globally coherent posture, but not always an
efficient one in terms of focus and concentration of effort.
From an industrial perspective, the
DPP continues the strategy of integrating the military system with the national
production base. The defense complex is portrayed as a technological
ecosystem in which major firms — Leonardo, Fincantieri, MBDA, and Iveco
Defence — act as bridges between operational capability and industrial
innovation. While consistent with the European logic of EDF and PESCO, this
approach carries a growing risk of political dependency on
industrial-chain maintenance needs rather than genuine strategic priorities. In
other words, planning risks being driven more by industrial supply logic
than by clear operational demand.
A second critical issue, implicit
throughout the DPP 2025–2027, is the persistent absence of a “total defense”
or integrated national security paradigm, similar to those found in Nordic
countries. Despite growing awareness of hybrid threats—cyber, infrastructural,
cognitive, and social—the document continues to frame resilience almost
exclusively in military or institutional-technical terms, neglecting the social
and civic dimensions of defense. In other words, Italy still lacks a vision
that treats citizens, businesses, and local communities as active participants
in the national security system. Investments remain heavily concentrated on the
armed instrument and its external projection, with limited effort to build a societal
resilience capable of reducing Italy’s vulnerability to energy,
informational, and logistical crises. The reference point should be the Nordic
“total defense” model—as in Sweden, Finland, or Norway—where defense, civil
protection, strategic communication, and civic education are integrated into a
single framework. Italy remains anchored instead to a vertical conception of
security, entrusted to the state rather than shared with society. The risk is
that of a modern, dual-use defense system, yet one isolated from its
civilian fabric and unable to translate security into a collective civic
culture.
A third area of concern involves
transparency and democratic legitimacy. Compared to previous DPPs, the 2025
edition reduces public detail on expenditures and programs, making
parliamentary and civil oversight more difficult. This may stem from technical
reasons — simplifying communication — but politically it signals a broader
trend: the normalization of high-level defense spending justified by
geopolitical necessity but increasingly insulated from public debate or from a
broader resilience strategy. Thus, defense risks becoming a “protected” sector
of the national budget, where consensus is built more through the rhetoric of
security than through measurable results.
At the European level, the 2025 DPP
reflects an effort to align with the emerging “ReArm Europe” paradigm
but remains hesitant to promote genuine industrial or operational integration.
Italy positions itself as a reliable contributor rather than a conceptual
leader, following the Franco-German trajectory while adapting it to its
Mediterranean focus and strengths in naval and aerospace industries.
In conclusion, the DPP expresses a pragmatic
balance — a compromise between fiscal constraints, interoperability
requirements, and aspirations for strategic autonomy. Yet it still lacks a
coherent vision of Italy’s role in the international security system.
Increased spending, digitalization, and industrial cooperation are means, not
ends. The 2025 DPP, though technically sound, does not convincingly articulate
the ultimate political purpose—whether deterrence, regional stability, global
projection, or mere institutional continuity.
In this sense, the 2025–2027 DPP is
a necessary but not yet sufficient document: it marks the consolidation
of a modern, technologically advanced, and European-integrated defense policy,
but it leaves open the deeper question—what kind of power does Italy aspire
to be in a world increasingly defined by permanent competition among great
actors?
NATO’s 5% spending target and the implications for Italy
by Andrea Molle in the United States
The adoption of the new NATO spending
objective of 5% of GDP at the Hague Summit on June 24–25 is not merely a
budgetary adjustment—it marks a strategic shift that redefines the very concept
of defense. The 3.5% + 1.5% formula—three and a half points for classic “hard
defense” and one and a half for dual-use investments supporting national
resilience—encapsulates the central lesson of the war in Ukraine: without
reinforced transportation routes, secure energy reserves, and protected
cyberspace, tanks won’t reach the front and drones won’t take off.
For Italy, the challenge is twofold. On one
hand, the Government has pledged to meet the new target while remaining on a
path of fiscal consolidation; on the other, it starts from a “pure” defense
spending level of roughly 1.57%, well below the 3.5% required for the
traditional military component. In concrete terms, this means securing an
additional €32 to €42 billion annually over ten years for weapons, training,
and operational readiness—on top of investments in infrastructure and cyber
resilience. NATO itself has made clear that the 5% goal is to be reached
gradually: 3.5% for military defense and 1.5% for civil security, both spread
over a decade. The effective increase is therefore modest, amounting to no more
than 0.3% of GDP annually. It is a demanding but not unmanageable commitment.
The Ministry of Defense will no longer be
able to spread increases evenly across the three branches. For the Army—long
relegated to third place behind the Navy and Air Force—this is a
once-in-a-generation opportunity: to close gaps in armored vehicles, long-range
artillery, precision munitions, and counter-UAS capabilities; to modernize
training ranges and maintenance infrastructure; to acquire strategic sensor
systems currently monopolized by the United States. Without this shift, Italy’s
commitments on NATO’s eastern flank will remain purely nominal.
The 1.5% portion opens the door to
industrial policy. Ports like Gioia Tauro, TEN-T rail corridors, and Italy’s
5G/quantum backbone can be co-financed by the EU under the “Military Mobility”
framework, channeling investments that benefit both defense and national
logistics competitiveness. Here the Army can become a bridge between Civil
Protection and critical infrastructure, redefining its role as a territorial
force within the broader design of total defense.
The 2035 horizon offers a gradual
implementation that softens the budgetary impact, but should not create
illusions: procurement cycles are measured in decades. Contracts for the
Ariete, Dardo, PzH 2000, and SAMP/T NG must be signed now to avoid another decade
of half-measures. This is also a political test: if Rome fails to turn the 5%
target into an opportunity for industrial modernization and credible
deterrence, it risks becoming just another symbolic benchmark—like the old
2%—never truly met.
What’s at stake is not just appeasing
Washington or avoiding future tariff threats; it is proving to allies that an
Italy with five million virtual reservists, but no ammunition and no roads
navigable by a Leopard tank, is a weak link. If the country can instead combine
European ambition, fiscal realism, and renewed investment in its Army, the 5%
goal could become a catalyst for a security architecture finally integrated
across barracks, factories, and bridges.
This new paradigm also calls for a
rethinking of the relationship between the Armed Forces and civil society,
after decades of cultural and institutional separation. Investment in national
resilience, in the protection of critical infrastructure, and in countering
hybrid threats gives the military a renewed role—visible, concrete, and
embedded in the nation’s fabric. No longer just professionals deployed in
missions overseas, they can become central actors in collective security,
guardians of the homeland, and partners to citizens. It is a historic
opportunity to rebuild that bond—one based not on rhetoric, but on strategic
utility and democratic transparency.
Risk Profile of Political Violence Offenders. United States vs. the European Union (EU‑27) in 2024 – 2025 (first quarter)
by Andrea Molle in the United States
Recent assessments by security agencies and research institutions reveal a growing convergence in the demographic and geographic profiles of individuals involved in political violence across Western democracies. While the specific ideologies vary—racial and ethnic grievance, as well as anti-government conspiracy theories, are more prevalent in the United States, whereas jihadist and separatist movements continue to dominate in Europe—the underlying offender profile is strikingly similar on both sides of the Atlantic. Typically, the individual is a young man, often in his late teens or twenties, who becomes radicalized online and is drawn to act in areas where media exposure is high or where local grievances create fertile ground for mobilization.
The table that follows draws from the most
up-to-date statistics provided by the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security,
Europol’s 2025 TE‑SAT report, the START-PIRUS dataset, and spatial analyses
based on ACLED event tracking. Together, these sources offer a detailed
snapshot of the current threat landscape.
Variable
United States
European Union
Gender
≈ 85 % male
(PIRUS, 1970–2021)
≈ 91 % male
(TE‑SAT 2025 juveniles)
Age
≈ 68 % aged 18‑34 (PIRUS)
> 60 % under 35; 29 % minors (TE‑SAT 2025)
Race / Ethnicity
REMVE white
supremacist actors = 52 % of FBI DVE disruptions FY 2024
Ethno‑nationalist
& separatist actors = 38 % of 2024 attacks
Religion
< 7 % jihadist‑inspired in U.S. plots (HTA 2025); rise in
Christian‑identity fringe
Jihadist ideology behind 24 of 58 attacks; political extremism
scene “post‑religious” (TE‑SAT)
Political affiliation
Anti‑gov/sovereign
+ partisan actors = 49 % of incidents since 2016 (CSIS)
72 % of incidents in metros > 250 k; secondary spike in
low‑density militia counties (arXiv 2025)
Major capitals plus separatist peripheries (Corsica, Basque
Country)
Table 1: Comparative Risk Markers
A clear gender disparity characterizes
individuals involved in acts of political violence across both the United
States and the European Union. In the U.S., data from the START-PIRUS dataset covering
1990 to 2021 shows that approximately 85% of offenders are male. The trend is
even more pronounced in Europe, where Europol’s 2025 TE-SAT report indicates
that 91% of juvenile terrorism suspects arrested in 2024 were male. This
overwhelming male dominance remains one of the most consistent features across
all ideological backgrounds.
Age is another strong indicator. In both
regions, the late teens to early thirties represent the most common age range
for radicalization and mobilization. In the U.S., nearly 70% of offenders fall
between 18 and 34 years old. Similarly, Europol reports that 29% of all
terrorism-related arrests in the EU in 2024 involved minors or very young
adults between the ages of 12 and 20. These figures highlight the growing
vulnerability of younger populations, especially in digital and social media
environments.
Racial and ethnic identity also play a
major role in shaping offender profiles. In the United States, the FBI
classified 52% of domestic violent extremist (DVE) disruptions in fiscal year
2024 as racially or ethnically motivated, with the majority linked to white
supremacist ideologies. In the EU, the picture is more mixed: 41% of completed
attacks in 2024 were attributed to jihadist actors, while 38% were carried out
by ethno-nationalist or separatist groups, particularly in regions with ongoing
autonomy conflicts.
Religious ideology, though no longer
dominant in the U.S., remains a key driver of lethal attacks in Europe.
Jihadist-inspired plots now account for fewer than 7% of DVE cases in the U.S.,
reflecting a broader shift toward secular or hybrid motivations. In contrast,
such plots were responsible for 41% of all fatal terrorist incidents in the EU
in 2024, making religion a more consequential factor on the European front.
Finally, political affiliation has emerged as a defining element of recent violent extremism. In the U.S., data from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) shows that 49% of incidents since 2016 involved anti-government, sovereign citizen, or highly polarized partisan actors. Meanwhile, in Europe, the most rapidly growing segment of terrorism-related arrests comes from accelerationist and neo-Nazi microcells—small, decentralized groups often operating transnationally and using encrypted communication platforms to coordinate attacks.
Typically, the individual is a young man, often in his late teens or twenties, who becomes radicalized online and is drawn to act in areas where media exposure is high or where local grievances create fertile ground for mobilization.
In the United States, geographic clusters
of political violence are not evenly distributed. Spatial analysis based on
ACLED event data reveals that California, Texas, Florida, and Georgia lead the
country in the total number of recorded incidents. However, when adjusted for
population size, the Pacific Northwest—particularly Oregon and Washington—ranks
highest in per capita terms. Beyond major metropolitan areas, a a secondary
cluster of concern emerges in rural counties with active militia networks, including
parts of northern Idaho and eastern Oregon. These regions, though less densely
populated, host communities with strong anti-government sentiment and
logistical infrastructure capable of supporting extremist activity.
Across the Atlantic, the European Union shows a similarly uneven pattern. Italy recorded the highest number of terrorist attacks in 2024 with 20 incidents, followed by France with 14. Spain and France also topped the charts in terms of total arrests related to political violence. Meanwhile, low-intensity but persistent acts of separatist violence continue in places like Corsica and the Basque Country, where historical grievances and regional identity continue to fuel localized conflict. These areas remain hotspots for ethno-nationalist activity, even as broader attention shifts to transnational threats.
Religious ideology, though no longer dominant in the U.S., remains a key driver of lethal attacks in Europe
A recent statistical overview based on Europol and START InSight’s data, summarized by Claudio Bertolotti in #ReaCT2024 (annual Report on Terrorism and Radicalisation in Europe) confirms the persistent threat of terrorism within Europe. In 2023, there were 43 attacks executed and 33 more prevented, with over 600 individuals arrested across EU member states. France and Austria topped the arrest figures, reflecting both operational intensity and intelligence prioritization. The data also emphasize the enduring challenge posed by ethno-nationalist and separatist groups—especially in France and Spain—alongside residual jihadist threats. Bertolotti’s analysis reinforces the view that radicalization is increasingly driven by hybrid factors, blending ideology with personal and psychological vulnerabilities, particularly among disaffected youth.
While demographic and geographic indicators
help identify who and where, understanding how individuals radicalize provides
deeper insight into the threat trajectory.
Regardless of ideology, most individuals
who engage in political violence tend to follow a similar radicalization
pathway. Typically, this begins with a personal crisis—such as emotional
distress, social isolation, or financial hardship—that becomes layered with
broader conspiracy theories or identity-based grievances. These narratives
offer a distorted framework through which the individual begins to make sense
of their situation, often blaming institutions, governments, or specific
groups. Over time, the search for meaning or belonging leads them into online
communities where these views are reinforced. Both the FBI and Europol have
flagged social media, gaming platforms, and encrypted messaging apps as key
accelerants in this process, especially among younger users. These digital
spaces provide not only ideological content but also peer validation, making
them fertile ground for recruitment and mobilization.
The likelihood of an individual engaging in
political violence varies based on a combination of demographic, geographic,
and behavioral factors. The highest-risk profile is a male between the ages of
18 and 34, residing in a politically polarized urban area or a region with
active separatist movements. This individual is typically deeply engaged in
extremist content online, often through forums, social media, or encrypted
apps.
A moderate level of risk is associated with individuals living in rural U.S. counties where militia activity is present. This group often includes people with a prior history of minor violence or domestic abuse, suggesting that a background of interpersonal aggression may be a precursor to political violence under political ideological influences.
Regardless of ideology, most individuals who engage in political violence tend to follow a similar radicalization pathway. Typically, this begins with a personal crisis—such as emotional distress, social isolation, or financial hardship—that becomes layered with broader conspiracy theories or identity-based grievances.
At the lowest end of the risk spectrum are
older adults—particularly women over the age of 45—who have no significant
online footprint in extremist spaces. This demographic remains substantially
underrepresented across all known datasets of politically motivated violence.
To effectively reduce the threat of political violence, prevention strategies must target the most vulnerable groups and high-risk environments. One of the most urgent priorities is early intervention aimed at young males between the ages of 13 and 24, who represent the fastest-growing segment among those radicalized online. Outreach programs that engage these individuals before they become deeply embedded in extremist networks can significantly reduce long-term risk.
One of the most urgent priorities is early intervention aimed at young males between the ages of 13 and 24, who represent the fastest-growing segment among those radicalized online.
At the same time, federal and local fusion
centers should align their resource deployment with the geographic clusters
identified by ACLED data and academic spatial models. This means focusing
efforts not only in major urban centers but also in specific counties where
historical or ongoing extremist activity has been recorded.
Importantly, prevention programs should
move beyond rigid ideological classifications. Rather than focusing solely on political
extremists, jihadist, or separatist threats, interventions should be built
around common behavioral patterns—such as personal crises, social isolation,
and online radicalization—that transcend ideological boundaries.
Finally, special attention must be given to
election cycles. Both the Department of Homeland Security and the Center for
Strategic and International Studies have documented consistent spikes in
political violence and threat activity during major elections. Surge planning
and targeted security measures around these periods are essential for
mitigating potential flashpoints.
Estimated Risk to the Public and
Strategic Mitigation
While the political violence landscape is
evolving and increasingly visible, the actual risk of physical harm to the
average citizen remains statistically low in both the United States and the
European Union. Based on aggregated datasets from the FBI, DHS, and Europol,
the annual likelihood of a civilian being killed in a politically motivated
attack is less than 1 in 10 million in most Western countries. For context,
this is comparable to the annual odds of being killed by lightning or a
domestic gas leak. However, these figures mask important nuances. The perceived
threat is far greater in certain high-profile environments—such as government
buildings, political rallies, and religious institutions—where attacks are more
likely to occur, particularly during periods of heightened political tension or
following polarizing events.
Over the last five years, the U.S. has averaged 25–35 documented incidents per year of domestic political violence involving physical harm or lethal intent. In the EU, while the number of successful attacks remains lower, the number of arrests and disrupted plots—over 400 in 2024 alone—indicates significant intent and mobilization potential. The real risk, therefore, is less about mass casualty events and more about the cumulative erosion of public trust, democratic stability, and civic norms.
Prevention programs should move beyond rigid ideological classifications. Rather than focusing solely on political extremists, jihadist, or separatist threats, interventions should be built around common behavioral patterns—such as personal crises, social isolation, and online radicalization—that transcend ideological boundaries.
Three intersecting dynamics heighten risk
exposure for specific groups:
Proximity to symbolic or political institutions (e.g., Capitol buildings, synagogues, embassies)
Demographic visibility (e.g.,
targeted religious or racial minorities)
Participation in high-profile civic activity (e.g., activists, elected officials, journalists)
To mitigate these risks, authorities and
communities must adopt a layered, preventive approach. Key strategies include:
Behavioral Threat Assessment:
Training frontline personnel (teachers, social workers, HR managers) to
recognize early signs of radicalization and intervene before mobilization.
Digital Literacy and Counter-Radicalization: Promoting fact-checking skills, online resilience, and reporting
mechanisms in youth populations—especially males aged 13–24.
Community-Based Partnerships:
Investing in trusted local actors, including faith leaders and
neighborhood organizations, to build relationships and disrupt isolation.
Election Security Surge Planning:
Deploying targeted security resources and disinformation countermeasures
during election cycles, which are now consistently associated with spikes
in threats.
Data-Driven Fusion Centers:
Expanding the capacity of regional intelligence hubs to share geospatial
and behavioral insights in real time between law enforcement and civic
institutions.
Ultimately, while political violence is
unlikely to touch the average citizen directly, its ripple effects can
undermine democratic life if left unchecked. The focus, therefore, should not
only be on physical security but also on rebuilding institutional trust and
strengthening social resilience.
Sources
[1] Europol.
*European Union Terrorism Situation & Trend Report (TE‑SAT 2025)*. Luxembourg:
Publications Office of the EU, 2025.
[2] DHS Office
of Intelligence & Analysis. *Homeland Threat Assessment 2025*.
Washington DC, 2024.
[3] University
of Maryland START. *Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United
States (PIRUS) Research Brief*, March 2023 update.
[4] Claudio
Bertolotti, ed., #ReaCT2023 – Report on Radicalization and Terrorism
(Rome: START InSight, 2023),
https://www.startinsight.eu/react2023-report-on-radicalization-and-terrorism/
[5] Riley
McCabe. “The Rising Threat of Anti‑Government Domestic Terrorism: What the Data
Tells Us.” CSIS Brief, October 21 2024.
[6] Ravi Varma
Pakalapati & Gary E. Davis. “Spatial and Temporal Analysis of
Political Violence in the United States.” arXiv preprint 2503.14399,
March 2025.
Why It’s Normal That Iron Dome Doesn’t Intercept Every Iranian Missile
by Andrea Molle in the United States
In recent days, amid rising tensions between Israel and Iran, some superficial observers have rushed to question the effectiveness of Israel’s missile defense systems—particularly Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow. The fact that a few Iranian missiles managed to strike Israeli territory has been interpreted by some as a sign of technical or strategic failure. But the truth is far more complex—and far more rational.
1. Missile defense systems aren’t magical shields Every missile defense system operates based on probabilities and prioritization. No technology in the world can guarantee 100% interception. Even the most advanced systems work under conditions of uncertainty and are constrained by the laws of statistics, physics, logistics, and electronic warfare.
2. Interceptor stockpiles are limited Each battery has a finite number of interceptor missiles. Firing one can cost hundreds of thousands of dollars. When faced with a saturation attack—i.e., dozens or hundreds of missiles launched simultaneously—Israeli commanders must prioritize: defending critical targets while allowing less dangerous missiles to hit uninhabited or low-value areas.
3. Launcher rotation and operational wear Systems like Iron Dome are regularly rotated and repositioned to avoid depletion, targeted strikes, or overconcentration in one area. This means that at any given moment, some zones might not be fully covered—not due to error, but by design.
4. Time and surprise are factors Some Iranian missiles are long-range and launched from afar, but others can be fired by closer proxies like Hezbollah. The diversity of threats, combined with the potential for simultaneous attacks from the north, east, and south, makes complete and instantaneous coverage impossible.
5. Layered defense works—but has limits Israel has built a multi-tiered defense system (Iron Dome for short-range rockets, David’s Sling for medium-range threats, and Arrow for ballistic missiles). However, each system has an optimal engagement angle and range, and a coordinated multi-front assault can stress the system’s efficiency.
In short: this isn’t a failure—it’s exactly
how modern warfare works. The effectiveness of a defense system isn’t measured
by achieving zero successful enemy hits, but by the ratio of damage prevented
versus damage sustained. And so far, the data shows that Israel’s network,
while under intense pressure, is holding up.
Nuclear Weapons and Irregular Warfare: A Real Escalation in the Israel-Iran Conflict
by Andrea Mollein the United States
The conflict between Israel and Iran is no longer a proxy war or a confrontation limited to the cyber domain or covert actions. Starting on June 13, 2025, the Middle East has witnessed one of the most serious clashes in its recent history: over 400 ballistic missiles and more than 1,000 drones were launched by Iran and its direct allies against Israeli civilian and military infrastructure in response to an offensive initiated by Jerusalem targeting Iranian military facilities. Among the targets hit by Iran were the Soroka Hospital in Beersheba, power plants in the Negev, and airport facilities in Galilee. The Israel Defense Forces responded with an unprecedented aerial offensive, striking more than 100 military targets in Iran, including the nuclear sites of Natanz, Fordow, and Arak, IRGC bases, and strategic energy installations. The US joining the conflict made it even more complex.
This new phase of the conflict, now
explicitly bilateral, has erased the line between conventional and irregular
warfare. The presence of proxies such as Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Shiite
militias in Iraq and Syria remains critical, but it is now joined by a direct
and declared confrontation between states, with Israel and Iran attacking each
other’s national territories. Hybrid warfare has evolved into high-intensity
war, while still retaining the irregular elements that Iran has systematically
integrated into its military doctrine.
In this context, Iran’s nuclear issue takes
on an immediate operational relevance. Recent IAEA inspections confirm that
Tehran possesses about 9 tons of enriched uranium, with material enriched to
60% and above—enough, according to estimates, to produce up to nine warheads.
The “breakout time,” i.e., the time needed to produce a usable
nuclear weapon, is now minimal, although experts disagree on whether this
actually amounts to a matter of months or even just weeks, as claimed by
Jerusalem. At the same time, Iran has scaled back cooperation with the Agency,
hindering inspectors’ access to Fordow and other key sites.
The likelihood of Tehran directly using a
nuclear weapon in a conventional scenario remains remote, due to the principle
of strategic survival that guides even the most hostile regimes. However, the
nuclear threat fits perfectly into the logic of irregular warfare. The bomb,
even in its latent form, becomes a political tool: a strategic shield that
allows Iran to intensify the activities of its regional proxies, deterring
Israel and the United States from attacking them directly out of fear of
nuclear escalation.
This scenario, previously theorized in
doctrine as “reverse deterrence,” is now manifesting in reality. Israel is
forced to operate under the explicit threat that too deep a strike into the
heart of the Iranian system could provoke a nuclear response or accelerate a
shift from deterrence to compellence. In turn, Tehran uses its nuclear
ambiguity to provide operational freedom to its non-state actors, fueling
systemic instability.
A second, less discussed but equally
realistic risk concerns the possibility that Iran might transfer radiological
materials to allied groups to build improvised devices—so-called “dirty bombs.”
The symbolic and psychological use of such a weapon, even without large-scale
destructive impact, would trigger political and social paralysis and a global
diplomatic crisis, radically altering the strategic balance in the Middle East
and the Mediterranean.
Finally, an extreme scenario must be
considered: the adoption by Iran of a “last resort” strategy if the
regime perceived an existential threat. In such a case, the leadership might
threaten or use a low-yield device in a symbolic area (such as the Strait of
Hormuz) to force immediate ceasefires—or even on third-party territory like the
United States. Such escalation, though not inevitable, aligns with the
“escalate to de-escalate” logic theorized by other nuclear powers like Russia.
Israel continues to respond with an active
deterrence doctrine, based on its ability to preemptively strike Iran’s
critical infrastructure and command centers. The Israeli Air Force, Mossad, and
cyber units collaborate on integrated operations aimed at delaying, sabotaging,
or neutralizing Iran’s ability to build and deploy a nuclear weapon. Recent
conflicts, from Gaza to Lebanon, have clearly shown that Israel is willing to
go beyond containment and adopt a multilayered offensive posture.
For Italy and European countries, this
evolution demands a reassessment of strategic priorities in the region. The
conflict is no longer a struggle for local hegemony: it directly affects trade
routes, energy supply lines, international naval missions, relations with Gulf
monarchies, and the stability of the entire Euro-Mediterranean security system.
A nuclear-armed Iran, fully embedded in a hybrid warfare strategy, now poses a
transnational and multidomain threat, while a high-intensity conflict or a sudden
and chaotic regime change in Tehran also entail serious risks.
Regarding the evolution of irregular
warfare doctrine, the integration of nuclear capabilities is no longer a
theoretical deviation but an ongoing process observable in the conflict’s
current dynamics. What was a strategic hypothesis just months ago is now an
operational reality guiding the tactical decisions of Israel, the United
States, and, indirectly, Europe. The bomb has not (yet) exploded, but it
already functions as a political and psychological lever, changing the very
nature of war. The Iranian case, in this respect, is the first true test of a
new reality in global hybrid conflict in an era increasingly detached from
international law.
Riots in Los Angeles and the New Front of Irregular Warfare
by Andrea Molle
Irregular warfare (IW) is commonly
understood as a conflict where the struggle is not necessarily over land or
conventional military superiority, but rather over legitimacy, influence, and control
of populations. Traditionally associated with insurgencies, guerrilla tactics,
and non-state actors, irregular warfare has increasingly evolved into a more
complex and hybrid phenomenon, especially in democratic societies. If examined
through this contemporary lens, the tensions unfolding in Los Angeles between
“Angelenos,” local authorities, and the federal government can be seen as a
domestic iteration of irregular warfare.
At the heart of the conflict is a
fundamental contest over legitimacy and sovereignty. Los Angeles, along with
other sanctuary jurisdictions, has actively defied federal immigration
enforcement, refused cooperation with certain Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) directives, and opposed national crime-control initiatives perceived as
unjust or racially biased. These actions reflect not just policy disagreements,
but a deeper ideological struggle over who gets to govern and how. By asserting
local governance norms over federal mandates, Los Angeles effectively
challenges the supremacy of the Federal Government within its own territory—an
act reminiscent of the strategic behavior of irregular actors seeking to
discredit or undermine centralized authority.
Crucially, the methods employed are
asymmetric. Rather than armed resistance, Los Angeles authorities deploy tools
of legal warfare (“lawfare”), bureaucratic resistance, and public messaging.
Strategic lawsuits, municipal non-compliance, prosecutorial discretion, and
ordinances designed to shield undocumented residents are instruments of
resistance, analogous to how irregular forces use terrain, time, and
unconventional means to outmaneuver superior forces. This bureaucratic
insurgency does not seek to overthrow the state, but rather to reshape the
boundaries of federal authority from within.
Yet, the conflict has not remained confined
to the realm of law and rhetoric. In recent days, it has taken a kinetic turn,
as federal agents have clashed physically with protesters, community
organizers, and even municipal law enforcement during raids and enforcement
operations. These confrontations—at times erupting into street riots, mass
detentions, or violent dispersals—mirror the tactical realities of irregular
warfare where control over urban space becomes a proxy for legitimacy. The deployment
of militarized federal units into city neighborhoods without coordination or
consent of local authorities further intensifies the perception of occupation,
leading to spontaneous or organized civilian resistance. This escalation into
physical confrontation blurs the line between law enforcement and political
coercion, a dynamic typical of hybrid conflicts in which the state itself
becomes fragmented and contested.
Equally important is the role of narrative
warfare. Federal authorities characterize Los Angeles as “lawless,” a
city held hostage by crime and chaos, while city officials portray themselves
as defenders of human dignity, civil rights, and moral governance. These
competing narratives are not peripheral—they are central to the conflict, as
both sides vie for public support and political capital. In irregular warfare,
victory often hinges not on battlefield wins but on the ability to sway hearts
and minds. In this respect, the struggle in Los Angeles fits squarely within
the psychological and informational dimensions of IW.
Moreover, this confrontation involves a
complex web of non-traditional actors. Civil society organizations, activist
networks, legal aid groups, and even religious communities have assumed
quasi-political and protective functions, stepping into roles typically
reserved for state institutions. Their coordinated efforts to resist federal
enforcement and provide alternative forms of governance and justice are
hallmarks of irregular conflict, where legitimacy is contested not only through
force but through competing institutions.
In conclusion, while there are no
conventional armies or insurgent militias involved, Los Angeles presents a
modern battlefield of irregular warfare—one where law, identity, narrative, and
at times even physical force are the weapons. As the nature of conflict in
liberal democracies continues to evolve, it becomes increasingly clear that
irregular warfare is no longer confined to distant insurgencies or failed
states. It is now playing out in the contested political geography of cities
like Los Angeles, where the fight for control is not just over policies, but
over the very meaning of sovereignty, legitimacy, and justice in the 21st
century.
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