flydubai

The Enemy in the Cockpit. The Flydubai Case and the Internal Vulnerability

by Claudio Bertolotti.

What happened on 30 September 2026 aboard Flydubai flight FZ1073, which departed from Dubai bound for Tel Aviv, calls for reflection that goes beyond the dramatic nature of the incident and beyond its still uncertain classification as a terrorist act. What emerges from the dynamics of the event, even before any possible ideological motive, is the existence of a structural vulnerability: the internal threat, the insider threat, when the potentially hostile actor is someone to whom the system itself grants access, trust and operational capabilities.

While the fundamental question of motive remains open, the information currently available allows for a more precise reconstruction of what happened. According to the Israeli authorities, the co-pilot of the Boeing 737 MAX 8, an Omani national, allegedly attacked the captain with a knife. The captain was identified by Indian sources as Smit Machchhar, an Indian national and a Flydubai captain since 2022. According to the Israeli reconstruction, the co-pilot then attempted to take control of the aircraft and cause it to crash. The airline confirmed that a violent altercation occurred inside the cockpit, although it has not publicly attributed any motive to the attacker.

Flight data add a particularly significant element. The aircraft, which was flying at more than 30,000 feet, reportedly lost over 14,000 feet of altitude in approximately thirty seconds. Flightradar24 then recorded transponder code 7700, indicating a general emergency, followed by code 7500, internationally used to signal unlawful interference aboard an aircraft. The signal subsequently returned to 7700 during the diversion to Saudi Arabia.

It is within those few seconds that the nature of the incident appears to have changed, shifting from the hypothesis of a mere violent confrontation between two crew members to a situation in which violence inside the cockpit directly endangered the aircraft and everyone on board.

According to testimonies collected by Reuters, the injured captain reportedly managed to open the cockpit door before collapsing. At that point, several passengers intervened and succeeded in restraining the co-pilot. A reserve Flydubai crew travelling on board subsequently took control of the aircraft and landed it safely at Tabuk Airport in Saudi Arabia. Videos recorded after the attack, again according to Reuters, show both pilots injured and covered in blood.

Terrorism or something else?

The alleged attacker, who survived and was arrested by the Saudi authorities, is the key element from which any analysis of the incident must begin, in order to determine whether this was terrorism or another form of individually motivated violence. The motive has not been made public by the Saudi authorities, and Flydubai has not confirmed the existence of a political, religious or ideological motivation.

Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz, however, described the incident as a jihadist terrorist attack, a hypothesis also supported by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Such an interpretation is certainly possible, although no evidence currently available through open sources is sufficient to confirm it. It remains under examination by the Israeli authorities.

The central question is therefore not whether the co-pilot attempted to cause the aircraft to crash, but why he might have wanted to do so.

The fact that the flight was bound for Tel Aviv, that more than 170 Israeli citizens were reportedly on board, and that the attacker was a citizen of Oman, a country that does not maintain diplomatic relations with Israel, are elements of relevance to the analysis. They are even more significant from an investigative perspective. They may suggest an ideological motivation of a jihadist or anti-Zionist nature, but they are not concrete evidence capable of proving it. At the same time, nothing can yet be excluded.

We currently have no information indicating whether the attacker was in any way connected to terrorist organisations, whether he had previously expressed clearly defined ideological positions, or whether he was undergoing a process of radicalisation. Nothing at all. But not because nothing has been found; rather, because it is simply too early. No message, no claim of responsibility. It should also be recalled that the Islamic State claims only successful terrorist operations, and this operation was not successful.

To attribute the attack prematurely to the Islamic State, al-Qa’ida or to a more generic form of jihadism would therefore mean confusing a hypothesis with a fact. This does not exclude such a possibility, but neither does it confirm it.

What is certain is that, regardless of any hypothesis concerning ideological adherence, what we have witnessed is a clear example of an insider threat, in which the security system is bypassed from within. If the intentional nature of the action were confirmed, the most important strategic element would not be the knife itself, but the identity of the person holding it, because the attacker was not a passenger who had unlawfully passed through airport security controls. He was the co-pilot. And it is precisely this fact that exposes the most significant vulnerability.

Since 11 September 2001, much of the Western aviation-security architecture has been built around the principle of separation between passengers and the cockpit, through reinforced doors, access procedures, passenger checks, restrictions on the carriage of objects and liquids, and increasingly sophisticated screening systems. The purpose has always been to prevent an attacker from reaching the aircraft’s operational and decision-making centre.

In the Flydubai case, the dynamic is reversed. The hostile individual was already inside the cockpit. He had access to the controls, knew how the aircraft functioned, understood the procedures and operational vulnerabilities, and had no need to cross a barrier, because that barrier was already behind him and, in effect, protected him from external attempts to stop his action. The very physical barrier designed to protect the aircraft from an external aggressor may therefore have contributed, at least initially, to separating the attacker from those who could have prevented him from acting.

This is precisely the paradox of the insider threat: the greater the level of trust attributed to a given function, the greater the potential damage when that trust is betrayed. The system is therefore not penetrated from the outside; it is turned against itself.

And what if it really was terrorism?

In that case, the incident would be entirely consistent with the now well-established evolution of the threat posed by contemporary terrorism, in which the tactical and operational complexity required to generate potentially strategic consequences has progressively decreased. This has been evident for many years and is now a consolidated analytical assumption, highlighted over time through the annual report on radicalism and counter-terrorism produced by the #ReaCT Observatory.

An attack on a commercial aircraft does not necessarily require sophisticated explosives, structured cells, infiltrated operational teams or months of preparation when a single individual may be sufficient. In this particular case, one individual placed in the right position, at the right time, with privileged access to a complex system.

Here we encounter the concept of maximising effects while minimising resources: a dynamic that can be observed in many manifestations of contemporary terrorism and that I have associated with the progressive individualisation of violence. The organisation tends to lose operational centrality while the individual increasingly gains the capacity to transform ordinary tools, professional access or simple opportunities into offensive capabilities.

This does not mean that organised terrorism has disappeared. It means, rather, that the relationship between organisation, ideology and operational actor has become more flexible and, in most cases, less tangible. An organisation may direct an attack, facilitate it, inspire it, or have no direct relationship with the perpetrator at all, limiting itself to providing a sense of belonging, an ideological imaginary within which the individual independently legitimises his own actions, identifies with the organisation or the ideology, and is in turn recognised by the organisation as one of its “soldiers”, a mujaheddin: in other words, a testimonial. It is precisely this relationship that the investigation into the co-pilot will have to clarify.

The target: Israel?

Why that particular flight?

If it were demonstrated that the co-pilot deliberately selected flight FZ1073 because it was bound for Tel Aviv and because most of its passengers were Israeli citizens, the ideological component would acquire an entirely different significance. The target would no longer simply be a civilian aircraft, but an Israeli target by virtue of its destination and the composition of its passengers. The fact that the airline itself was Emirati would become only a secondary element.

In such a scenario, the aircraft would assume a dual function: both a material and a symbolic target.

The symbolic dimension is essential to understanding and defining terrorism. A terrorist does not strike only what he intends to destroy; he strikes what he intends to represent.

Civil aviation, twenty-five years after 11 September, still retains extraordinary symbolic value because an aircraft is an enclosed space, beyond the control of those travelling inside it, technologically complex and potentially vulnerable to the actions of very few individuals. Above all, it is a means through which a limited number of potential victims can be transformed into a global audience of millions of spectators.

From this perspective, the attack becomes an instrument of communication and psychological conditioning, with obvious consequences in terms of threat perception, fear and even overreaction.

The strategic effect of a failed attack: functional blockade

When terrorism fails, it still achieves a result. Whatever that result may be, it contributes to the production of fear.

The fact that the aircraft did not crash does not mean that the possible attack, should its terrorist nature be confirmed, was entirely ineffective. The success or failure of a terrorist act cannot be measured solely by the number of casualties. It is necessary to observe the effects it produces, whose outcome is the “functional blockade”, a concept I have sought to introduce into the analysis of terrorism and which increasingly appears to be a determining factor, perhaps even the real result that terrorism seeks and achieves.

Functional blockade is the effect through which a terrorist action, regardless of its tactical success, causes a reduction, interruption or alteration of the normal functions of the system under attack, imposing costs, behavioural changes, new security measures and a reallocation of resources.

The incident triggered emergency procedures, the deployment of Israeli military aircraft, the involvement of the Saudi authorities, intervention by Israeli security services, a potentially complex diplomatic and operational crisis and, above all, an immediate review of security procedures. Israel has already announced its intention to strengthen checks on pilots operating flights bound for the country.

And this is precisely functional blockade: the ability of an act of violence to impose changes in behaviour, protocols and resource allocation even without fully achieving its tactical objective.

Terrorism works when it forces the targeted system to react.

Every new control has a cost, just as every additional procedure requires personnel, time and infrastructure. Likewise, every perception of vulnerability changes the behaviour of the public. In this sense, even an attack that materially fails may still produce a functional outcome.

There is, however, an opposite effect as well: a disproportionate response may indirectly amplify the impact of the attack. One of the major challenges of contemporary security is precisely to strengthen preventive capacity without transforming every exposed vulnerability into a permanent multiplier of fear.

This brings us to the growing importance of cognitive vulnerability, which operates on the informational and communicative level.

In the first hours after the incident, widely different interpretations circulated: a fight between two pilots, one Russian and one Ukrainian; an attempted hijacking; a suicide attack; jihadist terrorism.

This is predictable when information travels faster than investigation. And when an event contains highly symbolic elements — an aircraft, Israel, a Muslim attacker, the possibility of an attempted crash — the process through which public opinion constructs an explanation inevitably tends to precede the process through which investigators gather evidence.

This cognitive vulnerability shifts the centre of gravity from control of the aircraft to control of the narrative.

From this perspective, immediately accepting the perpetrator’s identity as that of a “jihadist terrorist” before his motivations are known may be understandable in terms of political expediency — or political opportunism — or emotional reaction, but analytically it risks anticipating the conclusions. Yet caution must also apply in the opposite direction: ruling out terrorism a priori would be equally methodologically incorrect, and could represent a serious mistake in terms of preventing and countering the terrorist threat.

The answer perhaps lies in the ability to keep three dimensions separate: what we know, what we consider probable and what still needs to be demonstrated.

What we know is that a co-pilot violently attacked the captain of a flight bound for Tel Aviv; that the aircraft experienced an extremely rapid loss of altitude; that the transponder code indicating unlawful interference was transmitted; that the attacker was restrained; that a reserve crew regained control of the aircraft; and that the man is now in Saudi custody.

What the Israeli authorities claim is that the man deliberately attempted to crash the aircraft and that the incident may have been an act of jihadist terrorism.

We await confirmation.

The question, therefore, is not simply how a knife could have been brought into a cockpit. It is something more complex: how can the long-term reliability of an individual entrusted with the control of a system capable, if deliberately used in a hostile manner, of being transformed into a weapon be guaranteed?

Perhaps it is time to begin seriously considering that question.

West Africa: a hybrid conflict zone

by Andrea Molle

Over the past decade, West Africa has reemerged as one of the critical frontiers in the geography of global instability. Once viewed primarily through the lens of underdevelopment and humanitarian crises, it is now a pivotal arena where transnational non-state actors intersect with great-power ambitions. The region’s chronic institutional fragility, pervasive corruption, and unresolved ethnic and social fractures have created the perfect conditions for external manipulation. Two actors epitomize this dynamic transformation: Hezbollah and the Wagner Group (now reorganized as the Africa Corps under the Russian Ministry of Defense). Despite their ideological and operational differences, both embody a shared strategic logic—the outsourcing of influence and the use of hybrid, deniable instruments of power projection.

Hezbollah’s “Silent Colonization”

Unlike the Middle East, West Africa is not a direct battlefield for Hezbollah’s military arm. Instead, it functions as a logistical and financial ecosystem sustaining the organization’s global activities. Leveraging the extensive Lebanese diaspora—particularly in countries such as Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, and Senegal—Hezbollah has built a network of front companies and illicit trade routes that generate substantial revenues. Through money laundering, diamond smuggling, art trafficking, and coerced donations, it channels funds back to Lebanon, compensating for declining Iranian patronage and the economic collapse at home.

Hezbollah’s African operations reveal a new form of strategic adaptation. The group has refined its capacity to operate under the radar by using honorary consulates, dual citizenships, and diplomatic covers, which provide legitimacy and insulation from scrutiny. This approach corrodes local economies by fusing political patronage with criminal enterprise, effectively blurring the boundary between state and non-state activity. While Hezbollah does not seek territorial control, it effectively colonizes African financial systems, embedding itself within the informal economy. The consequences are corrosive: institutions weakened, political elites compromised, and sovereignty diluted.

Wagner and the Militarization of Influence

If Hezbollah’s penetration is stealthy and economic, the Wagner Group’s is overtly coercive and militarized. Operating from Sudan to Mali, the Russian private military contractor represents the Kremlin’s mechanism of “plausible deniability”—a way to reassert geopolitical influence without formal state accountability. Through the promise of counterterrorism assistance, regime protection, and disinformation campaigns, Wagner has embedded itself in the security architecture of fragile African states. Its contracts often include mining concessions and strategic resource rights, creating a self-financing cycle of exploitation.

Wagner’s activities in Mali, for instance, demonstrate how counterterrorism rhetoric masks predatory behavior. The infamous Moura massacre in 2022—where hundreds of civilians were executed—illustrates the brutality accompanying this partnership. Far from stabilizing the Sahel, Russian involvement has deepened conflicts, alienated local communities, and provided jihadist movements with powerful narratives of foreign occupation and repression. The group’s rebranding as Africa Corps following Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death indicates Moscow’s determination to institutionalize this model of semi-official imperialism, using mercenaries as instruments of geopolitical leverage.

Screenshot of an article investigating Wagner’s crimes, published by Jeune Afrique on 24th June 2025

A Hybrid Battleground

Together, Hezbollah and Wagner transform West Africa into a hybrid conflict zone—a space where terrorism, organized crime, and great-power competition converge. Hezbollah’s economic infiltration and Wagner’s militarized presence feed off the same vulnerabilities: weak governance, the absence of rule of law, and the marginalization of local populations. The result is a multidimensional destabilization process that undermines both national and regional security architectures.

The implications extend far beyond Africa. Hezbollah’s money-laundering networks connect to banks and shell companies in Europe, the Gulf, and Latin America, while Russia’s African expansion provides Moscow with strategic leverage over global supply chains of gold, uranium, and rare minerals. These dynamics expose Europe’s southern flank to a new form of geopolitical pressure—one that operates below the threshold of conventional war but erodes resilience from within.

The Need for a Paradigm Shift

Traditional Western responses—whether development aid or military cooperation—have proven insufficient. Initiatives like Italy’s Mattei Plan, while well-intentioned, risk remaining superficial if not anchored in structural reforms that address governance, transparency, and institutional capacity. The challenge posed by Hezbollah and Wagner is not only one of security but also of state capture and financial sovereignty.

A credible European strategy must therefore integrate security, governance, and finance. This means empowering African judicial systems, reinforcing anti–money laundering mechanisms, enhancing intelligence-sharing, and regulating the diplomatic loopholes exploited by illicit actors. Only by addressing the root causes of vulnerability—economic dependency, political fragility, and lack of oversight—can external manipulation be contained.

Italy’s Strategic Opportunity

For Italy, this crisis presents both a threat and an opportunity. Given its geographical proximity, colonial legacy, and diplomatic credibility, Rome is well placed to shape a new European approach based on genuine partnership rather than paternalism. Italian defense cooperation, already active through the Missione Bilaterale di Supporto in Niger and other initiatives, can be expanded to include training, infrastructure, and judicial support. More importantly, Italy can champion the idea that African security is inseparable from European security—an interdependence that must guide the EU’s external policy for the coming decades.

Ultimately, West Africa is a microcosm of the emerging global order. The interplay of armed networks, criminal economies, and foreign interventions demonstrates how instability has become both a weapon and a market. Hezbollah and Wagner reveal the porous boundaries between terrorism, organized crime, and geopolitical ambition. To remain relevant and resilient, Europe must recognize this new reality—not merely reacting to crises but shaping the norms and partnerships that can prevent them. Africa’s instability is not a distant problem; it is the mirror of Europe’s own strategic complacency.

Why It’s Normal That Iron Dome Doesn’t Intercept Every Iranian Missile

by Andrea Molle in the United States

In recent days, amid rising tensions between Israel and Iran, some superficial observers have rushed to question the effectiveness of Israel’s missile defense systems—particularly Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow. The fact that a few Iranian missiles managed to strike Israeli territory has been interpreted by some as a sign of technical or strategic failure. But the truth is far more complex—and far more rational.

1. Missile defense systems aren’t magical shields
Every missile defense system operates based on probabilities and prioritization. No technology in the world can guarantee 100% interception. Even the most advanced systems work under conditions of uncertainty and are constrained by the laws of statistics, physics, logistics, and electronic warfare.

2. Interceptor stockpiles are limited
Each battery has a finite number of interceptor missiles. Firing one can cost hundreds of thousands of dollars. When faced with a saturation attack—i.e., dozens or hundreds of missiles launched simultaneously—Israeli commanders must prioritize: defending critical targets while allowing less dangerous missiles to hit uninhabited or low-value areas.

3. Launcher rotation and operational wear
Systems like Iron Dome are regularly rotated and repositioned to avoid depletion, targeted strikes, or overconcentration in one area. This means that at any given moment, some zones might not be fully covered—not due to error, but by design.

4. Time and surprise are factors
Some Iranian missiles are long-range and launched from afar, but others can be fired by closer proxies like Hezbollah. The diversity of threats, combined with the potential for simultaneous attacks from the north, east, and south, makes complete and instantaneous coverage impossible.

5. Layered defense works—but has limits
Israel has built a multi-tiered defense system (Iron Dome for short-range rockets, David’s Sling for medium-range threats, and Arrow for ballistic missiles). However, each system has an optimal engagement angle and range, and a coordinated multi-front assault can stress the system’s efficiency.

In short: this isn’t a failure—it’s exactly how modern warfare works. The effectiveness of a defense system isn’t measured by achieving zero successful enemy hits, but by the ratio of damage prevented versus damage sustained. And so far, the data shows that Israel’s network, while under intense pressure, is holding up.

Nuclear Weapons and Irregular Warfare: A Real Escalation in the Israel-Iran Conflict

by Andrea Mollein the United States

The conflict between Israel and Iran is no longer a proxy war or a confrontation limited to the cyber domain or covert actions. Starting on June 13, 2025, the Middle East has witnessed one of the most serious clashes in its recent history: over 400 ballistic missiles and more than 1,000 drones were launched by Iran and its direct allies against Israeli civilian and military infrastructure in response to an offensive initiated by Jerusalem targeting Iranian military facilities. Among the targets hit by Iran were the Soroka Hospital in Beersheba, power plants in the Negev, and airport facilities in Galilee. The Israel Defense Forces responded with an unprecedented aerial offensive, striking more than 100 military targets in Iran, including the nuclear sites of Natanz, Fordow, and Arak, IRGC bases, and strategic energy installations. The US joining the conflict made it even more complex.

This new phase of the conflict, now explicitly bilateral, has erased the line between conventional and irregular warfare. The presence of proxies such as Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria remains critical, but it is now joined by a direct and declared confrontation between states, with Israel and Iran attacking each other’s national territories. Hybrid warfare has evolved into high-intensity war, while still retaining the irregular elements that Iran has systematically integrated into its military doctrine.

In this context, Iran’s nuclear issue takes on an immediate operational relevance. Recent IAEA inspections confirm that Tehran possesses about 9 tons of enriched uranium, with material enriched to 60% and above—enough, according to estimates, to produce up to nine warheads. The “breakout time,” i.e., the time needed to produce a usable nuclear weapon, is now minimal, although experts disagree on whether this actually amounts to a matter of months or even just weeks, as claimed by Jerusalem. At the same time, Iran has scaled back cooperation with the Agency, hindering inspectors’ access to Fordow and other key sites.

The likelihood of Tehran directly using a nuclear weapon in a conventional scenario remains remote, due to the principle of strategic survival that guides even the most hostile regimes. However, the nuclear threat fits perfectly into the logic of irregular warfare. The bomb, even in its latent form, becomes a political tool: a strategic shield that allows Iran to intensify the activities of its regional proxies, deterring Israel and the United States from attacking them directly out of fear of nuclear escalation.

This scenario, previously theorized in doctrine as “reverse deterrence,” is now manifesting in reality. Israel is forced to operate under the explicit threat that too deep a strike into the heart of the Iranian system could provoke a nuclear response or accelerate a shift from deterrence to compellence. In turn, Tehran uses its nuclear ambiguity to provide operational freedom to its non-state actors, fueling systemic instability.

A second, less discussed but equally realistic risk concerns the possibility that Iran might transfer radiological materials to allied groups to build improvised devices—so-called “dirty bombs.” The symbolic and psychological use of such a weapon, even without large-scale destructive impact, would trigger political and social paralysis and a global diplomatic crisis, radically altering the strategic balance in the Middle East and the Mediterranean.

Finally, an extreme scenario must be considered: the adoption by Iran of a “last resort” strategy if the regime perceived an existential threat. In such a case, the leadership might threaten or use a low-yield device in a symbolic area (such as the Strait of Hormuz) to force immediate ceasefires—or even on third-party territory like the United States. Such escalation, though not inevitable, aligns with the “escalate to de-escalate” logic theorized by other nuclear powers like Russia.

Israel continues to respond with an active deterrence doctrine, based on its ability to preemptively strike Iran’s critical infrastructure and command centers. The Israeli Air Force, Mossad, and cyber units collaborate on integrated operations aimed at delaying, sabotaging, or neutralizing Iran’s ability to build and deploy a nuclear weapon. Recent conflicts, from Gaza to Lebanon, have clearly shown that Israel is willing to go beyond containment and adopt a multilayered offensive posture.

For Italy and European countries, this evolution demands a reassessment of strategic priorities in the region. The conflict is no longer a struggle for local hegemony: it directly affects trade routes, energy supply lines, international naval missions, relations with Gulf monarchies, and the stability of the entire Euro-Mediterranean security system. A nuclear-armed Iran, fully embedded in a hybrid warfare strategy, now poses a transnational and multidomain threat, while a high-intensity conflict or a sudden and chaotic regime change in Tehran also entail serious risks.

Regarding the evolution of irregular warfare doctrine, the integration of nuclear capabilities is no longer a theoretical deviation but an ongoing process observable in the conflict’s current dynamics. What was a strategic hypothesis just months ago is now an operational reality guiding the tactical decisions of Israel, the United States, and, indirectly, Europe. The bomb has not (yet) exploded, but it already functions as a political and psychological lever, changing the very nature of war. The Iranian case, in this respect, is the first true test of a new reality in global hybrid conflict in an era increasingly detached from international law.

Trump’s strategy: pressuring Iran to target China.

by Claudio Bertolotti.

The Trump administration has decided to intensify its maximum-pressure policy against Iran by directly targeting the country’s oil sector and related logistical infrastructure. Recent U.S. actions aim to significantly reduce Iranian oil exports, especially to China, thereby limiting Tehran’s ability to finance destabilizing activities throughout the Middle East. The State Department has imposed new sanctions on three companies involved in facilitating illicit transfers of Iranian oil through ship-to-ship (STS) naval operations conducted outside port limits in Southeast Asia. At the same time, three vessels involved in these activities have been identified and declared blocked properties.

These measures aim to interrupt the financial flows that enable Tehran to sustain its nuclear and missile programs and support regional terrorist groups. Simultaneously, the Treasury Department has directly targeted Iran’s Petroleum Minister, Mohsen Paknejad, a central figure in Iranian oil operations, accused of using national energy resources to support the regime’s illicit activities.

Several companies engaged in the transportation and sale of Iranian oil, particularly to China, have also been sanctioned. The sanctioned companies operated vessels registered in various countries, concealing the true origin of the transported oil by disabling or manipulating Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) to evade international monitoring. Among these companies are PT. Bintang Samudra Utama (Bintang), Shipload Maritime Pte. Ltd., and PT. Gianira Adhinusa Senatama (Gianira), which respectively managed the vessels CELEBES, MALILI, and MARINA VISION. These ships were involved in a significant STS transfer operation of Iranian oil on December 25, 2024, near Nipa, Indonesia.

Analysts emphasize that this strategy reflects a well-established U.S. tactic aimed not only at cutting off Tehran’s primary economic resources but also at deterring third-party companies and countries from collaborating, directly or indirectly, with the Iranian regime. Such sanctions create a strong deterrent effect, raising costs and risks for international operators seeking to circumvent U.S. restrictions. Economically and strategically, this intensified pressure seeks to progressively eliminate Iran’s oil revenues, thereby weakening the regime’s ability to finance its conventional armed forces as well as affiliated militias and groups considered by Washington as primary sources of regional instability.

The escalation of sanctions is likely to heighten international tensions further. However, it underscores the Trump administration’s resolve to maintain its maximum-pressure policy, ultimately aiming to compel Iran to reassess its regional strategies and ambitions in nuclear and missile development.

Wagner rebooted

by Andrea Molle
(AI-generated cover picture)

As of February 2025, the Wagner Group, the most famous Russian private military company (PMC), continues to play a significant role in Moscow’s foreign operations, particularly in Africa and parts of the Middle East. The group’s activities have evolved significantly following the death of its founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, in a suspicious plane crash in August 2023. His death marked the end of Wagner’s relative autonomy and the beginning of a new phase in which the Russian government has exerted much tighter control over its operations.

In the immediate aftermath of Prigozhin’s death, the Kremlin moved swiftly to reorganize Wagner’s structure and bring its leadership under the direct oversight of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (GRU). A number of Wagner’s top commanders were either removed or reassigned, while others who pledged loyalty to the Kremlin were integrated into official state structures. This process included requiring Wagner fighters to sign contracts with the MoD, effectively converting the once-independent mercenary force into a paramilitary extension of the Russian state.

Despite these changes, Wagner has retained its operational footprint, particularly in Africa, where its presence has been deemed strategically vital for Russia’s geopolitical ambitions. The group remains active in countries such as the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, and Libya, where it provides security services, military training, and resource extraction operations that generate revenue for both itself and the Russian state. However, reports indicate that Wagner’s operational model has shifted, with greater reliance on state funding and logistical support, reducing its previous financial independence.

The group’s activities in Ukraine have also changed. While Wagner played a major role in key battles, including the capture of Bakhmut, its direct involvement on the front lines has diminished since the restructuring. Many Wagner fighters were either absorbed into regular Russian military units or reassigned to other theaters, particularly in theaters where Moscow views them as crucial instruments of influence. Indeed, the post-Prigozhin era has transformed Wagner from a semi-autonomous force into a more centralized, state-controlled paramilitary entity, ensuring that its operations remain aligned with the broader strategic interests of the Kremlin.

Relationship with the Russian Government
The relationship between the Wagner Group and the Russian government has undergone a dramatic transformation, evolving from a shadowy paramilitary force with plausible deniability to a fully acknowledged and state-controlled entity. Initially, the Kremlin sought to obscure its ties to Wagner, consistently denying any official connection and portraying the group as an independent private military contractor (PMC) operating on its own accord. This ambiguity allowed Russia to project power abroad while avoiding direct responsibility for Wagner’s actions, particularly in sensitive regions like Ukraine, Syria, and Africa. However, this strategic distance gradually eroded as Wagner’s role in Russian military operations expanded and its reliance on state resources became undeniable.

The turning point in this relationship came in June 2023, when President Vladimir Putin openly admitted that Wagner had been entirely funded by the Russian government. He revealed that the Russian state had allocated approximately $1 billion to Wagner between May 2022 and May 2023, with $858 million going directly to salaries and operational costs, while an additional $162 million was paid to Prigozhin’s Concord company, which handled Wagner’s logistics and catering. This admission shattered any remaining illusions of Wagner’s independence and reinforced the notion that it had long functioned as an unofficial arm of Russian military strategy.

This public acknowledgment was a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it legitimized Wagner’s contributions to Russian military campaigns, particularly its role in the brutal battle for Bakhmut in Ukraine. On the other hand, it set the stage for tighter government oversight, as the Kremlin could no longer justify allowing a privately controlled military force to operate beyond state authority. The power struggle between Wagner and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), which had been brewing for years, reached its peak in June 2023 when Prigozhin launched his ill-fated mutiny against the Russian high command.

Prigozhin’s short-lived rebellion, in which Wagner forces briefly occupied Rostov-on-Don and marched toward Moscow, was the catalyst for the Kremlin’s full-scale takeover of Wagner’s operations. Although the mutiny ended in a negotiated settlement—allegedly brokered by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko—its consequences were far-reaching. The Russian government swiftly moved to dismantle Wagner’s independent command structure, forcing its fighters to either sign contracts with the MoD or disband. While some Wagner personnel chose to integrate into regular Russian military units, others relocated to Belarus, where a temporary Wagner presence was established under state supervision.

However, it soon became clear that the Kremlin had no intention of allowing Wagner to remain an autonomous entity. Following Prigozhin’s mysterious death in an August 2023 plane crash—widely believed to be an assassination orchestrated by the Russian security services—the Kremlin completed its absorption of Wagner into the state apparatus. High-ranking Wagner commanders who remained loyal to Prigozhin were purged, while those willing to cooperate with the MoD were given roles within the Russian military hierarchy. This restructuring ensured that Wagner, once an unpredictable and semi-independent force, was now fully subordinate to the Russian government.

Wagner no longer operated as an independent PMC but rather as an extension of the Russian military, with a focus on supporting Moscow’s geopolitical ambitions abroad.

As mentioned, with Wagner now under direct Kremlin control, its operations were officially integrated into the Russian MoD and intelligence agencies such as the GRU (Russia’s military intelligence service). The new leadership structure placed Wagner under experienced Russian military officers who were loyal to the state, ensuring that its actions aligned with national security objectives. The MoD also restructured Wagner’s financial framework, redirecting state funds to sustain its foreign operations while eliminating the private revenue streams that had once given Wagner financial autonomy.

In practical terms, this meant that Wagner no longer operated as an independent PMC but rather as an extension of the Russian military, with a focus on supporting Moscow’s geopolitical ambitions abroad. In Africa, for example, Wagner continued to function as Russia’s primary security contractor, securing resource-rich territories and propping up allied regimes. However, all contracts, logistics, and decision-making processes were now closely monitored by the Kremlin, ensuring that Wagner’s activities served Russian state interests rather than the ambitions of individual commanders.

The transformation of Wagner from a semi-autonomous mercenary force to a state-controlled entity solidified its role as a key instrument of Russian foreign policy. While its branding as a “PMC” remains useful for diplomatic and legal maneuvering, Wagner now operates with the full backing of the Russian state, allowing Moscow to expand its influence in strategic regions without directly deploying official military forces.

In Africa, Wagner has continued its security operations in the Central African Republic, Mali, Sudan, and Libya, often securing lucrative mining concessions and strategic military agreements in exchange for its services. These operations not only provide Russia with access to valuable resources such as gold and rare minerals but also strengthen its political alliances with authoritarian governments seeking an alternative to Western military assistance.

Meanwhile, in the Middle East, Wagner’s legacy in Syria—where it played a critical role in securing Bashar al-Assad’s regime—remains intact regime change notwithstanding, with reports suggesting that Wagner personnel continue to assist Syrian forces in maintaining control over key regions also providing a viable supply corridor for other Russian operations in Africa.

In Ukraine, however, Wagner’s direct combat role has diminished following its integration into the MoD. While some Wagner fighters have remained active on the front lines, particularly in specialist roles such as reconnaissance and sabotage operations, their overall presence has been significantly reduced compared to the peak of the Bakhmut offensive.

Current Operations
The Wagner Group remains active in several African nations, notably the Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali, where it continues to serve as a key instrument of Russian influence. Its operations in these countries are deeply intertwined with local governments, resource extraction, and military partnerships that provide both financial and strategic benefits to Moscow.

In the CAR, Wagner operatives have entrenched themselves as the dominant security force supporting President Faustin-Archange Touadéra’s government. Their involvement began in 2018, initially as military advisors and trainers for the CAR’s armed forces, but has since expanded into combat operations against rebel groups. Wagner mercenaries have been directly involved in fighting various insurgent factions, including the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC), an alliance of rebel groups seeking to overthrow Touadéra.

Beyond military operations, Wagner has established control over key economic sectors, particularly the lucrative gold and diamond mining industries. The group has secured exclusive rights to operate and manage several mining sites, with revenues reportedly funneled back to Russian-linked companies that provide financial support for Wagner’s global operations. These economic ventures have not only made Wagner self-sufficient in the region but have also strengthened Russia’s influence over the CAR government. Reports indicate that Wagner operatives play a role in protecting government officials, controlling border security, and even managing parts of the country’s defense infrastructure.

Additionally, Wagner’s influence extends beyond military and economic domains. It has been actively involved in propaganda efforts, running media campaigns that promote pro-Russian narratives while discrediting Western involvement in the country. Pro-Russian messaging is widespread in the CAR, with reports of Wagner-linked organizations distributing materials that portray Russia as a reliable ally in contrast to former colonial powers such as France.

Similarly, in Mali, Wagner’s presence has grown significantly following the withdrawal of French forces in 2022, marking a major shift in regional alliances. After the 2021 military coup in Mali, the ruling junta sought alternative security partnerships, and Russia, through Wagner, emerged as a key player. Wagner mercenaries were deployed under the pretext of assisting the Malian armed forces in counterterrorism operations against Islamist militant groups linked to al-Qaeda and ISIS in the Sahel region. However, their presence has been controversial, with numerous reports accusing Wagner operatives of committing human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings, torture, and civilian massacres.


Image by James Wiseman on Unsplash

Despite these concerns, Mali’s ruling junta continues to rely heavily on Wagner’s support, viewing it as a reliable alternative to Western military assistance. In return for their services, Wagner is believed to have secured agreements that grant them access to Mali’s natural resources, particularly gold mines, similar to their operations in the CAR. Additionally, Wagner has played a role in reshaping Mali’s foreign policy, fostering closer ties between Bamako and Moscow while distancing the country from traditional Western allies. This could pose a serious threat to Italy, the only European country with a substantial presence in the sub-Saharan region.

Wagner’s operations in CAR and Mali are part of Russia’s broader strategy to expand its geopolitical footprint in Africa, often filling vacuums left by Western powers. By positioning itself as a security guarantor for embattled regimes, Russia has managed to secure valuable economic and political footholds across the continent. Wagner’s involvement in Africa aligns with Moscow’s long-term objectives of challenging Western influence, securing access to critical resources, and cultivating strategic partnerships that could prove beneficial in international diplomatic arenas, such as the United Nations.

Beyond CAR and Mali, Wagner has also been reported to have a presence in other African nations, including Sudan, Libya, and Burkina Faso, where it continues to operate under varying degrees of Russian state control. While its future remains uncertain following the death of its founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, Wagner’s role as a tool of Russian influence in Africa remains intact, with its operations increasingly falling under the direct supervision of the Russian government.

Leadership and Command Structure
After Prigozhin’s death, the Kremlin moved swiftly to integrate Wagner’s operations more directly under state control, ensuring that the once-autonomous paramilitary group became a fully subordinate arm of Russian military and geopolitical strategy. In August 2023, President Vladimir Putin signed a decree requiring all Wagner fighters to swear an oath of allegiance to the Russian state, a move that signaled the end of Wagner’s independent chain of command and its absorption into Russia’s official military structure. This decree was accompanied by broader efforts to restructure the group, placing its leadership under direct oversight from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (GRU).

With the group now firmly under Kremlin control, key positions within Wagner have been reassigned to individuals closely aligned with the Russian military and intelligence agencies. Many of Wagner’s original leadership figures, particularly those loyal to Prigozhin, were either removed, reassigned, or eliminated under suspicious circumstances. In their place, figures from Russia’s defense establishment, including high-ranking officers from the GRU, have taken over command roles, ensuring that Wagner’s future operations remain directly aligned with Moscow’s strategic interests. Reports indicate that Andrei Averyanov, a GRU operative known for overseeing Russian covert operations abroad, has been among those involved in Wagner’s restructuring. Additionally, Sergei Troshev, a former high-ranking Wagner commander and veteran of the Chechen wars, has been tasked with overseeing Wagner’s integration into the Russian military framework.

Troop Strength and Numerical Consistency
The reorganization of Wagner also involved a reassessment of its numerical strength. Prior to Prigozhin’s death, Wagner’s troop count was estimated to be between 25,000 and 50,000 fighters, with a significant portion consisting of former Russian convicts who had been recruited under a controversial prisoner enlistment program. Following Prigozhin’s demise, many of these fighters were either absorbed into regular Russian military units or dismissed, leading to a temporary decline in Wagner’s operational strength. However, recruitment efforts have continued under the new Kremlin-aligned leadership, with reports suggesting that Wagner’s core fighting force now numbers between 15,000 and 25,000 personnel. A significant portion of these troops have been redeployed to Africa, where Wagner remains active in countries such as the Central African Republic, Mali, and Libya.

To replenish its ranks, Wagner has reportedly shifted its recruitment focus, targeting ex-military personnel, special forces veterans, and mercenaries with combat experience in Ukraine, Syria, and Africa. Training programs for new recruits have also been expanded, with Wagner fighters undergoing advanced military instruction at Russian MoD-controlled facilities before being deployed on foreign assignments.

Armaments and Equipment
Despite its formal integration into the Russian state apparatus, Wagner continues to operate with a high degree of autonomy in terms of its arsenal and logistical capabilities. The group has maintained access to a diverse range of weaponry, sourced primarily from Russian military stockpiles. These include small arms such as AK-74 and AK-12 assault rifles, PKM and Pecheneg machine guns, RPG-7 and RPG-29 anti-tank weapons, and advanced sniper rifles like the Dragunov SVD and Orsis T-5000.

In terms of heavy weaponry, Wagner has retained the use of armored personnel carriers (APCs) and infantry fighting vehicles, including BTR-80s and BMP-2s, which provide mobility and firepower for its operations in Africa and the Middle East. Additionally, Wagner units have been observed using T-72 and T-90 tanks in more intense combat zones, particularly in Ukraine before their redeployment.

Artillery support remains a key component of Wagner’s battlefield strategy, with access to multiple rocket launch systems (MRLS) such as the BM-21 Grad and heavier self-propelled artillery, including the 2S19 Msta-S. These assets allow Wagner to maintain significant firepower in asymmetric warfare environments. There have also been reports of Wagner utilizing combat drones, including Orlan-10 reconnaissance UAVs, for battlefield surveillance and precision strikes.

Under Kremlin control, Wagner is expected to continue its role as Russia’s primary tool for power projection in regions where direct military involvement would be politically or diplomatically costly.

In Africa, where air support is crucial for logistics and combat operations, Wagner has reportedly maintained a small fleet of helicopters, including Mi-8 and Mi-24 gunships, which are used for both troop transport and close air support missions. These aircraft are believed to be supplied directly by the Russian MoD, ensuring that Wagner’s air capabilities remain intact despite the restructuring.


Moscow, image by jacqueline macou on Pixabay

Strategic Outlook
With Wagner’s autonomy effectively dismantled, the group’s future remains tied to the Russian state’s strategic priorities. Under Kremlin control, Wagner is expected to continue its role as Russia’s primary tool for power projection in regions where direct military involvement would be politically or diplomatically costly. However, the loss of its independent command structure may reduce its effectiveness in some areas, particularly where its previous flexibility and adaptability had been key strengths.

Additionally, there are reports that Moscow is exploring the possibility of restructuring Wagner into multiple, smaller PMCs that can operate with varying degrees of state oversight. This would allow Russia to maintain plausible deniability while still benefiting from Wagner’s expertise in irregular warfare and security operations.

Regardless of the exact form Wagner takes in the coming years, its transformation from a rogue PMC to a fully state-controlled paramilitary organization marks a significant shift in Russian military doctrine. The Kremlin has effectively nationalized the world’s most infamous mercenary group, ensuring that its operations remain fully aligned with Russia’s long-term geopolitical ambitions.

With its new leadership, sustained recruitment efforts, and continued access to advanced weaponry, Wagner remains a formidable force despite its loss of autonomy. Under direct Kremlin control, Wagner is no longer just a rogue PMC but an integral part of Russia’s broader military and geopolitical strategy. Its role as a force multiplier in Africa and other theaters of Russian influence has only grown, with Moscow leveraging Wagner’s capabilities to secure key strategic and economic interests.

In the coming months, Wagner is expected to continue expanding its influence across Africa while maintaining a limited presence in Ukraine and the Middle East. Its integration into the Russian military apparatus ensures its operational continuity, but with a much stronger emphasis on aligning its missions with the Kremlin’s long-term global strategy.

Conclusion: Wagner’s Role in Russia’s Global Strategy
In summary, the Wagner Group continues to serve as a critical tool for Russia’s power projection, particularly in geopolitically significant regions such as Africa, the Middle East, and parts of Eastern Europe. The group’s transformation in the post-Prigozhin era marks a decisive shift in how the Kremlin manages paramilitary operations, transitioning from an informal yet highly influential private force to a more tightly controlled extension of the Russian state. This evolution underscores Moscow’s broader strategic priorities: securing economic and military footholds abroad, countering Western influence, and utilizing unconventional warfare tactics to achieve geopolitical objectives without direct state accountability.

The restructuring of Wagner under the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and intelligence agencies reflects the Kremlin’s determination to consolidate its influence over irregular military forces. The era in which Wagner operated with a degree of independence—often pursuing its own economic and strategic interests alongside those of the Russian government—has effectively ended. The direct subordination of Wagner to state authorities ensures that its missions align strictly with Moscow’s foreign policy goals, eliminating the risk of rogue actions, such as Prigozhin’s mutiny, that could challenge the Russian leadership.

With Wagner now firmly integrated into state operations, its commanders operate under direct Kremlin oversight, and its funding, logistics, and recruitment are fully controlled by Russian military institutions. This shift not only increases Moscow’s ability to dictate Wagner’s actions but also enables a more streamlined approach to paramilitary engagements, allowing for rapid deployment and coordination with official Russian military assets when necessary.

The continued deployment of Wagner forces in Africa highlights its role as a key component of Russia’s global strategy. By positioning itself as a security guarantor for regimes in countries such as the Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali, Wagner has helped Russia expand its political and economic influence in the region, particularly in securing access to valuable natural resources. These operations provide Russia with critical financial benefits and allow it to position itself as a reliable alternative to Western security partnerships.

Beyond Africa, Wagner-linked forces continue to be active in Syria, where they support Bashar al-Assad’s regime, and in Libya, where they have played a role in shaping the country’s ongoing conflict. Even though Wagner’s role in Ukraine has diminished compared to its peak during the Bakhmut offensive, some of its fighters have been integrated into Russian special operations units, ensuring that their expertise remains available for future military engagements.

Looking ahead, Wagner’s operational model is likely to evolve further under Kremlin control. While its direct battlefield presence in Ukraine has been reduced, its activities in Africa and the Middle East remain crucial to Moscow’s broader geopolitical ambitions. There are also indications that the Russian government may restructure Wagner into multiple smaller PMCs, each operating under varying degrees of state oversight to maintain plausible deniability while maximizing effectiveness.

Despite losing its former independence, Wagner’s role as an essential component of Russia’s hybrid warfare strategy ensures that it will remain a formidable force on the global stage.

This approach would allow Moscow to retain the strategic advantages of using mercenary forces—such as flexibility, reduced diplomatic consequences, and deniability—while preventing the emergence of a powerful, independent entity like the Prigozhin-era Wagner Group. By maintaining multiple paramilitary units under centralized control, Russia can continue leveraging irregular warfare tactics to achieve its objectives in a cost-effective and politically manageable way.

Ultimately, Wagner’s transformation into a direct instrument of Russian state power signals a new phase in Russia’s approach to global military engagements. The group remains a crucial extension of Moscow’s foreign policy toolkit, enabling the Kremlin to exert influence, secure resources, and challenge Western interests in regions of strategic importance. Despite losing its former independence, Wagner’s role as an essential component of Russia’s hybrid warfare strategy ensures that it will remain a formidable force on the global stage.

The Perils of a War Between Israel and Jordan

by Andrea Molle.

A war between Israel and Jordan remains an unlikely but potentially catastrophic scenario. Since signing a peace treaty in 1994, the two countries have maintained diplomatic and security cooperation, making armed conflict seem improbable. However, the Middle East is a region where tensions can escalate unexpectedly, and in the event of war, the consequences would be far-reaching, extending beyond the immediate battlefield and reshaping regional and global dynamics.

Militarily, Israel holds an overwhelming advantage. Its state-of-the-art air force, advanced missile defense systems, and cyber warfare capabilities make it one of the most formidable militaries in the world. Jordan’s military, while professional and well-trained, lacks the offensive power and technological sophistication to sustain a prolonged war against Israel. While Jordan’s mountainous terrain could offer some defensive advantages, its key cities and infrastructure would be vulnerable to Israeli airstrikes.

Conversely, Israeli population centers such as Tel Aviv and Jerusalem would be within range of Jordanian missiles, but Israel’s Iron Dome and other missile defense systems would likely neutralize most of these threats. If war were to break out under a U.S. administration led by Donald Trump, the geopolitical landscape would shift dramatically. Trump has a history of unwavering support for Israel, having moved the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem and recognized Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights during his first term. In the event of conflict, Washington would likely side decisively with Israel, providing military assistance, blocking diplomatic efforts to restrain Israeli actions, and exerting pressure on Jordan to de-escalate.

This approach could embolden Israeli leadership, reducing the incentive for a swift resolution and increasing the likelihood of a drawn-out conflict. At the same time, such a stance would further alienate Arab allies like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, who would face the difficult choice of supporting Jordan diplomatically while maintaining their fragile ties with Israel. The economic consequences of such a war would be devastating. Jordan, already reliant on foreign aid and economic cooperation with Israel, would suffer greatly, facing trade disruptions, infrastructure destruction, and economic collapse. While Israel has a more resilient economy, a prolonged war would still create market instability, harm the tourism industry, and disrupt vital sectors such as technology and defense.

A broader escalation could also lead to rising oil prices and regional economic turmoil, further complicating global markets. Beyond conventional military and economic consequences, one of the most dangerous ripple effects of such a conflict would be the resurgence of international terrorism. History has shown that war and instability in the Middle East create fertile ground for jihadist organizations, and a war between Israel and Jordan would likely open the door for extremist groups to exploit the chaos. ISIS-K, an already growing threat, could seize the moment to expand its influence, launching attacks in both Israel and Jordan while using the war as a recruitment tool. The instability could also encourage terrorist attacks in Western nations, as radicalized individuals respond to the conflict with violence abroad. The specter of a global wave of terrorism, fueled by the war, could reshape security policies worldwide and force governments to divert resources toward counterterrorism efforts. The possible outcomes of such a conflict vary in severity. A short, intense war could lead to a quick diplomatic resolution, with the United States or regional powers stepping in to mediate a ceasefire.

However, if the war dragged on and external actors such as Iran, Hezbollah, and Palestinian militant groups became involved, the situation could spiral into a broader regional conflict. Jordan itself could face internal instability, with the monarchy weakened by war and at risk of an uprising or coup. In the worst-case scenario, the war could trigger a new era of instability, empowering extremist groups and reshaping alliances across the region. Ultimately, a war between Israel and Jordan would be disastrous for both countries and the broader Middle East. The strategic, economic, and security costs far outweigh any potential gains, making a full-scale conflict unlikely.

However, as history has shown, political miscalculations, external provocations, or shifting alliances can sometimes push nations toward unintended wars. While outright conflict remains improbable, the risks of border tensions, proxy confrontations, and diplomatic crises should not be underestimated. The only real solution is continued dialogue and diplomatic engagement, as the alternative—a war with unpredictable and devastating consequences—would be a tragedy for the entire region.

Italy’s Strategic Role in the Sahel: Challenges and Opportunities After the French Withdrawal.

by Andrea Molle.

After the withdrawal of the last French military mission, Italy remains the only European country with a significant presence in the Sahel. This opens several opportunities but also presents various challenges that Rome will have to address with as integrated a strategy as possible. Italy indeed has a significant military presence in sub-Saharan Africa, with several missions aimed at ensuring security, combating terrorism, and supporting the stability of the region. These missions see Rome engaged in Niger, Chad, Djibouti, Somalia, and the Gulf of Guinea, both through bilateral operations and within the framework of EU, NATO, and UN missions. Italy maintains a military presence in Niger as part of the “MISIN” mission (Bilateral Support Mission in the Republic of Niger), launched in 2018 with the aim of supporting local authorities in contrasting terrorism, human trafficking, and organized crime. The operation fits into Italy’s broader commitment in the Sahel, aimed at ensuring stability and security in the region, countering threats that can also impact Europe, such as irregular migration flows.

The Italian mission in Niger primarily focuses on training and mentoring local security forces to improve their operational capabilities. Italian military personnel, drawing from various branches of the Armed Forces, provide courses on combat techniques, special operations, surveillance, and border control. Additionally, logistical and medical support is an essential component of the operation. The Italian contingent in Niger consists of several hundred units, with the possibility of deploying up to 470 soldiers, 130 vehicles, and aircraft for logistical and reconnaissance needs. Italy has established its operational base in Niamey, the capital of Niger, collaborating with local authorities and other international partners, including the United States and previously France. The operation is also part of a broader cooperation framework between Italy and Niger, which includes development initiatives, humanitarian aid, and investments to improve the economic and social conditions of the African country. However, the political situation in Niger is unstable, with the recent 2023 coup leading to a review of relations between the Nigerien government and Western states, including Italy.

Despite the geopolitical uncertainties, the Italian mission in Niger remains a key part of Italy’s defense and security strategy in the Sahel, contributing to the stabilization of a region crucial for the geopolitical and economic balance of both the region and Europe. Beyond Niger, Italy also maintains a limited military presence in neighboring Chad, focusing mainly on liaison, training, and supporting international missions in the Sahel region. This commitment is part of a broader multilateral cooperation effort aimed at combating terrorism, stabilizing the area, and strengthening local security forces’ capabilities. Italy’s activities in Chad work in synergy with operations led by international organizations such as the European Union, the United Nations, and the G5 Sahel, providing strategic and operational support through intelligence sharing, military training, and coordination with other military contingents in the area. Lastly, Italy participates in several initiatives to improve the country’s border security, prevent arms trafficking, and counter radicalization, all key elements for the stability of Chad and the Sahel region as a whole.

The Italian approach is distinguished by a strong emphasis on civil-military cooperation, promoting not only security but also the development and resilience of local communities. Italy also established a military base in Djibouti, the Italian Support Military Base (BMIS), operational since 2013. Located strategically in the Horn of Africa, the BMIS serves as a logistics and operations hub, developing intelligence capabilities for Italian armed forces engaged in missions in the East Africa region and the Indian Ocean. This base is a key infrastructure supporting anti-piracy operations, contributing to the security of shipping routes and the patrolling of international waters. It also provides logistical and operational support to various Italian and European missions in the region, including Italy’s participation in the EUNAVFOR Atalanta operation (against piracy in the Gulf of Aden) and the EUTM Somalia mission, dedicated to training Somali armed forces.

The presence of the BMIS also allows for the rapid deployment of Italian units in case of emergencies or crises in the area, strengthening Italy’s role in the security and stabilization of the Horn of Africa. The base hosts military personnel and advanced support infrastructure, allowing maintenance of vehicles, supplies, and assistance to Italian forces and allied missions. In addition to military aspects, the BMIS also represents a point of cooperation with local Djiboutian authorities, helping to strengthen diplomatic relations between Italy and Djibouti and support regional security, stability, and development initiatives. Italy maintains a significant presence in Somalia, actively contributing to the country’s security and stabilization through two main international missions. These are the EUTM Somalia (European Union Training Mission in Somalia), an EU mission active since 2010, aimed at training and mentoring the Somali National Army (SNA) to strengthen its operational capabilities and enable the Somali government to deal with internal security threats, particularly from the terrorist group Al-Shabaab.

Italy plays a leading role in this mission, providing military instructors, advisors, and strategic support. Italian personnel are involved in training Somali officers in tactical, strategic, and logistical aspects, as well as promoting international humanitarian law principles. The goal is to build a professional and efficient Somali army capable of ensuring the country’s security autonomously. In addition to military training, the mission focuses on the development of Somali military leadership and strengthening defense institutions, contributing to the creation of a more effective command and control chain. The other operation, called Operation Atalanta, is a naval mission of the European Union (EUNAVFOR Atalanta) launched in 2008, aimed at combating piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, protecting merchant navy ships, and ensuring the safety of strategic maritime routes.

Italy actively participates in the operation with naval units, helicopters, and military personnel, performing patrols and providing escorts for commercial and humanitarian ships, particularly those of the World Food Programme (WFP) heading to Somalia. The Italian Navy has played a prominent role in the mission, contributing to the deterrence of piracy and maintaining security in international waters. Operation Atalanta has had a significant impact, drastically reducing pirate attacks and strengthening cooperation among international naval forces. Italy, in addition to its operational contribution, has frequently held high-level commands within the mission, confirming its commitment to global maritime security. In addition to participating in these missions, Italy maintains strong historical and diplomatic ties with Somalia, a country that was an Italian colony until the mid-20th century. Italy’s commitment goes beyond the military aspect, encompassing development cooperation, humanitarian support, and initiatives for political stabilization.

Through the EUTM Somalia and Operation Atalanta missions, Italy significantly contributes to the security and stability of the Horn of Africa, consolidating its role as a key actor in international operations in the region. Finally, with Operation Gabinia, Italy has committed to strengthening maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, a crucial area for international oil and goods traffic, but also one of the regions most affected by maritime piracy. The deployment of Italian naval units aims to combat piracy, protect commercial ships (particularly those flying the Italian flag), and ensure the security of maritime infrastructure critical to global economic interests. All these operations are part of a broader Italian engagement in the region, which includes economic, military, and diplomatic cooperation with several West African countries.

Italy is working to develop strategic partnerships that include development initiatives, humanitarian aid, and investments to improve the economic and social conditions of the countries involved, thereby contributing to their stability and reducing the root causes of instability and forced migration. Key areas of intervention include training local security forces, border control, combating illicit trafficking (drugs, weapons, humans), and the fight against jihadist terrorism, which represents a growing threat in the Sahel region. Strengthening local security and intelligence capabilities is critical to counter groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram, and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), who exploit institutional weaknesses and ethnic tensions to expand their influence.

An additional objective that Italy will need to pursue more decisively in the future is containing the growing geopolitical penetration of Russia and China in the region. Moscow has strengthened its military and political presence through paramilitary groups like the Wagner Group, providing support to authoritarian regimes and military juntas in exchange for natural resources and strategic bases. Beijing, on the other hand, continues to expand its economic influence through significant infrastructure and financial investments, often through debt mechanisms that bind local governments to Chinese interests. In the face of these developments, Italy, in coordination with the United States and other NATO partners, will need to strengthen its political-military presence, intensify cooperation with local governments, and promote alternative development models based on sustainability and the economic self-determination of African countries.

Italy’s commitment to West Africa is therefore increasingly seen as a delicate balance between security, diplomacy, development cooperation, and the protection of national and European strategic interests.

The Islamic State in Khorasan’s “expansion” towards Europe

by Antonio Giustozzi.

Article published on #ReaCT2024 5th Report on Terrorism and Radicalism (order your copy or download the Report in Pdf).

Abstract

In 2023, Da’esh (ISIS) continued to carry out isolated attacks in Europe, generally with limited organisational support limited. The article notes the increasing effectiveness of European counter-terrorism measures European counterterrorism measures that would likely have made it less convenient for ISIS leaders deploy scarce human resources in such attacks. The author, in his article explores how the Islamic State group seems to favour the preservation of its organisational structures in Europe, delegating action to a few individuals or isolated cells. In addition, the growing involvement of the Khorasan (IS-K) branch of ISIS in planning attacks in Europe or against European targets abroad, as demonstrated by a 2020 plot against NATO bases in Germany. Despite the numerous plots identified in 2023, there is some discretion in attributing these plans exclusively to IS-K, suggesting wider intra-ISIS cooperation. The article notes that, despite appearances, Da’esh Khorasan is not necessarily expanding, but rather taking on new tasks assigned to it by the central leadership, pressed by resource scarcity.

The Islamic State (IS) continued in 2023 to occasionally carry out isolated attacks in Europe, usually with seemingly little organisational backup. As European counter-terrorism has become increasingly effective, the cost effectiveness of committing rare human resources to isolated attacks must have appeared questionable to IS leaders and police sources around Europe tend to think that IS indeed prefers to safeguard whatever organisational structure it still has in Europe, leaving the task of flying the flag to a few isolated individuals or cells. Indeed, as late as early 2022 police sources in Europe did not see an impending IS threat, its presence being limited to online propagandists, recruiters, and fundraisers. Taliban sources confirmed the detention of an IS-K operative in Afghanistan, who had raised thousands of euros in Germany and Spain (Giustozzi, 2022). Taliban intelligence sources also note that that much of IS-K online propaganda is now being produced outside Afghanistan, including Europe. After the fall of Kabul in August 2021, IS-K started releasing a significant portion of this propaganda in English. There might be multiple reasons for this, not all related to Europe. A possible reason that is relevant for European security is the intent to stimulate recruitment in Europe, perhaps in order to replace the loss of many Da’esh media operators due to the police crackdown in recent years. Even when in July 2023 the police detained several IS plotters in Germany and the Netherlands and described them as being “in contact with members” of the IS-K branch, it also noted that they were engaged in fund raising and there was no indication that they were actively preparing a terrorist attack (Stewart ASyI, 2023).

1. IS-K and the Ambition to Strike Europe.

Some observers have however noted a recent trend, concerning the growing organisational involvement of the Khorasan branch (IS-K) in planning attacks in Europe, or against European targets in Turkey. The German authorities alleged in 2020 that the cell behind a plot to attack NATO bases in Germany, thwarted by the police in April 2020, had received the order to act from an IS Khorasan cadre in Afghanistan.[1] This episode, however, was barely noticed and the evidence shared by the German authorities remains fuzzy. What really caught the eyes of many observers was the US intelligence report that turned up among the Discord leaks, showing that as of February 2023 15 different IS-K linked plots to carry out attacks against western interests in Europe, Turkey, the Middle East and elsewhere had been identified by the US military.[2] While these figures seem impressive, they contrast oddly with the fact that in March 2023 the US Central Command assessed was that IS-K was within 6 months of having the capacity to organise attacks against western interests in Asia or Europe. The discrepancy is difficult to explain, unless for the military the 15 plots mentioned above were not to be taken too seriously, or not to be attributed exclusively or even primarily to IS-K. Indeed, Turkish sources describe some of these plots, such as those aimed against Swedish and Dutch consulates on Turkish territory, as involving Central Asians linked to IS-K and members of the Turkish branch of IS. Apart from reportedly issuing the order, IS-K seemingly relied on assets and personnel that were already on location. Indeed, even the leaked US intelligence report itself noted that IS-K “relied on resources from outside Afghanistan”.

2. Afghanistan and the Developed Structure of IS.

In 2023 IS-K sources in Afghanistan confirmed to the author’s research team that the group coordinated operations in Turkey and Europe with other branches of the Islamic State, stressing however that this happened under the leadership of the central leadership of the ‘Caliphate”. This implies at least that IS-K as such was not determining the overall strategy presiding over the planning of these attacks. Sources within IS-K confirmed that Afghanistan hosted several military commissions for neighbouring countries, such as Iran and Central Asia, but did not mention any such entity focusing on Europe, Turkey or the Middle East. Sources contacted by the International Crisis Group in Syria indicated in 2023 that the Central Asians who used to operate under IS in Syria had been transferred under the responsibility of IS-K (International Crisis Group, 2023). According to the IS-K sources, at least initially this was meant to prelude to their transfer to Afghanistan, which however occurred considerably more slowly than planned.

The picture that these sources portray is one of a relatively developed IS-K structure in Turkey and Syria, with 200+ working in the financial hub of IS-K in Turkey, plus 400-500 Central Asians spread between Syria and Turkey, ex members of ISIL who either switched their allegiance or were reassigned to IS-K (the sources are not clear on this point), waiting to be transferred to Khorasan or in any case to be told what to do.  In Europe, the presence of IS-K is much more modest, with 60 members. According to the same sources, as of September 2022 there were 30 Europeans belonging to IS-K in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Of these, 16 were from Germany, ten were from France and four from Belgium. There were also four Americans, as well as a few Turks. These individuals with passports from European and North American countries were described as having been evacuated from the Middle East after the collapse of the Caliphate, rather than having been dispatched to IS-K for organising long-range attacks in Europe. While all these numbers cannot be verified, they seem compatible with the information summarised above and provided by Europol, ICG and others.

This picture suggests constant exchanges of members between the IS-K and other IS branches in Turkey, Europe and Syria (which occur incidentally, elsewhere as well), even if the speed and size of these exchanges have been declining over time. There was always considerable integration between IS branches, despite speculation early in the existence of IS-K that it was an opportunistic set up, with little organic relationship with the “Caliphate”. More than of IS-K expanding operations to Europe, therefore, one should speak of intra-IS branches cooperation. Such cooperation seems undoubtedly to have expanded in 2022-23, which begs the question of why this is the case

3. Is IS waiting?

In this regard, it is worth noticing that IS-K is not claiming or advertising its alleged “expansion”. Even when solicited, IS-K sources in Afghanistan have stayed well clear of boasting about such expansion. Quite the contrary, they tend to minimise its importance. This appears odd, given that

1. IS-K has been running a sophisticated media campaign, whose main future is magnifying its limited achievements and making unwarranted claims .

2. It would be committing a considerable portion of its limited resources, if the “expansion” were really such, and

3. Private IS-K social media chatter and interviews with members clearly show that the organisation struggles to explain to its own members and sympathisers why its activities have been so limited during 2023.

Perhaps IS-K might just be waiting to glorify its “expansion” and brand attacks outside the remit of Khorasan province (Afghanistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa of Pakistan, Central Asia, China, Iran) as “made in Afghanistan” until it succeeds in carrying out a successful one. However, IS-K shows no similar shyness in claiming its intent of bringing jihad to China (where despite years of propaganda, it could achieve nothing) or Central Asia, where its achievements have been minimal (firing rockets across the border into Tajikistan and Uzbekistan). If the primary purpose of IS-K were making a claim to having opened new fronts of its own in Europe, Turkey and Middle East, why wouldn’t it adopt tactics similar to those deployed in Khorasan province and carry out random attacks against the softest targets, then produce widely inflated claims of the damage inflicted?

4. The strength of IS.

In sum, the most logical explanation is that the “Caliphate”, which is at its weakest since its inception, has summoned IS-K’s help to reclaim the headlines with some high profile attack against European targets. One possibility is that the “Caliphate” might now be so weak in and around Europe that it simply does not have the strength anymore to systematically intensify operations there. Another possibility is that, in line with what noted at the beginning of this article, the central leadership of IS might have decided to raise its profile through intensified terrorist operations, while at the same time safeguarding its surviving structure in Europe and rely instead on IS-K elements, who are not part of the same structure and do not risk compromising it if caught.

Why IS-K and not other branches of IS? As mentioned above, IS-K has had a significant presence in Turkey for years, with safe houses and networks dedicated to supporting financial operations. This financial hub now struggles to carry out its original task, due to the Turkish authorities strongly increasing their pressure, so its conversion to more operational roles could well have appeared logical. Furthermore, as mentioned, the Central Asians were getting ready to be transferred to Afghanistan, having outlived their usefulness in Syria, where operating underground is much harder for them than for native Syrians or even Iraqis. As only a few tens were able to make the trip each month, those laying idle in Turkey and Syria could conceivably be mobilised for other duties. In short, IS-K happened to be readily available and well placed to provide support to the central leadership, whose Syrian and Iraqi branches have been greatly weakened in recent years. No other branch of IS was in a similar position.

Conclusions.

In conclusion, IS-K is not really “expanding”. The members involved in the planned attacks were already in IS-K, or had been scheduled to be transferred to it (in the case of the Central Asians). What appears to have changed is that IS-K was given additional tasks by a central leadership, which is low on money and human resources and needs to raise its media profile to have a chance of re-emerging from its crisis. This would also explain why IS-K members in Afghanistan and not particularly enthusiastic about this development, which at least in the short term is drawing scarce human resources away from them.

[1] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-april-2020-islamic-state-terror-plot-against-u-s-and-nato-military-bases-in-germany-the-tajik-connection

[2] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/04/22/afghanistan-terrorism-leaked-documents/

Article published on #ReaCT2024 5th Report on Terrorism and Radicalism (order your copy or download the Report in Pdf).

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