Introduction to the Urban Evolution of the
Conflict
No environment presents more formidable challenges for
military forces than urban areas. Urban warfare is uniquely destructive, yet
military forces frequently find themselves ill-prepared for the specific
difficulties of operating in densely populated battlefields and often cannot
avoid being drawn into the severe realities of urban combat. In their book
“Understanding Urban Warfare“,
Liam Collins and John Spencer highlight the distinct challenges posed by urban
warfare. These include the limiting effects of three-dimensional terrain on
various weapon systems, the numerous enemy firing points along urban
communication routes (such as streets, alleys, and avenues), and the crucial
need to minimize civilian casualties, protect critical infrastructure, and
preserve cultural heritage (Collins & Spencer, 2022). Urban areas, serving
as battlefields, provide diverse and often unpredictable maneuvering options
based on the type of urban environment, whether it be a megalopolis,
metropolitan city, peripheral town, conurbation, or even a smart city, each
with characteristics that significantly impact military operations.
As I highlighted in my latest volume on urban warfare
in the Israel-Hamas conflict, Gaza
Underground: la guerra sotterranea e urbana tra Israele e Hamas. Storia,
strategie, tattiche, guerra cognitiva e intelligenza artificiale (English
title: “Gaza Underground: The Underground and Urban War between Israel and
Hamas. History, Strategies, Tactics, Cognitive Warfare, and Artificial
Intelligence”), many of the most recent urban battles – from the Battle of
Mogadishu in 1993 to the Second Battle of Fallujah in Iraq in 2004, the Battle
of Shusha in 2020 during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, and also Mariupol in
2022 and Bakhmut in 2023 in the Russo-Ukrainian War – provide us with trends
and lessons learned to better understand urban warfare. In an increasingly
urbanized world, the future nature of conflict will also be increasingly urban.
The Israeli Approach to Urban Combat: The Lesson from
Gaza
On the tactical level, Israeli soldiers last
engaged in a major ground battle in 2014 when Israel deployed its troops inside
Gaza. Strategically, however, since then the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) have
focused on countering potential threats from Iran rather than the immediate
neighbor. This overall strategic shift has effectively distracted the Israeli
armed forces from a substantial but different nature of threat.
Conversely, Hamas has militarily strengthened
since 2008/2009, when it first faced an Israeli ground assault. Back then,
Hamas’s military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, consisted of 16,000
militiamen and approximately 2,000 troops specialized in combat. This was in
stark contrast to the situation on the eve of the 2023 offensive when,
according to the IDF, Hamas could rely on a force of 40,000 elite fighters, an
arsenal of drones, and about 30,000 rockets. This significant arsenal
overwhelmed the Iron Dome system on October 7, 2023, leading to a saturation
point where the number of rockets fired by Hamas exceeded the system’s
defensive capacity, prompting the United States to urgently send reinforcements
(Bertolotti, 2024).
With the launch of the ground offensive of
Operation Iron Swords, the Israeli
Defense Forces engaged in the urban area of Gaza, the most densely populated
part of the Strip, initiating a new phase of the conflict focused mainly on
urban warfare, including subterranean combat. Engineering units conducted
breaching operations to access tunnels, allowing specialized underground combat
units to overpower the enemy (Schalit, 2023).
As part of their defense strategy, Hamas
engineers had an extensive network of tactical tunnels at their disposal; some
interconnected, others isolated. Many, as previously argued, were dug to a
depth safe from aerial bombing, while others were closer to the surface for
quick access or exit. Furthermore, Hamas prepared tunnels and “mouse
holes” to allow fighters to move covertly between buildings and attack
Israeli soldiers before disappearing again (Schalit, 2023). In addition to
these tactical advantages for troop movement, Palestinian engineers also set up
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) – some hidden in walls to detonate as
armored vehicles passed, larger ones buried under roads or rubble piles, and
some with tunnel traps designed to lure and strike Israeli soldiers engaged in
hostage search and rescue operations.
Urban warfare is extremely slow.
The war entered a critical phase with the entry
of units into the urban perimeter of Gaza, where the Israeli army, equipped
with top-tier urban combat skills, faced an enemy determined to fight to the
last, having prepared for years for that confrontation. A battle that took
place in an environment favorable to the defender (Schalit, 2023).
Combat experiences in urban areas, such as those
in Mosul, Iraq, and Marawi, Philippines between 2016 and 2017, offer important
lessons. In Mosul, a 100,000-strong Iraqi contingent supported by the United
States took nine months to neutralize a group of Islamic State militants in a
fortified city, suffering the loss of 8,000 men and numerous military equipment
due to improvised explosive devices. Similarly, in Marawi, Filipino forces took
five months to overcome Islamic State-Maute militants, facing the harsh reality
of being able to take control of only one building per day due to the constant
risk of ambushes and hidden explosives. These scenarios underscore the complex
challenges of urban combat and the resilience required to overcome them.
The Three Levels of Challenge in Urban Warfare
As previously mentioned, urban warfare is one of
the most complex and multifaceted challenges an army can face. This type of
conflict is distinguished by its intensity and profound implications not only
tactically but also perceptually and ethically.
Perceptually, urban warfare highlights a marked
contrast between the expectations of a society inclined towards moderation and
the pursuit of ethically acceptable conduct in conflict, and the brutal reality
of urban combat, where the costs in terms of human lives, material destruction,
and loss of international legitimacy can be devastating. This discrepancy
creates a form of cognitive dissonance, making it difficult for modern armies,
anchored in the values of liberal societies, to adequately prepare for the
inherent brutality of this type of combat.
Tactically, urban warfare scenarios present a
series of unique difficulties, which we have partly illustrated. Combat in
densely built environments involves the risk of long-range attacks via drones
or improvised explosive devices, significantly increasing the danger for forces
on the ground. The urban environment facilitates the adversaries’ ability to
hide and set ambushes, creating a climate of constant uncertainty. Maneuvering
troops are exposed to high risks, with their firepower diluted by the need to
disperse among buildings, often with reduced visibility. Additionally, the
degradation of sensor and communication systems, essential for coordinating
operations, poses a significant problem.
Ethically and morally, the presence of civilians
in the urban theater of war introduces significant dilemmas. Civilians
disproportionately suffer the consequences of the conflict, both directly as
victims of the fighting and indirectly due to displacement and epidemics
resulting from the destruction of urban infrastructure. Military commanders
face the delicate dilemma of proportionality, having to balance the need to act
for the safety of their soldiers with the responsibility to avoid civilian
harm, in accordance with international humanitarian law (IHL). This balance is
further complicated by the presence of civilians who can use electronic devices
and social media, those who may be hostile or resist unarmed, and the
psychological and political weight these decisions impose on commanders,
potentially influencing their judgment and choices.
The Evolution of the Technical and Tactical
Capabilities of the Israeli Forces
The Israeli armed forces have historically faced
numerous challenges in the urban context of Gaza, particularly after the 2005
withdrawal, with military operations in 2008 and subsequent ones in 2014; different
periods in which the Israeli forces learned valuable lessons. Politically,
Jerusalem recognized the crucial importance of gaining public favor, both
internationally and domestically. Militarily, it became evident that air power
alone is never sufficient, leading to a redefinition of the capabilities and
organization of ground forces, particularly regarding the acquisition and
deployment of robust armored vehicles and the application of innovative
techniques, tactics, and procedures aimed at managing underground threats.
As a direct consequence of these lessons, the
IDF equipped itself with some of the best technologies for urban operations;
among these are tanks and armored personnel carriers, considered among the
safest in the world. The Israeli arsenal also includes the armored
“Doobi” D9 bulldozers from Caterpillar, designed to demolish
buildings and create safe pathways in potentially mined environments, thus
reducing the risk of ambushes and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks.
These powerful machines, which can also be remotely operated, have been
controversial due to their use in demolishing homes, which some interpret as
punitive measures.
However, the operational use of the D9s,
contrary to the criticisms which fit into a broader context of instrumental
opposition, involves creating safe pathways through hazardous areas, partially
destroying buildings to create alternative routes, and building protective
barriers around strategic areas to consolidate territorial gains by military
units. This approach reflects a combination of strength and ingenuity, marking
the continued evolution of Israeli military strategies in the face of the unique
challenges of urban warfare.
The Israeli army, within its vast arsenal of specialized vehicles, also possesses
a particular vehicle, the “Puma,” dedicated to neutralizing
minefields and countering improvised explosive devices. Equipped with an
elaborate mine clearance system called “IED Carpet,[1] ” the “Puma” can
detonate or neutralize hidden explosive devices through controlled explosions
with rockets. Beyond this cutting-edge technology, the vehicles used by the
engineering units are equipped with devices capable of disrupting circuits or
transmissions used for controlled activation of IEDs, some of which include the
“Thor” system that uses precision lasers to trigger devices from a
distance (Schalit, 2023).
In the realm of subterranean combat, the Israeli
army boasts specialized units, such as the Sarayet Yahalom elements, trained in
detecting, maneuvering, and destroying tunnels. These special forces use
special explosive charges, drones, and underground robots to conduct their
operations, confirming Israel’s forefront position in the search for
underground detection technologies, employing a wide range of instruments that
span geospatial, acoustic, seismic, tomographic resistivity (ERT), and
ground-penetrating radar, capable of mapping tunnels up to twenty meters deep.
The IDF’s approach to tunnels is primarily
focused on their destruction from the surface, avoiding entry and endangering
military operators wherever possible. However, for specific missions such as
hostage recovery, special units, including Yahalom reconnaissance teams and the
Oketz canine unit, equipped with specific gear for underground operations, have
been trained. The need for direct reconnaissance using soldiers within this
vast tunnel network suggests the use of highly specialized operational
techniques, potentially entrusted to the elite Mista’arvim units, capable of
operating undercover and blending in with enemy fighters.
In this scenario of technological and tactical
confrontation, both sides could present unexpected and devastating surprises.
While the IDF has the technological and military superiority necessary to
prevail, the outcome of the battle and its human and geopolitical repercussions
remain shrouded in uncertainty, testifying to the complexity and
unpredictability of modern conflict (Schalit, 2023).
Bibliografia
Bertolotti C. (2024), Gaza Underground: la guerra sotterranea e
urbana tra Israele e Hamas. Storia, strategie, tattiche, guerra cognitiva e
intelligenza artificiale, ed. START InSight, Lugano, pp. 325.
Collins L, Spencer J. (2022), Understanding Urban Warfare, Howgate
Publishing Limited, pp. 392.
Schalit A. (2023), Hidden tunnels, ambushes and explosives in
walls: the Israel-Hamas war enters a precarious new phase, The
Conversation, 23 novembre 2023.
[1]
Minefield Clearance and IED Neutralization: The Carpet is a
modern system for minefield clearance and IED neutralization, produced by the
Israeli company Rafael. It can efficiently clear a path of one hundred meters
in a minefield and neutralize all types of IEDs. To ensure maximum crew
survivability, the system is operated by two soldiers inside the vehicle. The
Carpet system consists of a launcher containing twenty rockets equipped with
FAE (Fuel-Air Explosive) warheads. The launcher is an autonomous add-on kit
that can be easily and quickly assembled in the field on any vehicle. The
Carpet is the most efficient system for minefield clearance and IED
neutralization/detonation on any terrain and in all weather conditions, while
maintaining crew safety.
Cognitive Warfare: Manipulating numbers to influence global public opinion. How Hamas deceived western media.
In the
digital age, warfare transcends mere physical confrontation. Enter the realm of
“cognitive warfare,” a sophisticated strategy aimed not just at
battles on the ground, but at the very fabric of human perception and behavior.
Cognitive warfare is characterized by the utilization of advanced technologies
and psychological methodologies to penetrate individual consciousness.
This
approach surpasses conventional disinformation or propaganda tactics; it
encompasses the utilization of artificial intelligence and machine learning
algorithms to sway thought processes and decision-making mechanisms without
explicit authorization (Farwell, 2020). This form of warfare exploits the
susceptibilities of contemporary societies to information overload, utilizing
the same platforms that facilitate global communication and access to
information to disseminate content aimed at causing instability. This article examines
how Hamas, a non-state actor designated as a terrorist organization by several
countries, has embraced cognitive warfare strategies to further its
geopolitical, economic, and social goals. Through a case study of the ongoing
conflict between Israel and Hamas and theoretical analysis, we delve into the
utilization of these tactics in a hybrid conflict context marked by
manipulation (Bachmann, 2024).
This
article, drawn from the research compiled in my latest book “Gaza Underground: la guerra sotterranea e
urbana tra Israele e Hamas” (Bertolotti, 2024), not only highlights the
destructive capabilities of cognitive warfare but also promotes a critical
debate on the international norms and policies necessary to regulate the use of
cognitive technologies in wartime contexts.
Cognitive
warfare represents a critical and disturbing frontier in modern conflict. Our
understanding of this phenomenon is essential for the protection of democracies
and for maintaining global peace and stability.
How does Hamas influence public opinion?
During
the conflict with Israel, Hamas has employed diverse cognitive warfare
strategies to sway public opinion, targeting both Arab-Muslim and Western
audiences to garner support for its cause. Central to these efforts is the utilization
of symbols and narratives by Hamas, aimed at evoking empathy or backing for
their objectives. This deliberate selection of symbols and narratives seeks to
forge an emotional connection between the public and Hamas’s struggle, thereby
shaping individuals’ perceptions through emotional alignment with the
organization’s cause.
Additionally,
online activities have emerged as a crucial tactic for Hamas. The group has
adeptly leveraged digital platforms to disseminate its messages, engage with
public sentiment, and coordinate propaganda campaigns. This virtual presence
has enabled Hamas to extend its reach to a global audience.
Furthermore,
Hamas has employed the staging of media events as another strategic tool. These
orchestrated events are cynically designed to generate extensive and favorable
media coverage, eliciting emotions of outrage towards Israel and solidarity
with the Palestinians. By framing these events within a narrative supportive of
Hamas’s cause and intertwining them with the broader “Palestinian
cause,” Hamas aims primarily at an international audience, seeking to
shape global public opinion. The overarching objective is to garner
international support through the involvement of international organizations,
governments, and lobbying groups, thereby influencing the global perception of
the conflict.
In
summary, through the coordinated deployment of these strategies, Hamas has
endeavored to shape public perception at both local and international levels,
with the aim of mobilizing widespread support against Israel.
One of
the primary strategies employed by Hamas involves media propaganda, utilizing
various channels to disseminate a favorable portrayal of their cause. Through
mediums such as interviews, press releases, and other communication channels,
Hamas officials have actively sought to shape public perception in their favor.
Throughout the conflict, Hamas has exploited media platforms to circulate
imagery and narratives aimed at eliciting empathy and garnering support for
their agenda. This includes the presentation of images depicting civilian
casualties and dramatic scenarios, often devoid of contextualization or presented
with fragmented information.
Moreover,
Hamas has extensively employed disinformation as a tactical approach, deliberately
disseminating false or misleading information to sow confusion and manipulate
public perception of events. This strategy has contributed to an environment
characterized by a blurred truth, casting doubt on the credibility of
information sources and complicating public comprehension of factual details.
For
instance, the so-called Ministry of Health in Gaza, effectively under the
control of Hamas, claimed a death toll of over 30,000, predominantly comprising
women and children, as of March 1, 2024. Is this assertion credible? No, it is
not. Abraham Wyner, Professor of Statistics and Data Science at the Wharton
School of the University of Pennsylvania and co-director of the faculty of
Sports Analytics and Business Initiative, conducted a study on this issue using
data provided by Hamas from October 26 to November 10, 2023, published in a
condensed form in the article “How
the Gaza Ministry of Health Fakes Casualty Numbers. The evidence is in their
own poorly fabricated figures“, the conclusions of which are
summarized here (Wyner 2024).
The count
of civilian casualties in Gaza has garnered global attention since the onset of
the conflict. The primary source cited by the media and international politics
is the Gaza Health Ministry, which is under the control of Hamas. As of March
1, 2024, they reported over 30,000 deaths, with the majority being children and
women. The U.S. administration, led by President Joe Biden, has endorsed these
figures. During a hearing at the House Armed Services Committee in late
February, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin stated that the number of
Palestinian women and children killed since October 7 exceeded 25,000, citing
an estimate from the Hamas-controlled Gaza Health Ministry. President Biden had
previously referenced this figure, underscoring that “too many” of
the over 27,000 Palestinians killed in the conflict were innocent civilians and
children. A subsequent White House press release affirmed that the president
had relied on publicly available data regarding the total number of casualties
(Wyner, 2024).
The
discrepancy within this dataset is evident: the figures are not accurate. An
examination of the available data and information indicates that the majority
of the casualties are not women and children, but rather combatants affiliated
with Hamas. Should there be any manipulation or fraudulence in Hamas’s data,
this can be substantiated through a thorough analysis of the dataset itself.
Despite its limitations, the available data is adequate for this purpose. Let
us delve into how Wyner (2024) confirmed the reliability of this dataset.
From
October 26 to November 10, 2023, the Gaza Health Ministry disseminated daily
casualty reports, encompassing both the total count and specific figures for
women and children. Wyner’s initial focus was on the aggregate number of
reported fatalities, which, as depicted in Figure 1, exhibits a consistent,
nearly linear progression over the given period (Wyner 2024).
Figure 1. The chart reveals an extremely regular increase in casualties over the considered period. The aggregated data by Wyner, provided by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), are based on figures from the Gaza Health Ministry (Source: Tablet Magazine).
The
consistency observed in the pattern of fatalities reveals incongruities that
indicate a significant lack of authenticity. Put differently, they appear to be
deceptive. One would anticipate some degree of day-to-day fluctuation, yet the
average daily casualty figure during the examined period hovers around two
hundred seventy, with a variation of merely fifteen percent. This remarkably
minimal fluctuation is unexpected, as one would anticipate days with
substantially higher-than-average counts (or conversely, lower-than-average
counts). This suggests the likelihood that the Gaza ministry has disseminated
falsified daily figures, exhibiting insufficient variation compared to typical
statistical patterns. Such uniformity may result from a misunderstanding of the
natural variability inherent in data generation processes. Even without
verified control data, the specifics of the daily counts raise significant
suspicions regarding the accuracy of the numbers (Wyner, 2024).
Going
into further detail, Wyner (2024) observes that we should anticipate
fluctuations in the number of child casualties that correspond to variations in
the number of women casualties. This is because daily changes in death tolls
are driven by fluctuations in attacks on residential buildings and tunnels, which
should lead to significant variability in overall counts but with less
variability in the proportion of deaths among demographic groups (men, women,
children): it’s a fundamental statistical principle concerning random
variation. Therefore, days with high female casualties should also see high
numbers of child casualties, while days with low female casualties should
correspond to fewer reported child casualties. This association can be assessed
and quantified using the coefficient of determination (R-squared), which
indicates the level of correlation between daily counts of female casualties
and daily counts of child casualties. In the case of genuine data, one would
expect an R-squared value substantially greater than 0, approaching 1.0.
However, the R-squared coefficient, as depicted in Figure 2, stands at 0.017, a value that statistically and substantively
does not deviate from 0 (Wyner, 2024).
Figure 2.The daily count of children reported as killed has no relationship with the number of women reported. The R-squared coefficient is 0.017, and the relationship is statistically and substantively insignificant (Source: Tablet Magazine).
The lack of correlation serves as the second piece of
circumstantial evidence indicating the potential falsity of the numbers
reported by the Ministry of Health of Gaza. An in-depth examination
necessitates taking into account an additional significant factor: considering
the conflict dynamics, one would anticipate a close relationship between the
daily number of female and male casualties, excluding women and minors. This
assumption stems from the expectation that changes in the frequency and
intensity of bombings and attacks would affect the daily counts of both sexes
uniformly. Contrary to this expectation, data analysis does not show a direct
correlation; instead, it reveals a strong inverse correlation (as shown in the
graph in Figure 2). This finding
contradicts the predictions and further suggests that the reported data may not
be accurate, providing a third piece of evidence supporting the potential
inauthenticity of the figures reported.
Figure 3. The correlation between the daily count of deceased men and the daily count of deceased women is extremely strong and negative (p-value < 0.0001) (Source: Tablet Magazine).
Wyner (2024)
identified further discrepancies within the analyzed data: for example, the
male casualty numbers reported on October 29 appear to contradict those from
the previous day, suggesting the paradoxical possibility that twenty-six men might
have come back to life, or more plausibly, that there were attribution or
recording errors. Additionally, there are days when the reported number of male
casualties is strikingly low, almost nonexistent; if these were simple
recording errors, one would expect the number of female casualties to be
average, at least. However, the article’s Author points out that on the three
days where the male casualty count is nearly zero, suggesting a potential
error, the number of female casualties is notably high. Interestingly, the
three highest daily peaks of female casualties occur on these anomalous days,
as shown in the graph in Figure 3 (Wyner
2024).
Figure 4. There are three days where the count of male casualties is close to zero. These three days correspond to the three highest daily counts of female casualties (Source: Tablet Magazine).
What
conclusions can be drawn from these observations? While not definitive, the
evidence strongly suggests that the figures were generated using a method that
is minimally, if at all, linked to actual events. It appears probable that the Hamas
Ministry of Health arbitrarily determined a daily total number of casualties.
This deduction stems from the excessively consistent increases in the daily
totals, which raises doubts about their reliability. Subsequently,
approximately seventy percent of these totals seem to have been randomly
allocated between women and children, with this distribution changing daily.
Lastly, the male casualty figures were likely adjusted to align with the
pre-determined total. Such an approach could explain the observed
inconsistencies and apparent anomalies in the data (Wyner, 2024).
There are
also additional conspicuous “warning signs.” The Ministry of Health
in Gaza consistently asserts that approximately seventy percent of the
casualties consist of women and children, a proportion markedly higher than
those documented in preceding conflicts with Israel. Moreover, given that
seventy percent of the casualties are purportedly women and children while
adult males comprise twenty-five percent of the population, it strongly implies
that the reported figures are, at the very least, substantially inaccurate and
likely falsified. Furthermore, on February 15, Hamas publicly acknowledged the
loss of 6,000 of its combatants, equating to more than twenty percent of the
total casualties reported, further highlighting discrepancies. Put differently,
if Hamas claims that seventy percent of the casualties are women and children,
alongside twenty percent being combatants, such a scenario appears highly
implausible in an urban armed confrontation, unless Israel intentionally
avoided targeting non-combatant males, or Hamas implies that nearly all male
residents of Gaza are affiliated with Hamas.
Are there
alternative datasets available for those seeking to validate the reliability of
Hamas’s data? Some impartial observers have conceded that Hamas’s casualty
figures in prior conflicts with Israel were relatively accurate. However, the
Israel-Hamas conflict that commenced in 2023 differs drastically in scale and
magnitude from past events; independent monitors, previously able to oversee
clashes between Israel and Hamas, were entirely absent during the recent
conflict, rendering reliance on past occurrences as a benchmark impossible. The
“fog of war” is particularly dense in Gaza, impeding the swift and
precise determination of civilian death tolls. Additionally, official tallies
of Palestinian fatalities do not differentiate between combatants and
civilians, and Hamas attributes all deaths to Israel, including those resulting
from failed Palestinian rocket launches, accidental detonations, intentional
homicides, or internal disputes. Substantiating this, an official Hamas
document (featured in Figure 4),
retrieved by Israeli forces in Gaza, explicitly acknowledges civilian
casualties stemming from failed rocket launches by the Palestinian Islamic
Jihad group and underscores the intent to ascribe responsibility to Israel.
Figure 5. Document attributed to Hamas regarding civilian casualties caused by the misfiring of rockets by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad group.
A team of
researchers from the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health conducted
a comparison between Hamas’s data and information regarding Unrwa (United
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees) workers. They posited
that since the mortality rates appeared to be roughly similar, Hamas’s reported
numbers would not have been artificially inflated. However, this line of
reasoning rests on an unverified assumption: that Unrwa workers are not
disproportionately more susceptible to being killed than the general
population. Wyner (2024) highlights the potential flaw in this assumption,
suggesting that some Unrwa workers may have affiliations with Hamas. This
implication gains weight given that some Unrwa workers were involved in the
events of the October 7th massacre (Wyner, 2024).
The truth
regarding the conflict between Israel and Hamas remains obscured and is likely
to remain so. However, it is plausible that the reported total of civilian
casualties is significantly inflated. Israel’s estimation of at least 12,000
Palestinian fighters killed suggests that even if this number is reasonably
accurate, the ratio between non-combatant and combatant casualties would be
remarkably low. This implies a concerted effort to minimize unnecessary loss of
civilian life while engaging an adversary intermingled within the civilian
populace (Wyner, 2024).
Figure 6. The data used by Wyner, presented in columns (Source: Tablet Magazine).
Bibliography
Bachmann S.D. (2024), Hamas-Israel: Tik Tok and the relevance of
the cognitive warfare domain, Defense Horizon Journal.
Bertolotti C. (2024), Gaza Underground: la guerra sotterranea e
urbana tra Israele e Hamas. Storia, strategie, tattiche, guerra cognitiva e
intelligenza artificiale, ed. START InSight, Lugano, pp. 325, in:
https://www.amazon.it/dp/8832294230.
Wyner A. (2024), How the Gaza Ministry of Health Fakes
Casualty Numbers. The evidence is in their own poorly fabricated figures,
The Tablet, march 7th, in
https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/news/articles/how-gaza-health-ministry-fakes-casualty-numbers.
Farwell J. (2020), Information
Warfare: Forging Communication Strategies for Twenty-first Century Operational
Environments, Chicago University Press, Doi:10.56686/9781732003095.
Iran attacks Israel: the day after.
by Claudio Bertolotti
Teheran has carried out the retaliation announced for the attack it suffered on April 1st, when its consulate in Damascus was targeted, an event that resulted in the death of at least 16 people, including two commanders of the Revolutionary Guards. Overnight, more than 300 drones and cruise missiles, launched by the Islamic Republic and its regional allies – the Ansar Allah Houthis from Yemen, the Iraqi Shiite militias, and Lebanese Hezbollah – targeted Israeli military installations, with most of these intercepted by the Iron Dome defense systems.
The attack by Tehran on Israel is an event that finally highlights the conflict dynamics in the Middle East that until now have seen Tehran strike Israel indirectly, without ever exposing itself. Today everything has changed, and this is the historical event that marks a change of pace, beyond the actual results achieved on the ground. Perhaps a result achieved by Israel is that of having drawn out of the shadows those who, over the last twenty years and more, have managed attacks and offenses against Israel hiding behind its regional proxies, from Syria, to Lebanese Hezbollah to Ansar Allah Houthis in Yemen, the Iraqi Shiite militias, and more recently Hamas itself.
A historic event that could be decisive in resolving conflicts unresolved for decades but that the United States will not allow to be resolved and this not out of a fear of regional expansion of the conflict but because the event itself takes place in full electoral campaign and the incumbent president fears losing the votes of the significant Arab and Muslim component.
On the tactical level, the less relevant one, we can read it as an attempt to saturate the Israeli air defense system by sending a high number of drone aircraft to then strike the targets with ballistic missiles. A failed result.
On the strategic level, the most relevant, and which allows us to make a forecast on the future scenarios of the ongoing conflict, although many analysts argue that it was a demonstrative act, almost symbolic, with the hope on the part of Iran of considering the direct confrontation between Jerusalem and Tehran concluded, personally I believe it was instead an option without choice in relation to the role of Iran in the so-called “Axis of Resistance”: asking its proxies for years to fight consistently with Tehran’s power ambitions would no longer have been sustainable after the Israeli attack on the Iranian embassy in Syria. Coherence, opportunity, sharing of effort: if Tehran had not acted, the entire Axis of Resistance would have weakened, progressively shattered, leaving Tehran alone to face Israel.
Tehran is also particularly fragile on the domestic political front, with a generational discontent increasingly acute and evident.. the search for an external enemy representing an existential threat is a political ruse as old as war. On this we must not be surprised.
However, I fear that the game is still open, although we can expect a diplomatic pause strongly desired by the Biden administration, and this for reasons of electoral campaign rather than strategic opportunity of Washington.
Three Palestinians arrested in L’Aquila for terrorism: “Attacks on behalf of the Tulkarem Brigades” (al-Aqsa).
by Claudio Bertolotti
The
Italian State Police arrested three Palestinian citizens in L’Aquila –
including Anan Yaeesh, a 37-year-old Palestinian currently in jail in Terni
after being arrested on January 27th at the request of Israeli authorities who
are seeking his extradition – accused of planning terrorist attacks, as part of
an operation against extremism. They were taken into custody following the
issuance of a pre-trial detention order for the crime of association with
terrorist purposes, including international targets, and subversion of the
democratic order. According to law enforcement, the arrested were involved in
proselytism and dissemination activities in favor of the organization and
intended to carry out attacks, including self-sacrifice, against civilian and
military targets outside national borders. The Minister of the Interior, Matteo
Piantedosi, expressed his satisfaction with the arrest of the three individuals
considered extremely dangerous, emphasizing the commitment and investigative
excellence of the Italian law enforcement. According to the minister, this
operation demonstrates the effective surveillance and preventive action against
extremism and radicalization, for which he extended his thanks to the police
and the judiciary for the significant success achieved, highlighting the
constant attention to threats to internal security.
Who are they and what are the origins and
objectives of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades?
“The Al-Aqsa Martyrs’
Brigades are a militant wing of the Fatah movement, founded in the late 1950s
by Yasser Arafat and other Palestinian leaders. Emerging at the beginning of
the Al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000, this group has played a significant
role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, conducting attacks against Israeli
military and civilian targets. The Brigades have stated their goal is to fight
Israeli occupation and have claimed responsibility for numerous suicide
attacks, shootings, and missile launches.
Within this organization, the
‘Rapid Response Group – Tulkarem Brigades’ represents a specific operational
articulation that operates mainly in the Tulkarem area, a city located in the
western part of the West Bank. This specific group was established with the aim
of providing a rapid response to Israeli military incursions, exploiting local
terrain knowledge and the ability to quickly mobilize its members in case of
conflict.
The nature of the ‘Rapid
Response Group’ is characterized by its operational agility and ability to
conduct targeted attacks. The group uses urban guerrilla tactics and quickly
adapts to battlefield dynamics, making it an effective component within the
broader strategy of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades. Their activity aims to
create a continuous sense of insecurity among Israeli forces, trying to prevent
or slow down military operations in their area of influence.
Despite their determination,
the actions of groups like the ‘Rapid Response Group – Tulkarem Brigades’ raise
significant questions regarding the cycle of violence in the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Their operations, often directed against civilian
targets, have led to international condemnations and have heightened human
suffering on both sides of the conflict. The complexity of their existence and
operations reflects the intricate network of causes, identities, and loyalties
that characterize the long and painful clash between Israelis and Palestinians.
The presence and actions of
groups like the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades and their ‘Rapid Response Group –
Tulkarem Brigades’ testify to the deep penetration capacity of jihadist
terrorism associated with Hamas, which, through a series of appeals to the
‘anger’ of Muslims, has called its followers to strike in defense of Islam.
Effectively pushing towards the now established phenomenon of emulative,
improvised, and predominantly individual terrorism that has imposed its
presence and will to act in Europe since the advent of the Islamic State
phenomenon (formerly ISIS) in the years 2014/2017. Today, this autonomous and
often unsuccessful terrorism has entered a new competitive dynamic between the
Islamic State brand and the ‘new’ actor of jihad, Hamas, which, while
positioning itself as a ‘national liberation movement,’ has not failed to
extend its vision and call to strike everywhere, with acts of ‘jihad’ aimed at
defending Islam from the corruption and violence of the West.”
The Egyptian strategy in Libya: between diplomacy and military intervention
by Alessia Melcangi, Atlantic Council – University “La Sapienza”
The latest developments in the Libyan crisis seem to have given new impetus to the Egyptian diplomatic initiative; Cairo’s intention to temporarily abandon the military option in support of dialogue between rival groups comes as a result of the ceasefire announced by the Government of National Accord (GNA) of Tripoli at the end of August 2020. If the diplomatic option would be ineffective or would not guarantee Egypt’s strategic interests in that country, Cairo could go back to the military option, which was never com-pletely set aside
Latest developments in the Libyan crisis and Cairo’s intentions
The latest developments in the Libyan crisis seem to have given new impetus to the Egyptian diplomatic initiative: in fact, on September 23, President al-Sisi hosted a meeting in Cairo between the Libyan National Army’s leader, General Khalifa Haftar, and the spokesman of the Tobruk parliament, Aguila Saleh. The purpose of this talk was to solicit the warring parties to restart the political process under UN supervision with the aim of restoring security and stability in the country (Ahram, 2020).
Cairo’s intention to temporarily abandon the military option in support of dialogue between rival groups comes as a result of the ceasefire announced by the Government of National Accord (GNA) of Tripoli at the end of August 2020. Egypt is not new to this type of strategy which, since the fall of Gaddafi in 2011, has followed two main directions: on the one hand, Cairo uses political mediation as a tool to achieve a diplomatic solution to the conflict; on the other hand, logistically and militarily it supports Haftar’s offensive against Tripoli, together with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia. Recently Egypt went as far as threatening to start a conflict for the defense of its own national security and its interests in Libya (Melcangi, 2020).
As a consequence of Ankara’s intervention in support of the GNA ‒, following the December 2019 agreements signed between Turkey and Libya on maritime border demarcation and military cooperation (Butler, Gumrukcu, 2020) ‒, Egypt decided to abandon the diplomatic option and recalibrate its moves in Libya. Turkey represents not only a geopolitical rival, whose strategic projection, particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean, represents a threat for al-Sisi, but also one of the fiercest supporters of political Islam that Cairo, together with the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia always try to obstruct.
The LNA forces’ retreat from the Western front in April 2020, pushed Cairo to resume the diplomatic path, asking for a ceasefire: the motivation behind this move was to avoid the general’s collapse and the loss of Cyrenaica into the hands of Ankara. On June 6, 2020, al-Sisi, supported by Haftar and Aguila Saleh, announced the so-called “Cairo Declaration” (Mezran, Melcangi, 2020), an intra-Libyan resolution for the relaunch of the pacification process. However, the declaration provoked the strong opposition of Ankara and the government of Tripoli. The diplomatic option had therefore turned into a warning of war launched by al-Sisi against the GNA and its supporters, positioned near the so-called red line of Sirte-Al-Jufra, at the gates of the rich and disputed “oil crescent”.
Historically, Libya has been a country of great importance for Egypt from different perspectives: from a domestic security perspective, to avoid the spillover of violence into its territory and penetration of jihadist groups, especially from the porous frontier bordering Cyrenaica; from an economic viewpoint , to deal with the consequences of the drastic decrease in remittances from Egyptian migrants working in Libya, which represent a serious threat to Egypt’s stability and internal security. But also, to reaffirm its image as a geostrategic regional pivot ready to defend its interests in a disputed area as strategic as the Eastern Mediterranean.
Following the latest events, Cairo has decided to abandon its assertive posture and return to a diplomatic strategy: on September 29, 2020 an important talk between the military delegations representing the GNA and the Libyan National Army was held in Hurghada. The principal topic discussed in this meeting was the possible restart of negotiations within the 5+5 Joint Military Committee (JMC). Strongly supported by the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), this meeting allowed Egypt to gain international recognition for its commitment to restarting peace dialogue between the various Libyan factions (UNSMIL, 2020).
Analysis, assessment, forecast
Al-Sisi, during his speech at the 75th session of the United Nations General Assembly, affirmed his support for restarting the political peace process under the aegis of the UN; but, at the same time, President al-Sisi stressed once again that violation of the red-line that goes from Sirte to Jufra, would trigger a strong military reaction by Egypt. So, Egypt seems to want to avoid an expensive military intervention with unpredictable results, but not at any cost. If the diplomatic option would be ineffective or would not guarantee Egypt’s strategic interests in that country, Cairo could go back to the military option, which was never completely set aside. Considering the extreme fluidity of the Libya context, the choice between weapons and diplomacy is far from being obvious (Melcangi, 2020).
Main events in the Maghreb and the Mashreq areas – September
Algeria: The growing importance of Algeria-Turkey relations
Both Algeria and Turkey are keen to build a relationship that is mutually beneficial- but challenges remain. Instability in the broader Middle East, in particular Libya, and a desire to broaden political and economic links, have brought Algeria and Turkey closer. Deepening relations between the two countries is still a relatively recent phenomenon. The “Friendship and Cooperation Agreement” signed in 2006 in Algeria under the current AK Party government, marks one of the first attempts by Ankara to re-calibrate its relations with the West and the global south. Since then, there have been an additional three state visits by Erdogan, the latest in January 2020, following the departure of Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika who was pushed out of power and forced to resign in April 2019 (Gjevori, 2020). Egypt: Egypt cuts interest rates by 50 bps as inflation subsides.
Egypt’s central bank unexpectedly cut its main overnight interest rates by 50 basis points on September 24th, saying exceptionally low inflation gave it room to help boost the economy. The bank’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) reduced the lending rate to 9.75 percent and the deposit rate to 8.75 percent. Inflation remained well below the central bank’s target range of 6 percent to 12 percent (MPC, 2020). Israel: a new peace deal with the United Arab Emirates
US President Donald J. Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on September 15th joined the foreign ministers of the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain at the White House to mark historic normalization agreements between Israel and the two Arab countries. Israel officially established full diplomatic ties with Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). On the one hand, the agreement is a sign of Middle East peace, on the other hand it could be considered as the establishment of a new front against Iran and Turkey. Lebanon: Macron attacks Hizbollah for failure to form Lebanon government
In less than a year, Lebanon has been hit by an economic meltdown, mass protests, financial collapse, a virus outbreak and a huge explosion in August that virtually wiped out the country’s main port, killing more than 190 people and causing up to $4.6bn worth of damage to the capital Beirut.
Recently, French president warns of ‘civil war’ and calls on Beirut’s politicians to compromise: French president Emmanuel Macron blamed the Iran-backed political party and paramilitary group Hizbollah for sabotaging the French-sponsored process to form a Lebanese crisis government and called on Beirut’s political class to try again over the next six weeks. Macron’s speech came after Lebanon’s prime minister-designate resigned on September 26th, saying he was unable to form an emergency government to tackle the overlapping crises which have left Lebanon suffering its most severe turbulence since its 15-year civil war ended in 1990 (Cornish, Abboud, 2020). Morocco: Moroccan security chief warns of terror ‘time-bomb’ in the region
The Moroccan security chief Abdelhak Khiame, head of the Central Bureau of Judicial Investigation (BCIJ), warned that the so-called group Islamic State “has developed in the Sahel-Sahara region, with the conflict in Libya and in countries like Mali which do not control their security”. The Sahel covers western and north-central Africa. “Terrorist cells and terrorism are growing in the region but also organised crime networks, drug trafficking, weapons and human beings”.
About economy, the Minister of Economy, Finance and Administration Reform Mohamed Benchaâboun stated that the national economy is expected to grow by 4.8% in 2021. Given the scenario of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concerning the recovery of the world economy (+5.2%), notably in the euro zone (5.3%), national economic growth should stand at 4.8%». However, this growth could not completely offset the economic contraction of 2020, which is forecast at -5.8%, due to the postponement of the recovery of some sectors such as tourism and related activities, as well as the deterioration of the labor market and corporate investment – the Minister stated. Syria: Carabinieri arrest Italian ‘ISIS bride’ in Syria
The ROS unit of Italy’s Carabinieri police said September 29th that it has arrested Alice Brignoli, an Italian ‘ISIS bride’, in Syria. Brignoli was the wife of Mohamed Koraichi, an Italian with Moroccan roots who became an ISIS militant. The couple left Italy to join the so-colled Islamic State (IS) in Syria in 2015, taking their three children with them. Koraichi, who is thought to have died, took part in IS military operations while the ROS said that Brugnoli had an “active role in teaching the children the cause of the jihad”. She is accused of criminal association for terrorism. The ROS unit tracked down Brignoli and her four children – she gave birth to her fourth child in Syria – and have brought them back to Italy (ANSA).
UK government probing cyber-attack over Syria propaganda leaks. Hackers have penetrated the computer systems of the UK’s foreign ministry and taken hundreds of files detailing the country’s controversial propaganda programmes in war-torn Syria. In a security breach of enormous proportions, the hackers appear to have deliberately targeted files that set out the financial and operational relationships between the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) and a network of private-sector contractors that have been covertly running media platforms in Syria throughout the nine-year civil war (Middle East Eye, 2020) Tunisia: Tunisia rejects any military solution in Libya
Tunisian Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi reiterated on September 28th that he rejects any military solution in Libya and intervention in its internal affairs. Addressing heads of Tunisian diplomatic missions, he said combining efforts to push the political settlement forward through an intra-Libyan dialogue under UN supervision. In response to the UAE and Bahrain signs of the US-sponsored agreements to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, Mechichi also stressed on Tunisia’s firm position on supporting the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people based on the 2002 Arab Peace initiative (Thabeti, 2020).
EUNAVFORMED “Irini” operation: constraints and two critical issues
Abstract The war in Libya represents the main obstacle to stability in the Mediterranean area. While regional and international actors scramble for influence, the European Union and European states seem unable to revive the diplomatic path launched last January with the Berlin Conference and to prevent a looming humanitarian disaster just beyond the EU’s southern border (ISPI, 2020). As war persists in the North African country, factors such as weapons’ supply, illegal migration, drugs and human trafficking continue to affect the region and the south of Europe -including NATO’s border- and to impact on security in the area. EUNAVFORMED’s “Irini” operation aims at ending arms trafficking in Libya: but such goal is far from being achieveddue to a lack of political cohesion and ineffective military capability.
Analysis by Claudio Bertolotti
EUNAVFORMED’s “Irini” operation: constraints and two critical issues
The Berlin Summit as a premise to the “Irini” operation Participants at the Berlin Conference on Libya, which was held on 19th January 2020, committed specifically to fully respecting and implementing the arms embargo established by the United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1970 (2011), 2292 (2016) and 2473 (2019). On 17th February 2020, the Council agreed to launch a new military operation in the Mediterranean, which would oversee the enactment of the embargo by means of aerial, satellite and maritime assets. In a break-through following months of negotiations, Greece confirmed its willingness to assist irregular migrants saved at sea by EU military ships, who would therefore not -at least formally- be sent over to an already hard-pressed Italy. This issue had previously stalled any tangible progress.
On 31st March 2020 Josep Borrell, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy announced an agreement over the creation of operation “Irini” (Greek for “peace”), an Italian-led mission with its operational centre in Rome. As well as supporting the implementation of the UN arms embargo on Libya, and in accordance with Resolution 2292 of the U.N. Security Council, the mission also entails the inspection of vessels navigating the high seas off the coast of Libya, assumed to be carrying weapons (or related material) to, and from, Libya; it also inherits some secondary tasks from its predecessor, EUNAVFORMED’s operation “Sophia”, including the training of the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy, and search-and-rescue duties.
the mission entails the inspection of vessels navigating the high seas off the coast of Libya, assumed to be carrying weapons to and from Libya
But up to now, “Irini” proved unable to achieve its primary goal, due to a fundamental political weakness brought about by the heterogeneous priorities set by EU countries, and to a limited military capability.
“Irini” ’s mission On 30th March 2020, the European Council officially launched EUNAVFORMED’s “Irini” operation in the Mediterranean. Through the imposition of an arms embargo and a new military operation within the scope of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the European Union is stepping up its efforts towards peace in Libya.
up to now, “Irini” proved unable to achieve its primary goal, due to a fundamental political weakness brought about by the heterogeneous priorities set by EU countries, and to a limited military capability
The main task assigned to EUNAVFORMED’s “Irini” consists in implementing the embargo by also inspecting vessels to and from Libya, which can be reasonably assumed to be carrying weapons (or related material) for belligerents; as well as gathering extensive and comprehensive information on the trafficking of arms and other military equipment and supplies by sea. As secondary tasks, EUNAVFOR MED “Irini” will also:
monitor and gather information on illicit exports of petroleum, crude oil and refined petroleum products from Libya
contribute to the capacity-building and training of the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy in law enforcement tasks at sea
contribute to the disruption of the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks through information gathering and patrolling by planes
“Irini” ’s mandate will initially last until 31st March 2021 and the operation will be performed under the close scrutiny of EU Member States, who will exercise political control and strategic direction through the Political and Security Committee (PSC) -in its turn under the responsibility of the Council and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy-. Unlike its predecessor “Sophia”, which operated in the Strait of Sicily, “Irini” shifted eastwards to patrol the waters between Egypt and Crete, with special attention payed to Cyrenaica.
A worsening situation: weapons keep reaching Libya
The internationalization of the conflict -its transformation from a civil war into a war by proxy- ensures that technologically-advanced military equipment continue to reach Libya by air, land, and sea. The fact that non-state armed actors in the country are pretty familiar with such weapons systems is a harbinger of danger for bordering countries as well: between 2012 and 2014, terrorists and separatist groups filled their arsenals with weapons belonging to the former Libyan army. These weapons could now cross into bordering countries, a number of which are increasingly struggling with insurgencies fueled by, among others, the so-called and dangerous as ever Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaida.
participants at the Berlin Conference on Libya committed to fully respecting the arms embargo established by the UN Security Council; according to the UN, the latter has since been broken by several participants
Against such background, the optimist attitude displayed at the Berlin Conference now seems unjustified, especially as according to the UN, the arms embargo has since been broken by several Summit participants, with planes landing at airports in both Eastern and Western Libya with their cargos of weapons, armored vehicles, foreign fighters, and military advisors. The UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL, 2020) reported that “several among those who participated in the Berlin Conference” have been involved in the “ongoing transfer of foreign fighters, weapons, ammunition and advanced systems” and other military equipment (Kaim, Schulz, 2020).
From theory to practice: operational difficulties and political boundaries “Irini” started its activities at sea on 4th May but, despite some initial confidence, it has since been marred by differences among EU members. Greek and French ships joined the mission at the end of May but Malta, which had pledged specially-trained on-board personnel, withdrew its participation in an apparent attempt at influencing the Libyan GNA and Turkey.
The mission currently operates with the Greek frigate “Spetsai” (Hydra class) and the French frigate “Jean Bart” (Cassard class); a small maritime reconnaissance aircraft made available by Luxembourg and Poland; a German P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft; and (as of July) the Italian ship “San Giorgio”. In August, Germany provided its “Hamburg” vessel -a Sachsen class frigate with a crew of 250 military personnel. Italy further contributes with a drone for surveillance operations and with the logistical bases of Augusta, Pantelleria and Sigonella, while a P72 maritime patrol aircraft, an Air early-warning aircraft (Aew) and a submarine “will occasionally be available in support” (Pioppi, 2020). According to its operational commander, the deployment will “soon be capable of reaching full operational capacity” (Pioppi, 2020): nevertheless, compared to its initial objectives, it suffers from very limited resources and its effectiveness is further undermined by poor political cohesion among the 27 European partners.
Turkey’s challenge to the European Union On 10th of June 2020 the Greek frigate “Spetsai” (under Italian command) tried to approach Tanzanian-flagged mercantile ship “Cirkin”, which was being suspected of carrying weapons from Turkey to Tripoli. The maneuver was countered in the Gulf of Sirte by direct intervention of a Turkish military unit escorting the mercantile (Hassad, 2020). A second Turkish military unit apparently converged towards the Greek frigate after a Greek navy helicopter overflew the “Cirkin”. As soon as the Greek helicopter approached the “Cirkin”, it received a call from the Turkish frigate explaining that “the Turkish ship is under the protection of the Turkish Republic”. The Turkish official said that the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) had not recognized “Irini”. A laser framing action on the part of the Turks -as a prelude to an escalation- is thought to have put an end to the situation by forcing “Spetsai” into retreat.
The “Cirkin” freighter, which entered the port of Tripoli on 11th of June (a day after the event), had set sail from the Sea of Marmara, south of Istanbul, after docking in a “roll-on roll-off” (RORO) port for a loadful of weapons, equipment and heavy vehicles, including armored vehicles hailing from a nearby military base of the Turkish army. The 4,000 tons, 100 metre’s long Turkish freighter was launched in 1980 and has previously been used by Ankara for shipping armored vehicles and other equipment to the GNA in Tripoli.
Greece denounced the incident -which would later re-occur with the French ship as well- as a blatant violation of the UN embargo; to which Ankara replied by underlining how, since the “Cirkin” enjoyed Turkish protection, the “Irini” intervention could in fact be deemed un-necessary. Turkey undeniably exposed the European operation’s critical issues; it also criticized its unilateral bias in favor of General Khalifa Haftar and further suggested the creation of a new mechanism by the United Nations (Hurriyet Daily News, 2020).
The incident, which did not make headlines outside Greece, testifies to the political -rather than operational- ineffectiveness of the European mission, which is supposed to be enforcing a military embargo on Libya; but as a matter of fact, does not seem to be able to control naval routes and to stop flows of weapons and other equipment from reaching General Haftar’s faction by land, from Egypt, and by air, from Russia.
the fact that the EU mission deals primarily with naval violations of the embargo raises questions about its effectiveness
“Irini” ’s two principal shortcomings
The fact that the EU mission deals primarily with naval violations of the embargo raises questions about its effectiveness. Military supplies reach the opposing Libyan factions from two directions: the western maritime border, used by Turkey to provide the GNA in Tripoli with weapons and fighters; and the eastern border, whereby Egypt and the United Arab Emirates send their support to Haftar’s LNA (al-Jazeera, 2020). As Egypt and the UAE are determined to take advantage of the situation, the Turks are left with no other option than supplying Tripoli with weapons across waters that are now being patrolled by the EU.
Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu recently complained that “the EU mission did not do anything to stop other powers’ shipments into Libya”, including what he alleged were “arms being sent by France to Haftar”. France, which denies supporting Haftar but has long been suspected of favoring him, voiced its fury last month after alleging that the French ship “Courbet” was subjected to laser framing by Turkish frigates’, while inspecting a mercantile en route to Libya (al-Jazeera, 2020).
Italian Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio addressed the issue as well by specifying that “Irini” “is not a naval blockade. The international regulatory framework includes the naval blockade as a method of war. Therefore, the blockade is a measure that can only be adopted during international armed conflicts. “Irini” envisages measures which must be selective, legitimate and fully respectful of international law, and aimed at promoting the return of peace and security in Libya “(Di Feo, 2020). Di Maio’s statement implicitly upholds the operation’s structural limitations, which clearly emerge in the form of two main criticalities.
the absence of a jurisdictional framework for States to operate in Libya or bordering nations, allows countries wanting to flout the arms embargo, to directly supply weapons to the conflicting parties by land, sea and air
One of the weak points of the arms embargo on Libya consists in its implementation. States’ and EU actions are restricted to enforcing the arms embargo at sea. Initially, the Security Council had only called upon States to inspect all cargos to and from Libya “in their territory, including at seaports and airports”, should they possess information providing reasonable grounds to believe that those cargos contained arms. The absence of a jurisdictional framework or authorization for States to act outside their own territory and to operate in Libya or bordering nations, allows countries wanting to flout the arms embargo, to directly supply weapons to the conflicting parties by land, sea and air.
The second criticality resides in the option of extending monitoring activities to Libya’s land borders, which involves having “boots on the ground” EU military personnel, but only in the event of a request from local authorities. If up to very recently, an agreement on this issue between General Khalifa Haftar in Tobruk and Tripoli government’s chairman Fayez al-Serraj seemed utterly unlikely, the truce which was announced on 21st August 2020 by al-Serraj and Aguila Saleh (spokesperson of the Chamber of Representatives in Tobruk) could open a different scenario (and al-Serraj’s apparent intention of leaving office at the end of October also adds to the picture[1]). Currently though, without any Security Council authorization or consent on the part of the Libyan authorities, the EU cannot conduct any aerial surveillance activities within Libyan airspace, let alone stem the supply of weapons by air or enforce the arms embargo on the ground in Libya. As most of the weapons destined for General Haftar’s forces are being transported by land or air, a stricter enforcement of the arms embargo at sea comes at the expense of the Libyan Government of National Accord, which receives most of its supplies from Turkey via the sea route.
One might question whether the EU operation will be any more than symbolic, as EU member States are not likely prepared to commit all the naval and surveillance assets which are required to effectively enforce the arms embargo.
Analysis, assessment, forecast Despite the UN arms embargo, Turkey signed a military cooperation deal with the GNA and sent drones, armored vehicles, Syrian mercenaries and military officers to support al-Sarraj against the forces of eastern-based commander, General Khalifa Haftar. Ankara’s support affected the balance on the ground, forcing Haftar’s Libyan National Army to retreat from the west of the country following an unsuccessful attempt at capturing Tripoli; an attempt which turned into an exhausting one-year siege.
It is clear how current rules make it impossible to stop weapons’ shipments from Turkey, while the latter consolidates its position and role in Tripoli. As a sign of this, Ankara was assigned the port of Misurata in a move which saw the simultaneous removal of Italy from the same area.
“Irini” should essentially consist in a deterrent barrier; however, due to its shortcomings in countering embargo violations, such deterrence inevitably fails and Europe cannot but acknowledge, at most, Turkey’s commitment to war, and its success in Libya.
Due to a lack of control on land, sea and air routes, the overall impact of “Irini” is currently marginal. The mission will only be successful in so far as it is inscribed into a broader strategy which needs to be clearly defined and better implemented.
As recently suggested by ECFR (European Council for Foreign Relations), Italy should grab the opportunity offered by the German presidency of the EU Council to initiate a platform from which -together with allies- to enforce international norms on the conflict; broker among international competitors who have an interest in ‘feeding’ a war-by-proxy; enable a new UN conference on Libya. An engagement in this direction would jeopardize Russia’s attempt at protracting the conflict and possibly fill the vacuum generated by Turkey, Egypt and the UAE, who are supporting opposing sides.
due to a lack of control on land, sea and air routes, the overall impact of “Irini” is currently marginal. The mission will only be successful in so far as it is inscribed into a broader strategy
The recent UN Security Council resolution 2473 (2019) in support of operation “Irini” can be seen as a useful stepping-stone towards bolstering a European political vision able to turn into diplomatic and military action and initiative. EU member States should launch a real, impartial and balanced operation based on a shared strategy, which would concretely fulfill the Berlin Conference’s commitments. In order for this to be achieved, the embargo must necessarily be extended to include air and land, rather than being restricted to patrolling sea routes (Varvelli and Megerisi, 2020).
[1] On 15th September 2020, al-Serraj apparently announced his intention to leave his post at the helm of the GNA by the end of October.
WAR AND PEACE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: understanding the Turkish escalation between the Chinese expansionism in Africa and the reshaping of Middle Eastern equilibria
by Andrea Molle
The renewed interest in the Mediterranean, too often considered as a secondary theater in the context of International Relations, derives from several medium and long-term processes that are affecting the global geopolitical equilibria. In particular, it is the consequence of an aggressive Chinese trade policy in Sub-Saharan Africa, which has intensified in the last decade and sees many African states, such as Kenya and Congo, for example, reduced to colonies or in a de facto subordination to China’s interests.
This dynamic is echoed by Beijing’s desire to complete its Belt and Road Initiative, affirming itself as a privileged trading partner of the most important powers within the EU to force it in a relationship of strong dependence. This scenario is made possible by the vacuum created with the protectionist and isolationist turn of the USA led by Donald J. Trump, who seems to lack any coherent international strategy. Moreover, it is a consequence of the lack of a coordinated European strategy in foreign affairs, as demonstrated by the recent Italian interest in becoming a closer partner to China independently from its partners’ choices.
The intensifying of migratory fluxes, aggravated by climate change, corruption, and the increased radicalization in Africa, is a symptom of the destabilization resulting from the Chinese expansionist policy that handed control of critical commercial routes and hubs over to Beijing. Faced with a substantial erosion of their economic systems, mostly caused by the quasi-monopolies established by Chinese companies and investors and the consequent social crisis, more and more people leave Africa to seek fortune in Europe, accentuating the demographic crisis of the continent. Paradoxically, such an easing of demographic pressure contributes to the perpetuating of Chinese control over African governments, hence aggravating the crisis and divisions within the European Union.
Moreover, the crisis is exacerbated by the recent Turkish initiatives aimed to gain a hegemonic role in the Maghreb and the Eastern Mediterranean. This pitch invasion is seemingly facilitated by the shared Islamic culture to which Turkey claims the role of Defensor in open competition with other countries such as Saudi Arabia. Once again, this is a consequence of America’s withdrawal and the lack of a single European voice. With the expected resignation of Fayez al-Sarraj, the head of the Government of National Accord (GNA) recognized by the United Nations, the effects on the current Turkish activities in Libya are hard to anticipate. Nevertheless, the intentions of Ankara remain unchanged: to become the privileged Chinese partner by taking advantage of this economic and political conjuncture.
To better understand Ankara’s strategy while not underestimating its chances of success, it is paramount to consider the totality and complexities of the Sino-Turkish relations. We are witnessing several signals. First of all, a softening of visa policies between the two powers has been underway for years. In addition to intensified cultural exchanges, China has recently granted Turkey considerable financial resources to support the industrial and military development plans of the government led by Erdogan. To overcome its structural military inadequacies, Turkey is now rumored to considering the purchase of fifth-generation Shenyang J-31 stealth fighter aircraft. The opening to a partnership with China has been made possible by the exclusion of Turkey from the Lockheed Martin F-35 initiative, wanted by the US. It also represents a further step towards Turkey’s exit from NATO. Should it happen, the loss of the Turkish partner would undoubtedly cause a crisis in the Atlantic Alliance, which is already in a state of suspended animation according to several international observers. A possible weakening of NATO is also a goal of Putin’s Russia, which, despite the current political tension with Turkey, is already providing the country with anti-aircraft systems and is pressing Ankara to purchase its Sukhoi Su-57 stealth fighters.
In this context, the normalization of the diplomatic relations between Israel and some of the Middle Eastern powers, such as the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, and the unconfirmed rumors of possible future agreements for developing common military assets, should not be at all surprising. Indeed, this event cannot be just considered due to Trump’s plan to bring stability to the Middle East, which many commentators describe as insufficient if not wholly nonexistent. Instead, it must be understood as evidence that the Arab world, in a perpetual crisis of relevance, is aware of the profound changes in the geopolitical equilibrium of the Eastern Mediterranean and is trying to gain the most advantageous position possible. Finally, what seems to be consolidation now may appear as an anti-Turkish front. However, on a closer look, it is more likely to form an opposing front to Chinese neo-colonial reaches in Africa, or at least contain them while reducing at the same time the dependency from the West.
This game of Risk against the Sleeping Giant will eventually involve all those Persian Gulf countries, which were once sworn enemies of the Jewish state, which today think of Israel more and more as a natural ally. To them, Tel Aviv will represent not only a strong military partner but also an economic and technological hub capable of rivaling Beijing. Such a realignment of alliances and loyalties would probably lead to a solution to the long-standing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This result, however, will not be due to either the American mediation or the joint efforts of various nations and international organizations. But instead to the emergence of a common enemy at the horizon. If a solution is therefore reached, it will, unfortunately, be at the expense of the Palestinians. Clinging to obsolete rhetoric and increasingly marginalized by their former allies, they do not seem willing to accept the changes and adapt their long-term objectives and strategy accordingly, falling into complete irrelevance.
With tensions with China predictably on the rise and in the face of the recent threats to Greece, the US has recently taken a stand, causing the temporary withdrawal of Turkish exploration vessels in the territorial waters controlled by Athens. However, coming “too late and one dollar short,” the US is not signaling any intent to get involved in the Eastern Mediterranean. On the contrary, responding to the American intervention and following the announcement of military exercises planned by the Greek armed forces in the northern Aegean, Ankara accused again Athens of violating the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which ended the Greek-Turkish war (1919- 1923) by redesigning the new borders between the two countries. It is not the first time that Turkey has accused Greece of violating the Treaty. The first time was in June 1964, following the deployment of a Greek motorized brigade on the island. However, this time Turkey does not seem to rule out a military reaction to the exercises recently announced by Athens.
On the northern shore of mare nostrum, things are not going any better. Although it is clear that the game that is being played in the Mediterranean, and that involves Greece and Cyprus, is an existential threat to European and Western interests, including the survival of the European Union, few nations have fully understood it. Amongst the European capitals, the change in the balance that for years accompanied the Union’s Mediterranean policy seems to be fully appreciated only by Paris. Accused of only aiming to control negligible energy resources, the second powerhouse of the EU has instead always pushed for a more incisive international role for Europe and its military integration. France is left alone while Berlin acts as Germany is still a trading state, interested only in short-term economic gains and not to upset the precarious balance reached with Turkey on the issue of migrants from the Balkan route.
As for Italy, Rome seems to think its best option is to take once again on the very same posture of equidistance and neutrality that has reduced it to a background actor in the international relations system with the addition of a dangerously ambiguous relationship with China. Nevertheless, France, which appears to be the natural candidate to lead the Union’s foreign policy, cannot expect to win this game alone. Geography is not an opinion: without Italy, the second naval power in the EU, Europe stands no chances of being relevant. It will inevitably be doomed in a humiliating position of subjugation.
Main events in the Maghreb and the Mashreq – August
Algeria: beyond the crisis, Algeria allows private banks, airlines, sea transport firms
Algeria will allow its private sector to set up banks as well as air and sea transport companies for goods and passengers to reduce spending, President Abdelmadjid Tebboune said on 18th August. The move is part of wider reforms by the OPEC member to cope with financial problems caused by a sharp fall in energy export revenues, the main source of state funding for the North African country. Elected in December 2019, Tebboune wants to encourage private investors and improve the investment climate in an effort to develop the non-energy sector and reduce reliance on oil and gas.
Algeria’s foreign exchange reserves have fallen to $57 billion from $62 billion in January, while energy export revenues are expected to reach $24 billion this year compared with $33 billion in 2019, Tebboune said. Energy earnings currently account for 94% of total exports and the government aims to bring that figure to 80% from next year, while increasing the value of exports of non-energy products to $5 billion from $2 billion now, he added. To achieve that goal, the authorities will allocate $14.84 billion to help finance investment projects for the coming months (MEMO – Middle East Monitor, 2020).
Egypt: Greek deals with Egypt, Italy
The agreement for the partial designation of an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) between Greece and Egypt in the eastern Mediterranean was signed on August 6 in Cairo. For Athens, the deal effectively nullified a maritime accord between Turkey and the internationally recognized government of Libya signed last year. This agreement is part of a broader strategy of settling bilateral issues, building alliances with third parties in a way that promotes national interests, based on respect for international law. It is also a balanced agreement that is fully in line with the United Nations Law of the Sea, a piece of international law in which Turkey is one of only 15 countries in the whole world to not sign or ratify. The agreement with Egypt came after Greece signed a deal with Italy on June 9 which effectively extended a 1977 agreement between the two states on continental shelves in the Ionian Sea.
Israele: a new peace deal with the United Arab Emirates
Israel Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and UAE Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed had agreed to a peace agreement: Israel it will temporarily “suspend” plans to annex the West Bank, as part of a new peace deal. The deal was announced by US President Donald Trump.
The UAE and Israel plan to exchange embassies and ambassadors, according to the statement. It will be the third Arab country to open relations with Israel, after Egypt and Jordan. Netanyahu formally thanked Egyptian President Adel-Fattah el-Sisi and the governments of Oman and Bahrain for their support to the normalization of relations between Abu Dhabi and Jerusalem.
But Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas trashed the peace agreement as “a betrayal of Jerusalem.” In a statement read out on Palestine TV, Abbas spokesman Nabil Abu Rudeineh said, “The Palestinian leadership rejects what the United Arab Emirates has done and considers it a betrayal of Jerusalem, the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Palestinian cause. This deal is a de facto recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. The PA also announced it was immediately withdrawing its Ambassador to the UAE, according to a statement on the Palestinian news agency Wafa. Officials from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) rejected the agreement, as did Palestinian militant group Hamas.
Lebanon: the Beirut explosion a Turning Point for Lebanon?
On the afternoon of 4th August 2020, two explosions occurred at the port of the city of Beirut, the capital of Lebanon. The second explosion was extremely powerful, and caused at least 177 deaths, 6,000 injuries, and US$10–15 billion in property damage, leaving an estimated 300,000 people homeless. The main blast at Beirut’s port was caused when an estimated 2,750 tons of ammonium nitrate had been ignited: ammonium nitrate is a highly combustible material used to make fertilisers and bombs. The appalling negligence that left more than 2,700 tons of ammonium nitrate stored in the port in unsuitable climatic conditions, with no expert oversight, for more than six years demonstrate the endemic corruption and incompetence of a country devasted by decades of settarian conflicts, absence of a governance and cynical political games played by regional States and internal actors. Exacerbated by the pandemic, the chronic corruption and misrule had brought the economy to ruin; because a long term economic and social crisis the State is going to fail, although Lebanon has been a failing state for years.
For months prices have been soaring and the middle class has been sinking into poverty and despair. For weeks, before the explosion, residents of the capital demonstrated against mismanagement and economic uncertainty. Since the day of the explosion, protesters tried to break the police and army cordons; as consequence, Lebanon’s parliament has approved a state of emergency that grants sweeping powers to the army: the state of emergency allows the army to curb free speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of the press, as well as to enter homes and arrest anyone deemed a security threat. But it was not enough to contain the mass protests: the demonstrations prompted Prime Minister Hassan Diab and his cabinet to resign: but the crisis is too deep to be resolved by a change of management.
The impact of the crisis is terrific, especially in the urban areas. People try to leave or survive thanks to economic support from relatives abroad; others are resorting to some support from Hezbollah. Economic sanctions have made Iran less generous, but Hezbollah continues to maintain a widespread patronage network. The main short-term consequence is fragmentation and criminalisation. In the long term, it remains to be seen in which sphere of influence Lebanon ends up. Iran is trying to exploit the deadlock, but cannot alleviate its financial need. Hezbollah is now increasingly looking to China, such as the government that is trying to attract Chinese investment and China itself sees an additional hub in the East Mediterranean (in addition to the bridgeheads it already has in Egypt and Greece), (Holslag, 2020).
Libya: Turkey and Qatar sign military cooperation deal with Libya government
According to Ahval News, Turkey and Qatar have signed a tripartite deal with the Libyan government for military cooperation, in a new development set to enhance the government’s defence against the forces of Khalifa Haftar. The agreement, which was announced by Libya’s Deputy Defence Minister Salam Al-Namroush on 17th August, will establish military facilities and training programmes within the country. This cooperation will include Qatar’s funding of military training centres and the establishment of a trilateral coordination centre and Turkish naval base in the city of Misrata. Consultation will also be provided to Libyan government forces as part of the agreement.
Italy, which has been present in Misrata for years with its own military hospital, has been removed from the area, making the efforts made so far in vain. The same Italian staff will be redeployed near the capital Tripoli.
Syria: U.S. troop levels in Iraq and Syria would most likely shrink in the coming months
The top American military commander in the Middle East said that U.S. troop levels in Iraq and Syria would most likely shrink in the coming months, but that he had not yet received orders to begin withdrawing forces.
Gen. Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr., the head of the Pentagon’s Central Command, said the 5,200 troops in Iraq to help fight remnants of the Islamic State and train Iraqi forces “will be adjusted” after consultations with the government in Baghdad.
General McKenzie said he expected American and other NATO forces to maintain “a long-term presence” in Iraq — both to help fight Islamic extremists and to check Iranian influence in the country. He declined to say how large that presence might be, but other American officials said discussions with Iraqi officials that resume this month could result in a reduction to around 3,500 U.S. troops.
Despite President Trump’s demand last fall for a complete withdrawal of all 1,000 American forces from Syria, the president still has some 500 troops, mostly in the country’s northeast, assisting local Syrian Kurdish allies in combating pockets of ISIS fighters (Schmitt, 2020).
Morocco:Morocco, Portugal Pledge to Fight Against Irregular Migration
Portugal and Morocco have pledged to join efforts to curb irregular migration: Rabat and Lisbon announced the move in a statement following a videoconference between Portugal’s Minister of Internal Affairs, Eduardo Cabrita, and Morocco’s Minister of the Interior, Abdelouafi Laftit. The two officials built the conference’s talking points on the strong cooperation between Morocco and the European Union on security issues. They expressed their governments’ readiness to “intensify” their security cooperation within the broader EU-Morocco agenda of preventing and fighting against “illegal migration and human trafficking.” According to reports, the increasing shift towards Portugal is directly linked to Morocco’s success in curbing migrants’ attempts to reach Europe through Spain, which has long been the traditional route of waves of irregular migrants in recent years (Tamba, 2020).
Tunisia: Tunisia cracks down on migrant departures. Economic crisis worsens
Thousands of migrants disembarked on Lampedusa and Sicily in July and August. The governor of the Sicilian region has called on the federal government to call a state of emergency with hotspots above capacity and a number of migrants testing positive for coronavirus. The majority of the migrants who reportedly disembarked on Lampedusa and Sicily came from Tunisia. Italian authorities reported that in 2020, nearly half of the over 16,000 people who have landed on Italy’s shores departed from Tunisia.
Following pressure from the Italian foreign ministry, Tunisia announced on August 6 that it had made available more means to counter irregular migrant departures from the North African country. Tunisia has announced that it has made available naval units, surveillance devices, and search teams at Mediterranean crossing points to counter irregular migrant departures (ANSA).
Italy’s Interior Ministry has released €11 million ($13 million) to Tunisia’s government for use in efforts to stem the flow of migrants. On 18th August, Italian Interior Minister Luciana Lamorgese and Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio visited Tunis, accompanied by European Commissioner for Home Affairs Ylva Johansson and European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy Oliver Varhelji.
The decision arrived in a critical moment for the country both at economic and political level: the economic situation is worsening and the tourism sector’s revenues down 56% at the end of July to 1.2 billion dinars compared to 2.6 billion in the same period last year (ANSA). Economic crisis is a push factors for Tunisian migrants. At political level, Tunisia’s prime minister-designate Hichem Mechichi said he would form a purely technocratic government following wrangling among political parties over the formation of the country’s next administration. The decision will likely put the prime minister-designate in confrontation with the Islamist Ennahdha Party, the largest political group in parliament, which announced it would oppose the formation of a non-political government. However, the proposal for a government of independent technocrats without political parties will win support from the powerful UGTT trade union and some other parties, including Tahya Tounes and Dustoury el Hor. Protests have erupted in the country’s interior this year over widespread unemployment, lack of development and poor public services in health, electricity and water.
Strategic Analysis 2019: Mashreq, Greater Maghreb, Egypt and Israel
The full report Strategic Analysis 2019: Mashreq, Gran Maghreb, Egypt and Israel by C. Bertolotti is now available
Introduction: factors and challenges in Maghreb and Mashreq areas
The 2011 Arab uprisings’ represents a breaking point announcing the need for a regime overhaul in the region; the consequences of these strong aftershocks still have the potential to undermine the entire Arab state system.
Dramatic changes in the Maghreb and Mashreq area after 2011 underline the need for external actors to forge a new policy approach to address the region’s long-term challenges. In tackling the region’s increasingly intersecting and conflicting politics, aggravated by external interventions, international policy makers should keep their attention on both old and new conflict drivers, or risk fighting symptoms rather than causes, and thus potentially do more harm.
The Arab uprisings underlined the notion that existing conditions in the Maghreb and Mashreq area had become unmaintainable and announced the region-wide expiry of a socioeconomic order that had underwritten relative stability for decades. Today, the grievances that led to the near collapse of the regional order persist, and economic trends paint a bleak picture of further decline. Within the area, political dynamics will continue to feed frustrations among the mass of the population, fueling unrest and outmigration. At the same time, the 2011 uprisings produced a certain momentum for change, and in some places provided new opportunities.
At social level, the countries within the Maghreb and Mashreq area have significant population growth and concentration in a largely challenging environment both physically and in terms of infrastructure and socio-economic development. This means that in many places there is an excess of water food and energy demand over supply. This is particularly the case in areas of extreme population concentration, along rivers and coasts for example, in otherwise dry and climatically challenging environments. Dense populations in a few areas surrounded by vast expanses of virtually uninhabited land create pressures in the concentrated spaces and challenges in governance over the more remote areas.
At economic level, as reported by the World Bank, growth in the Maghreb and Mashreq area is projected to remain subdued, at 1.3 percent. Activity in oil exporters has slowed due to weak oil sector output and the effects of intensified U.S. sanctions on Iran, despite an easing of fiscal stance and positive prospects in non-oil sectors in some countries. Many oil importers continue to benefit from business climate reforms and resilient tourism activity. Regional growth is projected to pick up to around 3 percent a year in 2020-21, supported by capital investment and policy reforms.
Risks to the outlook are tilted to the downside, including geopolitical tensions, reform setbacks, and a further escalation of global trade tensions.
Download the ITA/ENG full report Strategic Analysis 2019: Mashreq, Greater Maghreb, Egypt and Israel, by C. Bertolotti (pdf version) Download the ITA/ENG full report Strategic Analysis 2019: Mashreq, Greater Maghreb, Egypt and Israel, by C. Bertolotti (eBook ePubb versio
SUMMARY
Introduction: factors and challenges in Maghreb and Mashreq areas
Algeria. Instabilità politica: tra opposizione e repressione
Main events
The political consequences of the mass protests
Who will succeed to Bouteflika?
Analysis, assessments and forecasts
Libya: Turkey’s strategic interest and the military support to Islamists. Russian expansion in Libya
Main events
The siege of Tripoli and the activism of the Libyan “Islamic State”
The political front
The military front
Turkish activism in support to Islamists: between financial interests and military aid
Turkey’s activism in Misurata and the bombing of the airport hosting the Italian contingent
Italian military presence in Misrata
As the competition for the Libyan oil assets becomes harsher, the Italian interests are affected
Russian expansion in Libya
Syria. “Peace spring”: the third Turkish military operation in Syria. The weakening of the Kurdish-Syrian YPG and the death of Abu Bakr al Baghdadi
Main events
“Peace spring”, October 9-23
Conflict history: the battlefield moves to the border
The US-Turkey and Russia-Turkey agreements. US flexibility and strengthening of the Moscow-Ankara axis
Analysis, assessments and forecasts
Tunisia. A new political balance after Béji Caïd Essebsi?
Main events
The legacy of Béji Caïd Essebsi
Political dynamics
Security concerns
Analysis, assessment and forecasts
Israel. Political uncertainty and attacks by the “Palestinian Islamic Jihad” group
Main events
The terrorist “Palestinian Islamic Jihad” group attacked Israel after the death of one of its leaders
Egypt. Popular protests do not weaken the government
Main events
Lebanon. Popular protests force the prime minister to resign
Main events
Morocco: new approach to combating terrorism and greater security efforts
Main events
The strategic priorities and the pillars
Fighting regional terrorism
Broadening the scope of defense to include security challenges
Morocco wants women, minors held in Iraq, Syria to come home
BCIJ Discovers Hideout of Dismantled, IS-linked Terror Cell
Consequences, risks and opportunities of oil price changes in the Maghreb and Mashreq countries
Impact on major North African oil producers
Impact on Morocco, the major North African fuel importer
Military expenditure in the Maghreb and Mashreq areas: different trends
Download the ITA/ENG full report Strategic Analysis 2019: Mashreq, Gran Maghreb, Egypt and Israel, by C. Bertolotti, (pdf version)
Download the ITA/ENG full report Strategic Analysis 2019: Mashreq, Gran Maghreb, Egypt and Israel, by C. Bertolotti (eBook ePubb version)
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