Over the past decade, West Africa has reemerged as one of the critical frontiers in the geography of global instability. Once viewed primarily through the lens of underdevelopment and humanitarian crises, it is now a pivotal arena where transnational non-state actors intersect with great-power ambitions. The region’s chronic institutional fragility, pervasive corruption, and unresolved ethnic and social fractures have created the perfect conditions for external manipulation. Two actors epitomize this dynamic transformation: Hezbollah and the Wagner Group (now reorganized as the Africa Corps under the Russian Ministry of Defense). Despite their ideological and operational differences, both embody a shared strategic logic—the outsourcing of influence and the use of hybrid, deniable instruments of power projection.
Hezbollah’s “Silent Colonization”
Unlike the Middle East, West Africa is not a direct battlefield for Hezbollah’s military arm. Instead, it functions as a logistical and financial ecosystemsustaining the organization’s global activities. Leveraging the extensive Lebanese diaspora—particularly in countries such as Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, and Senegal—Hezbollah has built a network of front companies and illicit trade routes that generate substantial revenues. Through money laundering, diamond smuggling, art trafficking, and coerced donations, it channels funds back to Lebanon, compensating for declining Iranian patronage and the economic collapse at home.
Hezbollah’s African operations reveal a new
form of strategic adaptation. The group has refined its capacity to
operate under the radar by using honorary consulates, dual citizenships, and
diplomatic covers, which provide legitimacy and insulation from scrutiny.
This approach corrodes local economies by fusing political patronage with
criminal enterprise, effectively blurring the boundary between state and
non-state activity. While Hezbollah does not seek territorial control, it
effectively colonizes African financial systems, embedding itself within the
informal economy. The consequences are corrosive: institutions weakened,
political elites compromised, and sovereignty diluted.
Wagner and the Militarization of
Influence
If Hezbollah’s penetration is stealthy and
economic, the Wagner Group’s is overtly coercive and militarized.
Operating from Sudan to Mali, the Russian private military contractor
represents the Kremlin’s mechanism of “plausible deniability”—a way to
reassert geopolitical influence without formal state accountability. Through
the promise of counterterrorism assistance, regime protection, and
disinformation campaigns, Wagner has embedded itself in the security
architecture of fragile African states. Its contracts often include mining
concessions and strategic resource rights, creating a self-financing cycle
of exploitation.
Wagner’s activities in Mali, for instance, demonstrate how counterterrorism rhetoric masks predatory behavior. The infamous Moura massacre in 2022—where hundreds of civilians were executed—illustrates the brutality accompanying this partnership. Far from stabilizing the Sahel, Russian involvement has deepened conflicts, alienated local communities, and provided jihadist movements with powerful narratives of foreign occupation and repression. The group’s rebranding as Africa Corps following Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death indicates Moscow’s determination to institutionalize this model of semi-official imperialism, using mercenaries as instruments of geopolitical leverage.
Screenshot of an article investigating Wagner’s crimes, published by Jeune Afrique on 24th June 2025
A Hybrid Battleground
Together, Hezbollah and Wagner transform
West Africa into a hybrid conflict zone—a space where terrorism,
organized crime, and great-power competition converge. Hezbollah’s economic
infiltration and Wagner’s militarized presence feed off the same
vulnerabilities: weak governance, the absence of rule of law, and the
marginalization of local populations. The result is a multidimensional
destabilization process that undermines both national and regional security
architectures.
The implications extend far beyond Africa. Hezbollah’s
money-laundering networks connect to banks and shell companies in Europe,
the Gulf, and Latin America, while Russia’s African expansion
provides Moscow with strategic leverage over global supply chains of gold,
uranium, and rare minerals. These dynamics expose Europe’s southern flank
to a new form of geopolitical pressure—one that operates below the threshold of
conventional war but erodes resilience from within.
The Need for a Paradigm Shift
Traditional Western responses—whether development
aid or military cooperation—have proven insufficient. Initiatives
like Italy’s Mattei Plan, while well-intentioned, risk remaining
superficial if not anchored in structural reforms that address governance,
transparency, and institutional capacity. The challenge posed by Hezbollah and
Wagner is not only one of security but also of state capture and financial
sovereignty.
A credible European strategy must therefore
integrate security, governance, and finance. This means empowering
African judicial systems, reinforcing anti–money laundering mechanisms,
enhancing intelligence-sharing, and regulating the diplomatic loopholes
exploited by illicit actors. Only by addressing the root causes of
vulnerability—economic dependency, political fragility, and lack of
oversight—can external manipulation be contained.
Italy’s Strategic Opportunity
For Italy, this crisis presents both
a threat and an opportunity. Given its geographical proximity, colonial legacy,
and diplomatic credibility, Rome is well placed to shape a new European
approach based on genuine partnership rather than paternalism. Italian
defense cooperation, already active through the Missione Bilaterale di
Supporto in Niger and other initiatives, can be expanded to include training,
infrastructure, and judicial support. More importantly, Italy can champion
the idea that African security is inseparable from European security—an
interdependence that must guide the EU’s external policy for the coming
decades.
Ultimately, West Africa is a microcosm
of the emerging global order. The interplay of armed networks, criminal
economies, and foreign interventions demonstrates how instability has become
both a weapon and a market. Hezbollah and Wagner reveal the porous boundaries
between terrorism, organized crime, and geopolitical ambition. To remain
relevant and resilient, Europe must recognize this new reality—not merely
reacting to crises but shaping the norms and partnerships that can prevent
them. Africa’s instability is not a distant problem; it is the mirror of
Europe’s own strategic complacency.
Why It’s Normal That Iron Dome Doesn’t Intercept Every Iranian Missile
by Andrea Molle in the United States
In recent days, amid rising tensions between Israel and Iran, some superficial observers have rushed to question the effectiveness of Israel’s missile defense systems—particularly Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow. The fact that a few Iranian missiles managed to strike Israeli territory has been interpreted by some as a sign of technical or strategic failure. But the truth is far more complex—and far more rational.
1. Missile defense systems aren’t magical shields Every missile defense system operates based on probabilities and prioritization. No technology in the world can guarantee 100% interception. Even the most advanced systems work under conditions of uncertainty and are constrained by the laws of statistics, physics, logistics, and electronic warfare.
2. Interceptor stockpiles are limited Each battery has a finite number of interceptor missiles. Firing one can cost hundreds of thousands of dollars. When faced with a saturation attack—i.e., dozens or hundreds of missiles launched simultaneously—Israeli commanders must prioritize: defending critical targets while allowing less dangerous missiles to hit uninhabited or low-value areas.
3. Launcher rotation and operational wear Systems like Iron Dome are regularly rotated and repositioned to avoid depletion, targeted strikes, or overconcentration in one area. This means that at any given moment, some zones might not be fully covered—not due to error, but by design.
4. Time and surprise are factors Some Iranian missiles are long-range and launched from afar, but others can be fired by closer proxies like Hezbollah. The diversity of threats, combined with the potential for simultaneous attacks from the north, east, and south, makes complete and instantaneous coverage impossible.
5. Layered defense works—but has limits Israel has built a multi-tiered defense system (Iron Dome for short-range rockets, David’s Sling for medium-range threats, and Arrow for ballistic missiles). However, each system has an optimal engagement angle and range, and a coordinated multi-front assault can stress the system’s efficiency.
In short: this isn’t a failure—it’s exactly
how modern warfare works. The effectiveness of a defense system isn’t measured
by achieving zero successful enemy hits, but by the ratio of damage prevented
versus damage sustained. And so far, the data shows that Israel’s network,
while under intense pressure, is holding up.
Nuclear Weapons and Irregular Warfare: A Real Escalation in the Israel-Iran Conflict
by Andrea Mollein the United States
The conflict between Israel and Iran is no longer a proxy war or a confrontation limited to the cyber domain or covert actions. Starting on June 13, 2025, the Middle East has witnessed one of the most serious clashes in its recent history: over 400 ballistic missiles and more than 1,000 drones were launched by Iran and its direct allies against Israeli civilian and military infrastructure in response to an offensive initiated by Jerusalem targeting Iranian military facilities. Among the targets hit by Iran were the Soroka Hospital in Beersheba, power plants in the Negev, and airport facilities in Galilee. The Israel Defense Forces responded with an unprecedented aerial offensive, striking more than 100 military targets in Iran, including the nuclear sites of Natanz, Fordow, and Arak, IRGC bases, and strategic energy installations. The US joining the conflict made it even more complex.
This new phase of the conflict, now
explicitly bilateral, has erased the line between conventional and irregular
warfare. The presence of proxies such as Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Shiite
militias in Iraq and Syria remains critical, but it is now joined by a direct
and declared confrontation between states, with Israel and Iran attacking each
other’s national territories. Hybrid warfare has evolved into high-intensity
war, while still retaining the irregular elements that Iran has systematically
integrated into its military doctrine.
In this context, Iran’s nuclear issue takes
on an immediate operational relevance. Recent IAEA inspections confirm that
Tehran possesses about 9 tons of enriched uranium, with material enriched to
60% and above—enough, according to estimates, to produce up to nine warheads.
The “breakout time,” i.e., the time needed to produce a usable
nuclear weapon, is now minimal, although experts disagree on whether this
actually amounts to a matter of months or even just weeks, as claimed by
Jerusalem. At the same time, Iran has scaled back cooperation with the Agency,
hindering inspectors’ access to Fordow and other key sites.
The likelihood of Tehran directly using a
nuclear weapon in a conventional scenario remains remote, due to the principle
of strategic survival that guides even the most hostile regimes. However, the
nuclear threat fits perfectly into the logic of irregular warfare. The bomb,
even in its latent form, becomes a political tool: a strategic shield that
allows Iran to intensify the activities of its regional proxies, deterring
Israel and the United States from attacking them directly out of fear of
nuclear escalation.
This scenario, previously theorized in
doctrine as “reverse deterrence,” is now manifesting in reality. Israel is
forced to operate under the explicit threat that too deep a strike into the
heart of the Iranian system could provoke a nuclear response or accelerate a
shift from deterrence to compellence. In turn, Tehran uses its nuclear
ambiguity to provide operational freedom to its non-state actors, fueling
systemic instability.
A second, less discussed but equally
realistic risk concerns the possibility that Iran might transfer radiological
materials to allied groups to build improvised devices—so-called “dirty bombs.”
The symbolic and psychological use of such a weapon, even without large-scale
destructive impact, would trigger political and social paralysis and a global
diplomatic crisis, radically altering the strategic balance in the Middle East
and the Mediterranean.
Finally, an extreme scenario must be
considered: the adoption by Iran of a “last resort” strategy if the
regime perceived an existential threat. In such a case, the leadership might
threaten or use a low-yield device in a symbolic area (such as the Strait of
Hormuz) to force immediate ceasefires—or even on third-party territory like the
United States. Such escalation, though not inevitable, aligns with the
“escalate to de-escalate” logic theorized by other nuclear powers like Russia.
Israel continues to respond with an active
deterrence doctrine, based on its ability to preemptively strike Iran’s
critical infrastructure and command centers. The Israeli Air Force, Mossad, and
cyber units collaborate on integrated operations aimed at delaying, sabotaging,
or neutralizing Iran’s ability to build and deploy a nuclear weapon. Recent
conflicts, from Gaza to Lebanon, have clearly shown that Israel is willing to
go beyond containment and adopt a multilayered offensive posture.
For Italy and European countries, this
evolution demands a reassessment of strategic priorities in the region. The
conflict is no longer a struggle for local hegemony: it directly affects trade
routes, energy supply lines, international naval missions, relations with Gulf
monarchies, and the stability of the entire Euro-Mediterranean security system.
A nuclear-armed Iran, fully embedded in a hybrid warfare strategy, now poses a
transnational and multidomain threat, while a high-intensity conflict or a sudden
and chaotic regime change in Tehran also entail serious risks.
Regarding the evolution of irregular
warfare doctrine, the integration of nuclear capabilities is no longer a
theoretical deviation but an ongoing process observable in the conflict’s
current dynamics. What was a strategic hypothesis just months ago is now an
operational reality guiding the tactical decisions of Israel, the United
States, and, indirectly, Europe. The bomb has not (yet) exploded, but it
already functions as a political and psychological lever, changing the very
nature of war. The Iranian case, in this respect, is the first true test of a
new reality in global hybrid conflict in an era increasingly detached from
international law.
Trump’s strategy: pressuring Iran to target China.
by Claudio Bertolotti.
The Trump administration has decided to intensify its maximum-pressure policy against Iran by directly targeting the country’s oil sector and related logistical infrastructure. Recent U.S. actions aim to significantly reduce Iranian oil exports, especially to China, thereby limiting Tehran’s ability to finance destabilizing activities throughout the Middle East. The State Department has imposed new sanctions on three companies involved in facilitating illicit transfers of Iranian oil through ship-to-ship (STS) naval operations conducted outside port limits in Southeast Asia. At the same time, three vessels involved in these activities have been identified and declared blocked properties.
These measures aim to interrupt the financial flows that enable Tehran to sustain its nuclear and missile programs and support regional terrorist groups. Simultaneously, the Treasury Department has directly targeted Iran’s Petroleum Minister, Mohsen Paknejad, a central figure in Iranian oil operations, accused of using national energy resources to support the regime’s illicit activities.
Several companies engaged in the transportation and sale of Iranian oil, particularly to China, have also been sanctioned. The sanctioned companies operated vessels registered in various countries, concealing the true origin of the transported oil by disabling or manipulating Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) to evade international monitoring. Among these companies are PT. Bintang Samudra Utama (Bintang), Shipload Maritime Pte. Ltd., and PT. Gianira Adhinusa Senatama (Gianira), which respectively managed the vessels CELEBES, MALILI, and MARINA VISION. These ships were involved in a significant STS transfer operation of Iranian oil on December 25, 2024, near Nipa, Indonesia.
Analysts emphasize that this strategy reflects a well-established U.S. tactic aimed not only at cutting off Tehran’s primary economic resources but also at deterring third-party companies and countries from collaborating, directly or indirectly, with the Iranian regime. Such sanctions create a strong deterrent effect, raising costs and risks for international operators seeking to circumvent U.S. restrictions. Economically and strategically, this intensified pressure seeks to progressively eliminate Iran’s oil revenues, thereby weakening the regime’s ability to finance its conventional armed forces as well as affiliated militias and groups considered by Washington as primary sources of regional instability.
The escalation of sanctions is likely to heighten international tensions further. However, it underscores the Trump administration’s resolve to maintain its maximum-pressure policy, ultimately aiming to compel Iran to reassess its regional strategies and ambitions in nuclear and missile development.
Wagner rebooted
by Andrea Molle (AI-generated cover picture)
As of February 2025, the Wagner Group, the most famous Russian private military company (PMC), continues to play a significant role in Moscow’s foreign operations, particularly in Africa and parts of the Middle East. The group’s activities have evolved significantly following the death of its founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, in a suspicious plane crash in August 2023. His death marked the end of Wagner’s relative autonomy and the beginning of a new phase in which the Russian government has exerted much tighter control over its operations.
In the immediate aftermath of Prigozhin’s
death, the Kremlin moved swiftly to reorganize Wagner’s structure and bring its
leadership under the direct oversight of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)
and the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (GRU). A
number of Wagner’s top commanders were either removed or reassigned, while
others who pledged loyalty to the Kremlin were integrated into official state
structures. This process included requiring Wagner fighters to sign contracts with
the MoD, effectively converting the once-independent mercenary force into a
paramilitary extension of the Russian state.
Despite these changes, Wagner has retained
its operational footprint, particularly in Africa, where its presence has been
deemed strategically vital for Russia’s geopolitical ambitions. The group
remains active in countries such as the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali,
and Libya, where it provides security services, military training, and resource
extraction operations that generate revenue for both itself and the Russian
state. However, reports indicate that Wagner’s operational model has shifted, with
greater reliance on state funding and logistical support, reducing its previous
financial independence.
The group’s activities in Ukraine have also
changed. While Wagner played a major role in key battles, including the capture
of Bakhmut, its direct involvement on the front lines has diminished since the
restructuring. Many Wagner fighters were either absorbed into regular Russian
military units or reassigned to other theaters, particularly in theaters where
Moscow views them as crucial instruments of influence. Indeed, the
post-Prigozhin era has transformed Wagner from a semi-autonomous force into a
more centralized, state-controlled paramilitary entity, ensuring that its
operations remain aligned with the broader strategic interests of the Kremlin.
Relationship with the Russian Government The relationship between the Wagner Group and the Russian government has undergone a dramatic transformation, evolving from a shadowy paramilitary force with plausible deniability to a fully acknowledged and state-controlled entity. Initially, the Kremlin sought to obscure its ties to Wagner, consistently denying any official connection and portraying the group as an independent private military contractor (PMC) operating on its own accord. This ambiguity allowed Russia to project power abroad while avoiding direct responsibility for Wagner’s actions, particularly in sensitive regions like Ukraine, Syria, and Africa. However, this strategic distance gradually eroded as Wagner’s role in Russian military operations expanded and its reliance on state resources became undeniable.
The turning point in this relationship came
in June 2023, when President Vladimir Putin openly admitted that Wagner had
been entirely funded by the Russian government. He revealed that the Russian
state had allocated approximately $1 billion to Wagner between May 2022 and May
2023, with $858 million going directly to salaries and operational costs, while
an additional $162 million was paid to Prigozhin’s Concord company, which
handled Wagner’s logistics and catering. This admission shattered any remaining
illusions of Wagner’s independence and reinforced the notion that it had long
functioned as an unofficial arm of Russian military strategy.
This public acknowledgment was a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it legitimized Wagner’s contributions to Russian military campaigns, particularly its role in the brutal battle for Bakhmut in Ukraine. On the other hand, it set the stage for tighter government oversight, as the Kremlin could no longer justify allowing a privately controlled military force to operate beyond state authority. The power struggle between Wagner and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), which had been brewing for years, reached its peak in June 2023 when Prigozhin launched his ill-fated mutiny against the Russian high command.
Prigozhin’s short-lived rebellion, in which
Wagner forces briefly occupied Rostov-on-Don and marched toward Moscow, was the
catalyst for the Kremlin’s full-scale takeover of Wagner’s operations. Although
the mutiny ended in a negotiated settlement—allegedly brokered by Belarusian
President Alexander Lukashenko—its consequences were far-reaching. The Russian
government swiftly moved to dismantle Wagner’s independent command structure,
forcing its fighters to either sign contracts with the MoD or disband. While
some Wagner personnel chose to integrate into regular Russian military units,
others relocated to Belarus, where a temporary Wagner presence was established
under state supervision.
However, it soon became clear that the Kremlin had no intention of allowing Wagner to remain an autonomous entity. Following Prigozhin’s mysterious death in an August 2023 plane crash—widely believed to be an assassination orchestrated by the Russian security services—the Kremlin completed its absorption of Wagner into the state apparatus. High-ranking Wagner commanders who remained loyal to Prigozhin were purged, while those willing to cooperate with the MoD were given roles within the Russian military hierarchy. This restructuring ensured that Wagner, once an unpredictable and semi-independent force, was now fully subordinate to the Russian government.
Wagner no longer operated as an independent PMC but rather as an extension of the Russian military, with a focus on supporting Moscow’s geopolitical ambitions abroad.
As mentioned, with Wagner now under direct
Kremlin control, its operations were officially integrated into the Russian MoD
and intelligence agencies such as the GRU (Russia’s military intelligence
service). The new leadership structure placed Wagner under experienced Russian
military officers who were loyal to the state, ensuring that its actions
aligned with national security objectives. The MoD also restructured Wagner’s
financial framework, redirecting state funds to sustain its foreign operations
while eliminating the private revenue streams that had once given Wagner
financial autonomy.
In practical terms, this meant that Wagner
no longer operated as an independent PMC but rather as an extension of the
Russian military, with a focus on supporting Moscow’s geopolitical ambitions
abroad. In Africa, for example, Wagner continued to function as Russia’s
primary security contractor, securing resource-rich territories and propping up
allied regimes. However, all contracts, logistics, and decision-making
processes were now closely monitored by the Kremlin, ensuring that Wagner’s
activities served Russian state interests rather than the ambitions of
individual commanders.
The transformation of Wagner from a
semi-autonomous mercenary force to a state-controlled entity solidified its
role as a key instrument of Russian foreign policy. While its branding as a
“PMC” remains useful for diplomatic and legal maneuvering, Wagner now operates
with the full backing of the Russian state, allowing Moscow to expand its
influence in strategic regions without directly deploying official military
forces.
In Africa, Wagner has continued its
security operations in the Central African Republic, Mali, Sudan, and Libya,
often securing lucrative mining concessions and strategic military agreements
in exchange for its services. These operations not only provide Russia with
access to valuable resources such as gold and rare minerals but also strengthen
its political alliances with authoritarian governments seeking an alternative
to Western military assistance.
Meanwhile, in the Middle East, Wagner’s
legacy in Syria—where it played a critical role in securing Bashar al-Assad’s
regime—remains intact regime change notwithstanding, with reports suggesting
that Wagner personnel continue to assist Syrian forces in maintaining control
over key regions also providing a viable supply corridor for other Russian
operations in Africa.
In Ukraine, however, Wagner’s direct combat
role has diminished following its integration into the MoD. While some Wagner
fighters have remained active on the front lines, particularly in specialist
roles such as reconnaissance and sabotage operations, their overall presence
has been significantly reduced compared to the peak of the Bakhmut offensive.
Current Operations The Wagner Group remains active in several African nations, notably the Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali, where it continues to serve as a key instrument of Russian influence. Its operations in these countries are deeply intertwined with local governments, resource extraction, and military partnerships that provide both financial and strategic benefits to Moscow.
In the CAR, Wagner operatives have
entrenched themselves as the dominant security force supporting President
Faustin-Archange Touadéra’s government. Their involvement began in 2018,
initially as military advisors and trainers for the CAR’s armed forces, but has
since expanded into combat operations against rebel groups. Wagner mercenaries
have been directly involved in fighting various insurgent factions, including
the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC), an alliance of rebel groups seeking
to overthrow Touadéra.
Beyond military operations, Wagner has
established control over key economic sectors, particularly the lucrative gold
and diamond mining industries. The group has secured exclusive rights to
operate and manage several mining sites, with revenues reportedly funneled back
to Russian-linked companies that provide financial support for Wagner’s global
operations. These economic ventures have not only made Wagner self-sufficient
in the region but have also strengthened Russia’s influence over the CAR
government. Reports indicate that Wagner operatives play a role in protecting
government officials, controlling border security, and even managing parts of
the country’s defense infrastructure.
Additionally, Wagner’s influence extends
beyond military and economic domains. It has been actively involved in
propaganda efforts, running media campaigns that promote pro-Russian narratives
while discrediting Western involvement in the country. Pro-Russian messaging is
widespread in the CAR, with reports of Wagner-linked organizations distributing
materials that portray Russia as a reliable ally in contrast to former colonial
powers such as France.
Similarly, in Mali, Wagner’s presence has grown significantly following the withdrawal of French forces in 2022, marking a major shift in regional alliances. After the 2021 military coup in Mali, the ruling junta sought alternative security partnerships, and Russia, through Wagner, emerged as a key player. Wagner mercenaries were deployed under the pretext of assisting the Malian armed forces in counterterrorism operations against Islamist militant groups linked to al-Qaeda and ISIS in the Sahel region. However, their presence has been controversial, with numerous reports accusing Wagner operatives of committing human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings, torture, and civilian massacres.
Despite these concerns, Mali’s ruling junta
continues to rely heavily on Wagner’s support, viewing it as a reliable
alternative to Western military assistance. In return for their services,
Wagner is believed to have secured agreements that grant them access to Mali’s
natural resources, particularly gold mines, similar to their operations in the
CAR. Additionally, Wagner has played a role in reshaping Mali’s foreign policy,
fostering closer ties between Bamako and Moscow while distancing the country
from traditional Western allies. This could pose a serious threat to Italy, the
only European country with a substantial presence in the sub-Saharan region.
Wagner’s operations in CAR and Mali are
part of Russia’s broader strategy to expand its geopolitical footprint in
Africa, often filling vacuums left by Western powers. By positioning itself as
a security guarantor for embattled regimes, Russia has managed to secure
valuable economic and political footholds across the continent. Wagner’s
involvement in Africa aligns with Moscow’s long-term objectives of challenging
Western influence, securing access to critical resources, and cultivating
strategic partnerships that could prove beneficial in international diplomatic
arenas, such as the United Nations.
Beyond CAR and Mali, Wagner has also been
reported to have a presence in other African nations, including Sudan, Libya,
and Burkina Faso, where it continues to operate under varying degrees of
Russian state control. While its future remains uncertain following the death
of its founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, Wagner’s role as a tool of Russian influence
in Africa remains intact, with its operations increasingly falling under the
direct supervision of the Russian government.
Leadership and Command Structure After Prigozhin’s death, the Kremlin moved swiftly to integrate Wagner’s operations more directly under state control, ensuring that the once-autonomous paramilitary group became a fully subordinate arm of Russian military and geopolitical strategy. In August 2023, President Vladimir Putin signed a decree requiring all Wagner fighters to swear an oath of allegiance to the Russian state, a move that signaled the end of Wagner’s independent chain of command and its absorption into Russia’s official military structure. This decree was accompanied by broader efforts to restructure the group, placing its leadership under direct oversight from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (GRU).
With the group now firmly under Kremlin
control, key positions within Wagner have been reassigned to individuals
closely aligned with the Russian military and intelligence agencies. Many of
Wagner’s original leadership figures, particularly those loyal to Prigozhin,
were either removed, reassigned, or eliminated under suspicious circumstances.
In their place, figures from Russia’s defense establishment, including
high-ranking officers from the GRU, have taken over command roles, ensuring
that Wagner’s future operations remain directly aligned with Moscow’s strategic
interests. Reports indicate that Andrei Averyanov, a GRU operative known for
overseeing Russian covert operations abroad, has been among those involved in
Wagner’s restructuring. Additionally, Sergei Troshev, a former high-ranking
Wagner commander and veteran of the Chechen wars, has been tasked with
overseeing Wagner’s integration into the Russian military framework.
Troop Strength and Numerical Consistency The reorganization of Wagner also involved a reassessment of its numerical strength. Prior to Prigozhin’s death, Wagner’s troop count was estimated to be between 25,000 and 50,000 fighters, with a significant portion consisting of former Russian convicts who had been recruited under a controversial prisoner enlistment program. Following Prigozhin’s demise, many of these fighters were either absorbed into regular Russian military units or dismissed, leading to a temporary decline in Wagner’s operational strength. However, recruitment efforts have continued under the new Kremlin-aligned leadership, with reports suggesting that Wagner’s core fighting force now numbers between 15,000 and 25,000 personnel. A significant portion of these troops have been redeployed to Africa, where Wagner remains active in countries such as the Central African Republic, Mali, and Libya.
To replenish its ranks, Wagner has
reportedly shifted its recruitment focus, targeting ex-military personnel,
special forces veterans, and mercenaries with combat experience in Ukraine,
Syria, and Africa. Training programs for new recruits have also been expanded,
with Wagner fighters undergoing advanced military instruction at Russian
MoD-controlled facilities before being deployed on foreign assignments.
Armaments and Equipment Despite its formal integration into the Russian state apparatus, Wagner continues to operate with a high degree of autonomy in terms of its arsenal and logistical capabilities. The group has maintained access to a diverse range of weaponry, sourced primarily from Russian military stockpiles. These include small arms such as AK-74 and AK-12 assault rifles, PKM and Pecheneg machine guns, RPG-7 and RPG-29 anti-tank weapons, and advanced sniper rifles like the Dragunov SVD and Orsis T-5000.
In terms of heavy weaponry, Wagner has
retained the use of armored personnel carriers (APCs) and infantry fighting
vehicles, including BTR-80s and BMP-2s, which provide mobility and firepower
for its operations in Africa and the Middle East. Additionally, Wagner units
have been observed using T-72 and T-90 tanks in more intense combat zones,
particularly in Ukraine before their redeployment.
Artillery support remains a key component of Wagner’s battlefield strategy, with access to multiple rocket launch systems (MRLS) such as the BM-21 Grad and heavier self-propelled artillery, including the 2S19 Msta-S. These assets allow Wagner to maintain significant firepower in asymmetric warfare environments. There have also been reports of Wagner utilizing combat drones, including Orlan-10 reconnaissance UAVs, for battlefield surveillance and precision strikes.
Under Kremlin control, Wagner is expected to continue its role as Russia’s primary tool for power projection in regions where direct military involvement would be politically or diplomatically costly.
In Africa, where air support is crucial for logistics and combat operations, Wagner has reportedly maintained a small fleet of helicopters, including Mi-8 and Mi-24 gunships, which are used for both troop transport and close air support missions. These aircraft are believed to be supplied directly by the Russian MoD, ensuring that Wagner’s air capabilities remain intact despite the restructuring.
Strategic Outlook With Wagner’s autonomy effectively dismantled, the group’s future remains tied to the Russian state’s strategic priorities. Under Kremlin control, Wagner is expected to continue its role as Russia’s primary tool for power projection in regions where direct military involvement would be politically or diplomatically costly. However, the loss of its independent command structure may reduce its effectiveness in some areas, particularly where its previous flexibility and adaptability had been key strengths.
Additionally, there are reports that Moscow
is exploring the possibility of restructuring Wagner into multiple, smaller
PMCs that can operate with varying degrees of state oversight. This would allow
Russia to maintain plausible deniability while still benefiting from Wagner’s
expertise in irregular warfare and security operations.
Regardless of the exact form Wagner takes
in the coming years, its transformation from a rogue PMC to a fully
state-controlled paramilitary organization marks a significant shift in Russian
military doctrine. The Kremlin has effectively nationalized the world’s most
infamous mercenary group, ensuring that its operations remain fully aligned
with Russia’s long-term geopolitical ambitions.
With its new leadership, sustained
recruitment efforts, and continued access to advanced weaponry, Wagner remains
a formidable force despite its loss of autonomy. Under direct Kremlin control,
Wagner is no longer just a rogue PMC but an integral part of Russia’s broader
military and geopolitical strategy. Its role as a force multiplier in Africa
and other theaters of Russian influence has only grown, with Moscow leveraging
Wagner’s capabilities to secure key strategic and economic interests.
In the coming months, Wagner is expected to
continue expanding its influence across Africa while maintaining a limited
presence in Ukraine and the Middle East. Its integration into the Russian
military apparatus ensures its operational continuity, but with a much stronger
emphasis on aligning its missions with the Kremlin’s long-term global strategy.
Conclusion: Wagner’s Role in Russia’s Global Strategy In summary, the Wagner Group continues to serve as a critical tool for Russia’s power projection, particularly in geopolitically significant regions such as Africa, the Middle East, and parts of Eastern Europe. The group’s transformation in the post-Prigozhin era marks a decisive shift in how the Kremlin manages paramilitary operations, transitioning from an informal yet highly influential private force to a more tightly controlled extension of the Russian state. This evolution underscores Moscow’s broader strategic priorities: securing economic and military footholds abroad, countering Western influence, and utilizing unconventional warfare tactics to achieve geopolitical objectives without direct state accountability.
The restructuring of Wagner under the
Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and intelligence agencies reflects the
Kremlin’s determination to consolidate its influence over irregular military
forces. The era in which Wagner operated with a degree of independence—often
pursuing its own economic and strategic interests alongside those of the
Russian government—has effectively ended. The direct subordination of Wagner to
state authorities ensures that its missions align strictly with Moscow’s
foreign policy goals, eliminating the risk of rogue actions, such as
Prigozhin’s mutiny, that could challenge the Russian leadership.
With Wagner now firmly integrated into
state operations, its commanders operate under direct Kremlin oversight, and
its funding, logistics, and recruitment are fully controlled by Russian
military institutions. This shift not only increases Moscow’s ability to
dictate Wagner’s actions but also enables a more streamlined approach to
paramilitary engagements, allowing for rapid deployment and coordination with
official Russian military assets when necessary.
The continued deployment of Wagner forces
in Africa highlights its role as a key component of Russia’s global strategy.
By positioning itself as a security guarantor for regimes in countries such as
the Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali, Wagner has helped Russia expand
its political and economic influence in the region, particularly in securing
access to valuable natural resources. These operations provide Russia with
critical financial benefits and allow it to position itself as a reliable
alternative to Western security partnerships.
Beyond Africa, Wagner-linked forces
continue to be active in Syria, where they support Bashar al-Assad’s regime,
and in Libya, where they have played a role in shaping the country’s ongoing
conflict. Even though Wagner’s role in Ukraine has diminished compared to its
peak during the Bakhmut offensive, some of its fighters have been integrated
into Russian special operations units, ensuring that their expertise remains
available for future military engagements.
Looking ahead, Wagner’s operational model is likely to evolve further under Kremlin control. While its direct battlefield presence in Ukraine has been reduced, its activities in Africa and the Middle East remain crucial to Moscow’s broader geopolitical ambitions. There are also indications that the Russian government may restructure Wagner into multiple smaller PMCs, each operating under varying degrees of state oversight to maintain plausible deniability while maximizing effectiveness.
Despite losing its former independence, Wagner’s role as an essential component of Russia’s hybrid warfare strategy ensures that it will remain a formidable force on the global stage.
This approach would allow Moscow to retain
the strategic advantages of using mercenary forces—such as flexibility, reduced
diplomatic consequences, and deniability—while preventing the emergence of a
powerful, independent entity like the Prigozhin-era Wagner Group. By
maintaining multiple paramilitary units under centralized control, Russia can
continue leveraging irregular warfare tactics to achieve its objectives in a
cost-effective and politically manageable way.
Ultimately, Wagner’s transformation into a
direct instrument of Russian state power signals a new phase in Russia’s
approach to global military engagements. The group remains a crucial extension
of Moscow’s foreign policy toolkit, enabling the Kremlin to exert influence,
secure resources, and challenge Western interests in regions of strategic
importance. Despite losing its former independence, Wagner’s role as an
essential component of Russia’s hybrid warfare strategy ensures that it will
remain a formidable force on the global stage.
The Perils of a War Between Israel and Jordan
by Andrea Molle.
A war between Israel and Jordan remains an
unlikely but potentially catastrophic scenario. Since signing a peace treaty in
1994, the two countries have maintained diplomatic and security cooperation,
making armed conflict seem improbable. However, the Middle East is a region
where tensions can escalate unexpectedly, and in the event of war, the
consequences would be far-reaching, extending beyond the immediate battlefield
and reshaping regional and global dynamics.
Militarily, Israel holds an overwhelming
advantage. Its state-of-the-art air force, advanced missile defense systems,
and cyber warfare capabilities make it one of the most formidable militaries in
the world. Jordan’s military, while professional and well-trained, lacks the
offensive power and technological sophistication to sustain a prolonged war
against Israel. While Jordan’s mountainous terrain could offer some defensive
advantages, its key cities and infrastructure would be vulnerable to Israeli
airstrikes.
Conversely, Israeli population centers such
as Tel Aviv and Jerusalem would be within range of Jordanian missiles, but
Israel’s Iron Dome and other missile defense systems would likely neutralize
most of these threats. If war were to break out under a U.S. administration led
by Donald Trump, the geopolitical landscape would shift dramatically. Trump has
a history of unwavering support for Israel, having moved the U.S. embassy to
Jerusalem and recognized Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights during his
first term. In the event of conflict, Washington would likely side decisively
with Israel, providing military assistance, blocking diplomatic efforts to
restrain Israeli actions, and exerting pressure on Jordan to de-escalate.
This approach could embolden Israeli
leadership, reducing the incentive for a swift resolution and increasing the
likelihood of a drawn-out conflict. At the same time, such a stance would
further alienate Arab allies like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, who would face the
difficult choice of supporting Jordan diplomatically while maintaining their
fragile ties with Israel. The economic consequences of such a war would be
devastating. Jordan, already reliant on foreign aid and economic cooperation
with Israel, would suffer greatly, facing trade disruptions, infrastructure
destruction, and economic collapse. While Israel has a more resilient economy,
a prolonged war would still create market instability, harm the tourism
industry, and disrupt vital sectors such as technology and defense.
A broader escalation could also lead to
rising oil prices and regional economic turmoil, further complicating global
markets. Beyond conventional military and economic consequences, one of the
most dangerous ripple effects of such a conflict would be the resurgence of
international terrorism. History has shown that war and instability in the
Middle East create fertile ground for jihadist organizations, and a war between
Israel and Jordan would likely open the door for extremist groups to exploit the
chaos. ISIS-K, an already growing threat, could seize the moment to expand its
influence, launching attacks in both Israel and Jordan while using the war as a
recruitment tool. The instability could also encourage terrorist attacks in
Western nations, as radicalized individuals respond to the conflict with
violence abroad. The specter of a global wave of terrorism, fueled by the war,
could reshape security policies worldwide and force governments to divert
resources toward counterterrorism efforts. The possible outcomes of such a
conflict vary in severity. A short, intense war could lead to a quick
diplomatic resolution, with the United States or regional powers stepping in to
mediate a ceasefire.
However, if the war dragged on and external
actors such as Iran, Hezbollah, and Palestinian militant groups became
involved, the situation could spiral into a broader regional conflict. Jordan
itself could face internal instability, with the monarchy weakened by war and
at risk of an uprising or coup. In the worst-case scenario, the war could
trigger a new era of instability, empowering extremist groups and reshaping
alliances across the region. Ultimately, a war between Israel and Jordan would
be disastrous for both countries and the broader Middle East. The strategic,
economic, and security costs far outweigh any potential gains, making a
full-scale conflict unlikely.
However, as history has shown, political
miscalculations, external provocations, or shifting alliances can sometimes
push nations toward unintended wars. While outright conflict remains
improbable, the risks of border tensions, proxy confrontations, and diplomatic
crises should not be underestimated. The only real solution is continued
dialogue and diplomatic engagement, as the alternative—a war with unpredictable
and devastating consequences—would be a tragedy for the entire region.
Italy’s Strategic Role in the Sahel: Challenges and Opportunities After the French Withdrawal.
by Andrea Molle.
After the withdrawal of the last French military
mission, Italy remains the only European country with a significant presence in
the Sahel. This opens several opportunities but also presents various
challenges that Rome will have to address with as integrated a strategy as
possible. Italy indeed has a significant military presence in sub-Saharan
Africa, with several missions aimed at ensuring security, combating terrorism,
and supporting the stability of the region. These missions see Rome engaged in
Niger, Chad, Djibouti, Somalia, and the Gulf of Guinea, both through bilateral
operations and within the framework of EU, NATO, and UN missions. Italy maintains
a military presence in Niger as part of the “MISIN” mission
(Bilateral Support Mission in the Republic of Niger), launched in 2018 with the
aim of supporting local authorities in contrasting terrorism, human
trafficking, and organized crime. The operation fits into Italy’s broader
commitment in the Sahel, aimed at ensuring stability and security in the
region, countering threats that can also impact Europe, such as irregular
migration flows.
The Italian mission in Niger primarily
focuses on training and mentoring local security forces to improve their
operational capabilities. Italian military personnel, drawing from various
branches of the Armed Forces, provide courses on combat techniques, special
operations, surveillance, and border control. Additionally, logistical and
medical support is an essential component of the operation. The Italian
contingent in Niger consists of several hundred units, with the possibility of
deploying up to 470 soldiers, 130 vehicles, and aircraft for logistical and
reconnaissance needs. Italy has established its operational base in Niamey, the
capital of Niger, collaborating with local authorities and other international
partners, including the United States and previously France. The operation is
also part of a broader cooperation framework between Italy and Niger, which
includes development initiatives, humanitarian aid, and investments to improve
the economic and social conditions of the African country. However, the
political situation in Niger is unstable, with the recent 2023 coup leading to
a review of relations between the Nigerien government and Western states,
including Italy.
Despite the geopolitical uncertainties, the
Italian mission in Niger remains a key part of Italy’s defense and security
strategy in the Sahel, contributing to the stabilization of a region crucial
for the geopolitical and economic balance of both the region and Europe. Beyond
Niger, Italy also maintains a limited military presence in neighboring Chad,
focusing mainly on liaison, training, and supporting international missions in
the Sahel region. This commitment is part of a broader multilateral cooperation
effort aimed at combating terrorism, stabilizing the area, and strengthening
local security forces’ capabilities. Italy’s activities in Chad work in synergy
with operations led by international organizations such as the European Union,
the United Nations, and the G5 Sahel, providing strategic and operational
support through intelligence sharing, military training, and coordination with
other military contingents in the area. Lastly, Italy participates in several initiatives
to improve the country’s border security, prevent arms trafficking, and counter
radicalization, all key elements for the stability of Chad and the Sahel region
as a whole.
The Italian approach is distinguished by a
strong emphasis on civil-military cooperation, promoting not only security but
also the development and resilience of local communities. Italy also established
a military base in Djibouti, the Italian Support Military Base (BMIS),
operational since 2013. Located strategically in the Horn of Africa, the BMIS
serves as a logistics and operations hub, developing intelligence capabilities
for Italian armed forces engaged in missions in the East Africa region and the
Indian Ocean. This base is a key infrastructure supporting anti-piracy
operations, contributing to the security of shipping routes and the patrolling
of international waters. It also provides logistical and operational support to
various Italian and European missions in the region, including Italy’s
participation in the EUNAVFOR Atalanta operation (against piracy in the Gulf of
Aden) and the EUTM Somalia mission, dedicated to training Somali armed forces.
The presence of the BMIS also allows for
the rapid deployment of Italian units in case of emergencies or crises in the
area, strengthening Italy’s role in the security and stabilization of the Horn
of Africa. The base hosts military personnel and advanced support
infrastructure, allowing maintenance of vehicles, supplies, and assistance to
Italian forces and allied missions. In addition to military aspects, the BMIS
also represents a point of cooperation with local Djiboutian authorities,
helping to strengthen diplomatic relations between Italy and Djibouti and
support regional security, stability, and development initiatives. Italy
maintains a significant presence in Somalia, actively contributing to the
country’s security and stabilization through two main international missions.
These are the EUTM Somalia (European Union Training Mission in Somalia), an EU
mission active since 2010, aimed at training and mentoring the Somali National
Army (SNA) to strengthen its operational capabilities and enable the Somali
government to deal with internal security threats, particularly from the
terrorist group Al-Shabaab.
Italy plays a leading role in this mission,
providing military instructors, advisors, and strategic support. Italian
personnel are involved in training Somali officers in tactical, strategic, and
logistical aspects, as well as promoting international humanitarian law
principles. The goal is to build a professional and efficient Somali army capable
of ensuring the country’s security autonomously. In addition to military
training, the mission focuses on the development of Somali military leadership
and strengthening defense institutions, contributing to the creation of a more
effective command and control chain. The other operation, called Operation
Atalanta, is a naval mission of the European Union (EUNAVFOR Atalanta) launched
in 2008, aimed at combating piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean,
protecting merchant navy ships, and ensuring the safety of strategic maritime
routes.
Italy actively participates in the
operation with naval units, helicopters, and military personnel, performing
patrols and providing escorts for commercial and humanitarian ships,
particularly those of the World Food Programme (WFP) heading to Somalia. The
Italian Navy has played a prominent role in the mission, contributing to the
deterrence of piracy and maintaining security in international waters.
Operation Atalanta has had a significant impact, drastically reducing pirate
attacks and strengthening cooperation among international naval forces. Italy,
in addition to its operational contribution, has frequently held high-level
commands within the mission, confirming its commitment to global maritime
security. In addition to participating in these missions, Italy maintains
strong historical and diplomatic ties with Somalia, a country that was an
Italian colony until the mid-20th century. Italy’s commitment goes beyond the
military aspect, encompassing development cooperation, humanitarian support,
and initiatives for political stabilization.
Through the EUTM Somalia and Operation
Atalanta missions, Italy significantly contributes to the security and
stability of the Horn of Africa, consolidating its role as a key actor in
international operations in the region. Finally, with Operation Gabinia, Italy
has committed to strengthening maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, a
crucial area for international oil and goods traffic, but also one of the
regions most affected by maritime piracy. The deployment of Italian naval units
aims to combat piracy, protect commercial ships (particularly those flying the
Italian flag), and ensure the security of maritime infrastructure critical to
global economic interests. All these operations are part of a broader Italian
engagement in the region, which includes economic, military, and diplomatic
cooperation with several West African countries.
Italy is working to develop strategic
partnerships that include development initiatives, humanitarian aid, and
investments to improve the economic and social conditions of the countries
involved, thereby contributing to their stability and reducing the root causes
of instability and forced migration. Key areas of intervention include training
local security forces, border control, combating illicit trafficking (drugs,
weapons, humans), and the fight against jihadist terrorism, which represents a
growing threat in the Sahel region. Strengthening local security and
intelligence capabilities is critical to counter groups such as Al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram, and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara
(ISGS), who exploit institutional weaknesses and ethnic tensions to expand
their influence.
An additional objective that Italy will
need to pursue more decisively in the future is containing the growing
geopolitical penetration of Russia and China in the region. Moscow has
strengthened its military and political presence through paramilitary groups
like the Wagner Group, providing support to authoritarian regimes and military
juntas in exchange for natural resources and strategic bases. Beijing, on the
other hand, continues to expand its economic influence through significant
infrastructure and financial investments, often through debt mechanisms that
bind local governments to Chinese interests. In the face of these developments,
Italy, in coordination with the United States and other NATO partners, will
need to strengthen its political-military presence, intensify cooperation with
local governments, and promote alternative development models based on
sustainability and the economic self-determination of African countries.
Italy’s commitment to West Africa is
therefore increasingly seen as a delicate balance between security, diplomacy,
development cooperation, and the protection of national and European strategic
interests.
The Islamic State in Khorasan’s “expansion” towards Europe
In 2023, Da’esh (ISIS) continued to carry out isolated attacks in Europe, generally with limited organisational support limited. The article notes the increasing effectiveness of European counter-terrorism measures European counterterrorism measures that would likely have made it less convenient for ISIS leaders deploy scarce human resources in such attacks. The author, in his article explores how the Islamic State group seems to favour the preservation of its organisational structures in Europe, delegating action to a few individuals or isolated cells. In addition, the growing involvement of the Khorasan (IS-K) branch of ISIS in planning attacks in Europe or against European targets abroad, as demonstrated by a 2020 plot against NATO bases in Germany. Despite the numerous plots identified in 2023, there is some discretion in attributing these plans exclusively to IS-K, suggesting wider intra-ISIS cooperation. The article notes that, despite appearances, Da’esh Khorasan is not necessarily expanding, but rather taking on new tasks assigned to it by the central leadership, pressed by resource scarcity.
The Islamic
State (IS) continued in 2023 to occasionally carry out isolated attacks in
Europe, usually with seemingly little organisational backup. As European
counter-terrorism has become increasingly effective, the cost effectiveness of
committing rare human resources to isolated attacks must have appeared
questionable to IS leaders and police sources around Europe tend to think that
IS indeed prefers to safeguard whatever organisational structure it still has
in Europe, leaving the task of flying the flag to a few isolated individuals or
cells. Indeed, as late as early 2022 police sources in Europe did not see an
impending IS threat, its presence being limited to online propagandists,
recruiters, and fundraisers. Taliban sources confirmed the detention of an IS-K operative in
Afghanistan, who had raised thousands of euros in Germany and Spain (Giustozzi,
2022). Taliban
intelligence sources also note that that much of IS-K online propaganda is now
being produced outside Afghanistan, including Europe. After the fall of Kabul in August
2021, IS-K started releasing a significant portion of this propaganda in
English. There might be multiple reasons for this, not all related to Europe. A
possible reason that is relevant for European security is the intent to
stimulate recruitment in Europe, perhaps in order to replace the loss of many
Da’esh media operators due to the police crackdown in recent years. Even when in
July 2023 the police detained several IS plotters in Germany and the
Netherlands and described them as being “in contact with members” of the IS-K
branch, it also noted that they were engaged in fund raising and there was no
indication that they were actively preparing a terrorist attack (Stewart ASyI, 2023).
1. IS-K and the Ambition to Strike Europe.
Some
observers have however noted a recent trend, concerning the growing
organisational involvement of the Khorasan branch (IS-K) in planning attacks in
Europe, or against European targets in Turkey. The German authorities alleged
in 2020 that the cell behind a plot to attack NATO bases in Germany, thwarted
by the police in April 2020, had received the order to act from an IS Khorasan
cadre in Afghanistan.[1] This
episode, however, was barely noticed and the evidence shared by the German
authorities remains fuzzy. What really caught the eyes of many observers was
the US intelligence report that turned up among the Discord leaks, showing that
as of February 2023 15 different IS-K linked plots to carry out attacks against
western interests in Europe, Turkey, the Middle East and elsewhere had been
identified by the US military.[2] While these
figures seem impressive, they contrast oddly with the fact that in March 2023 the
US Central Command assessed was that IS-K was within 6 months of having the
capacity to organise attacks against western interests in Asia or Europe. The
discrepancy is difficult to explain, unless for the military the 15 plots
mentioned above were not to be taken too seriously, or not to be attributed
exclusively or even primarily to IS-K. Indeed, Turkish sources describe some of
these plots, such as those aimed against Swedish and Dutch consulates on
Turkish territory, as involving Central Asians linked to IS-K and members of
the Turkish branch of IS. Apart from
reportedly issuing the order, IS-K seemingly relied on assets and personnel
that were already on location. Indeed, even the leaked US intelligence report
itself noted that IS-K “relied on resources from outside Afghanistan”.
2. Afghanistan
and the Developed Structure of IS.
In 2023 IS-K
sources in Afghanistan confirmed to the author’s research team that the group
coordinated operations in Turkey and Europe with other branches of the Islamic
State, stressing however that this happened under the leadership of the central
leadership of the ‘Caliphate”. This implies at least that IS-K as such was not
determining the overall strategy presiding over the planning of these attacks.
Sources within IS-K confirmed that Afghanistan hosted several military
commissions for neighbouring countries, such as Iran and Central Asia, but did
not mention any such entity focusing on Europe, Turkey or the Middle East. Sources
contacted by the International Crisis Group in Syria indicated in 2023 that the
Central Asians who used to operate under IS in Syria had been transferred under
the responsibility of IS-K (International Crisis
Group, 2023).
According to the IS-K sources, at least initially this was meant to prelude to
their transfer to Afghanistan, which however occurred considerably more slowly than
planned.
The picture
that these sources portray is one of a relatively developed IS-K structure in
Turkey and Syria, with 200+ working in the financial hub of IS-K in Turkey,
plus 400-500 Central Asians spread between Syria and Turkey, ex members of ISIL
who either switched their allegiance or were reassigned to IS-K (the sources
are not clear on this point), waiting to be transferred to Khorasan or in any
case to be told what to do. In Europe,
the presence of IS-K is much more modest, with 60 members. According to the
same sources, as of September 2022 there were 30 Europeans belonging to IS-K in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Of these, 16 were from Germany, ten were from France
and four from Belgium. There were also four Americans, as well as a few Turks.
These individuals with passports from European and North American countries were
described as having been evacuated from the Middle East after the collapse of
the Caliphate, rather than having been dispatched to IS-K for organising
long-range attacks in Europe. While all these numbers cannot be verified, they
seem compatible with the information summarised above and provided by Europol,
ICG and others.
This picture
suggests constant exchanges of members between the IS-K and other IS branches
in Turkey, Europe and Syria (which occur incidentally, elsewhere as well), even
if the speed and size of these exchanges have been declining over time. There
was always considerable integration between IS branches, despite speculation
early in the existence of IS-K that it was an opportunistic set up, with little
organic relationship with the “Caliphate”. More than of IS-K expanding
operations to Europe, therefore, one should speak of intra-IS branches
cooperation. Such cooperation seems undoubtedly to have expanded in 2022-23,
which begs the question of why this is the case
3. Is IS waiting?
In this
regard, it is worth noticing that IS-K is not claiming or advertising its
alleged “expansion”. Even when solicited, IS-K sources in Afghanistan have stayed
well clear of boasting about such expansion. Quite the contrary, they tend to
minimise its importance. This appears odd, given that
1. IS-K has been running a sophisticated media campaign,
whose main future is magnifying its limited achievements and making unwarranted
claims .
2.
It would be committing a considerable portion of its limited resources, if the
“expansion” were really such, and
3. Private
IS-K social media chatter and interviews with members clearly show that the
organisation struggles to explain to its own members and sympathisers why its
activities have been so limited during 2023.
Perhaps IS-K
might just be waiting to glorify its “expansion” and brand attacks outside the
remit of Khorasan province (Afghanistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa of Pakistan,
Central Asia, China, Iran) as “made in Afghanistan” until it succeeds in
carrying out a successful one. However, IS-K shows no similar shyness in
claiming its intent of bringing jihad to China (where despite years of
propaganda, it could achieve nothing) or Central Asia, where its achievements
have been minimal (firing rockets across the border into Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan). If the primary purpose of IS-K were making a claim to having
opened new fronts of its own in Europe, Turkey and Middle East, why wouldn’t it
adopt tactics similar to those deployed in Khorasan province and carry out
random attacks against the softest targets, then produce widely inflated claims
of the damage inflicted?
4. The
strength of IS.
In sum, the
most logical explanation is that the “Caliphate”, which is at its weakest since
its inception, has summoned IS-K’s help to reclaim the headlines with some high
profile attack against European targets. One possibility is that the
“Caliphate” might now be so weak in and around Europe that it simply does not
have the strength anymore to systematically intensify operations there. Another
possibility is that, in line with what noted at the beginning of this article,
the central leadership of IS might have decided to raise its profile through
intensified terrorist operations, while at the same time safeguarding its
surviving structure in Europe and rely instead on IS-K elements, who are not
part of the same structure and do not risk compromising it if caught.
Why IS-K and
not other branches of IS? As mentioned above, IS-K has had a significant
presence in Turkey for years, with safe houses and networks dedicated to
supporting financial operations. This financial hub now struggles to carry out
its original task, due to the Turkish authorities strongly increasing their
pressure, so its conversion to more operational roles could well have appeared
logical. Furthermore, as mentioned, the Central Asians were getting ready to be
transferred to Afghanistan, having outlived their usefulness in Syria, where
operating underground is much harder for them than for native Syrians or even
Iraqis. As only a few tens were able to make the trip each month, those laying
idle in Turkey and Syria could conceivably be mobilised for other duties. In
short, IS-K happened to be readily available and well placed to provide support
to the central leadership, whose Syrian and Iraqi branches have been greatly
weakened in recent years. No other branch of IS was in a similar position.
Conclusions.
In
conclusion, IS-K is not really “expanding”. The members involved in the planned
attacks were already in IS-K, or had been scheduled to be transferred to it (in
the case of the Central Asians). What appears to have changed is that IS-K was
given additional tasks by a central leadership, which is low on money and human
resources and needs to raise its media profile to have a chance of re-emerging
from its crisis. This would also explain why IS-K members in Afghanistan and
not particularly enthusiastic about this development, which at least in the
short term is drawing scarce human resources away from them.
The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), during a raid on the Kamal Adwan Hospital in northern Gaza—used by Hamas as a command post for the terrorist organization—eliminated 19 militants, including key figures involved in the October 7, 2023, attack on Israel.
In coordination with Shin Bet (the Israeli Security Agency), the IDF also arrested over 240 terrorists as part of an operation aimed at thwarting Hamas’ latest attempt to re-establish itself in northern Gaza. The Palestinian militia leadership had deliberately exploited the Kamal Adwan Hospital in Jabaliya, employing the well-documented strategy of using human shields—this time, patients inside the hospital. This incident not only highlights Hamas’ criminal intent but also underscores the IDF’s efforts to minimize the war’s impact on Palestinian civilians, despite widespread media narratives depicting the conflict as disproportionately violent. In fact, this war has resulted in historically low civilian casualties compared to other urban conflicts.
Operation at al-Shifa Hospital: A New Humanitarian Standard?
The Israel-Hamas war has provided Israeli forces with the opportunity to conceptualize and implement an unprecedented standard of urban warfare. In March 2024, the IDF conducted a targeted operation at al-Shifa Hospital in Gaza—repurposed by Hamas as a logistical and operational base—while adopting extraordinary measures to protect civilians during the approach, entry, and management of the facility. This approach integrated not only military personnel but also Israeli medical teams and paramedics tasked with assisting Palestinian patients, along with logistical units ensuring the supply of food, water, and medical resources.
This strategy aimed to limit the collateral damage caused by Hamas’ presence within civilian infrastructure, while simultaneously prioritizing patient welfare and minimizing civilian casualties. It stands as a first in the history of urban warfare—an innovative yet costly standard in terms of resources and the inherent risks faced by military personnel operating within hostile environments. From a doctrinal and historical perspective, this marks the first instance of an army undertaking such extensive measures to safeguard an adversarial civilian population, even as offensive military operations unfolded within the same building.
Military analyst John Spencer, in his article Israel Has Created a New Standard for Urban Warfare. Why Will No One Admit It?, remarked that Israel had implemented “more precautions to prevent civilian harm than any military in history—exceeding international legal requirements and surpassing the measures taken by the U.S. in recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.”
The al-Shifa precedent stands as a case study in urban warfare and civilian protection in operational areas. Despite posing a tactical disadvantage, this approach allows militaries engaged in highly scrutinized operations to prevent accusations of violating jus in bello and international conventions. It prompts reflection on the tactical applications and self-imposed limitations designed to protect civilians—not purely for humanitarian reasons but also as a defensive measure against adversary propaganda and cognitive warfare. Hamas, by using civilian infrastructure for military purposes and exploiting civilian casualties to bolster international pressure on Israel, demonstrates how lawfare (the use of legal frameworks as a weapon) plays a central role in modern conflicts.
The dominant Western military doctrine, as described at the beginning of this chapter, revolves around “maneuver warfare”—designed to physically and morally overwhelm an enemy through overwhelming force and speed, striking political and military centers of gravity to compel surrender or destruction. This doctrine underpinned the invasions of Panama (1989), Afghanistan (2001), Iraq (2003), and Russia’s attempt to swiftly capture Ukraine in 2022. In each case, civilians were given little warning or time to evacuate, resulting in significant non-combatant casualties.
Israel, however, has deviated from this entrenched “textbook” approach, prioritizing civilian protection. The IDF pre-announced nearly every operation, allowing civilians time to relocate—often forfeiting the element of surprise. This gave Hamas the opportunity to reposition military and political leaders (along with Israeli hostages) within urban areas, concealing them among civilians or through underground tunnels during evacuations. Unlike the IDF, Hamas fighters do not wear uniforms, granting them a tactical advantage—striking from within civilian populations and blending in to retreat alongside them.
As a result, Hamas has successfully pursued a dual strategy—inflicting suffering on the Palestinian population while crafting a narrative that leverages images of civilian casualties to amplify international pressure on Israel to halt its operations.
📌#ReaCT2023 The 4th annual Report on Terrorism and Radicalisation in Europe ⬇📈launches on 23rd May. Don't miss it! 📊📚Numbers, trends, analyses, books, interviews👇 pic.twitter.com/KLIWWlrJXS
🔴📚 OUT SOON! #ReaCT2023 Annual Report on Terrorism and Radicalisation in Europe | Start Insight ⬇ 16 articles by different authors discuss current trends and numbers. Available in Italian and English startinsight.eu/en/out-soon-r…
🔴@cbertolotti1 a FanPage sulle varie ipotesi dell'attacco👉"(...) non si tratterebbe di droni in grado di fare danni significativi, ma piuttosto di una tipologia di equipaggiamento in grado di fare danni limitati con l'obiettivo di portare l'attenzione mediatica sulla questione" twitter.com/cbertolotti1/s…
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