Cognitive Warfare: How a Violent Event Can Generate an Ecosystem of Hate

by Andrea Molle

A recent article published by the Israel Democracy Institute on the antisemitic attack at Bondi Beach provides a useful point of departure for understanding a dynamic that extends well beyond the individual incident. The analytical value of the case lies not so much in the act of violence itself as in the speed with which the event was immediately absorbed, distorted, and repurposed within a hostile information ecosystem, one already primed to generate disinformation, invert responsibility, and mobilize emotional responses. It is precisely in this transition—from the physical event to its cognitive reprocessing—that the geopolitical dimension of MDMH becomes most visible (MDMH stands for “Misinformation, Disinformation, Malinformation and Hate Speech”).

Within the MDMH paradigm, violence is no longer a terminal point but a trigger. The attack does not close a cycle; it opens one. The physical act produces an emotional spike that is immediately exploited to saturate the information space with alternative narratives—often contradictory, yet united by a common function: preventing the stabilization of facts. In this sense, disinformation does not primarily aim to persuade, but to disorient. Truth is not replaced by a coherent counter-truth; it is dissolved into a plurality of competing versions that make a shared reconstruction of reality impossible.

Within the MDMH paradigm, violence is no longer a terminal point but a trigger. The attack does not close a cycle; it opens one

This mechanism lies at the core of contemporary cognitive warfare. The objective is not adherence to a specific narrative, but the erosion of trust in the very process by which reality is established. When every event is instantly reframed as an “operation,” a “provocation,” or a “false flag,” the outcome is not informational pluralism but cognitive paralysis. Citizens no longer know what to believe and, in this state of permanent uncertainty, become more vulnerable to emotional, identity-based, and Manichean frames.

A decisive element highlighted by the Bondi case is that this dynamic is not spontaneous. It is not the product of disordered reactions by isolated users, but of structured information ecosystems, characterized by cross-platform synchronization, repeated reuse of decontextualized content, algorithmic amplification, and continuous migration of the same narratives across social media, private messaging channels, short-form video platforms, and generative AI tools. In such an environment, the distinction between information, opinion, and propaganda becomes functionally irrelevant.

From a geopolitical perspective, MDMH represents a form of low-intensity but high-persistence conflict, in which state and non-state actors can operate at low cost, with plausible deniability and significant cumulative impact. Antisemitism, in this context, is not merely a historical prejudice resurfacing periodically, but a particularly effective cognitive vector: it is emotionally charged, easily recognizable, cross-cultural, and immediately deployable to explain complex events through simple schemas of blame and malign intent.

In such an environment, the distinction between information, opinion, and propaganda becomes functionally irrelevant

One crucial aspect of the analyzed case concerns the role of artificial intelligence. When automated systems participate in the real-time synthesis of events—summarizing, answering, suggesting interpretations—they become cognitive actors in their own right. They are not neutral tools: they operate within an already polarized environment and can amplify its distortions. Errors, omissions, or improper associations do not merely produce misinformation; they contribute to shifting moral responsibility, rewriting context, and legitimizing hostile narratives under the appearance of technical neutrality.

This introduces a significant rupture with the past. In classical propaganda, intentionality was identifiable and attributable. In MDMH, manipulation is often emergent, distributed across human actors, algorithmic incentives, and automated processes. Responsibility fragments, while political effect remains. It is a form of power that does not impose an official line, but instead configures the environment in which all lines become possible—and therefore equivalent.

When automated systems (e.g. AI) participate in the real-time synthesis of events—summarizing, answering, suggesting interpretations—they become cognitive actors in their own right

From this follows a fundamental strategic implication: regulatory neutrality is no longer sustainable. Treating the information ecosystem as a purely private space, self-regulated by commercial platforms, amounts to relinquishing any form of cognitive security. Within the MDMH framework, algorithmic design, content moderation, recommendation systems, and generative AI are not neutral technical choices but decisions with geopolitical consequences. They shape which events emerge, which emotions are activated, and which groups are perceived as threats.

The Bondi case illustrates how a single local episode can be immediately integrated into a global narrative of hate, and how this integration occurs faster than factual verification. This reverses the traditional analytical sequence of “event → interpretation → reaction.” In MDMH, interpretation precedes the event because the frame is already in place. The event merely serves to fill it.

From this perspective, speaking of security without incorporating the cognitive dimension is analytically insufficient. The protection of communities, the prevention of radicalization, and the stability of pluralistic societies increasingly depend on the ability to defend the information space as critical infrastructure. This is not a matter of censorship, but of recognizing that freedom of expression presupposes an environment in which facts are at least able to attempt to emerge before being overwhelmed by manipulation.

From this perspective, speaking of security without incorporating the cognitive dimension is analytically insufficient

MDMH therefore forces us to reconsider the relationship between violence, information, and power. Attacks are no longer merely acts of force, but cognitive operations designed to produce indirect, durable, and difficult-to-attribute political effects. Ignoring this dimension means continuing to respond to a twenty-first-century conflict with twentieth-century categories.

Designating Antifa: Legal, Strategic, and Policy Implications

by Andrea Molle in the United States

The Trump administration’s recent decision to designate Antifa as a terrorist organization raises significant questions about the use of counterterrorism instruments in the domestic context. Unlike foreign groups traditionally subject to such designations, Antifa is not a structured entity with at least a minimum level of centralized leadership, identifiable membership, or a coherent financial apparatus. It is best described as a decentralized social movement characterized by self-described antifascist ideology, localized networks, and diverse tactical repertoires ranging from peaceful protest to violent confrontation. This structural ambiguity is central to the challenges and controversies surrounding the designation.

From a legal standpoint, the move enters contested territory. Federal law grants clear authority to designate foreign terrorist organizations under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. No equivalent domestic framework exists, even though both the Obama and Biden administrations considered domestic terrorism a top national security priority. The Obama administration’s 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism explicitly acknowledged the potential threat of ideologically motivated violence within the United States, though it stopped short of proposing a formal designation regime. Instead, it emphasized community engagement and counter-radicalization initiatives. The Biden administration, in turn, released in 2021 the first National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism, which identified racially or ethnically motivated violent extremism, as well as anti-government and anarchist movements, as pressing challenges. That document directed resources to intelligence sharing, law enforcement coordination, and prevention programs but, crucially, reaffirmed that existing U.S. law provides no mechanism to designate domestic groups as terrorist organizations in the same way foreign entities can be listed under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. This continuity underscores the structural gap: administrations of both parties have recognized the salience of domestic extremist violence yet have not sought to create a domestic designation framework, largely due to constitutional and political constraints.

Antifa is best described as a decentralized social movement characterized by self-described antifascist ideology, localized networks, and diverse tactical repertoires ranging from peaceful protest to violent confrontation. This structural ambiguity is central to the challenges and controversies surrounding the designation.

Applying the “terrorist organization” label to an informal domestic movement would also probably rely on reinterpretations of existing statutes, such as those covering material support or conspiracy. The First Amendment sharply limits the scope of government action in this area: expression of political views, even radical or offensive ones, is protected speech. To withstand judicial scrutiny, prosecutions would have to demonstrate concrete involvement in acts of violence or provision of material assistance to illegal activities. This high evidentiary bar limits the practical enforceability of the designation.

Strategically, the designation offers nonetheless certain advantages. It signals deterrence, both to participants and to those contemplating financial or logistical support. It expands the range of investigative tools available to law enforcement, including enhanced surveillance authority and the ability to pursue financing channels. It also provides a symbolic victory to policymakers who wish to demonstrate resolve against political violence.

At the same time, the approach carries several risks. Because Antifa lacks organizational cohesion, the designation may prove more symbolic than operational. Efforts to prosecute under terrorism frameworks could generate constitutional challenges and unfavorable precedents. The broad application of the terrorist label to a movement that includes lawful protest activity risks chilling legitimate dissent and expanding state surveillance in ways that may be difficult to constrain. There is also the strategic cost of misalignment and prioritizing Antifa could divert resources from addressing other most statistically significant threats.

The policy implications extend to digital environments. Online expressions of sympathy or identification with Antifa could, depending on prosecutorial discretion, be construed as “material support.” Even if courts ultimately narrow the definition, the perception of risk could deter individuals from lawful speech and association, producing a chilling effect inconsistent with democratic norms. This dynamic underscores the tension between counterterrorism objectives and civil liberties protections when tools designed for foreign threats are applied domestically.

The broad application of the terrorist label to a movement that includes lawful protest activity risks chilling legitimate dissent and expanding state surveillance in ways that may be difficult to constrain.

In sum, designating Antifa as a terrorist organization exemplifies the challenges of adapting counterterrorism frameworks to movements that are diffuse, networked, and embedded within democratic societies. The policy yields symbolic and deterrent benefits but faces substantial legal, operational, and normative obstacles. Its long-term impact will depend on judicial interpretation, enforcement practices, and whether it contributes to reducing violence or instead exacerbates polarization and erodes constitutional protections.

Risk Profile of Political Violence Offenders. United States vs. the European Union (EU‑27) in 2024 – 2025 (first quarter)

by Andrea Molle in the United States

Recent assessments by security agencies and research institutions reveal a growing convergence in the demographic and geographic profiles of individuals involved in political violence across Western democracies. While the specific ideologies vary—racial and ethnic grievance, as well as anti-government conspiracy theories, are more prevalent in the United States, whereas jihadist and separatist movements continue to dominate in Europe—the underlying offender profile is strikingly similar on both sides of the Atlantic. Typically, the individual is a young man, often in his late teens or twenties, who becomes radicalized online and is drawn to act in areas where media exposure is high or where local grievances create fertile ground for mobilization.

The table that follows draws from the most up-to-date statistics provided by the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security, Europol’s 2025 TE‑SAT report, the START-PIRUS dataset, and spatial analyses based on ACLED event tracking. Together, these sources offer a detailed snapshot of the current threat landscape.

*Variable*	*United States*	*European Union*
Gender	≈ 85 % male (PIRUS, 1970–2021)	≈ 91 % male (TE‑SAT 2025 juveniles)
Age	≈ 68 % aged 18‑34 (PIRUS)	> 60 % under 35; 29 % minors (TE‑SAT 2025)
Race / Ethnicity	REMVE white supremacist actors = 52 % of FBI DVE disruptions FY 2024	Ethno‑nationalist & separatist actors = 38 % of 2024 attacks
Religion	< 7 % jihadist‑inspired in U.S. plots (HTA 2025); rise in Christian‑identity fringe	Jihadist ideology behind 24 of 58 attacks; political extremism scene “post‑religious” (TE‑SAT)
Political affiliation	Anti‑gov/sovereign + partisan actors = 49 % of incidents since 2016 (CSIS)	Accelerationist & neo‑Nazi micro‑cells expanding (TE‑SAT)
Urban / Rural	72 % of incidents in metros > 250 k; secondary spike in low‑density militia counties (arXiv 2025)	Major capitals plus separatist peripheries (Corsica, Basque Country)

Table 1: Comparative Risk Markers

A clear gender disparity characterizes individuals involved in acts of political violence across both the United States and the European Union. In the U.S., data from the START-PIRUS dataset covering 1990 to 2021 shows that approximately 85% of offenders are male. The trend is even more pronounced in Europe, where Europol’s 2025 TE-SAT report indicates that 91% of juvenile terrorism suspects arrested in 2024 were male. This overwhelming male dominance remains one of the most consistent features across all ideological backgrounds.

Age is another strong indicator. In both regions, the late teens to early thirties represent the most common age range for radicalization and mobilization. In the U.S., nearly 70% of offenders fall between 18 and 34 years old. Similarly, Europol reports that 29% of all terrorism-related arrests in the EU in 2024 involved minors or very young adults between the ages of 12 and 20. These figures highlight the growing vulnerability of younger populations, especially in digital and social media environments.

Racial and ethnic identity also play a major role in shaping offender profiles. In the United States, the FBI classified 52% of domestic violent extremist (DVE) disruptions in fiscal year 2024 as racially or ethnically motivated, with the majority linked to white supremacist ideologies. In the EU, the picture is more mixed: 41% of completed attacks in 2024 were attributed to jihadist actors, while 38% were carried out by ethno-nationalist or separatist groups, particularly in regions with ongoing autonomy conflicts.

Religious ideology, though no longer dominant in the U.S., remains a key driver of lethal attacks in Europe. Jihadist-inspired plots now account for fewer than 7% of DVE cases in the U.S., reflecting a broader shift toward secular or hybrid motivations. In contrast, such plots were responsible for 41% of all fatal terrorist incidents in the EU in 2024, making religion a more consequential factor on the European front.

Finally, political affiliation has emerged as a defining element of recent violent extremism. In the U.S., data from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) shows that 49% of incidents since 2016 involved anti-government, sovereign citizen, or highly polarized partisan actors. Meanwhile, in Europe, the most rapidly growing segment of terrorism-related arrests comes from accelerationist and neo-Nazi microcells—small, decentralized groups often operating transnationally and using encrypted communication platforms to coordinate attacks.

Typically, the individual is a young man, often in his late teens or twenties, who becomes radicalized online and is drawn to act in areas where media exposure is high or where local grievances create fertile ground for mobilization.

In the United States, geographic clusters of political violence are not evenly distributed. Spatial analysis based on ACLED event data reveals that California, Texas, Florida, and Georgia lead the country in the total number of recorded incidents. However, when adjusted for population size, the Pacific Northwest—particularly Oregon and Washington—ranks highest in per capita terms. Beyond major metropolitan areas, a a secondary cluster of concern emerges in rural counties with active militia networks, including parts of northern Idaho and eastern Oregon. These regions, though less densely populated, host communities with strong anti-government sentiment and logistical infrastructure capable of supporting extremist activity.

Across the Atlantic, the European Union shows a similarly uneven pattern. Italy recorded the highest number of terrorist attacks in 2024 with 20 incidents, followed by France with 14. Spain and France also topped the charts in terms of total arrests related to political violence. Meanwhile, low-intensity but persistent acts of separatist violence continue in places like Corsica and the Basque Country, where historical grievances and regional identity continue to fuel localized conflict. These areas remain hotspots for ethno-nationalist activity, even as broader attention shifts to transnational threats.

Religious ideology, though no longer dominant in the U.S., remains a key driver of lethal attacks in Europe

A recent statistical overview based on Europol and START InSight’s data, summarized by Claudio Bertolotti in #ReaCT2024 (annual Report on Terrorism and Radicalisation in Europe) confirms the persistent threat of terrorism within Europe. In 2023, there were 43 attacks executed and 33 more prevented, with over 600 individuals arrested across EU member states. France and Austria topped the arrest figures, reflecting both operational intensity and intelligence prioritization. The data also emphasize the enduring challenge posed by ethno-nationalist and separatist groups—especially in France and Spain—alongside residual jihadist threats. Bertolotti’s analysis reinforces the view that radicalization is increasingly driven by hybrid factors, blending ideology with personal and psychological vulnerabilities, particularly among disaffected youth.

While demographic and geographic indicators help identify who and where, understanding how individuals radicalize provides deeper insight into the threat trajectory.

Regardless of ideology, most individuals who engage in political violence tend to follow a similar radicalization pathway. Typically, this begins with a personal crisis—such as emotional distress, social isolation, or financial hardship—that becomes layered with broader conspiracy theories or identity-based grievances. These narratives offer a distorted framework through which the individual begins to make sense of their situation, often blaming institutions, governments, or specific groups. Over time, the search for meaning or belonging leads them into online communities where these views are reinforced. Both the FBI and Europol have flagged social media, gaming platforms, and encrypted messaging apps as key accelerants in this process, especially among younger users. These digital spaces provide not only ideological content but also peer validation, making them fertile ground for recruitment and mobilization.

The likelihood of an individual engaging in political violence varies based on a combination of demographic, geographic, and behavioral factors. The highest-risk profile is a male between the ages of 18 and 34, residing in a politically polarized urban area or a region with active separatist movements. This individual is typically deeply engaged in extremist content online, often through forums, social media, or encrypted apps.

A moderate level of risk is associated with individuals living in rural U.S. counties where militia activity is present. This group often includes people with a prior history of minor violence or domestic abuse, suggesting that a background of interpersonal aggression may be a precursor to political violence under political ideological influences.

Regardless of ideology, most individuals who engage in political violence tend to follow a similar radicalization pathway. Typically, this begins with a personal crisis—such as emotional distress, social isolation, or financial hardship—that becomes layered with broader conspiracy theories or identity-based grievances.

At the lowest end of the risk spectrum are older adults—particularly women over the age of 45—who have no significant online footprint in extremist spaces. This demographic remains substantially underrepresented across all known datasets of politically motivated violence.

To effectively reduce the threat of political violence, prevention strategies must target the most vulnerable groups and high-risk environments. One of the most urgent priorities is early intervention aimed at young males between the ages of 13 and 24, who represent the fastest-growing segment among those radicalized online. Outreach programs that engage these individuals before they become deeply embedded in extremist networks can significantly reduce long-term risk.

One of the most urgent priorities is early intervention aimed at young males between the ages of 13 and 24, who represent the fastest-growing segment among those radicalized online.

At the same time, federal and local fusion centers should align their resource deployment with the geographic clusters identified by ACLED data and academic spatial models. This means focusing efforts not only in major urban centers but also in specific counties where historical or ongoing extremist activity has been recorded.

Importantly, prevention programs should move beyond rigid ideological classifications. Rather than focusing solely on political extremists, jihadist, or separatist threats, interventions should be built around common behavioral patterns—such as personal crises, social isolation, and online radicalization—that transcend ideological boundaries.

Finally, special attention must be given to election cycles. Both the Department of Homeland Security and the Center for Strategic and International Studies have documented consistent spikes in political violence and threat activity during major elections. Surge planning and targeted security measures around these periods are essential for mitigating potential flashpoints.

Estimated Risk to the Public and Strategic Mitigation

While the political violence landscape is evolving and increasingly visible, the actual risk of physical harm to the average citizen remains statistically low in both the United States and the European Union. Based on aggregated datasets from the FBI, DHS, and Europol, the annual likelihood of a civilian being killed in a politically motivated attack is less than 1 in 10 million in most Western countries. For context, this is comparable to the annual odds of being killed by lightning or a domestic gas leak. However, these figures mask important nuances. The perceived threat is far greater in certain high-profile environments—such as government buildings, political rallies, and religious institutions—where attacks are more likely to occur, particularly during periods of heightened political tension or following polarizing events.

Over the last five years, the U.S. has averaged 25–35 documented incidents per year of domestic political violence involving physical harm or lethal intent. In the EU, while the number of successful attacks remains lower, the number of arrests and disrupted plots—over 400 in 2024 alone—indicates significant intent and mobilization potential. The real risk, therefore, is less about mass casualty events and more about the cumulative erosion of public trust, democratic stability, and civic norms.

Prevention programs should move beyond rigid ideological classifications. Rather than focusing solely on political extremists, jihadist, or separatist threats, interventions should be built around common behavioral patterns—such as personal crises, social isolation, and online radicalization—that transcend ideological boundaries.

Three intersecting dynamics heighten risk exposure for specific groups:

Proximity to symbolic or political institutions (e.g., Capitol buildings, synagogues, embassies)
Demographic visibility (e.g., targeted religious or racial minorities)
Participation in high-profile civic activity (e.g., activists, elected officials, journalists)

To mitigate these risks, authorities and communities must adopt a layered, preventive approach. Key strategies include:

Behavioral Threat Assessment: Training frontline personnel (teachers, social workers, HR managers) to recognize early signs of radicalization and intervene before mobilization.
Digital Literacy and Counter-Radicalization: Promoting fact-checking skills, online resilience, and reporting mechanisms in youth populations—especially males aged 13–24.
Community-Based Partnerships: Investing in trusted local actors, including faith leaders and neighborhood organizations, to build relationships and disrupt isolation.
Election Security Surge Planning: Deploying targeted security resources and disinformation countermeasures during election cycles, which are now consistently associated with spikes in threats.
Data-Driven Fusion Centers: Expanding the capacity of regional intelligence hubs to share geospatial and behavioral insights in real time between law enforcement and civic institutions.

Ultimately, while political violence is unlikely to touch the average citizen directly, its ripple effects can undermine democratic life if left unchecked. The focus, therefore, should not only be on physical security but also on rebuilding institutional trust and strengthening social resilience.

Sources

[1] Europol. *European Union Terrorism Situation & Trend Report (TE‑SAT 2025)*. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the EU, 2025.

[2] DHS Office of Intelligence & Analysis. *Homeland Threat Assessment 2025*. Washington DC, 2024.

[3] University of Maryland START. *Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) Research Brief*, March 2023 update.

[4] Claudio Bertolotti, ed., #ReaCT2023 – Report on Radicalization and Terrorism (Rome: START InSight, 2023), https://www.startinsight.eu/react2023-report-on-radicalization-and-terrorism/

[5] Riley McCabe. “The Rising Threat of Anti‑Government Domestic Terrorism: What the Data Tells Us.” CSIS Brief, October 21 2024.

[6] Ravi Varma Pakalapati & Gary E. Davis. “Spatial and Temporal Analysis of Political Violence in the United States.” arXiv preprint 2503.14399, March 2025.

Riots in Los Angeles and the New Front of Irregular Warfare

by Andrea Molle

Irregular warfare (IW) is commonly understood as a conflict where the struggle is not necessarily over land or conventional military superiority, but rather over legitimacy, influence, and control of populations. Traditionally associated with insurgencies, guerrilla tactics, and non-state actors, irregular warfare has increasingly evolved into a more complex and hybrid phenomenon, especially in democratic societies. If examined through this contemporary lens, the tensions unfolding in Los Angeles between “Angelenos,” local authorities, and the federal government can be seen as a domestic iteration of irregular warfare.

At the heart of the conflict is a fundamental contest over legitimacy and sovereignty. Los Angeles, along with other sanctuary jurisdictions, has actively defied federal immigration enforcement, refused cooperation with certain Department of Homeland Security (DHS) directives, and opposed national crime-control initiatives perceived as unjust or racially biased. These actions reflect not just policy disagreements, but a deeper ideological struggle over who gets to govern and how. By asserting local governance norms over federal mandates, Los Angeles effectively challenges the supremacy of the Federal Government within its own territory—an act reminiscent of the strategic behavior of irregular actors seeking to discredit or undermine centralized authority.

Crucially, the methods employed are asymmetric. Rather than armed resistance, Los Angeles authorities deploy tools of legal warfare (“lawfare”), bureaucratic resistance, and public messaging. Strategic lawsuits, municipal non-compliance, prosecutorial discretion, and ordinances designed to shield undocumented residents are instruments of resistance, analogous to how irregular forces use terrain, time, and unconventional means to outmaneuver superior forces. This bureaucratic insurgency does not seek to overthrow the state, but rather to reshape the boundaries of federal authority from within.

Yet, the conflict has not remained confined to the realm of law and rhetoric. In recent days, it has taken a kinetic turn, as federal agents have clashed physically with protesters, community organizers, and even municipal law enforcement during raids and enforcement operations. These confrontations—at times erupting into street riots, mass detentions, or violent dispersals—mirror the tactical realities of irregular warfare where control over urban space becomes a proxy for legitimacy. The deployment of militarized federal units into city neighborhoods without coordination or consent of local authorities further intensifies the perception of occupation, leading to spontaneous or organized civilian resistance. This escalation into physical confrontation blurs the line between law enforcement and political coercion, a dynamic typical of hybrid conflicts in which the state itself becomes fragmented and contested.

Equally important is the role of narrative warfare. Federal authorities characterize Los Angeles as “lawless,” a city held hostage by crime and chaos, while city officials portray themselves as defenders of human dignity, civil rights, and moral governance. These competing narratives are not peripheral—they are central to the conflict, as both sides vie for public support and political capital. In irregular warfare, victory often hinges not on battlefield wins but on the ability to sway hearts and minds. In this respect, the struggle in Los Angeles fits squarely within the psychological and informational dimensions of IW.

Moreover, this confrontation involves a complex web of non-traditional actors. Civil society organizations, activist networks, legal aid groups, and even religious communities have assumed quasi-political and protective functions, stepping into roles typically reserved for state institutions. Their coordinated efforts to resist federal enforcement and provide alternative forms of governance and justice are hallmarks of irregular conflict, where legitimacy is contested not only through force but through competing institutions.

In conclusion, while there are no conventional armies or insurgent militias involved, Los Angeles presents a modern battlefield of irregular warfare—one where law, identity, narrative, and at times even physical force are the weapons. As the nature of conflict in liberal democracies continues to evolve, it becomes increasingly clear that irregular warfare is no longer confined to distant insurgencies or failed states. It is now playing out in the contested political geography of cities like Los Angeles, where the fight for control is not just over policies, but over the very meaning of sovereignty, legitimacy, and justice in the 21st century.

Zizians, the rise of the vegan cult: from philosophy to violence

by Andrea Molle.

The recent arrest of Jack LaSota, known online as “Ziz,” has brought attention to the enigmatic and dangerous group called the Zizians. Once an obscure internet subculture, it has now been thrust into the public eye as authorities uncover disturbing details about the group’s ideology and its links to violent crimes. Under LaSota’s leadership, the Zizians have evolved from a niche philosophical movement into an organized and radicalized network, willing to engage in extreme actions to further its beliefs.

This cult-like organization has been implicated in violent incidents across the United States, including deadly confrontations with law enforcement, targeted attacks, and aggressive protests. Reports suggest that its members adhere to a rigid, almost apocalyptic worldview, combining radical veganism, anarchism, transhumanism, and a deep distrust of established institutions. The group’s activities, from online proselytization to real-world aggression, raise urgent questions about its origins, recruitment methods, and the broader implications of its growing influence. As investigations continue, authorities and analysts face the challenge of dismantling a decentralized movement that thrives on the internet. The Zizians exemplify how ideological extremism, fueled by online radicalization, can spill over into real-world violence, posing a unique and evolving threat to public safety.

The group traces its origins to the San Francisco Bay Area, where in 2016, Jack LaSota began publishing a blog under the pseudonym “Ziz.” Initially, LaSota’s writings attracted a niche audience, particularly within online circles interested in philosophy, artificial intelligence, and radical social theories. Over time, her ideas evolved into a more complex and controversial ideology, drawing in followers and forming the foundation of what is now the Zizian movement. LaSota, a transgender woman, delved into unconventional theories about human consciousness, proposing that the brain’s hemispheres could possess distinct values and even separate gender identities, often existing in internal conflict. She framed this as a fundamental struggle within individuals, one that could be “resolved” through personal transformation and ideological commitment. This perspective resonated with some online communities, but it also fostered a more rigid and dogmatic worldview among her followers.

LaSota’s discourse expanded into political and ethical domains, incorporating radical veganism, anarchism, and extreme opposition to mainstream rationalist communities—particularly those concerned with artificial intelligence and existential risk. She criticized these groups for what she perceived as moral cowardice and an unwillingness to take direct action against perceived threats. This opposition became a defining characteristic of Zizian ideology, shaping the group’s adversarial stance against the rationalist movement and its institutions.

The eclectic mix of beliefs that emerged gave the Zizians a distinct ideological identity. What began as an online intellectual pursuit morphed into an action-oriented movement, increasingly militant in nature. The group’s shift from fringe philosophy to violent action became evident in 2019, marking a turning point in its evolution. That year, LaSota and several associates were arrested during a protest outside a Northern California retreat center hosting a rationalist event. What started as an ideological dispute over artificial intelligence ethics quickly escalated into direct action, characterized by aggressive tactics such as physical confrontations, property damage, and attempts to disrupt the event. This incident signaled a disturbing shift from intellectual critique to militancy, setting the stage for more extreme actions in subsequent years.

By 2020, the Zizians had attracted individuals not only ideologically aligned but also willing to engage in direct, sometimes violent action. In one notable case, a Zizian-affiliated individual was arrested in Portland, Oregon, after setting fire to a research facility linked to AI development. The attack, classified as arson, was framed by the perpetrator as a “preemptive strike” against artificial intelligence systems they believed posed an existential threat to humanity.

In 2021, a coordinated harassment campaign targeted key figures in the rationalist and effective altruism communities. Several prominent researchers received death threats, and at least one rationalist blogger’s home was vandalized with Zizian slogans. While no direct physical violence was involved, the campaign demonstrated the group’s increasing willingness to engage in intimidation tactics.

The escalation continued in 2022, when a group of Zizians staged a break-in at a biotech laboratory in San Diego, allegedly to “liberate” animals used in testing. Security footage showed masked individuals wearing tactical gear, further indicating the group’s militarization. Though no injuries were reported, the break-in resulted in extensive property damage, and several members were arrested.

In 2023, violence took a deadlier turn. A Zizian member was implicated in the attempted murder of a computer scientist in Boston, a researcher advocating AI safety protocols. The suspect, who had posted several online manifestos aligning with LaSota’s theories, was apprehended before the attack could be carried out. However, the incident reinforced concerns that the Zizians were moving beyond property crimes and harassment into targeted physical violence.

These incidents paved the way for outright bloodshed in 2025. In January of that year, U.S. Border Patrol Agent David Maland was fatally shot during a traffic stop in Vermont. The assailants, linked to the Zizians, were found with tactical gear and weaponry, underscoring the group’s operational capabilities and the seriousness of the threat they posed. Another shocking act of violence occurred in Vallejo, California, where landlord Curtis Lind was brutally stabbed. Investigations revealed connections between the suspects and the Zizian network, highlighting the group’s expanding geographic reach and its growing disregard for human life in pursuit of its ideological goals.

The pattern of escalation, from online radicalization to targeted violence, demonstrates the Zizians’ transformation into a dangerous extremist movement. What started as an obscure philosophical discourse has now become an organized threat, with real-world consequences that authorities are struggling to contain.

While the Zizians originated in the United States, their influence now extends beyond American borders. Their activities and network have gained footholds in various European countries, sparking alarm about the group’s global reach and impact. Individuals like German national Felix Bauckholt, implicated in violent activities associated with the Zizians, demonstrate the group’s ability to infiltrate and operate across national borders. Bauckholt’s involvement signals a broader trend of the group’s international appeal or organization, suggesting a transnational network that facilitates coordination and ideologically driven violence.

In Europe, authorities are reporting Zizian-inspired actions in several countries. In the United Kingdom, there have been instances of radicalization tied to the group’s ideology. France, with its history of radical movements, has also seen individuals align themselves with Zizian ideals, heightening concerns about the potential for organized extremist attacks. Furthermore, countries such as Italy and Spain have become critical points for recruitment and logistical support, with their porous borders and diverse political climates making them susceptible to external ideological movements like the Zizians. These nations’ connections may involve financial networks, online propaganda campaigns, and logistical support that enable actions across Europe.

The growing international dimension of Zizian influence raises several critical concerns. Law enforcement and intelligence agencies across Europe are increasingly collaborating to track the group’s activities, share intelligence, and prevent further escalation. The rise of this transnational extremist network highlights the need for enhanced cooperation between nations to counter the threat of globalized radical movements. The Zizians’ ability to inspire or directly coordinate actions beyond the United States underscores the evolving nature of modern extremism and the growing complexity of combating transnational threats.

The Zizians exemplify how online radicalization can give rise to extremist movements in the digital age. Central to their operations was the digital presence of key figures like LaSota, whose online platforms became gathering places for like-minded individuals drawn to the group’s violent ideology. These platforms allowed LaSota and others to disseminate propaganda, ideologically charged materials, and violent rhetoric, creating an echo chamber where extremism could flourish without traditional geographic limitations.

LaSota’s online influence served as a nexus for isolated individuals who, driven by shared grievances or radical ideologies, could find solidarity and reinforcement in each other’s beliefs. This virtual space allowed members of the Zizian network to coordinate actions, share strategies, and mobilize others toward radicalization. Through encrypted communications, private chat rooms, and social media platforms, the Zizians could organize discreetly and spread their messages far beyond what was previously possible.

The reach of online radicalization cannot be overstated. For many, exposure to extremist content online acts as a catalyst for radical thinking, sometimes evolving into violent intentions. The anonymity and unregulated nature of digital platforms, especially on the dark web, facilitate the spread of extremist ideologies while bypassing traditional monitoring and control mechanisms.

This underscores the growing importance of vigilance in monitoring online spaces to prevent the incubation of such dangerous movements. The Zizians’ ability to thrive in these virtual spaces highlights the necessity for law enforcement, social media companies, and governments to collaborate in identifying and neutralizing online radicalization efforts. This requires not only enhanced tracking of extremist content but also a proactive strategy of engagement, where tech platforms are empowered to detect and remove harmful materials before they gain traction.

Moreover, the Zizians’ use of digital tools to recruit, radicalize, and plan violent actions illustrates the urgency of adopting more sophisticated countermeasures in cyberspace. This includes improving online content moderation, fostering digital literacy programs to combat extremism, and raising awareness of the dangers of radicalization. The lessons learned from observing the Zizians and similar groups should drive global efforts to regulate digital platforms and prevent them from becoming breeding grounds for violence, helping to stem the tide of online radicalization before it can manifest in real-world harm.

The emergence of the Zizians, rising from the shadows of obscure online forums to orchestrating real-world acts of violence, serves as a chilling reminder of the potential dangers posed by unchecked extremist ideologies in the digital age. What began as an online fringe movement quickly evolved into a transnational network capable of mobilizing individuals across borders, turning virtual radicalization into tangible, violent actions. This escalation underscores the urgent need to address the broader issue of how extremist ideologies can thrive in the digital realm, often going unnoticed until it’s too late.

The Zizians’ ability to recruit, radicalize, and coordinate violence online highlights significant vulnerabilities in our current systems of monitoring and regulation. It serves as a potent warning that the digital space, with its vast anonymity and global reach, can be harnessed by malicious actors to spread hate and incite violence. Therefore, it is essential for law enforcement and intelligence agencies to increase vigilance, while governments and international organizations implement proactive policies that limit extremist groups’ ability to flourish in these unregulated spaces.

Policymakers must collaborate with tech companies to establish robust frameworks for monitoring online content, while also developing counter-radicalization strategies that are effective and non-invasive. Social media platforms must take greater responsibility in identifying and removing extremist materials before they gain traction. However, these efforts must be balanced with the protection of free speech and individual rights, which presents a complex challenge requiring nuanced solutions.

Furthermore, society at large has a vital role in preventing the radicalization of vulnerable individuals. Educational initiatives that promote digital literacy, critical thinking, and awareness of online extremism are crucial in empowering individuals to recognize and resist harmful ideologies. Community-based efforts to foster inclusion, tolerance, and dialogue can help counteract the divisive rhetoric that fuels radical movements like the Zizians.

Ultimately, the rise of the Zizians serves as a wake-up call, urging us to confront the evolving nature of extremism in the digital era. The collective responsibility of law enforcement, policymakers, tech companies, and the public is essential in ensuring that the digital age does not become a breeding ground for such threats. Only through continued vigilance, cooperation, and innovation can we hope to combat the growing menace of online radicalization and protect society from the devastating consequences of extremist violence.

The Islamic State in Khorasan’s “expansion” towards Europe

by Antonio Giustozzi.

Article published on #ReaCT2024 5th Report on Terrorism and Radicalism (order your copy or download the Report in Pdf).

Abstract

In 2023, Da’esh (ISIS) continued to carry out isolated attacks in Europe, generally with limited organisational support limited. The article notes the increasing effectiveness of European counter-terrorism measures European counterterrorism measures that would likely have made it less convenient for ISIS leaders deploy scarce human resources in such attacks. The author, in his article explores how the Islamic State group seems to favour the preservation of its organisational structures in Europe, delegating action to a few individuals or isolated cells. In addition, the growing involvement of the Khorasan (IS-K) branch of ISIS in planning attacks in Europe or against European targets abroad, as demonstrated by a 2020 plot against NATO bases in Germany. Despite the numerous plots identified in 2023, there is some discretion in attributing these plans exclusively to IS-K, suggesting wider intra-ISIS cooperation. The article notes that, despite appearances, Da’esh Khorasan is not necessarily expanding, but rather taking on new tasks assigned to it by the central leadership, pressed by resource scarcity.

The Islamic State (IS) continued in 2023 to occasionally carry out isolated attacks in Europe, usually with seemingly little organisational backup. As European counter-terrorism has become increasingly effective, the cost effectiveness of committing rare human resources to isolated attacks must have appeared questionable to IS leaders and police sources around Europe tend to think that IS indeed prefers to safeguard whatever organisational structure it still has in Europe, leaving the task of flying the flag to a few isolated individuals or cells. Indeed, as late as early 2022 police sources in Europe did not see an impending IS threat, its presence being limited to online propagandists, recruiters, and fundraisers. Taliban sources confirmed the detention of an IS-K operative in Afghanistan, who had raised thousands of euros in Germany and Spain (Giustozzi, 2022). Taliban intelligence sources also note that that much of IS-K online propaganda is now being produced outside Afghanistan, including Europe. After the fall of Kabul in August 2021, IS-K started releasing a significant portion of this propaganda in English. There might be multiple reasons for this, not all related to Europe. A possible reason that is relevant for European security is the intent to stimulate recruitment in Europe, perhaps in order to replace the loss of many Da’esh media operators due to the police crackdown in recent years. Even when in July 2023 the police detained several IS plotters in Germany and the Netherlands and described them as being “in contact with members” of the IS-K branch, it also noted that they were engaged in fund raising and there was no indication that they were actively preparing a terrorist attack (Stewart ASyI, 2023).

1. IS-K and the Ambition to Strike Europe.

Some observers have however noted a recent trend, concerning the growing organisational involvement of the Khorasan branch (IS-K) in planning attacks in Europe, or against European targets in Turkey. The German authorities alleged in 2020 that the cell behind a plot to attack NATO bases in Germany, thwarted by the police in April 2020, had received the order to act from an IS Khorasan cadre in Afghanistan.[1] This episode, however, was barely noticed and the evidence shared by the German authorities remains fuzzy. What really caught the eyes of many observers was the US intelligence report that turned up among the Discord leaks, showing that as of February 2023 15 different IS-K linked plots to carry out attacks against western interests in Europe, Turkey, the Middle East and elsewhere had been identified by the US military.[2] While these figures seem impressive, they contrast oddly with the fact that in March 2023 the US Central Command assessed was that IS-K was within 6 months of having the capacity to organise attacks against western interests in Asia or Europe. The discrepancy is difficult to explain, unless for the military the 15 plots mentioned above were not to be taken too seriously, or not to be attributed exclusively or even primarily to IS-K. Indeed, Turkish sources describe some of these plots, such as those aimed against Swedish and Dutch consulates on Turkish territory, as involving Central Asians linked to IS-K and members of the Turkish branch of IS. Apart from reportedly issuing the order, IS-K seemingly relied on assets and personnel that were already on location. Indeed, even the leaked US intelligence report itself noted that IS-K “relied on resources from outside Afghanistan”.

2. Afghanistan and the Developed Structure of IS.

In 2023 IS-K sources in Afghanistan confirmed to the author’s research team that the group coordinated operations in Turkey and Europe with other branches of the Islamic State, stressing however that this happened under the leadership of the central leadership of the ‘Caliphate”. This implies at least that IS-K as such was not determining the overall strategy presiding over the planning of these attacks. Sources within IS-K confirmed that Afghanistan hosted several military commissions for neighbouring countries, such as Iran and Central Asia, but did not mention any such entity focusing on Europe, Turkey or the Middle East. Sources contacted by the International Crisis Group in Syria indicated in 2023 that the Central Asians who used to operate under IS in Syria had been transferred under the responsibility of IS-K (International Crisis Group, 2023). According to the IS-K sources, at least initially this was meant to prelude to their transfer to Afghanistan, which however occurred considerably more slowly than planned.

The picture that these sources portray is one of a relatively developed IS-K structure in Turkey and Syria, with 200+ working in the financial hub of IS-K in Turkey, plus 400-500 Central Asians spread between Syria and Turkey, ex members of ISIL who either switched their allegiance or were reassigned to IS-K (the sources are not clear on this point), waiting to be transferred to Khorasan or in any case to be told what to do. In Europe, the presence of IS-K is much more modest, with 60 members. According to the same sources, as of September 2022 there were 30 Europeans belonging to IS-K in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Of these, 16 were from Germany, ten were from France and four from Belgium. There were also four Americans, as well as a few Turks. These individuals with passports from European and North American countries were described as having been evacuated from the Middle East after the collapse of the Caliphate, rather than having been dispatched to IS-K for organising long-range attacks in Europe. While all these numbers cannot be verified, they seem compatible with the information summarised above and provided by Europol, ICG and others.

This picture suggests constant exchanges of members between the IS-K and other IS branches in Turkey, Europe and Syria (which occur incidentally, elsewhere as well), even if the speed and size of these exchanges have been declining over time. There was always considerable integration between IS branches, despite speculation early in the existence of IS-K that it was an opportunistic set up, with little organic relationship with the “Caliphate”. More than of IS-K expanding operations to Europe, therefore, one should speak of intra-IS branches cooperation. Such cooperation seems undoubtedly to have expanded in 2022-23, which begs the question of why this is the case

3. Is IS waiting?

In this regard, it is worth noticing that IS-K is not claiming or advertising its alleged “expansion”. Even when solicited, IS-K sources in Afghanistan have stayed well clear of boasting about such expansion. Quite the contrary, they tend to minimise its importance. This appears odd, given that

1. IS-K has been running a sophisticated media campaign, whose main future is magnifying its limited achievements and making unwarranted claims .

2. It would be committing a considerable portion of its limited resources, if the “expansion” were really such, and

3. Private IS-K social media chatter and interviews with members clearly show that the organisation struggles to explain to its own members and sympathisers why its activities have been so limited during 2023.

Perhaps IS-K might just be waiting to glorify its “expansion” and brand attacks outside the remit of Khorasan province (Afghanistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa of Pakistan, Central Asia, China, Iran) as “made in Afghanistan” until it succeeds in carrying out a successful one. However, IS-K shows no similar shyness in claiming its intent of bringing jihad to China (where despite years of propaganda, it could achieve nothing) or Central Asia, where its achievements have been minimal (firing rockets across the border into Tajikistan and Uzbekistan). If the primary purpose of IS-K were making a claim to having opened new fronts of its own in Europe, Turkey and Middle East, why wouldn’t it adopt tactics similar to those deployed in Khorasan province and carry out random attacks against the softest targets, then produce widely inflated claims of the damage inflicted?

4. The strength of IS.

In sum, the most logical explanation is that the “Caliphate”, which is at its weakest since its inception, has summoned IS-K’s help to reclaim the headlines with some high profile attack against European targets. One possibility is that the “Caliphate” might now be so weak in and around Europe that it simply does not have the strength anymore to systematically intensify operations there. Another possibility is that, in line with what noted at the beginning of this article, the central leadership of IS might have decided to raise its profile through intensified terrorist operations, while at the same time safeguarding its surviving structure in Europe and rely instead on IS-K elements, who are not part of the same structure and do not risk compromising it if caught.

Why IS-K and not other branches of IS? As mentioned above, IS-K has had a significant presence in Turkey for years, with safe houses and networks dedicated to supporting financial operations. This financial hub now struggles to carry out its original task, due to the Turkish authorities strongly increasing their pressure, so its conversion to more operational roles could well have appeared logical. Furthermore, as mentioned, the Central Asians were getting ready to be transferred to Afghanistan, having outlived their usefulness in Syria, where operating underground is much harder for them than for native Syrians or even Iraqis. As only a few tens were able to make the trip each month, those laying idle in Turkey and Syria could conceivably be mobilised for other duties. In short, IS-K happened to be readily available and well placed to provide support to the central leadership, whose Syrian and Iraqi branches have been greatly weakened in recent years. No other branch of IS was in a similar position.

Conclusions.

In conclusion, IS-K is not really “expanding”. The members involved in the planned attacks were already in IS-K, or had been scheduled to be transferred to it (in the case of the Central Asians). What appears to have changed is that IS-K was given additional tasks by a central leadership, which is low on money and human resources and needs to raise its media profile to have a chance of re-emerging from its crisis. This would also explain why IS-K members in Afghanistan and not particularly enthusiastic about this development, which at least in the short term is drawing scarce human resources away from them.

[1] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-april-2020-islamic-state-terror-plot-against-u-s-and-nato-military-bases-in-germany-the-tajik-connection

[2] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/04/22/afghanistan-terrorism-leaked-documents/

Article published on #ReaCT2024 5th Report on Terrorism and Radicalism (order your copy or download the Report in Pdf).

MDHM in the Digital Age: The Dual Role of Artificial Intelligence as Both a Threat and a Solution for Democracy.

by Claudio Bertolotti.

Abstract

The spread of false, misleading, or manipulated information—summarized under the acronym MDHM (misinformation, disinformation, malinformation, and hate speech)—represents one of the most critical challenges of the digital age, with profound consequences for social cohesion, political stability, and global security. This study examines the distinctive characteristics of each phenomenon and their interconnected impact, highlighting how they contribute to the erosion of trust in institutions, social polarization, and political instability. Artificial intelligence emerges as a crucial resource for combating MDHM, offering advanced tools for detecting manipulated content and monitoring disinformation networks. However, the same technology also fuels new threats, such as the creation of deepfakes and the generation of automated content that amplifies the reach and sophistication of disinformation. This paradox underscores the need for the ethical and strategic use of emerging technologies. The study proposes a multidimensional approach to addressing MDHM, structured around three main pillars: critical education, with school programs and public campaigns to enhance media literacy; regulation of digital platforms, aimed at balancing the removal of harmful content with the protection of freedom of expression; and global collaboration, ensuring a coordinated response to a transnational threat. In conclusion, the article emphasizes the importance of concerted efforts among governments, technology companies, and civil society to mitigate the destabilizing effects of MDHM and safeguard democracy, security, and trust in information

The spread of false, misleading, or manipulated information is one of the most complex and dangerous challenges of the digital age, with significant repercussions on social, political, and cultural balance. The phenomena known as misinformation, disinformation, malinformation, and hate speech—collectively summarized under the acronym MDHM—represent distinct yet closely interconnected manifestations of this issue. A thorough understanding of their specificities is essential for developing effective strategies to contain and counter the threats these phenomena pose to social cohesion and institutional stability.

Definitions and Distinctions

Misinformation: False information shared without the intent to cause harm. For example, the unintentional sharing of unverified news on social media.

Disinformation: Information deliberately created to deceive, harm, or manipulate individuals, social groups, organizations, or nations. An example would be the intentional dissemination of false news to influence public opinion or destabilize institutions.

Malinformation: Information based on factual content but used out of context to mislead, cause harm, or manipulate. For instance, the release of personal data with the intent to damage someone’s reputation.

Hate Speech: Expressions that incite hatred against individuals or groups based on characteristics such as race, religion, ethnicity, gender, or sexual orientation.

Impact on Society

The spread of misinformation, disinformation, malinformation, and hate speech poses a critical challenge to the stability of modern societies. These phenomena, amplified by the speed and global reach of digital media, have significant consequences that manifest across various social, political, and cultural domains. Among the most notable effects are the erosion of trust in institutions, social polarization, and heightened security threats.

Erosion of Trust

False or manipulated information directly undermines the credibility of public institutions, the media, and even the scientific community. When individuals are inundated with a constant flow of contradictory or blatantly false news, the inevitable result is a widespread crisis of trust. No source is spared from suspicion—not even the most authoritative journalists or the most transparent government bodies. This process weakens the very foundations of society, fostering a climate of uncertainty that, over time, can turn into alienation.

A striking example can be observed in the democratic process, where disinformation strikes with particular intensity. Manipulative campaigns spreading falsehoods about voting procedures or candidates have a devastating effect on electoral integrity. This not only fuels suspicion and distrust in democratic institutions but also creates a sense of disillusionment among citizens, further alienating them from active participation.

The consequences become even more evident in the management of global crises. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the wave of conspiracy theories and the dissemination of unverified remedies significantly hindered public health efforts. Disinformation fueled unfounded fears and skepticism toward vaccines, slowing the global response to the crisis and exacerbating the virus’s spread.

However, this erosion of trust extends beyond the individual level. Its repercussions impact society as a whole, fragmenting it. Social bonds, already weakened by preexisting divisions, become even more vulnerable to manipulation. This creates fertile ground for further conflicts and instability, isolating institutions and increasing the risk of a society unable to respond to collective challenges.

Social Polarization

Disinformation campaigns thrive on exploiting existing societal divisions, amplifying them with the aim of making them insurmountable. These phenomena, driven by targeted strategies and enhanced by digital platforms, intensify social conflict and undermine the possibility of dialogue, paving the way for ever-deepening polarization.

The amplification of divisions is perhaps the most visible result of disinformation. Information manipulation is used to radicalize political, cultural, or religious opinions, constructing narratives of opposition between “us” and “them.” In contexts of ethnic tensions, for example, malinformation—spread with the intent to distort historical events or exploit current political issues—exacerbates perceived differences between social groups. These existing contrasts are magnified until they crystallize into identity conflicts that are difficult to resolve.

Adding to this is the effect of so-called “information bubbles” created by digital platform algorithms. These systems, designed to maximize user engagement, present content that reinforces their preexisting opinions, limiting exposure to alternative perspectives. This phenomenon, known as the “filter bubble,” not only entrenches biases but isolates individuals within a media reality that thrives on continuous confirmation, hindering the understanding of differing viewpoints.

The polarization fueled by MDHM extends beyond ideology. In many cases, the radicalization of opinions translates into concrete actions: protests, clashes between groups, and, in extreme cases, armed conflicts. Civil wars and social crises are often the culmination of a spiral of division originating from divisive narratives disseminated through disinformation and hate speech.

Ultimately, the polarization generated by MDHM not only undermines social dialogue but also erodes the foundations of collective cohesion. In such a context, finding shared solutions to common problems becomes impossible. What remains is a climate of perpetual conflict, where “us versus them” replaces any attempt at collaboration, making society more fragile and vulnerable.

Threat to Security

In conflict contexts, MDHM emerges as a powerful and dangerous weapon, capable of destabilizing societies and institutions with devastating implications for both collective and individual security. Disinformation, coupled with hate speech, fuels a cycle of violence and political instability, threatening peace and compromising human rights. Concrete examples of how these dynamics unfold not only illustrate the severity of the problem but also highlight the urgency for effective responses.

Propaganda and Destabilization.One of the most insidious uses of disinformation is propaganda and destabilization. States and non-state actors exploit these practices as tools of hybrid warfare, aimed at undermining the morale of opposing populations and fomenting internal divisions. In recent geopolitical scenarios, the spread of false information has generated confusion and panic, slowing institutional response capabilities. This planned and systematic strategy goes beyond disorienting public opinion; it strikes at the very heart of social cohesion.

Hate Speech as a Precursor to Violence.Hate speech, amplified by digital platforms, often serves as a precursor to mass violence. A tragic example is the Rohingya genocide in Myanmar, preceded by an online hate campaign that progressively dehumanized this ethnic minority, laying the groundwork for persecution and massacres. These episodes demonstrate how entrenched hate speech can translate into systematic violent actions, with irreparable consequences for the communities involved.

Individual Impacts.On an individual level, the effects of MDHM are deeply destructive. Phenomena such as doxxing—the public release of personal information with malicious intent—directly endanger the physical and psychological safety of victims. This type of attack not only exposes individuals to threats and assaults but also amplifies a sense of vulnerability that extends far beyond the incident itself, undermining trust in the system as a whole.

The cumulative impact of these dynamics undermines overall social stability, creating deep fractures that demand immediate and coordinated responses. Addressing MDHM is not merely a matter of defending against disinformation but an essential step in preserving peace, protecting human rights, and ensuring global security in an increasingly interconnected and vulnerable world.

Mitigation Strategies

Combating the MDHM phenomenon requires a comprehensive and coordinated response capable of addressing its multifaceted nature. Given the complex and devastating impact these phenomena have on society, mitigation strategies must be developed with a multidimensional approach, combining education, collaboration among various stakeholders, and an appropriate regulatory framework.

Education and Awareness

The first and most effective line of defense against MDHM lies in education and the promotion of widespread media literacy. In a global context where information circulates at unprecedented speeds and often without adequate oversight, the ability of citizens to identify and critically analyze the content they consume becomes an essential skill. Only through increased awareness can the negative effects of disinformation be curbed and a more resilient society built.

Critical thinking is the foundation of this strategy. Citizens must be empowered to distinguish reliable information from false or manipulated content. This process requires the adoption of educational tools that teach how to verify sources, identify signs of manipulation, and analyze the context of news. This effort goes beyond simple training: it is about fostering a culture of verification and constructive skepticism—essential elements in countering informational manipulation.

Schools play a crucial role in this battle. They must become the primary setting for teaching media literacy, preparing new generations to navigate the complex digital landscape conscientiously. Integrating these teachings into educational curricula is no longer optional but essential. Through practical workshops, real-case analysis, and simulations, young people can develop the skills needed to recognize manipulated content and understand the implications of spreading false information.

However, education must not be limited to young people. Adults, who are often more exposed and vulnerable to disinformation, must also be engaged through public awareness campaigns. These initiatives, delivered through both traditional and digital media, should highlight the most common techniques used to spread false content and emphasize the societal consequences of these phenomena. An informed citizen, aware of the risks and able to recognize them, becomes a powerful asset in the fight against disinformation.

Investing in education and awareness is not just a preventive measure but a cornerstone in combating MDHM. A population equipped with critical tools is less susceptible to manipulation, thereby helping to strengthen social cohesion and the stability of democratic institutions. This path, though requiring constant and coordinated effort, represents one of the most effective responses to one of the most insidious threats of our time.

Cross-Sector Collaboration

The complexity of the MDHM phenomenon is such that no single actor can effectively address it alone. It is a global challenge requiring a collective and coordinated response in which governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), tech companies, and civil society collaborate to develop shared strategies. Only through synergistic efforts can the destabilizing effects of this threat be mitigated.

Government institutions must take a leading role. Governments are tasked with creating effective regulations and safe environments for the exchange of information, ensuring that these measures balance two fundamental aspects: combating harmful content and protecting freedom of expression. Excessive control risks veering into censorship, undermining the democratic principles being safeguarded. The approach must be transparent, targeted, and adaptable to the evolution of technologies and disinformation dynamics.

Tech companies, particularly social media platforms, play a central role in this challenge. They bear significant responsibility in countering MDHM, as they are the primary channels through which these dynamics propagate. They must invest in developing advanced algorithms capable of identifying and removing harmful content promptly and effectively. However, the effectiveness of interventions must not come at the expense of users’ freedom of expression. Transparency in moderation criteria, data management, and reporting mechanisms is essential to maintain user trust and prevent abuse.

Alongside these actors, NGOs and civil society serve as intermediaries. NGOs can act as a bridge between institutions and citizens by providing verified and reliable information, monitoring disinformation phenomena, and promoting awareness initiatives. These organizations also have the capacity to operate locally, better understanding the specific dynamics of certain communities and tailoring counter-strategies to their needs.

Lastly, fostering public-private partnerships is essential. Collaboration between the public and private sectors is crucial for sharing resources, knowledge, and technological tools to combat MDHM. Companies can offer innovative solutions, while governments can provide the regulatory framework and support needed to implement them. This synergy allows disinformation to be addressed with a broader and more integrated approach, combining technical expertise with monitoring and intervention capabilities.

The response to MDHM cannot be fragmented or limited to a single sector. Only through cross-sectoral and global collaboration can the consequences of these phenomena be mitigated, protecting institutions, citizens, and society as a whole.

Role of Advanced Technologies and Artificial Intelligence (AI) in the Context of MDHM

Emerging technologies, particularly artificial intelligence (AI), play a crucial role in the context of misinformation, disinformation, malinformation, and hate speech. AI represents a double-edged sword: on one hand, it offers powerful tools to identify and combat the spread of harmful content; on the other, it fuels new threats, making disinformation tools more sophisticated and harder to detect.

Automatic Detection

Artificial intelligence has revolutionized the way we address disinformation, introducing advanced detection systems capable of quickly identifying false or harmful content. In a digital landscape where the volume of data generated daily is immense, human monitoring alone is no longer sufficient. AI-powered tools are therefore essential for managing this complexity, providing timely and precise responses.

Among the most significant innovations are machine learning algorithms, which form the core of automatic detection systems. These algorithms use machine learning techniques to analyze vast amounts of data, looking for patterns that indicate the presence of manipulated or false content. Trained on datasets containing examples of previously identified disinformation, these systems can recognize common features such as sensationalist headlines, emotionally charged language, or altered images. The effectiveness of these tools lies in their ability to adapt to new manipulation patterns, continually improving their performance.

Another critical area is source verification. AI-based tools can compare online information with reliable sources, identifying discrepancies and facilitating the work of fact-checkers. This accelerates verification processes, enabling more efficient counteraction against false content before it reaches a wide audience.

AI is also pivotal in tackling one of the most sophisticated threats: deepfakes, which will be discussed further below. Using advanced techniques, AI can analyze manipulated videos and images, detecting anomalies in facial movements, lip synchronization, or overall visual quality. Companies like Adobe and Microsoft are developing tools dedicated to verifying the authenticity of visual content, providing a concrete response to a technology easily exploited for malicious purposes.

Monitoring hate speech is another area where AI proves valuable. Through natural language processing (NLP) algorithms, texts can be analyzed in real time to identify expressions of hate speech. These systems not only categorize content but also prioritize interventions, ensuring rapid and effective responses to the most severe cases. In a context where hate speech can quickly escalate into real-world violence, the ability to intervene promptly is crucial.

Lastly, AI can detect and analyze disinformation networks. By examining social interactions, AI can identify patterns suggesting coordinated campaigns, such as the simultaneous dissemination of similar messages by linked accounts. This functionality is particularly useful for exposing orchestrated operations, whether political or social, aimed at destabilizing public trust or manipulating opinions.

In summary, artificial intelligence is an indispensable tool for addressing disinformation and hate speech. However, like any technology, it requires ethical and responsible use. Only through transparent and targeted implementation can the full potential of AI be harnessed to protect the integrity of information and social cohesion.

Content Generation

While artificial intelligence is a valuable resource for countering disinformation, it also contributes to making the MDHM phenomenon even more dangerous by providing tools for creating false and manipulated content with unprecedented levels of sophistication. This dual nature makes AI both a powerful and insidious technology.

A prime example is the aforementioned deepfakes, generated using technologies based on generative adversarial networks (GANs). These tools enable the creation of highly realistic videos and images in which individuals appear to say or do things that never occurred. Deepfakes severely undermine trust in visual information, which was once considered tangible evidence of reality. Their use extends beyond trust issues: they can be deployed for defamation campaigns, public opinion manipulation, or destabilization in already fragile political contexts. The ability to create alternative visual realities poses a direct threat to the credibility of visual sources and social cohesion.

Similarly, automatically generated texts from advanced language models, such as GPT, have opened new frontiers in disinformation. These systems can produce articles, comments, and social media posts that appear entirely authentic, making it extremely difficult to distinguish machine-generated content from that created by real individuals. Unsurprisingly, these tools are already being used to power botnets—automated networks that spread polarizing or entirely false narratives, often aiming to manipulate opinions and fuel social conflicts.

Another crucial aspect is the scalability of disinformation. AI-driven automation allows for the creation and dissemination of false content on a massive scale, exponentially amplifying its impact. For instance, a single malicious actor can use these tools to generate thousands of variations of a false message, further complicating detection efforts. In mere moments, manipulated content can be disseminated globally, reaching millions of people before any intervention is possible.

Finally, AI provides tools for content obfuscation, making manipulated messages even harder to detect. Advanced algorithms can make minor but strategic modifications to texts or images, bypassing traditional monitoring systems. This adaptability poses an ongoing challenge for developers of countermeasures, who must continually update their tools to keep pace with new manipulation techniques.

In conclusion, artificial intelligence, with its ability to generate highly sophisticated content, represents a double-edged sword in the MDHM landscape. Without proper regulation and ethical use, it risks accelerating the spread of disinformation, further eroding public trust in information and destabilizing society. Addressing this threat requires awareness and appropriate tools, combining technological innovation with ethical principles to limit the effects of this dangerous evolution.

Challenges and Opportunities

The use of artificial intelligence in the fight against MDHM represents one of the most promising yet complex frontiers of the digital era. While AI offers extraordinary opportunities to counter the spread of harmful information, it also presents significant challenges, underscoring the need for an ethical and strategic approach.

Opportunities Offered by AI

Among its most relevant advantages is AI’s ability to analyze data in real time. This capability makes it possible to anticipate disinformation campaigns by identifying signals before they spread on a large scale. Such proactive measures can reduce the impact of these phenomena by enabling timely interventions to mitigate damage.

Another key advantage is the use of advanced tools to certify the authenticity of content. Technologies developed by leading organizations allow verification of the origin and integrity of digital data, restoring trust among users. In a context where visual and textual manipulation is increasingly sophisticated, these solutions serve as an essential bulwark against informational chaos.

AI also streamlines fact-checking activities. Automating verification processes reduces the workload on human operators, accelerating responses to the spread of false content. This not only enhances efficiency but also allows human resources to focus on particularly complex or sensitive cases.

Challenges of AI in Combating MDHM

However, the same technologies that offer these opportunities can also be exploited for malicious purposes. Tools designed to combat disinformation can be manipulated to increase the sophistication of attacks, creating content that is even harder to detect. This paradox highlights the importance of rigorous oversight and responsible use of these technologies.

The difficulty in distinguishing between authentic and manipulated content is another critical challenge. As disinformation techniques evolve, algorithms must be continuously updated to remain effective. This requires not only technological investments but also ongoing collaboration among experts from various fields.

Finally, the inherent biases in AI models cannot be overlooked. Poorly designed algorithms or those trained on unrepresentative datasets risk removing legitimate content or failing to detect certain forms of disinformation. Such errors not only compromise the effectiveness of operations but can also undermine trust in the system itself.

Conclusions

Artificial intelligence is a strategic resource in the fight against misinformation, disinformation, malinformation, and hate speech, but it also presents a complex challenge. Its ambivalence as both a defensive and offensive tool demands conscious and responsible use. On one hand, it offers innovative solutions to detect and counter manipulated content; on the other, it enables the creation of increasingly sophisticated disinformation, amplifying risks to social and institutional stability.

MDHM (Misinformation, Disinformation, Hate Speech, and Malinformation) is not an isolated or temporary phenomenon but a systemic threat undermining the foundations of social cohesion and global security. Its proliferation fuels a vicious cycle where the erosion of trust, social polarization, and security threats reinforce each other. When disinformation contaminates the flow of information, trust in institutions, the media, and even science crumbles. This phenomenon not only fosters alienation and uncertainty but also diminishes citizens’ ability to actively participate in democratic life.

Social polarization, amplified by information manipulation, is a direct consequence of this dynamic. Divisive narratives and polarizing content, driven by algorithms prioritizing engagement over accuracy, fragment the social fabric and make dialogue impossible. In a “us versus them” climate, political, cultural, and ethnic divisions become insurmountable barriers.

From a security perspective, MDHM represents a global threat. Disinformation campaigns orchestrated by states or non-state actors destabilize entire regions, incite violence, and fuel armed conflicts. The use of hate speech as a dehumanizing tool has demonstrated its destructive potential in various contexts, contributing to a climate of collective and individual vulnerability.

Addressing this challenge requires an integrated approach that combines education, regulation, and global cooperation.

Promoting critical education: Media literacy must be a priority. Educating citizens to recognize and counter disinformation is the first step toward building a resilient society. Educational programs and awareness campaigns should equip people with the tools needed to navigate the complex informational landscape.

Strengthening the regulation of digital platforms: Technology companies can no longer remain passive observers. Clear and transparent standards for managing harmful content are essential, while also ensuring respect for freedom of expression. Independent oversight can ensure a balance between security and fundamental rights.

Encouraging global collaboration: The transnational nature of MDHM requires a coordinated response. Governments, private companies, and international organizations must work together to share resources, develop innovative technologies, and combat disinformation campaigns on a global scale.

Only through concerted action can the devastating effects of MDHM be mitigated, paving the way for a more resilient and informed society. The future of democracy, social cohesion, and security depends on our collective ability to face this threat with determination, foresight, and responsibility.

The new Syria: between the Islamist threat, Israel’s preventive response, and the Turkish ‘buffer zone’.

by Claudio Bertolotti.

The recent conquest of Damascus by the jihadist leader Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, head of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), marks a turning point in the political-military balance of the Middle East. After thirteen years of civil war against Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Syria now finds itself in the most critical phase of its contemporary history: the rise to power of the Islamists led by al-Jolani, previously affiliated with al-Qaeda, sets the country on the path to becoming an “Islamic State” destined to reshape regional dynamics. Once again, the jihadist factor emerges as a destabilizing element with potentially global repercussions.

The Israeli occupation of the Golan: a preventive and strategic maneuver
The Islamist advance in Syria, and the consequent loss of centralized control from Damascus, create a power vacuum in which radical groups and external actors seeking geostrategic advantages can proliferate. Israel’s action—specifically, the consolidation of its occupation of the Golan Heights—must be understood in this context. It is not yet another expansionist incursion, but a defensive and preventive maneuver. On the one hand, Tel Aviv aims to prevent jihadist forces from settling along its northern border, directly threatening its security. On the other, Israel’s military presence in the area also serves to protect UN peacekeeping forces, who might otherwise be exposed to attacks by radical groups in the absence of a reliable central authority in Damascus.

The preventive strike against strategic and chemical arsenals
The lessons learned in Afghanistan and Iraq—where conventional and unconventional arsenals fell into the hands of extremist groups—have made it clear that rapid, surgical interventions are necessary. Israel’s preventive strike on Syrian strategic weapons depots, including those suspected of containing chemical agents, seeks to prevent these tools from ending up with jihadists. This is not merely an Israeli interest: if radical groups were to gain access to chemical weapons, the entire region and even the West could suffer the consequences. As highlighted by the latest analyses from the Institute for the Study of War (Iran Update, December 11, 2024), non-state actors’ control of Syrian arsenals opens the door to extremely high-risk scenarios. Israel thus acts with strategic intelligence aimed at preventing future large-scale terrorist attacks.

The Israeli move and the Turkish choice: two sides of the same coin
Israel’s policy in the Golan cannot be viewed in isolation: it is consistent with Turkey’s strategic logic of threat containment through its occupation of parts of northern Syrian territory. Ankara, as demonstrated in the past, intends to maintain a “buffer zone” between the areas under its control and regions inhabited by Syrian Kurds, regarded as a threat due to their connection with the PKK in Turkey. This action not only limits the movement of Kurdish militias, but also serves a dual purpose: curbing Kurdish power and preventing the establishment of Islamist groups hostile to Turkey. Israel’s advance on the Golan and Turkey’s buffer zone are, in different ways, two examples of preventive containment of the jihadist threat.

The rise of Islamists in Syria: the rights dilemma and the Taliban parallel
The Islamist takeover led by al-Jolani and his men cannot be viewed favorably. The reassuring statements regarding minorities, women, and the Christian community sound like mere rhetoric. The history of jihadist movements is well known: the strict application of sharia, the lack of respect for religious and cultural differences, and the elimination of any pluralistic space. As previously seen in Taliban-led Afghanistan, the establishment of an Islamic State under the leadership of recycled ex-al-Qaeda members turned local political force will merely institutionalize a repressive regime contrary to fundamental human rights principles.

The terrorist threat extends to the West
The Islamist victory in Syria, as was the case with the Taliban’s return to Kabul in 2021, will act as a catalyst for international terrorism. Recent reports show that every advancement of jihadist ideology is accompanied by an increase in attacks and violent propaganda, prompting radicalized or sympathetic individuals to carry out copycat acts in the West. As highlighted by recent analyses in international media (see the 5th Report on Radicalization and Counter-Terrorism #ReaCT2024 and Il Giornale), HTS’s success in Syria increases the risk that Europe will become the target of new attacks, inspired or orchestrated by individuals who draw fresh momentum and symbolic legitimacy from al-Jolani’s “victory.” The jihadist media dimension is such that controlling territory—and proclaiming an Islamic State—becomes a powerful message directed at potential supporters and recruits.

Perspectives and conclusions
Al-Jolani’s new Syria is no less dangerous than Assad’s regime. On the contrary, the open adherence to fundamentalist principles, the impending power struggles between Islamist and jihadist groups competing—primarily with the Islamic State—the influence of radical groups, and the absence of an international guarantee system make the situation more unpredictable. Israel’s move in the Golan and Turkey’s strategy in the north reflect a understandable, though partial, response to these threats. The West cannot afford to fall under the illusion of a “pragmatic” al-Jolani: the Islamist and jihadist nature of the new leadership is a fact. Added to this are the risks associated with the availability of strategic and chemical weapons, making the Israeli and Turkish interest in creating buffer zones and conducting preemptive strikes on arsenals tragically sensible. In this scenario—akin to Taliban-ruled Afghanistan—Syria could become an attractive hub for a jihadism now in search of legitimacy and symbolic victories, with direct consequences for Europe as well.

The Fall of Damascus and the Crumbling of the Iranian Resistance Axis.

by Claudio Bertolotti.

Bashar al-Assad’s Syria no longer exists.

Syria, a land with a millennia-old history, is currently undergoing a moment of epochal and unforeseen upheaval. After nearly fourteen years of a bloody conflict—one woven through with international and regional interests—the longstanding dominance of the Assad family, unbroken for over half a century, now appears to be nearing its end. Bashar al Assad, who succeeded his father Hafez in 2000, is currently portrayed as a leader on the run, while the Islamist insurgents, advancing from both the north and the south, are ominously pressing at the gates of Damascus.

International reports, including those cited by outlets such as MSN and NPR, depict a scenario of rapid disintegration of the regime’s political and military apparatus. The lightning advance of the Islamist formations led by HTS (Hayat Tahrir al-Sham), under the leadership of Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, began roughly ten days ago in Idlib near the Turkish border and has shattered what were once considered unassailable fortifications. Aleppo, Hama, and Homs—long regarded as regime strongholds and pillars of the “Resistance Axis,” an alliance uniting Syria, Iran, affiliated armed groups, and Russia—have fallen. The apparent withdrawal of Russian support has further accelerated the collapse of a system built on authoritarian control and external backing.

Meanwhile, rumors abound about Assad’s fate. Some sources already claim he is in exile, with Tehran as a potential safe haven. In the United States, speculation suggests he is no longer in the Syrian capital, and there is even talk of his possible presence in Moscow or Doha. The presidential office attempts to deny such claims, insisting that the raìs remains in Damascus, but trust in these assertions appears to have waned drastically.

As Lorenzo Trombette (ANSA) reports, Doha has become the stage for high-level diplomatic consultations. While the foreign ministers of Russia, Iran, and Turkey confer in Qatar, a Western “quartet”—the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany—has met with European Union representatives and UN Special Envoy Geir Pedersen. From these meetings has emerged the intent to initiate, as early as next week in Geneva, a post-Assad political transition process. This path aims to involve figures from the Assad system who have not been directly implicated in the regime’s worst atrocities, along with some representatives of armed opposition groups, in order to prevent new bloodshed and forestall institutional collapse. The goal is to preserve the Syrian state—distinguished from the disintegrating regime—and offer the population a prospect of stability.

The prospective, albeit indirect, inclusion of figures linked to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in the Geneva talks signals an unprecedented flexibility. Although HTS has been labeled a terrorist organization by various Western powers, its mediated involvement through lesser groups associated with it appears to be a compromise aimed at forging a negotiating framework that could lead to a lasting agreement.

The sudden downfall of Assad is accompanied by the fragmentation of the Resistance Axis. Iran, a longtime supporter of the Damascus government, may now opt for a more cautious stance, focusing on its strategic interests along the coast and in territories home to ancient Shiite-Alawite clans historically loyal to the Assad family. Russia, preoccupied on multiple international fronts, seems less inclined to maintain its support, paving the way for a more uncertain scenario.

As the Islamist insurgents reach the outskirts of Damascus, the imminent collapse of the regime throws open the doors of symbolic places of repression: the notorious prisons of Adra and Saydnaya. Within these facilities, thousands of dissidents, activists, and political opponents have been detained and disappeared over the decades. Their fate, long shrouded in silence, may now be revealed, potentially marking one of the first symbolic steps of a new chapter in Syrian history.

The entire Middle East is feeling the repercussions of this upheaval. Assad’s fall affects not only Syria’s borders but also has implications for Lebanon, Iraq, and even relations between Israel and Iran. In a context where sectarian, ethnic, and political tensions have never been fully resolved, the region will be forced to reassess its balance of power. The international community, through its gatherings from Doha to Geneva, must now tackle a crucial challenge: managing a transfer of power that, from a secular dictatorial regime, may yield to an Islamist surge capable of reigniting jihadist violence.

In short, Syria risks becoming another Afghanistan: similar dynamics, worrisome prospects linked to international jihadism that, originating in Syria, could threaten the region and the West. What is even more concerning is the role Turkey might play, having supported the regime’s downfall through direct assistance to the Islamists of HTS—an organization whose roots trace back to al-Qaida and ISIS—and how it may now seek to leverage its influence in the Middle East and North Africa.

📌#ReaCT2023 The 4th annual Report on Terrorism and Radicalisation in Europe ⬇📈launches on 23rd May. Don't miss it! 📊📚Numbers, trends, analyses, books, interviews👇 pic.twitter.com/KLIWWlrJXS

L'anno scorso dal Twitter di START InSight via Twitter Web App

🔴📚 OUT SOON! #ReaCT2023 Annual Report on Terrorism and Radicalisation in Europe | Start Insight ⬇ 16 articles by different authors discuss current trends and numbers. Available in Italian and English startinsight.eu/en/out-soon-r…

L'anno scorso dal Twitter di START InSight via Twitter Web App

🔴 Disponibile a breve #ReaCT2023 – Rapporto annuale su terrorismo e radicalismo in Europa | Start Insight ⬇ startinsight.eu/disponibile-a…

L'anno scorso dal Twitter di START InSight via Twitter Web App

🔴 #US #mass #shootings ⬇ some stats from @GunDeaths from a chronological perspective ⬇ leave it with our fellow @AndreaMolle9 for some later insights twitter.com/GunDeaths/stat…

L'anno scorso dal Twitter di START InSight via Twitter Web App

🔴@cbertolotti1 a FanPage sulle varie ipotesi dell'attacco👉"(...) non si tratterebbe di droni in grado di fare danni significativi, ma piuttosto di una tipologia di equipaggiamento in grado di fare danni limitati con l'obiettivo di portare l'attenzione mediatica sulla questione" twitter.com/cbertolotti1/s…

L'anno scorso dal Twitter di START InSight via Twitter Web App

Cognitive Warfare: How a Violent Event Can Generate an Ecosystem of Hate

Designating Antifa: Legal, Strategic, and Policy Implications

Risk Profile of Political Violence Offenders. United States vs. the European Union (EU‑27) in 2024 – 2025 (first quarter)

Sources

Riots in Los Angeles and the New Front of Irregular Warfare

Zizians, the rise of the vegan cult: from philosophy to violence

The Islamic State in Khorasan’s “expansion” towards Europe

MDHM in the Digital Age: The Dual Role of Artificial Intelligence as Both a Threat and a Solution for Democracy.

Conclusions

The new Syria: between the Islamist threat, Israel’s preventive response, and the Turkish ‘buffer zone’.

The Fall of Damascus and the Crumbling of the Iranian Resistance Axis.

Ultimi prodotti editoriali

Carrello – Acquisto Libri

Recent Posts

Articoli recenti

Tweets