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Released and safe at last! Italy welcomes Murtaza, the Afghan ‘Little Messi’

Murtaza, the Afghan football-loving boy known as the “Little Messi”, who was forced to live on the run and in hiding for years due to threats from the Taliban and other criminal groups, is finally safe with his family in Italy. As with other households that START InSight strove to help being rescued from Afghanistan, we were seeking a solution for them since the chaotic days of the evacuation which followed regime change in Kabul. It took 18 months, many efforts and a lot of patience before a turning point was reached thanks to Caritas Italia, co-organizer of the humanitarian corridors from Pakistan that were activated last autumn.

by Chiara Sulmoni, Claudio Bertolotti, Andrea Molle
For additional information we are available at: info@startinsight.eu

While, in the days that followed the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul, the Afghan population, in search of a way out, poured like an overflowing river towards the airport, a long-lasting line of communication opened between us, where concise “how are you? are you safe?” would alternate with long, silent stretches of time, unanswered questions, fears and concerns, a few photographs and heart-shaped emojis.

The first messages we exchanged on Whatsapp with Mahdia, Murtaza’s older sister, who will also be our main contact for the whole time, date back to the third week of August 2021 and clearly convey the precariousness and distress enveloping everyday life: “now we are only at home, but mentally uncomfortable with unknown future. After a period of time, I don’t think we feel safe even at home. As they threaten Murtaza many times before.”

The person who notified us of this situation and then put us in direct communication with Mahdia is Rahmatullah Alizadah, a local photojournalist who has now found shelter in Switzerland. At the age of 5, Murtaza used to play with his soccer ball in his native village, located in a remote, rural Afghan province; a photograph shows him with a shy smile and a white and blue plastic shopping bag worn over his clothes as if it were a jersey, with the number 10 and Messi’s name written in a black marker. Unable to purchase a real shirt of the Argentine champion of whom he is a fan, Murtaza makes do with this ‘improvised’ replica, created for him by his older brother. In the age of social media which does away with physical distance, the picture taken with a mobile phone and posted on FB goes viral and is quickly shared in the international press. This is how, in 2016, the “little Messi” becomes known in the world. Rahmat was the first journalist to meet the child made famous by the Internet, to tell his story and also to attract the attention of the South American footballer who, having learned of Murtaza, with the help of UNICEF, ultimately will meet the boy at a Barcelona match in Qatar.

This sudden notoriety however does not usher in, as hoped, any new opportunities. Upon returning home, all that remains of this adventure in the Gulf, are an autographed soccer ball and uniform. Murtaza and his family will henceforth be forced to hide and move frequently, in order to escape both the risk of kidnappings by criminal gangs convinced that the child has received a stack of money, and threats by religious fundamentalists. All this translates into no schooling and an isolated childhood, while the return of the Taliban regime spells more danger and leads to frequent re-locations – over twelve in the past year and a half alone. “A few days ago, my father went to the bakery, some of the people knew him again and said a few things to him. Our neighbours have told us several times that you were identified in the alley. Some one will inform Taliban? That’s why we changed our place, so that nothing would happen to my family”, Mahdia writes one day. 

THE EVACUATION

While foreign armies, diplomats and international organizations hasten to leave the country with as many of their local employees as possible, calls for help pile up on the cell phones of veterans, journalists, and aid workers who have been working in Afghanistan for twenty years and consequently forged relationships and friendships with the local population. Those with useful contacts, share them in an endless chain. Not only military, humanitarian, and media professionals, administrative employees, judges, lawyers, professors, and activists, but also ordinary citizens in distress, many women, and the Hazaras, the ethnic group poorly tolerated by the Taliban and hated by the Islamic State Khorasan (the notorious Afghan franchise of what was ISIS in Syria and Iraq), to which Murtaza’s family also belongs. Kabul airport is besieged by an endless river of people of all ages trying to overcome walls and barriers and board planes heading west, before Afghanistan will be abandoned to its fate; TV screens send harrowing images of those clinging to broken promises and fallen hopes to the last, who will spend days on end in front of the gates. The pictures coming in on phone chats show worse than that, amid gunfire and bewildered people fleeing the sticks of the Taliban guards or slipping into the gutters. The intention is to bring to safety as many as possible in those chaotic hours, often without proper screening, with consular staff at the airport gates making crucial and difficult choices. This was a giant rescue operation of unprecedented scale.

After getting in touch with other associations committed to saving as many lives as possible, we receive a green light from the Italian Defense: the family made it on the boarding list of the last flight. In the meantime, thousands of people crowd the “Abbey gate”, the area where the Italians operate, and where Murtaza’s family must report shortly. This is seemingly impossible, but we try to make it happen and coordinate with Colonel T., who awaits them at the entrance. But difficulties increase with time, as well as warnings of possible attacks by the “Islamic State” terrorist group against the airport infrastructure, which is now jointly controlled by U.S. forces and the Taliban, who will take responsibility after a few days. One alert, in particular, comes through on the evening of 25th August: very detailed, too precise and different from the usual ones. A decision must quickly be made. We make it: “stop, don’t go to the airport, stay home tomorrow”. We know that such decision would prevent them from getting on that plane. Under these conditions, it is unthinkable for Murtaza’s family, eight people in all with children and an infant in tow, to risk everything to reach the exit where they could be helped by the Italian army. But that choice was a right and fortunate one, the best among those made in the urgency of the moment. The suicide attack which took place on 26th August right by the “Abbey gate” of Kabul airport, killed over 180 people.

We have kept other options open, our many “Plan Bs.” Several attempts at finding seats on the few buses organized by whoever knows who, and which are said to be crossing Taliban checkpoints, fail.

Another option raised by U.S. veterans seems to open up. We have been in contact with them since the beginning and we discuss the possibility of a “humanitarian operation” run by former military personnel, consisting in “exfiltration” from Kabul and transfer to the North, where a plane could be ready for take off. Murtaza and his family, along with hundreds of other former staffers who worked for the U.S. military in the longest war, could be recovered in this way. It feels like an endless movie with a fast and relentless plot. Every decision must rationally be made on the spot, risks notwithstanding. A US charitable organization could cover part of the (very high) costs, we somewhat find the rest with great difficulty, but the exceptionality of the moment, in this case, comes handy. A U.S. senator follows this issue with us. Some Italian members of Parliament and soldiers are also very active and personally committed to finding a solution. The enthusiasm for such participation is overwhelming, only saddened by Mahdia’s fears and desperate messages. Everything seems fine, minus the risks for those who will have to complete the operation. Then, a cold shower: the operation is canceled.

Leaving the country in other ways involves unsustainable costs and risks. Among papers and documents, phone calls, e-mails and signals thrown in every direction, for those who are striving on the front lines or behind the scenes, the hours go by frantically without continuity between day and night. Getting all endangered Afghans to safety seems a monumental and unthinkable task, a good-hearted aspiration that clashes with reality.

EIGHTEEN MONTHS OF ATTEMPTS AND PATIENCE

With the departure of the last flight on 30th August, Afghanistan reverts to a previous state as an Emirate without embassies. Those who weren’t able to leave, can still apply for humanitarian visas in a third State, but for ordinary Afghans who have not directly worked with NGOs, the media or foreign militaries, difficulties are enormous. Passports are issued or renewed at a slow pace, identity documents and visas are too expensive for the citizens of a country whose economy over the past two decades was sustained mainly by donations and injections of money from outside. Most people live below the poverty line and a critical situation is quickly turning into a far-reaching social tragedy.

We don’t get discouraged. We continue to support Murtaza’s family and to think of an escape route, like travelling by land to the borders of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Pakistan. It would be risky, but we test the water nevertheless. We discover, however, that borders have been sealed on both sides, by the Taliban and the authorities of neighboring countries. A visa, a pass from a third country are mandatory. After many phone calls to embassies, ministries and other institutions in Italy, Switzerland or elsewhere, and an endless wait, nothing happens. The paradoxes of bureaucracy paint a picture whose tones are dramatic and almost unbelievable: “We can issue them a visa,” we are told, “but they have to report to our embassy in person in Qatar, Pakistan, for example, or another country.” Yet, in order to get to the embassy, they would need to cross the border with a regular visa that they cannot get beforehand and in a digital form.

The doors keep closing, one by one.

A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY OPENS UP: THE HUMANITARIAN CORRIDORS

“Today Murtaza told me that I can’t stand sitting at home. All my friends and other children go to school and learn an education but I always stand at home. He really cries and apologized to me that he wants to go to school and wants to be like other children. I really can’t control myself I am sorry for him. I just promise him to help him to be safe and everything will change”.  This is one of many messages from Mahdia, whom we speak to regularly, urging us to keep going, to press on. It will take a lot of patience, but we won’t leave them alone. Meanwhile, our triangulations continue, followed by weeks-long silence.

Then, on 4th November, 2021 there’s some good news: a Memorandum of Understanding for the activation of humanitarian corridors is being signed in Rome.

That’s our chance.

We get in touch with Daniele, from Caritas Italia, whom we have known for some time and whose help will prove crucial.

It is our turning point, so we get to work once more in the hope of being able to bring the family to Italy, but the timing and other difficulties still seem insurmountable, due to objective and bureaucratic impediments. Some members of the family do not yet have passports, while others have in the meantime expired. It’s a race against time, but not against corruption, which, indeed, is the only way to obtain those documents. That’s how it is and there’s no alternative.

Weeks and then months go by. In the meantime, Murtaza’s father is captured, imprisoned and tortured by the Taliban, who will release him some weeks later, sick, upon the payment of a ransom. While he is still weak, he leaves his family behind in Afghanistan to hide, illegally, in Iran.

Meanwhile, in October 2022, more positive news come our way: Murtaza’s family can travel to Islamabad for an interview with the volunteers of Caritas Italia. They get their visas, albeit at a very high cost, and they cross the border. They are in Pakistan, safe and ready to leave for Italy, we think at this point.

However, the youngest sister’s passport is missing, which requires to make a decision. As she can’t be left behind, the family splits. Murtaza and his father will remain in Pakistan while Mahdia, along with the others, will return to Afghanistan in an attempt at somehow obtaining the last passport. Again, months will go by, until the ID gets released, at the start of 2022.

In February, Daniele informs us that everything is ready for their flight to Italy. The family, at last, leaves a country where perhaps they will never set foot again, or at least for many years to come, with just a handful of things, packed in small suitcases and bags. They will bring along the bare necessities, some memories and the will to start from scratch elsewhere, hoping for a better future thanks to the people who, by committing to bringing the humanitarian corridors to life, have achieved a true miracle.

Today, the family is in Italy. We hope that real opportunities will come along, for them and for the many Afghans the country has taken in and will support. And especially for Murtaza, who will finally be able to study and play football without fear.

This is a drop in the ocean, which does not close a chapter but rather keeps so many others open.
This is a story of patience and persistence.

SPECIAL THANKS GO TO

… the many who have taken Murtaza’s story to heart and made themselves available, at different times and in various ways, by means of concrete actions, suggestions or words of support: NGOs, politicians, the military, other institutions and ordinary citizens in Italy, Switzerland and the United States. In particular, we are grateful to Daniele Albanese, Pierluigi Dovis, Mauro D’Ubaldi, His Excellency the Bishop of Turin, Mons. Roberto Repole, Alberto Pagani, Lorenzo Guerini, Piero Fassino, Don Diego, Don Marco Di Matteo, Don Domenico Catti, NOVE Onlus, Gruppo Ticino di Amnesty International, Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), Rav. Arnold Rachlis, Luciano Portolano, Roberto Trubiani, Mauro Berruto, Isabella Rauti, Alessandro Sicchiero, Raffaella Virelli, Nicola Guerini, Luca Tenzi, Rahmatullah Alizadah, Farmanullah Turab, Ahmadullah Turab, Associazione Zenzero…. and others we could not reach out to before the publication of this article, including those who wished to remain anonymous.


Main events in the Maghreb and the Mashreq areas – September

Algeria: The growing importance of Algeria-Turkey relations
Both Algeria and Turkey are keen to build a relationship that is mutually beneficial- but challenges remain. Instability in the broader Middle East, in particular Libya, and a desire to broaden political and economic links, have brought Algeria and Turkey closer. Deepening relations between the two countries is still a relatively recent phenomenon. The “Friendship and Cooperation Agreement” signed in 2006 in Algeria under the current AK Party government, marks one of the first attempts by Ankara to re-calibrate its relations with the West and the global south. Since then, there have been an additional three state visits by Erdogan, the latest in January 2020, following the departure of Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika who was pushed out of power and forced to resign in April 2019 (Gjevori, 2020).
Egypt: Egypt cuts interest rates by 50 bps as inflation subsides.
Egypt’s central bank unexpectedly cut its main overnight interest rates by 50 basis points on September 24th, saying exceptionally low inflation gave it room to help boost the economy. The bank’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) reduced the lending rate to 9.75 percent and the deposit rate to 8.75 percent. Inflation remained well below the central bank’s target range of 6 percent to 12 percent (MPC, 2020).
Israel: a new peace deal with the United Arab Emirates
US President Donald J. Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on September 15th joined the foreign ministers of the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain at the White House to mark historic normalization agreements between Israel and the two Arab countries. Israel officially established full diplomatic ties with Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). On the one hand, the agreement is a sign of Middle East peace, on the other hand it could be considered as the establishment of a new front against Iran and Turkey.
Lebanon: Macron attacks Hizbollah for failure to form Lebanon government
In less than a year, Lebanon has been hit by an economic meltdown, mass protests, financial collapse, a virus outbreak and a huge explosion in August that virtually wiped out the country’s main port, killing more than 190 people and causing up to $4.6bn worth of damage to the capital Beirut.
Recently, French president warns of ‘civil war’ and calls on Beirut’s politicians to compromise: French president Emmanuel Macron blamed the Iran-backed political party and paramilitary group Hizbollah for sabotaging the French-sponsored process to form a Lebanese crisis government and called on Beirut’s political class to try again over the next six weeks. Macron’s speech came after Lebanon’s prime minister-designate resigned on September 26th, saying he was unable to form an emergency government to tackle the overlapping crises which have left Lebanon suffering its most severe turbulence since its 15-year civil war ended in 1990 (Cornish, Abboud, 2020).
Morocco: Moroccan security chief warns of terror ‘time-bomb’ in the region
The Moroccan security chief Abdelhak Khiame, head of the Central Bureau of Judicial Investigation (BCIJ), warned that the so-called group Islamic State “has developed in the Sahel-Sahara region, with the conflict in Libya and in countries like Mali which do not control their security”. The Sahel covers western and north-central Africa. “Terrorist cells and terrorism are growing in the region but also organised crime networks, drug trafficking, weapons and human beings”.
About economy, the Minister of Economy, Finance and Administration Reform Mohamed Benchaâboun stated that the national economy is expected to grow by 4.8% in 2021. Given the scenario of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concerning the recovery of the world economy (+5.2%), notably in the euro zone (5.3%), national economic growth should stand at 4.8%». However, this growth could not completely offset the economic contraction of 2020, which is forecast at -5.8%, due to the postponement of the recovery of some sectors such as tourism and related activities, as well as the deterioration of the labor market and corporate investment – the Minister stated.
Syria: Carabinieri arrest Italian ‘ISIS bride’ in Syria
The ROS unit of Italy’s Carabinieri police said September 29th that it has arrested Alice Brignoli, an Italian ‘ISIS bride’, in Syria. Brignoli was the wife of Mohamed Koraichi, an Italian with Moroccan roots who became an ISIS militant. The couple left Italy to join the so-colled Islamic State (IS) in Syria in 2015, taking their three children with them. Koraichi, who is thought to have died, took part in IS military operations while the ROS said that Brugnoli had an “active role in teaching the children the cause of the jihad”. She is accused of criminal association for terrorism. The ROS unit tracked down Brignoli and her four children – she gave birth to her fourth child in Syria – and have brought them back to Italy (ANSA).
UK government probing cyber-attack over Syria propaganda leaks. Hackers have penetrated the computer systems of the UK’s foreign ministry and taken hundreds of files detailing the country’s controversial propaganda programmes in war-torn Syria. In a security breach of enormous proportions, the hackers appear to have deliberately targeted files that set out the financial and operational relationships between the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) and a network of private-sector contractors that have been covertly running media platforms in Syria throughout the nine-year civil war (Middle East Eye, 2020)
Tunisia: Tunisia rejects any military solution in Libya
Tunisian Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi reiterated on September 28th that he rejects any military solution in Libya and intervention in its internal affairs. Addressing heads of Tunisian diplomatic missions, he said combining efforts to push the political settlement forward through an intra-Libyan dialogue under UN supervision. In response to the UAE and Bahrain signs of the US-sponsored agreements to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, Mechichi also stressed on Tunisia’s firm position on supporting the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people based on the 2002 Arab Peace initiative (Thabeti, 2020).

 


Main events in the Maghreb and the Mashreq – August

Algeria: beyond the crisis, Algeria allows private banks, airlines, sea transport firms

Algeria will allow its private sector to set up banks as well as air and sea transport companies for goods and passengers to reduce spending, President Abdelmadjid Tebboune said on 18th August. The move is part of wider reforms by the OPEC member to cope with financial problems caused by a sharp fall in energy export revenues, the main source of state funding for the North African country. Elected in December 2019, Tebboune wants to encourage private investors and improve the investment climate in an effort to develop the non-energy sector and reduce reliance on oil and gas.

Algeria’s foreign exchange reserves have fallen to $57 billion from $62 billion in January, while energy export revenues are expected to reach $24 billion this year compared with $33 billion in 2019, Tebboune said. Energy earnings currently account for 94% of total exports and the government aims to bring that figure to 80% from next year, while increasing the value of exports of non-energy products to $5 billion from $2 billion now, he added. To achieve that goal, the authorities will allocate $14.84 billion to help finance investment projects for the coming months (MEMO – Middle East Monitor, 2020).

Egypt: Greek deals with Egypt, Italy

The agreement for the partial designation of an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) between Greece and Egypt in the eastern Mediterranean was signed on August 6 in Cairo. For Athens, the deal effectively nullified a maritime accord between Turkey and the internationally recognized government of Libya signed last year. This agreement is part of a broader strategy of settling bilateral issues, building alliances with third parties in a way that promotes national interests, based on respect for international law. It is also a balanced agreement that is fully in line with the United Nations Law of the Sea, a piece of international law in which Turkey is one of only 15 countries in the whole world to not sign or ratify. The agreement with Egypt came after Greece signed a deal with Italy on June 9 which effectively extended a 1977 agreement between the two states on continental shelves in the Ionian Sea.

Israele: a new peace deal with the United Arab Emirates

Israel Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and UAE Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed had agreed to a peace agreement: Israel it will ​temporarily “suspend​” plans to annex the West Bank, as part of a new peace deal. The deal was announced by US President Donald Trump.

The UAE and Israel plan to exchange embassies and ambassadors, according to the statement. It will be the third Arab country to open relations with Israel, after Egypt and Jordan. Netanyahu formally thanked Egyptian President Adel-Fattah el-Sisi and the governments of Oman and Bahrain for their support to the normalization of relations between Abu Dhabi and Jerusalem.

But Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas trashed the peace agreement as “a betrayal of Jerusalem.” In a statement read out on Palestine TV, Abbas spokesman Nabil Abu Rudeineh said, “The Palestinian leadership rejects what the United Arab Emirates has done and considers it a betrayal of Jerusalem, the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Palestinian cause. This deal is a de facto recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. The PA also announced it was immediately withdrawing its Ambassador to the UAE, according to a statement on the Palestinian news agency Wafa. Officials from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) rejected the agreement, as did Palestinian militant group Hamas.

Lebanon: the Beirut explosion a Turning Point for Lebanon?

On the afternoon of 4th August 2020, two explosions occurred at the port of the city of Beirut, the capital of Lebanon. The second explosion was extremely powerful, and caused at least 177 deaths, 6,000 injuries, and US$10–15 billion in property damage, leaving an estimated 300,000 people homeless. The main blast at Beirut’s port was caused when an estimated 2,750 tons of ammonium nitrate had been ignited: ammonium nitrate is a highly combustible material used to make fertilisers and bombs. The appalling negligence that left more than 2,700 tons of ammonium nitrate stored in the port in unsuitable climatic conditions, with no expert oversight, for more than six years demonstrate the endemic corruption and incompetence of a country devasted by decades of settarian conflicts, absence of a governance and cynical political games played by regional States and internal actors. Exacerbated by the pandemic, the chronic corruption and misrule had brought the economy to ruin; because a long term economic and social crisis the State is going to fail, although Lebanon has been a failing state for years.

For months prices have been soaring and the middle class has been sinking into poverty and despair. For weeks, before the explosion, residents of the capital demonstrated against mismanagement and economic uncertainty. Since the day of the explosion, protesters tried to break the police and army cordons; as consequence, Lebanon’s parliament has approved a state of emergency that grants sweeping powers to the army: the state of emergency allows the army to curb free speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of the press, as well as to enter homes and arrest anyone deemed a security threat. But it was not enough to contain the mass protests: the demonstrations prompted Prime Minister Hassan Diab and his cabinet to resign: but the crisis is too deep to be resolved by a change of management.

The impact of the crisis is terrific, especially in the urban areas. People try to leave or survive thanks to economic support from relatives abroad; others are resorting to some support from Hezbollah. Economic sanctions have made Iran less generous, but Hezbollah continues to maintain a widespread patronage network. The main short-term consequence is fragmentation and criminalisation. In the long term, it remains to be seen in which sphere of influence Lebanon ends up. Iran is trying to exploit the deadlock, but cannot alleviate its financial need. Hezbollah is now increasingly looking to China, such as the government that is trying to attract Chinese investment and China itself sees an additional hub in the East Mediterranean (in addition to the bridgeheads it already has in Egypt and Greece), (Holslag, 2020).

Libya: Turkey and Qatar sign military cooperation deal with Libya government

According to Ahval News, Turkey and Qatar have signed a tripartite deal with the Libyan government for military cooperation, in a new development set to enhance the government’s defence against the forces of Khalifa Haftar. The agreement, which was announced by Libya’s Deputy Defence Minister Salam Al-Namroush on 17th August, will establish military facilities and training programmes within the country. This cooperation will include Qatar’s funding of military training centres and the establishment of a trilateral coordination centre and Turkish naval base in the city of Misrata. Consultation will also be provided to Libyan government forces as part of the agreement.

Italy, which has been present in Misrata for years with its own military hospital, has been removed from the area, making the efforts made so far in vain. The same Italian staff will be redeployed near the capital Tripoli.

Syria: U.S. troop levels in Iraq and Syria would most likely shrink in the coming months

The top American military commander in the Middle East said that U.S. troop levels in Iraq and Syria would most likely shrink in the coming months, but that he had not yet received orders to begin withdrawing forces.

Gen. Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr., the head of the Pentagon’s Central Command, said the 5,200 troops in Iraq to help fight remnants of the Islamic State and train Iraqi forces “will be adjusted” after consultations with the government in Baghdad.

General McKenzie said he expected American and other NATO forces to maintain “a long-term presence” in Iraq — both to help fight Islamic extremists and to check Iranian influence in the country. He declined to say how large that presence might be, but other American officials said discussions with Iraqi officials that resume this month could result in a reduction to around 3,500 U.S. troops.

Despite President Trump’s demand last fall for a complete withdrawal of all 1,000 American forces from Syria, the president still has some 500 troops, mostly in the country’s northeast, assisting local Syrian Kurdish allies in combating pockets of ISIS fighters (Schmitt, 2020).

Morocco: Morocco, Portugal Pledge to Fight Against Irregular Migration

Portugal and Morocco have pledged to join efforts to curb irregular migration: Rabat and Lisbon announced the move in a statement following a videoconference between Portugal’s Minister of Internal Affairs, Eduardo Cabrita, and Morocco’s Minister of the Interior, Abdelouafi Laftit. The two officials built the conference’s talking points on the strong cooperation between Morocco and the European Union on security issues. They expressed their governments’ readiness to “intensify” their security cooperation within the broader EU-Morocco agenda of preventing and fighting against “illegal migration and human trafficking.” According to reports, the increasing shift towards Portugal is directly linked to Morocco’s success in curbing migrants’ attempts to reach Europe through Spain, which has long been the traditional route of waves of irregular migrants in recent years (Tamba, 2020).

Tunisia: Tunisia cracks down on migrant departures. Economic crisis worsens

Thousands of migrants disembarked on Lampedusa and Sicily in July and August. The governor of the Sicilian region has called on the federal government to call a state of emergency with hotspots above capacity and a number of migrants testing positive for coronavirus. The majority of the migrants who reportedly disembarked on Lampedusa and Sicily came from Tunisia. Italian authorities reported that in 2020, nearly half of the over 16,000 people who have landed on Italy’s shores departed from Tunisia.

Following pressure from the Italian foreign ministry, Tunisia announced on August 6 that it had made available more means to counter irregular migrant departures from the North African country. Tunisia has announced that it has made available naval units, surveillance devices, and search teams at Mediterranean crossing points to counter irregular migrant departures (ANSA).

Italy’s Interior Ministry has released €11 million ($13 million) to Tunisia’s government for use in efforts to stem the flow of migrants. On 18th August, Italian Interior Minister Luciana Lamorgese and Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio visited Tunis, accompanied by European Commissioner for Home Affairs Ylva Johansson and European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy Oliver Varhelji.

The decision arrived in a critical moment for the country both at economic and political level: the economic situation is worsening and the tourism sector’s revenues down 56% at the end of July to 1.2 billion dinars compared to 2.6 billion in the same period last year (ANSA). Economic crisis is a push factors for Tunisian migrants. At political level, Tunisia’s prime minister-designate Hichem Mechichi said he would form a purely technocratic government following wrangling among political parties over the formation of the country’s next administration. The decision will likely put the prime minister-designate in confrontation with the Islamist Ennahdha Party, the largest political group in parliament, which announced it would oppose the formation of a non-political government. However, the proposal for a government of independent technocrats without political parties will win support from the powerful UGTT trade union and some other parties, including Tahya Tounes and Dustoury el Hor. Protests have erupted in the country’s interior this year over widespread unemployment, lack of development and poor public services in health, electricity and water.


General David Petraeus, US Army (Ret.) and former Director of the CIA, interviewed by Claudio Bertolotti

by Claudio Bertolotti

The Italian version of this interview was published in the Italian Army military magazine Rivista Militare‘ N.°3/2020.

US Army General (Ret.) David Petraeus headed the Multinational Forces in Iraq -where he supervised the ‘surge’ campaign in 2007-8-; served as Commander in Chief of the US Central Command CENTCOM (2008-10) and led Coalition Forces in Afghanistan (2010-11). He is a former Director of the CIA. He is now a Partner with the global investment firm KKR and Chairman of the KKR Global Institute.

Rather than setting the stage for a difficult intra-Afghan compromise, then, the deal implicitly appears to anticipate the endgame the insurgents themselves have consistently articulated since 2001: a Taliban reconquest of the country.

General Petraeus, how do you feel about the WHAM strategy (‘Winning Hearts and Minds‘), which particularly characterized your leadership in the Afghan (and Iraqi) wars, considering the situation the two countries are facing today?
As we stressed in the counterinsurgency field manual, “the decisive terrain” in such an endeavor is the “human terrain.” A counterinsurgency campaign necessarily focuses on the people, on providing them security and then on solidifying the security foundation by helping to restore basic services, repair damaged infrastructure, re-establish local governance, revive local economies, and so on –; to show the people that their lives will be better if they support the government and the coalition forces supporting the government, rather than if they actively or tacitly support the insurgents. And over time, as security and the situation improve for the people, they understand the logic of rejecting the insurgents and supporting the counterinsurgents.

Looking at negotiations with the Taliban and military disengagement from Afghanistan: are you disappointed in how it ended or was it the only deal that could be reached today?
The agreement holds out the tantalizing prospect of transforming Afghanistan from a problem that will require the perpetual military management of the United States into one that can be solved politically, once and for all. But the risks presented by this gamble are huge, and the signs from the deal’s early aftermath – continued Taliban attacks and an Afghan government in disarray – are not encouraging.
The Taliban’s vehement insistence that all U.S. troops leave Afghanistan strongly suggests that its purpose in peace talks isn’t to transform its relationship with the United States but to evict its forces so that they can then overthrow the Afghan government. The deal would seem to give the Taliban little incentive to bargain seriously with the internationally recognized government in Kabul, since its opponent’s position will grow progressively weaker as the deadline for international withdrawal approaches. Rather than setting the stage for a difficult intra-Afghan compromise, then, the deal implicitly appears to anticipate the endgame the insurgents themselves have consistently articulated since 2001: a Taliban reconquest of the country.

A personal consideration on the Afghan war.
We went to Afghanistan for a reason – to eliminate the Al Qaeda sanctuary in Afghanistan, under Taliban rule, in which the 9/11 attacks were planned and where the initial training of the attackers was conducted.  And we have stayed for a reason – to ensure that al-Qaeda did not succeed in re-establishing that sanctuary, something they have repeatedly sought to do since the Taliban and other insurgents returned to Afghanistan and repeatedly carried out violent attacks on the Afghan people, their forces, and their coalition partners.

General, the author of this interview had the honor of serving his country in Afghanistan alongside US troops, partly during Operation Enduring Freedom, partly during the subsequent ISAF mission. What is your opinion about the Italian commitment in Afghanistan?
It was a privilege to have superb Italian contingents in Afghanistan and to have an Italian commander and headquarters as Regional Command West in Herat. During my time as Commander of US Central Command (2008-2010) and then as Commander of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (2010-2011), the Italian forces in RC-West conducted textbook counterinsurgency operations. All Italians should be very proud of the men and women who wore their country’s uniform in Afghanistan.

 

General David H. Petraeus (U.S. Army, Ret.)

General David H. Petraeus (U.S. Army, Ret.) is one of the most prominent U.S. military figures of the post-9/11 era. During his 37-year career in the United States Army, General Petraeus was widely recognized for his leadership of the organization that produced the U.S. Army’s counterinsurgency manual and overhauled all aspects of preparing U.S. Army leaders and units for deployment to combat; for his subsequent command of the Surge in Iraq that retrieved a desperate situation and dramatically reduced violence in the country; and for his command of coalition forces in Afghanistan as they reversed the momentum of the Taliban and enabled initial transition of tasks to Afghan forces and institutions. He culminated his military career with six consecutive commands as a general officer, five of which were in combat, a record unmatched in the post-World War II era. General Petraeus has been awarded numerous U.S. military, State Department, NATO, and United Nations medals.

 


Comorbidity Factors (such as heart disease and diabetes) Influence COVID-19 Mortality More Than Age (Chapman University)

by Steven Gjerstad and Andrea Molle – Chapman University, USA

last update 2020.03.30

“It is an extremely important finding, not only because it allows for better decisions in the triage phase. But also because in the following phases, starting from the so-called phase 2 up to the production and distribution of a vaccine, it will be essential to make decisions aimed at protecting those who are the most at risk of serious consequences. Moreover, before the vaccine is distributed, individuals with hypertension, diabetes, heart disease, if not already developed immunity, will necessarily have to be closely monitored. Not only as they are at higher risk, but above all because if the disease is reactivating, we will see it in those with comorbidities, since healthy individuals tend to be asymptomatic and therefore could spread the virus silently.”

THE RESEARCH

The global reaction to the COVID-19 epidemic has rested on a critical assumption, that all persons over the age of 60 face an unacceptable risk of death if they are infected with the virus.  Recent evidence from a detailed analysis of individual Chinese, American, and Italian patient data clearly indicates that this assumption is incorrect.  Our research indicates that only 0.8% of all coronavirus-related deaths in Italy involved otherwise healthy individuals.  The remaining 99.2% of deaths involved individuals who had at least one, and often at least 3 other illness factors.  There are significant public policy implications to our quarantine and triage strategies.

Mortality from COVID-19 increases substantially  with comorbidity factors, such as heart disease, hypertension, diabetes, stroke, and liver disease. After we control for the high incidence of  comorbidity factors among the elderly, we find that mortality from coVid-19 does not vary much with age.

The coronavirus epidemic in Italy has strained hospital resources, including ICU beds and ventilators for those experiencing acute respiratory failure. Studies of COVID-19 in China [1], Italy [2], and the United States [3] show that fatality rates increase rapidly with age, especially beyond age 60. The same studies and others also show that fatalities increase substantially with comorbidity factors, such as heart disease, hypertension, diabetes, stroke, and liver disease [1, 4]. These morbidity factors are known to increase rapidly with age [5, 6, 7]. This paper demonstrates that once we control for comorbidity factors, age has a minor effect on COVID-19 mortality. Among the elderly the higher incidence of heart disease, diabetes, hypertension, and other comorbidity factors lead to their increased mortality form COVID-19. The distinction is an important one for the critical triage decisions that are required now. If it is the comorbidity factors that lead to death with COVID-19 patients and not age, then triage will be more effective if healthy elderly people are provided with treatment, since their chances of survival are good.

We examine 73,780 cases of COVID-19 and 6,801 deaths from COVID-19 in Italy through March 26, 2020. Based on estimates of the prevalence of comorbidity factors in Italy by age group and on the frequency of COVID-19 cases and mortality rates for age groups, we estimate the percentage of patients with and without morbidity factor that would be expected to die, first assuming that those with and without comorbidity factors are equally likely to die. Subsequently, we use a maximum likelihood estimate to get mortality probabilities for people in each age group, with and without comorbidity conditions. COVID-19 patients with comorbidity conditions are 10.5 times as likely to die than those without a comorbidity condition. For example, an Italian COVID-19 patient between 70 and 79 years old with no comorbidity factor has about a 1.6% chance of death, whereas a 70 to 79 year-old patient with a comorbidity condition has a 21.4% chance of death.

Triage decisions based on patient age do not account for the large differences between the prognosis for patients with and without morbidity factors. As medical resources become strained during the epidemic, it will be important to take account of the probabilities of survival for patients with different medical histories.

Analysis

Table 1 in [4] shows that 50.7% of the fatal cases of COVID-19 in Italy through March 26 had 3 or more of the comorbidity factors. Another 25.9% had 2 of these factors, and 21.3% had one factor. Only 2.1% had no factor. This last statistic is important. If age alone were an independent factor that leads to high mortality, then – we will demonstrate in this paper – there would be many more deaths among those who are elderly but otherwise healthy. In other words, the 2.1% frequency of no comorbidity factors would be much higher.

Tabella 1 in [8] shows that 19.2% of 73,780 COVID-19 cases in Italy through 4 p.m. on 26 March were among people age 70 to 79. From Tavola 7 in [7], we can infer that close to 25% of those people have none of the comorbidity conditions. We take death rates for the age groups from Tabella 1 in [8]. We consider the hypothesis that healthy people in each age group are as likely to die as those with 1 or more comorbidity condition. This hypothesis will lead us to the conclusion that there should be approximately 10.5 times as many people with no comorbidity factors as the number that are shown in Table 1 in [4].

People between 70 and 79 comprise 19.2% of the cases, and 25% of those have no comorbidity condition, so healthy people 70 – 79 years old are 4.8% of the cases. If healthy people between the ages of 70 and 79 are as susceptible to death from COVID-19 as those in their age group who have comorbidity conditions, then their death rate should be 16.9%, like their age group. If they were dying at the same rate as their age group, the fraction of all cases who would be people between 70 and 79 and have no comorbidity factor would be 0.048 x 0.1569 = 0.0081. Now we repeat this analysis for the remaining age groups and fill out Table 1.

Table 1: Column E shows the percentage of the 73,780 total cases that would be healthy people (i.e., no comorbidity factor) in their age group and would die from COVID-19.

The total number of deaths that we would expect for people with no comorbidity factor would be this expected death frequency times the number of cases, which is 0.0209 x 73,780 = 1,542.

Table 2: Column E shows the percentage of the 73,780 cases in each age group that would die who have one or more comorbidity factor.

We now carry out a similar calculation in Table 2, but we consider here those people who have one or more comorbidity factor. This calculation shows that 7.08% of the total cases should be people with one or more comorbidity factor who died. That would result in 0.0708 x 73,780 = 5,223 deaths. As a check, total predicted deaths are 6,765. The total number of deaths from Tabella 1 in [8] where we get our total number of cases and our lethality factors for age groups (Column D) is 6,801.3

Our hypothesis that healthy people in each age group have the same probability of dying from COVID-19 leads us to the conclusion that of our estimated 6,765 deceased, 1,542 or 22.8% should have no comorbidity factor. Yet Tabella 1 in [4] shows that only 2.11% had no comorbidity factor. Consequently, the hypothesis that the probability of dying is the same for all people in an age group regardless of their comorbidity factors leads to the conclusion that there would be about 10.8 times as many deaths among those with no comorbidity factor than what we see in the sample of deceased persons in Tabella 1 in [4].

This analysis can be augmented by assuming different probabilities of mortality for those with and without comorbidity factors. If we multiply every element in Column D in Table 1 by 0.0925 we would get 143 deaths among those with no comorbidity factor. If we multiple every element in Column D, Table 2 by 1.2677 we would get 6,622 deaths among those with one or more comorbidity factor. We would then have 143/6,765 = 2.11% of the deceased having no comorbidity factor, as in Tabella 1 in [4]. The probabilities of death are then those in Table 3.

Table 3: These mortality probabilities produce fatalities in each age group that match total fatalities and match the frequency of comorbidities found in Tabella 1 in [4].

From this we conclude that age is most likely only a moderate factor leading to COVID-19 mortality. Of course, healthy elderly patients are not dying in large numbers from COVID-19, so triage decisions that ignore the elderly healthy are not likely to lead to large numbers of deaths within this group. These patients are likely to recover, but they are likely to recover more quickly and with less physical damage if they are provided treatment. They also are unlikely to require critical care for much longer than a healthy young person, since like the healthy young, they are recovering. For these reasons, we believe that triage decisions should be made without regard to a patient’s age.

About the authors

Steven Gjerstad, PhD, Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, 1 University Drive, Orange, California, 92866 USA, E-mail: gjerstad@chapman.edu; Tel: 714-628-7282

Andrea Molle, PhD, Institute for the Study of Religion, Economics and Society, Chapman University, Orange, California, 92866 USA

References

[1] Wu, Zunyou and Jennifer M. McGoogan, “Characteristics of and Important Lessons from the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Outbreak in China,” Journal of the American Medical Association, Feb. 24, 2020.

[2] Livingston, Edward and Karen Bucher, “Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Italy,” Journal of the American Medical Association, March 17, 2020.

[3] “Severe Outcomes Among Patients with Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) — United States, February 12–March 16, 2020.” Centers for Disease Control, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR), 18 March 2020. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm6912e2

[4] “Report sulle caratteristiche dei pazienti deceduti positivi a COVID-19 in Italia,” Instituto Superiore di Sanita, 20 Marzo 2020.

[5] “Age-adjusted percentages of selected circulatory diseases among adults,” Centers for Disease Control, Summary Health Statistics: National Health Interview Survey, 2018. https://ftp.cdc.gov/pub/Health_Statistics/NCHS/NHIS/SHS/2018_SHS_Table_A-1.pdf

[6] “Diabetes prevalence and glycemic control among adults,” Centers for Disease Control, 2018. https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/2015/040.pdf

[7] “Patologie croniche in costante aumento in Italia con incremento della spesa sanitaria. La cronicità non colpisce tutti allo stesso modo: si confermano le diseguaglianze di genere, territoriali, culturali e socio economiche,” Istituto di Sanità Pubblica, Roma, 15 febbraio 2019. https://www.osservatoriosullasalute.it/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Focus-1-Osservasalute-La- cronicità-in-Italia-feb-2019.pdf

[8] “Epidemia COVID-19 Aggiornamento nazionale,” Istituto Superiore di Sanità (ISS), Roma, 26 Marzo 2020.


Youth and extremism. START InSight took part in the Muslim World League’s international conference in Geneva

On the 18th and 19th of February 2020 the Muslim World League convened an International Conference at the UN headquarters in Geneva to discuss

“Initiatives for Protecting the Youth from Extremist and Violent Ideologies: Implementation Measures”

In the presence of the League’s Secretary General, His Excellency Mohammad bin Abdul Karim al-Issa, of numerous religious leaders, political representatives, experts and researchers, the Conference tackled the following subjects:

  1. Thoughts, Ideologies and Milieux leading to Extremism
  2. National Identity and its Role in Building Intellectual Security
  3. Europe’s Muslim Youth in Europe and the Threat of Extremism
  4. Religious and Cultural Pluralism, and the Culture of Tolerance

START InSight’s President, Chiara Sulmoni, featured in a panel focussed on Muslim youth in the West and the threat of extremism. In her intervention, she talked about the average ages of extremists resulting from profiles analysed by researchers in a series of European countries and also about time spans characterising the process of radicalisation in Europe; she then underlined the need for early prevention. Based on her field-research and interviews with practitioners in 5 different nations, she suggested a greater involvement of the private sector and the value of  ‘models’ as effective counter-narrative tools, while she also highlighted the dangers stemming from a ‘politicisation’ of the whole issue. In the end, after briefly explaining how prevention is organised in Switzerland according to the National Action Plan adopted in 2017, she concluded by stating that if we really consider citizenship as an antidote to parallel societies and extremism, we should collaborate more, trust and value European Muslims as part of the solution.

Among closing remarks, those of the Vice-President of Swiss Parliament, On. Isabelle Moret and Amb. Elan Carr, US envoy for the fight against anti-Semitism who conveyed President Trump’s greetings.

The Muslim World League’s Twitter account reports some more contents on the issues addressed by the many speakers.