The Russian Strategy: offensive (action and interference), defensive, and deterrent. Digital diplomacy, cyber warfare, and artificial intelligence in global competition.
by Claudio Bertolotti.
Abstract.
This article explores the Russian
strategy of digital diplomacy, cyber warfare, and the use of artificial
intelligence (AI) as fundamental tools in global competition. Initially
welcomed, Russian soft diplomacy has experienced fluctuations due to information
campaigns that have damaged the country’s international image. In recent years,
Russia has developed a “digital diplomacy” to influence international
public opinion, leveraging tools like social media to spread polarizing
messages and alternative news. At the same time, the country has enhanced its
cyber warfare capabilities, considering it an essential component of
information operations and a means to achieve an asymmetric military balance
against the West. The use of AI amplifies these operations, enabling
large-scale disinformation and strengthening espionage techniques and cyber-attacks,
with the goal of destabilizing adversaries and consolidating Russian influence
on a global scale.
Public Soft
diplomacy, Digital Diplomacy and Cyber Operations
At the beginning of the 21st
century, the emergence of Russian public soft diplomacy was met with optimism
by both analysts and the international public. However, over time, Russian
public diplomacy experienced several fluctuations due to information campaigns
that damaged Russia’s global image, particularly after the Russo-Georgian
conflict in 2008. In recent years, the advancement of information technologies
and the growing spread of social media have introduced what is known as
“digital diplomacy.” This form of communication, first launched by
the Obama administration, involves direct dialogue between governments and the
online community, known as netizens or cyber citizens, with the goal of
influencing public opinion. Initially, digital diplomacy was praised for its
ability to exert a significant impact on international public opinion during
conflicts, thanks to targeted communication strategies, psychological warfare,
and online operations.[1]However, the negative side of digital
diplomacy soon became apparent, particularly when some authoritarian regimes
began using internet resources to manipulate online traffic with the aim of
hindering dissident groups and political opposition.[2]
Another significant aspect
related to the digital advancement of information is the increasing use of
information warfare, now enhanced by artificial intelligence, which has become
a crucial factor in achieving strategic objectives.[3]
Russian strategy and doctrine
have always placed great importance on cybersecurity and cyber operations,
considering them an essential part of broader information operations. This
approach often blurs the line between military and civilian capabilities, as
both collaborate within the overall national strategy. Indeed, the main Russian
cybersecurity agencies actively participate, even at the highest levels, within
the government’s Security Council, which includes members such as the Minister
of Defense, the head of the Federal Security Service (FSB), and the Chief of
the General Staff.
The 2015 military doctrine,
which preceded the 2016 cybersecurity doctrine, emphasizes the importance of
protecting cyberspace as an integral part of Russian national security,
assigning this task to the armed forces. In line with this doctrine, in 2017,
Russia established “information operations units,” initially designed
for the defense of cyberspace, but which quickly took on a broader role,
including traditional information activities and psychological operations. The
“Main Directorate of the General Staff” (GU), formerly known as the GRU, along
with its subordinate commands, such as the 85th Main Special
Services Center (Unit 26165) and the 72nd Main Special Services
Center (Unit 54777), under the direct control of the Chief of the General Staff
of the Russian Armed Forces, is considered the primary entity responsible for
offensive cyber operations and influence activities.
Figure 1. Evolution of Russian and Cyber Operations.
The graph in Figure 1 represents the evolution of Russian diplomacy and cyber operations, showing how they have become increasingly influential over time. The time phases are illustrated as follows:
First
phase: Early 21st century – Introduction of public soft diplomacy.
Second
phase: 2008-2012 – Development of digital diplomacy and initial cyber
operations, especially after the Russo-Georgian conflict.
Third
phase: 2013-Present – Consolidation and intensification of cyber operations and
influence through digital diplomacy, enhanced by artificial intelligence.
The
graph highlights a progressive increase in the level of influence of these
strategies in the global context.
The Public
Diplomacy of Russia: Between Strategy and Mechanisms
Contemporary Russian public
diplomacy is based on the foreign policy strategy outlined in 2013. In an
article titled “Russia and the Changing World,” published in February
2012, Russian President Vladimir Putin defined soft power as a set of tools and
methods for achieving foreign policy objectives without resorting to the use of
weapons or other forms of pressure, with particular emphasis on the use of
financial leverage.[4] In line with this vision, the “Foreign
Policy Concept of the Russian Federation,” approved by Putin in February
2013, states that soft power—a comprehensive set of tools for achieving foreign
policy objectives based on the potential of civil society, information, and
cultural methods and technologies alternative to traditional diplomacy—has
become an essential component of contemporary international relations. However,
the intensification of global competition and the increased risk of crises can
sometimes lead to the distorted and illegal use of soft power and human rights
«to exert political pressure on sovereign states, interfere in their internal
affairs, destabilize political situations, and manipulate public opinion, even
through the funding of cultural and human rights projects.»[5]
The quote aptly captures
Russia’s attitude towards the concept of soft power, seen as a driving force
behind the so-called “color revolutions” and Western activities that
Russia perceives as unfavorable to itself. In developing its own public
diplomacy, Russia has made extensive use of influence tools to shape the
political landscape of third countries.[6]
With these ambitions, in 2010
Russia established two diplomatic agencies: the “Russian World,”
focused on promoting the Russian language, and the “Alexander Gorchakov
Fund for Public Diplomacy.” Additionally, as early as 2008, the Rossotrudnichestvo Division, a federal
agency responsible for affairs concerning the Commonwealth of Independent
States, compatriots abroad, and international humanitarian cooperation, was
established within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This agency focuses on
Russians and Russian-speaking communities abroad. In 2020, Rossotrudnichestvo expanded its structure by adding departments
dedicated to information and cybersecurity, science and education, and foreign
aid.
Overall, the Russian approach
to public diplomacy demonstrates a continuous evolution in Moscow’s strategic
communication and political marketing, where tools like targeted messages,
tweets, and public engagement are becoming increasingly central, both in
traditional and digital communication.[7]
Russian influence through the
dissemination of information is limited by the low accessibility and
penetration of Russian-language content, particularly in Europe and the United
States. To overcome this obstacle, Russia is effectively enhancing its
capabilities in cyberspace action and penetration. Given the political pressures
and the ineffectiveness of traditional Russian cultural diplomacy, digital and
data diplomacy is being used as a tool to spread “alternative news”
in countries of interest to the Kremlin. In this context, political messages
and divisive communications are aimed at polarizing national public opinions
through social networks such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, which are used
as tools of information warfare by users registered in Russia. Through these
means, Russian public diplomacy intensified its efforts during the Covid-19
pandemic, leveraging Russian humanitarian aid to present itself credibly to
foreign public opinions. Countries like Serbia in the Balkans, Syria in the
Middle East, Venezuela in Latin America, and even Italy in the European Union
received Russian aid, which was promoted on social networks through a
well-organized and effective propaganda campaign.
Information warfare, artificial
intelligence: competition with the NATO
As discussed, Russia perceives
the West as a threat. This viewpoint was reiterated by the Chief of the General
Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Valery Gerasimov, in April 2019, when he
emphasized the danger posed by NATO’s expansion towards Russia’s borders and by
Western attempts to destabilize President Putin’s government through the use of
“hybrid warfare.”[8]
This perception is further
reinforced by the awareness of the weakness of the Russian conventional armed
forces, which are considered insufficiently prepared to face a potential
conflict with NATO. Russian military leadership strongly believes that it is
essential to avoid a conventional war, preferring instead to shift the
confrontation to the cyber domain in order to achieve an asymmetric military
balance. This strategy is actively pursued by the Kremlin to ensure that Russia
gains a military advantage capable of countering NATO’s ambitions without
resorting to conventional kinetic force.
The Russian approach can be
described as a form of “strategic deterrence,” or as Gerasimov
himself has termed it, an “active defense strategy,” known in the
West as “hybrid warfare” or “below-threshold activities.”
This concept is based on non-kinetic operations aimed at weakening potential
adversaries over the long term during peacetime, by creating political and
social divisions within them, thereby undermining the resolve and strategic
decision-making capabilities of the target state. The primary targets would be
strongly anti-Russian countries, particularly those located on NATO’s eastern
flank, where Russia could focus intense information warfare to provoke
significant political changes. In this way, Russia could pursue its doctrine of
“sovereign self-assertion” and gain greater freedom of action in
critical regions such as Syria, the Middle East, and Africa. These preventive
measures could also serve to hinder any collective NATO decision, including the
possibility of direct intervention against Moscow.[9] In line with this
understanding, at the onset of the Russo-Ukrainian war in February 2022, there
was a wave of actions aimed at penetrating NATO networks at the start of the
conflict— a reasonable precaution from the Russian perspective, given the fear
of a possible NATO intervention in support of Kyiv.
Information
Warfare and Artificial Intelligence (AI)
As previously mentioned,
Gerasimov emphasized the growing importance of information in neutralizing the
state’s opponents, both internal and external. According to Gerasimov,
“information technologies” are becoming “one of the most
promising types of weapons” to be used against other countries. For this
reason, he states that “the study of topics related to the preparation and
conduct of information actions is the most important task of military
science.”
With this approach, Russia has
prioritized the development of advanced information operations over the
expansion of conventional weapons, such as tanks or missile systems, as today
“information technologies” can be significantly enhanced by
artificial intelligence (AI).[10] The thinking of the Russian armed forces regarding the development
and use of artificial intelligence in the military sector focuses on the
advantages it can offer in supporting military operations. These advantages
range from the enhancement of autonomous systems and other military technologies
to the management of information, particularly at the global strategic level.
In this context, artificial intelligence acts as an amplifier, strengthening
disinformation operations through the intentional spread of false and
misleading information, with the aim of influencing policies and societies and
creating large-scale instability through information manipulation and cyber
activities.[11]
During the crisis in Ukraine,
Russia reportedly conducted a large-scale information operations campaign aimed
at influencing public opinion and creating confusion in the information space
by spreading a combination of true, partially true, and false information to
make it credible. A significant example of these efforts is the more than
65,000 tweets disseminated by fake Russian accounts in the 24 hours following
the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH-17 on July 17, 2014, with the goal
of blaming the incident on the Ukrainian government. Additionally, during the
annexation of Crimea, Russian forces reportedly blacked out nine Ukrainian
television channels in Crimea, replacing them with Russian broadcasts to
silence pro-government Ukrainian media:[12] An event that would confirm the conduct of electronic warfare (EW)
actions as an enabling factor for information operations.[13]
The
actions mentioned highlight Russia’s determination to improve and intensify its
capabilities in the context of cyber warfare, which, within Russian military
doctrine, is considered a component of the broader information warfare. The
strategic threat posed by cyber warfare enhanced by artificial intelligence
will be particularly dangerous, as cyber tools will increasingly be able to
generate detailed and credible disinformation (including “deep fakes”[14]) in such volumes that it becomes
extremely difficult to distinguish real truth from a vast amount of conflicting
information.[15] AI will enable the saturation of the
information space with artificial data, creating a “virtual truth”
that can confuse and destabilize adversaries, paving the way for a possible
“cognitive warfare” that Russia could dominate.
Another
crucial aspect of cyber warfare concerns the technical domain: espionage,
malware installation, selective destruction, and, particularly, the search for
vulnerabilities in adversaries’ IT systems. With the advent of AI, these cyber
techniques will become increasingly effective, allowing the weaknesses of
opponents’ IT systems to be identified more quickly.[16]
Figure 2. Evolution of the importance of Cybersecurity
in Russian Strategy.
Here is a graph that
represents the evolution of the importance attributed to cybersecurity and
cyber operations in Russian strategy over the years. The graph shows a
significant increase in the emphasis on cybersecurity from 2010 to 2020,
indicating its growing priority in Russia’s strategic planning.
[1] J. Fieke, Digital Activism in
the Middle East: Mapping Issue Networks in Egypt, “Knowledge Management for
Development Journal” 6 (1), 2010, pp. 37–52.
[2] N. Tsvetkova, D. Rushchin, (2021), Russia’s Public Diplomacy: From Soft Power
to Strategic Communication, Journal of Political Marketing. 20. 1-12.
10.1080/15377857.2020.1869845.
[3] R. Thornton & M. Miron, Towards
the ‘Third Revolution in Military Affairs’, The RUSI Journal, 165:3, 2020,
pp. 12-21, DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2020.1765514:
https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2020.1765514.
[4] V. Putin (2012), Russia and the
Changing World, “Rossiyskaya Gaseta”. Accessed October 20, 2020.
[5] A. Sergunin, L. Karabeshkin, Understanding
Russia’s Soft Power Strategy, “Politics” 35
(3–4):347–63,
2015.
[6] U.S. Congress. 2015. “U.S.
Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Extremist Content and Russian Disinformation
Online:
Working with Tech to Find Solutions.”. In:
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/extremist-content-and-russian-disinformation-online-working-with-tech-to-find-solutions
(ultimo accesso 21 luglio 2021).
[7] N. Tsvetkova & D. Rushchin, Russia’s
Public Diplomacy…, cit.
[8] V. Gerasimov, Vektory Razvitiya
Voyennoy Strategii [“The Vectors of Military Strategic Development”],
“Krasnaya Zvezda” [Red Star], 3 aprile 2019, in
http://redstar.ru/vektory-razvitiya-voennoj-strategii/.
[9] R. Thornton & M. Miron, Towards
the ‘Third Revolution…, cit.
[12] Office of the UN High Commissioner
for Human Rights, ‘Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine’, 15
July 2014, p. 31. In:
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/Ukraine_Report_15July2014.pdf
(ultimo accesso 21 luglio 2021).
[13] D. McCrory (2021), Russian
Electronic Warfare, Cyber and Information Operations in Ukraine, “The RUSI
Journal”, 2021, pp –.
[14] A Deepfake is a technique
that uses artificial intelligence to rework human images. This involves
combining and overlaying existing images and videos with other videos or
original images through a machine learning technique known as a generative
adversarial network (GAN). GANs consist of two neural networks—one generates
new data (like fake images or videos), and the other attempts to detect the
fake content, improving the quality of the generated content over time. This
process allows for the creation of highly realistic, yet entirely fabricated,
visual content.
[15] R. Thornton & M. Miron, Towards
the ‘Third Revolution…, cit.
Abstract Over the course of 2023 and 2024, several European countries grew increasingly concerned about the involvement of teenagers and minors in terror-related crimes and extremist activities. If, on the one hand, attacks are still largely carried out by men just under the age of 30, on the other, online radicalization is having an unprecedented impact on kids; as such, it represents a demanding challenge for law enforcement and professionals working in the field of prevention. Keywords Radicalization, Terrorism
On the evening of Saturday, 2nd March, 2024, in a central district of Zürich, a fifteen-year-old Swiss boy of Tunisian origin seriously stabs an Orthodox Jew walking nearby. In the hours following the attack, a pre-recorded video message emerges online, in which the boy, who calls himself a “soldier of the Caliphate” and swears allegiance to the Islamic State, declares that he acted in response to the latter’s appeal to target “the Jews and Christians and their criminal allies”, and he in turn incites others to take the initiative (1).
This event took place within a global context which has been marked by a significant increase in anti-Semitism following Hamas’ brutal terrorist attack on 7th October, 2023 to which Israel responded by putting Gaza to fire and sword. The tragic loss of civilian lives has fuelled jihadi and extremist narratives more in general, as well as igniting an intense social polarization of the kind we see play out, often violently, in the streets, on university campuses and the internet; a climate with a strong potential for radicalization and mobilization, accentuated by intense misinformation, to which children under the age of 15 are also subjected (2).
The Swiss Confederation – that was already hit by two jihadist stabbing attacks back in 2020 in Morges and Lugano, where an adult man and woman respectively, lashed out at randomly chosen victims – is suddenly confronted with a trend which characterized the universe of violent extremism and radicalization in Europe for some years now: that is, individuals involved in these phenomena keep getting younger and younger.
In 2021, British statistics already highlighted a significant increase in the arrests of children under the age of 18 on suspicion of terrorism-related crimes, with a prevalence of far-right ideology (3). Percentages continued to rise till they reached their highest peak so far in 2023 when, out of the total number of people who were detained, almost 19% concerned teenagers under the age of 17 (4).
Boys’ and girls’ attraction to jihadism is consistent with the events that unfolded around the middle of the past decade, at the height of ISIS’ territorial expansion; at that time too, the Old Continent saw numerous teenagers buy into the Islamic State’s plans and narrative, setting out on a journey to Syria and Iraq; like British teenager Shamima Begum, who left London in 2015, at the age of 15, with two friends, and who’s currently stuck in a detention camp in Syria, where the families of ex-combatants are held. Her case became emblematic and controversial following the authorities’ decision to deprive her of British citizenship -which made her stateless- despite arguments that she might be a victim of indoctrination and perhaps even trafficking (5).
Very young people committed acts of jihadist violence after ISIS, as of 2014, started encouraging those who could not make it to the Middle East, to rise up in their respective countries and with all means available; which would also usher in the so-called “lone wolves” season -a somewhat misleading definition, considering the contacts and networks that regularly pop up in investigations-. This strategic move by the Caliphate permanently changed the terrorists’ modus operandi, enhancing the autonomy of individuals and allowing the Islamic State, when confronted with operational difficulties, to continue projecting an image of strength by claiming ‘successful’ actions carried out by its own sym-pathizers.
A study of Islamist attacks which occurred in Europe between 2014 and 2017 shows that teenagers and children were involved in just under a quarter of jihadist events, both successful and foiled; the phenomenon mainly affected France, Germany and the United King-dom (6).
An event similar to the one which happened in Zürich had previously taken place in Marseille in 2016, when a 15-year-old of Kurdish origin attacked a Jewish teacher near the school where he taught.
More recent cases were the brutal killing, in November 2020, on the outskirts of Paris, of Prof. Samuel Paty by an 18-year-old Russian of Chechen origin (the attack followed a violent Islamist social media campaign which had been unleashed against the teacher over the previous days) or again, the stabbing of a high school teacher in Arras, in October 2023, by a 20-year-old radicalized youth from Ingushetia. After this latest attack, French anti-terrorism prosecutor Jean-François Ricard stated that over three years (in other words, since 2020) a growing propensity, on the part of youth, for planning violent action had been noted (7).
It should be underlined that successful attacks largely remain a prerogative of adults; START InSight’s database, which traces the profiles of jihadists who spring to action, indicates that the median age of those who have struck Europe over the past nine years (2014-2023) is 26: a figure that varies over time – from 24 years of age in 2016, to 30 in 2019) – and which appears slightly on the rise in 2023, settling at 28.5 years of age.
Figure 1 age of jihadist attackers in Europe, 2014-2023 (START InSight’s database)
More generally, we can see that 7% of terrorists were under the age of 19 (with signs of a progressive decrease in minors!); 38% were between 19 and 26 years of age; 41.5% between 27 and 35 years of age and, finally, 13.5% were over 35.
A previous study by the University of Applied Sciences of Zürich (ZHAW, 2019), based on the available information pertaining to 130 different jihadist cases which had been dealt with by the Federal Intelligence Service over the previous ten years, indicated that individuals whose radicalisation process started under the age of 20 represented 18%, while for minors this figure dropped to 6% (8), hinting at the time at a somewhat ‘marginal’ problem.
However, in the Canton of Vaud, where a prevention programme has been in place since 2018, over 40% of the cases the authorities dealt with involve minors (9). Moreover, Christian Dussey, the head of Swiss Intelligence, recently declared that the jihadist radicalization of minors today affects the Confederation in (even) greater proportions than other European states (10). Shortly after the attack in Zürich, six other boys between the ages of 15 and 18 were arrested in the French-speaking and German-speaking regions of Switzerland; they were in contact with peers in Germany, France and Belgium and some among them apparently intended to carry out attacks, in Switzerland as well. According to reports, over the first 9 months of 2024, Swiss Police had to intervene in 11 cases of young people who were radicalised; an 11-year-old boy was also arrested (11). Terrorism expert Peter Neumann pointed out that overall, in Europe, since October 2023, two-thirds of all arrests involved children between the ages of 13 and 19 (12).
In England and Wales, from April 2022 to March 2023, over 60% of the cases referred to the Prevent programme – which requires professionals in the public sector, especially schools, to report suspected radicalisation of all kinds – concerned individuals aged 20 and below; 31% did not reach the age of 14. But while most of the cases did not require to be further supported through the programme – almost half of the most serious ones involved children between the ages of 11 and 15 (13).
“Childhood Innocence? Mapping Trends in Teenage Terror-ism Offenders” is a comprehensive study published by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR, King’s College London, 2023), which examines the activities of 43 juveniles convicted of terrorism-related offences across all ideologies in England and Wales since 2016 (14); its authors warn against underestimating the role of children; although no child managed to commit an attack in the period under their consideration, and despite the fact that the most common crime consisted in possession of extremist material, this research indicates that almost a third of the children were convicted of preparing acts of terrorism and that kids can act as “amplifiers” and “innovators”. Minors can create and disseminate their own propaganda, recruit others and plan attacks. Factors related to age, such as naivety or lack of experience and organizational skills likely played a role in disrupting their projects.
This resourcefulness on the part of youngsters characterised the extremist landscape in recent years: in 2020, it was brought to light that the Feuerkrieg Division, a far-right online group with terrorist intents and members in various countries, from the United States to Lithuania, was headed by a 13-year-old Estonian (he was 11, at the time of its foundation in 2018). Several teenagers within the group were actively planning attacks (15).
In March 2024 in Liverpool, a 20-year-old left-wing anarchist was sentenced to 13 years in prison; among other things, he planned to kill 50 people and dedicated a weapons and bomb making manual to “misfits, social nobodies, anarchists, [and] terrorists past and future, who want to fight for freedom against the government” (16).
The emancipation of extremism A number of studies and investigations have analysed how groups, movements and individuals -especially jihadists or those belonging to the vast galaxy of the far-right- have been capable of seizing and exploiting the opportunities progressively offered by the Internet and the evolving technologies, in order to forward their ideologies, approach potential recruits and sympathizers, disseminate magazines and practical guides for aspiring attackers, as well as adapting and diversifying their communication also according to gender. This includes the use of AI to quickly process propaganda images and videos with a strong and ‘immediate’ aesthetic and emotional impact, that only a decade ago would have required the meticulous contribution of a team while today it can rely on the work of a single person (17).
Over time, the ways of producing, consuming and sharing propaganda, as well as the identities of those involved in these activities, have substantially changed.
The advent of social media around the mid-2000s, in particular, made access to and spread of extremist material easy and fast; people can establish long-distance relationships and consistently interact, to the point that, researcher Jacob Ware writes in his essay on this topic, “the radicalization process now infiltrated every aspect of a subject’s life, and a radicalizer could project influence into a living room or bedroom” (18).
Ware explains that we are today facing the third generation of online (social media) radicalization, when individuals do not merely act autonomously, but they promote themselves and their own actions.
Terrorist groups (those with a solid internal hierarchy) have become less relevant, while ideologies are more fluid. In #ReaCT2022, media scholar Michael Krona, referring to the jihadist context, had already spoken of online supporters who seem less inclined to tie themselves to a single organization, and who rather ” promote wider ideological interpretations and build their own brand, rather than strictly enhancing the brand of IS.” (19).
Today, the production of extremist propaganda and narrative – and incitement to action too – are no longer a prerogative of terrorist movements’ media arms, but an operation which sees the contribution of a large base of followers and militants in contact with each other. A ‘grid’ that can extend from one continent to the other. A 2022 joint international investigation by journalists who infiltrated an online network of neo-Nazi teenagers points out how the advantage of this network -but the same observation could apply to others as well- lies in its loose, mobile structure, which hinges on the participation of individuals scattered around the world: “all they need is a computer, a mobile phone and a bedroom. And all they have in common is their ideology and their hatred: towards Jews, political figures, journalists” (20).
The image of teenagers radicalising in the privacy of their bedrooms seems recurring; yet the latter can today be considered more of a control room than a shelter where vulnerable and isolated boys (or girls) fall prey to ill-intentioned recruiters. The aforementioned British study on juveniles convicted of terrorism underlines the need to overcome the stereotype which sees children as mere “pawns” in the hands of adults; when active within an extremist online context which thrives on anonymity, the “weight” and effect of, by instance, their actions and posts, is identical to that of all the other users.
These online ‘fighters’, who are now mainly digital natives, show a strong potential in ensuring the constant promotion of extremist ideas – a pro-ISIS media campaign specifically urges these “one-person armies” and “Internet mujahideen” not to give up. (21). The ability to selectively use different social media and encrypted messaging apps to communicate, exchange information, encourage each other, discuss violence, attacks and targets, and to migrate from platform to platform with a view to escaping the axe of big tech and joint police operations aimed at ridding the Internet of terrorist content, make them an asset difficult to counter.
In brief, the current era is characterized by an ’emancipated’, widespread and decentralised type of extremism, which is based on ‘free initiative’; within this ecosystem, “everyone can be replaced”(22) and all attackers can turn into a source of inspiration for others; whether it’s Brenton Tarrant, a right-wing extremist who, in 2019, at the age of 28, attacked two mosques killing over 50 people in Christchurch, New Zealand; whether it’s Elliott Rodger who, in 2014, at the age of 22, committed a misogynistic massacre in California and is now celebrated by violent incels; or again, whether it’s the 15-year-old Swiss perpetrator of the Zürich attack, whose gesture is praised by IS’ acolytes. A few days after the event, researchers from the Counter Extremism Project spotted half a dozen Tik-Tok profiles celebrating the Swiss jihadist (23).
The radicalisation of violence When defining the current context in which teenage extremism occurs, analysts and media have sometimes resorted to the expression ‘TikTok-jihad’ or ‘TikTok terrorism’. Indeed, social media, gaming platforms and encrypted chats are now thought to represent the main tools of radicalisation. They should not, however, be simply viewed as communication ‘channels’ that can get a message across to potential new supporters. Rather, they should be acknowledged as ‘spaces’ where interaction, socialisation and engagement take place; these terms and concepts are vital when trying to understand a ‘world’ that does not merely consist in a galaxy of violent politico-religious ideologies but is also inhabited by sub-cultures which youth helped expand (like the incel movement, or the Siege culture). In other words, this environment consists in communities with their own values, behavioural norms, linguistic and aesthetic codes; and for teens, who might be struggling to find their own identity and place in the world, or might harbour feelings of rebellion, or might be weighed down by personal vulnerabilities that can result from family conflicts, bullying or racism, such sense of belonging plays an important role.
Over the past few years researchers and intelligence professionals have been drawing attention to the fact that psychological problems and commitment to violence tend to precede ideology on the path to extremism; appetite for power in social relationships, a desire for revenge, or to take centre stage, vent personal frus-trations (24), are all considered strong enough motivations in contributing to youth radicalisation, a process that sees personal grievances overlap with socio-political battles. All these aspects combined with algorithms that reward provocative content and the trivialization of hatred, help lowering the threshold for accessing extremism.
In this complex and ever-evolving scenario, assessing risks associated to radicalized individuals in the real world can be particularly difficult, especially if they are minors, and despite the awareness that radicalisation consists in a personal and reversible path that does not necessarily lead to terrorism (25).
Notes 1) In Video Uploaded To Internet, Teenage Stabber Of Jew In Zü-rich Swears Allegiance To Islamic State (ISIS), Calls On Mus-lims To Target Jews And Christians Everywhere, MEMRI, Spe-cial Dispatch No. 11166, 4 March 2024 https://www.memri.org/reports/video-uploaded-internet-teenage-stabber-jew-z%C3%BCrich-swears-allegiance-islamic-state-isis 2) Symonds, T., Gaza war creating a radicalisation moment, senior UK police officer says, BBC News , 19th January 2024 https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-68035172 3) Counter- Terrorism Policing, Upward trend in children arrest-ed for terrorism offences, News, 9th June 2022 https://www.counterterrorism.police.uk/upward-trend-in-children-arrested-for-terrorism-offences/ 4) Counter-Terrorism Policing, Number of young people arrested for terrorism offences hits record high, News, 15th March 2024 https://www.counterterrorism.police.uk/number-of-young-people-arrested-for-terrorism-offences-hits-record-high/ 5) Sabbagh, D., Shamima Begum a victim of trafficking when she left Britain for Syria, court told, The Guardian, 24th October 2023 https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2023/oct/24/shamima-begum-victim-of-trafficking-when-she-left-uk-for-syria-court-told 6) Simcox, R., European Islamist Plots and Attacks Since 2014 — and How the U.S. Can Help Prevent Them, The Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder No. 3236, 1st August 2017 ; see also: Bourebka, M., Overlooked and underrated? The role of youth and women in preventing violent extremism, CIDOB, Notes internationals, 240, 11/2020: “In the European con-text, as of 2016, the fastest-growing age group amongst the radical-ised individuals in Europe was 12- to 17-year-olds” 7) de la Ruffie, E., Attentat: des mineurs radicalisés, « un phéno-mène nouveau » et « inquiétant », selon le procureur anti-terroriste, Le Journal du Dimanche, November 7, 2023 https://www.lejdd.fr/societe/attentat-des-mineurs-radicalises-un-phenomene-nouveau-et-inquietant-selon-le-procureur-antiterroriste-139493 8) Sulmoni, C., Radicalizzazione jihadista e prevenzione. Aggiornamenti dalla Svizzera, START InSight https://www.startinsight.eu/tag/zhaw/ 9) How the Islamic State group is courting minors on video game platforms, RTS, 27 May 2024 https://www.rts.ch/info/suisse/2024/article/comment-le-groupe-etat-islamique-courtise-les-mineurs-sur-les-plateformes-de-jeux-video-28516132.html 10) Rhyn, L., and Knellwolf, T., «Die Schweiz hat überdurchschnittlich viele Fälle radikalisierter Jugendlicher», Tages-Anzeiger, 22 August 2024 https://www.tagesanzeiger.ch-geheimdienst-chef-sieht-sicherheit-der-schweiz-in-gefahr-665955949850 11) Minorenni radicalizzati, ma non per forza terroristi, SEIDI-SERA, RSI, September 6, 2024 https://www.rsi.ch/info/ticino-grigioni-e-insubria/%E2%80%9CMinorenni-radicalizzati-ma-non-per-forza-terroristi%E2%80%9D–2246363.html 12) Ernst, A., Terrorismus in Europa: «Es gibt genügend Hinweise, dass sich etwas Grösseres ankündigt»“, NZZ, 23 August 2024 https://www.nzz.ch/international/terrorismus-in-europa-die-tik-tok-generation-peter-r-neumann-ld.1844746 13) Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent Pro-gramme, April 2022 to March 2023. Home Office Official Statistics, 14th December 2023 https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/individuals-referred-to-prevent/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2022-to-march-2023#demographic 14) Rose, H., and Vale, G., Childhood Innocence? Mapping Trends in Teenage Terrorism Offenders, ICSR, London, 2023 15) Nabert, A., Brause, C., Bender, B., Robins-Early, N., Death Weapons, Inside a Teenage Terrorist Network, Politico, 27th July 2022 https://www.politico.eu/article/inside-teenage-terrorist-network-europe-death-weapons/ 16) Gardham, D., Jacob Graham: Left-wing anarchist jailed for 13 years over terror offences after declaring he wanted to kill at least 50 people, Sky News, 19th March 2024 https://news.sky.com/story/jacob-graham-left-wing-anarchist-jailed-for-13-years-over-terror-offences-after-declaring-he-wanted-to-kill-at-least-50-people-13097584 17) Katz, R., SITE Special Report: Extremist Movements are Thriving as AI Tech Proliferates, SITE Intelligence Group, 16th May 2024 https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Articles-and-Analysis/extremist-movements-are-thriving-as-ai-tech-proliferates.html 18) Ware, J., The Third Generation of Online Radicalization, Program on Extremism, George Washington University, 16th June 2023 https://extremism.gwu.edu/third-generation-online-radicalization 19) Krona, M., Online jihadist communities build their brands and expand the terrorist universe by creating new entities, Re-aCT2022, Report on Terrorism and Radicalism in Europe, N.3, Year 3, ed. START InSight (Lugano) https://www.startinsight.eu/react2022-n-3-anno-3/ 20) Nabert, A., Brause, C., Bender, B., Robins-Early, N., Death Weapons, Inside a Teenage Terrorist Network, Politico, 27th July 2022 https://www.politico.eu/article/inside-teenage-terrorist-network-europe-death-weapons/ 21) Pro-Islamic State (ISIS) Social Media Campaign Calling For ‘Media Jihad’ Expands To TikTok, Jihad and Terrorism Threat Monitor, MEMRI, 22nd June 2023 https://www.memri.org/jttm/pro-islamic-state-isis-social-media-campaign-calling-media-jihad-expands-tiktok 22) See: Death Weapons 23) Extremist Content Online: Pro-ISIS TikTok Users Celebrate Accused Attacker In Zurich Stabbing, Counter Extremism Pro-ject, 11 March 2024 https://www.counterextremism.com/press/extremist-content-online-pro-isis-tiktok-users-celebrate-accused-attacker-zurich-stabbing 24) “IS recruitment is not portrayed as violent enlistment for a political-religious cause but as a platform for venting frustrations with parents, teachers and society. It offers an outlet for their mundane lives and a chance at dubious “15 minutes of fame”, in: Av-rahami, Z., TikTok jihad: Online radicalization threat looms over Europe, Ynetnews.com, 10th August 2024 https://www.ynetnews.com/article/rjgiduh9c 25) Minorenni radicalizzati, ma non per forza terroristi, cit.
Chiara Sulmoni, BA, MA, Presidente e Coordinatrice editoriale di START InSight, Lugano, (Svizzera), ha conseguito un BA e un MA in Italian Studies c/o UCL (University College London) e un MA in Near and Middle Eastern Studies c/o SOAS (School of Oriental and African Studies, London). Giornalista e producer, ha lavorato alla realizzazione di documentari e reportage per la radio / TV in particolare su temi legati al mondo arabo e islamico, Afghanistan e Pakistan, conflitti, radicalizzazione di matrice islamista. Dal 17 aprile 2019, è Co-Direttore di ReaCT – Osservatorio nazionale sul Radicalismo e il Contrasto al Terrorismo (Roma-Milano-Lugano).
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