Nuclear Weapons and Irregular Warfare: A Real Escalation in the Israel-Iran Conflict

by Andrea Mollein the United States

The conflict between Israel and Iran is no longer a proxy war or a confrontation limited to the cyber domain or covert actions. Starting on June 13, 2025, the Middle East has witnessed one of the most serious clashes in its recent history: over 400 ballistic missiles and more than 1,000 drones were launched by Iran and its direct allies against Israeli civilian and military infrastructure in response to an offensive initiated by Jerusalem targeting Iranian military facilities. Among the targets hit by Iran were the Soroka Hospital in Beersheba, power plants in the Negev, and airport facilities in Galilee. The Israel Defense Forces responded with an unprecedented aerial offensive, striking more than 100 military targets in Iran, including the nuclear sites of Natanz, Fordow, and Arak, IRGC bases, and strategic energy installations. The US joining the conflict made it even more complex.

This new phase of the conflict, now explicitly bilateral, has erased the line between conventional and irregular warfare. The presence of proxies such as Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria remains critical, but it is now joined by a direct and declared confrontation between states, with Israel and Iran attacking each other’s national territories. Hybrid warfare has evolved into high-intensity war, while still retaining the irregular elements that Iran has systematically integrated into its military doctrine.

In this context, Iran’s nuclear issue takes on an immediate operational relevance. Recent IAEA inspections confirm that Tehran possesses about 9 tons of enriched uranium, with material enriched to 60% and above—enough, according to estimates, to produce up to nine warheads. The “breakout time,” i.e., the time needed to produce a usable nuclear weapon, is now minimal, although experts disagree on whether this actually amounts to a matter of months or even just weeks, as claimed by Jerusalem. At the same time, Iran has scaled back cooperation with the Agency, hindering inspectors’ access to Fordow and other key sites.

The likelihood of Tehran directly using a nuclear weapon in a conventional scenario remains remote, due to the principle of strategic survival that guides even the most hostile regimes. However, the nuclear threat fits perfectly into the logic of irregular warfare. The bomb, even in its latent form, becomes a political tool: a strategic shield that allows Iran to intensify the activities of its regional proxies, deterring Israel and the United States from attacking them directly out of fear of nuclear escalation.

This scenario, previously theorized in doctrine as “reverse deterrence,” is now manifesting in reality. Israel is forced to operate under the explicit threat that too deep a strike into the heart of the Iranian system could provoke a nuclear response or accelerate a shift from deterrence to compellence. In turn, Tehran uses its nuclear ambiguity to provide operational freedom to its non-state actors, fueling systemic instability.

A second, less discussed but equally realistic risk concerns the possibility that Iran might transfer radiological materials to allied groups to build improvised devices—so-called “dirty bombs.” The symbolic and psychological use of such a weapon, even without large-scale destructive impact, would trigger political and social paralysis and a global diplomatic crisis, radically altering the strategic balance in the Middle East and the Mediterranean.

Finally, an extreme scenario must be considered: the adoption by Iran of a “last resort” strategy if the regime perceived an existential threat. In such a case, the leadership might threaten or use a low-yield device in a symbolic area (such as the Strait of Hormuz) to force immediate ceasefires—or even on third-party territory like the United States. Such escalation, though not inevitable, aligns with the “escalate to de-escalate” logic theorized by other nuclear powers like Russia.

Israel continues to respond with an active deterrence doctrine, based on its ability to preemptively strike Iran’s critical infrastructure and command centers. The Israeli Air Force, Mossad, and cyber units collaborate on integrated operations aimed at delaying, sabotaging, or neutralizing Iran’s ability to build and deploy a nuclear weapon. Recent conflicts, from Gaza to Lebanon, have clearly shown that Israel is willing to go beyond containment and adopt a multilayered offensive posture.

For Italy and European countries, this evolution demands a reassessment of strategic priorities in the region. The conflict is no longer a struggle for local hegemony: it directly affects trade routes, energy supply lines, international naval missions, relations with Gulf monarchies, and the stability of the entire Euro-Mediterranean security system. A nuclear-armed Iran, fully embedded in a hybrid warfare strategy, now poses a transnational and multidomain threat, while a high-intensity conflict or a sudden and chaotic regime change in Tehran also entail serious risks.

Regarding the evolution of irregular warfare doctrine, the integration of nuclear capabilities is no longer a theoretical deviation but an ongoing process observable in the conflict’s current dynamics. What was a strategic hypothesis just months ago is now an operational reality guiding the tactical decisions of Israel, the United States, and, indirectly, Europe. The bomb has not (yet) exploded, but it already functions as a political and psychological lever, changing the very nature of war. The Iranian case, in this respect, is the first true test of a new reality in global hybrid conflict in an era increasingly detached from international law.