New Insurrectional Terrorism ignites individual terrorism in Europe
by Claudio Bertolotti
From Africa to Afghanistan: Europe looks with concern at jihadist exaltation
The Islamic State no longer has the strength to
dispatch terrorists to Europe as the loss of territory, financial strenght and
recruits reduced its operational capability to zero. However, the threat
remains significant due to the availability and action of lone actors, self-starters
driven by emulation without a direct link to the organization.
While on the ideological level the Islamic State
remains the main jihadist threat, it is however unlikely that it will be able
to replicate the overwhelming appeal the “Caliphate” enjoyed in the
2014-2017 period, as it lost the advantage of novelty, which constituted its
strength, particularly with younger people. In addition, both from a legislative
and operational perspective, Europe has been able to significantly reduce its own
vulnerabilities, although there were greater achievements in terms of counter-terrorism
rather than prevention. On the whole, however, the scenario remains uncertain due
to the risks connected to copycat attacks (“effetto
emulativo” in Italian) and the “call to war” issued in relation to
international events, which can mobilise individuals in the name of jihad. The
most important event which occured in 2021 that has provided and will continue
to provide impetus with respect to transnational jihad is the success of the
Taliban in Afghanistan as, on the one hand, it feeds jihadist propaganda via
the underlying message that “victory results from fighting to the bitter
end”; on the other hand, it fuels a competition between jihadist groups
engaged in exclusively local forms of struggle and resistance and those which,
like the Islamic State, understand and promote jihad solely as an means of
fighting to the bitter end on a global level.
In this overall and constantly evolving picture, we
must pay attention to growing extremist forces in some areas of Africa, specifically
in sub-Saharan Africa, the Sahel, the Horn of Africa and, furthermore, in Rwanda
and Mozambique, in order to counter the rise of new “caliphates” or
“wilayats” that could directly threaten Europe.
In its prolific jihadist propaganda, the Islamic
State boasts of its spread throughout the African continent and emphasizes
how the goal of countering the presence and spread of Christianity will lead
the group to expand into other areas of the continent. In the Maghreb, Mashreq
and Afghanistan, the activities of the Islamic State are centered around the
intra-Muslim sectarian struggle, while in Africa its presence imposes itself as
part of a conflict between Muslims and Christians with the help of propaganda
insisting on the need to stop the conversion of Muslims to Christianity by
“missionaries”, and under the “pretext” of humanitarian
aid. Within this context, there’s no
shortage of violence taking place; kidnappings and murders of religious
missionaries, attacks against NGOs and international missions from Burkina Faso
to Congo, and attacks on Christian villagers, especially during Christmas and
New Year’s holidays.
A drop in attacks,
but the threat of terrorism persists
Over the past three years, from a quantitative
perspective, the frequency of terrorist attacks
remained linear. From 2017 to 2020, 457 attacks took place in the European
Union, the United Kingdom and Switzerland, including failed and foiled attacks:
from 2014 to 2017, their number stood at 895.
In 2020, there were 119 attacks -including 62 in the
UK and 2 in Switzerland-. According to Europol (TeSat 2020) 43% of those are attributed to radical left-wing
movements (with a decrease from 26 to 25); 24% to separatist and
ethno-nationalist groups; 7% to far-right groups (compared to 2019, there was
an increase in percentage yet they decreased in absolute term); 26% are
jihadist actions. Although jihadist violence is marginal compared to the total
number of actions motivated by other ideologies, it
remains the most relevant and dangerous in terms of results, the victims it causes
-from 16 victims in 2020 to 13 in 2021- and direct effects.
In the wake of major terror events linked to the
Islamic State group in Europe, 165 jihadist actions have taken place from 2014
to 2021, according to START InSight’s database; of those, 34 were explicitly
claimed by the Islamic State; they were perpetrated by 219 terrorists (63 were
killed in action); 434 victims lost their lives and 2,473 were injured.
The number of jihadist events recorded in 2021 stands
at 18, down slightly from the 25 attacks of the previous year, but with an
increase in the percentage of “emulative” actions – meaning, actions inspired
by other attacks that occured over the previous days-; from 48% in 2020, they rose
to 56% in 2021 (in 2019, they stood at 21%). 2021 also confirmed the
predominance of individual, un-organized, mainly improvised and unsuccessful
actions that progressively replaced the structured and coordinated actions which
had characterized the European urban “battlefield” in the years from 2015
to 2017.
The “European” terrorists
Active
terrorism is a male prerogative: out of 207 attackers, 97% are male (7 are
women); unlike in 2020, when there were 3 female attackers, 2021 did not record
the active participation of women.
The
median age of the 207 terrorists (male and female) is 26: a figure which varies
over time (from 24 years of age in 2016, to 30 in 2019). The biographical data
of 169 individuals for whom we have complete information allow us to draw a
very interesting picture which tells us that 10% are younger than 19, 36% are
between 19 and 26, 39% are between 27 and 35 and, finally, 15% are older than
35.
88%
of the attacks (where we have complete information) were carried out by second
and third-generation “immigrants” and first-generation immigrants,
both legal and irregular.
Of
the 154 out of 207 terrorists analyzed through START InSight’s database, 45%
are legal immigrants; 24% are descendants of immigrants (second or third
generation); 19% are irregular immigrants; this last figure is growing, rising
to 25% in 2020 and doubling to 50% in 2021. The presence of an 8% of citizens
of European origin who have converted to Islam is significant. Overall, 77% of
terrorists are regular residents of Europe, while the role of irregular
immigrants stands out with a ratio of about 1 for every 6 terrorists. In 4% of
the attacks, children/minors (7) were found to be among the attackers.
The ethno-national map of terrorism in Europe
The
phenomenon of jihadist radicalization in Europe afflicts certain
national/ethnic groups more than others. There is a proportional relationship
between the main immigrant groups and terrorists, as it seems to appear from the
nationality of the terrorists, or of the families of origin, which is in line
with the size of foreign communities in Europe. The Maghrebi origins prevail:
the ethno-national groups mainly affected by jihadist adherence are Moroccan
(in France, Belgium, Spain and Italy) and Algerian (in France).
Increase in recidivism and individuals already known to
intelligence
The
role played by repeat offenders – individuals already convicted of terrorism
who carry out violent actions at the end of their prison sentence and, in some
cases, in prison – is prominent; they accounted for 3% of the terrorists in
2018 (1 case), then rose to 7% (2) in 2019, to 27% (6) in 2020, and were down
to a single case in 2021. This seems to confirm the social danger represented
by individuals who, in the face of a prison sentence, tend to postpone the
conduct of terrorist actions; this evidence points to a potential increase in
terrorist acts over the coming years, coinciding with the release of most terrorists
currently detained.
Parallel
to repeat offenders, START InSight found another significant trend, which is related
to actions carried out by terrorists already known to European law enforcement
or intelligence agencies: they account for 44% and 54% of the total in 2021 and
2020 respectively, compared to 10% in 2019 and 17% in 2018.
There
is a certain stability related to participation in terrorist actions by
individuals with a prison history (including those detained for non-terrorist
offenses) with a figure of 23% in 2021, slightly down from the previous year
(33% in 2020) but in line with 2019 (23% in 2019, 28% in 2018 and 12% in 2017);
this confirms the hypothesis that sees prisons as places of radicalization.
Is the offensive capacity of terrorism being reduced?
In
order to draw a precise picture of terrorism, one needs to analyse the three
levels on which terrorism itself develops and operates, and that is the strategic,
the operational and the tactical. Strategy consists in the employment of combat
for the purpose of war; tactics is the employment of troops for the purpose of
battle; the operational level is between these two. This is a simple summary which
underlines an essential feature: that is, the employment of fighters.
Success
at the strategic level is marginal
16%
of the actions were successful at the strategic level, as they brought about
structural consequences consisting in a blockade of national and/or
international air/rail traffic, mobilization of the armed forces, far-reaching
legislative interventions. This is a very high figure, in consideration of the
limited organizational and financial capabilities of the groups and lone
attackers. The trend over the years has been uneven, but it highlighted a
progressive reduction in capability and effectiveness: 75% of strategic success
was recorded in 2014, 42% in 2015, 17% in 2016, 28% in 2017, 4% in 2018, 5% in
2019, 12% in 2020 and 6% in 2021. Overall, attacks garnered international media
attention 79% of the time, 95% domestically, while organized and structured
commando and team-raid actions received full media attention. An evident, as
much as sought after, media success that may have significantly affected the
recruitment campaign of aspiring martyrs or jihad fighters, whose numerical
magnitude remains high in correspondence with periods of heightened terrorist
activity (2016-2017).But while it is true that mass media amplification has positive
effects on recruitment, it is also true that this attention tends to diminish
over time, due to two main reasons: the first, is the prevalence of
low-intensity actions over high-intensity actions – which have been decreasing
– and on low- and medium-intensity actions – which increased significantly from
2017 to 2021. The second, is that public opinion is increasingly inured to
terroristic violence and consequently less ‘touched’, particularly by
“low” and “medium intensity” events.
The tactical level is worrisome, but it is not
the priority of terrorism
Assuming that the aim of terrorist attacks consists in killing
at least one enemy (in 35% of the cases, the targets are security forces), this
aim has been achieved over the period from 2004 to 2021 on average in 50% of
the cases. However, it should be taken into account that the large time frame tends
to affect the margin of error; the trend over the 2014-2021 period, hints at a decline
in the results of terrorism, with a prevalence of low-intensity attacks and an
increase in actions with a failed outcome at least until 2019. The results of
the last six years in particular, show that success at a tactical level was
obtained, in 2016, in 31% of the cases (against 6% of formally unsuccessful
acts), while 2017 recorded a success rate of 40% and a failure rate of 20%. An
overall trend that, when taking into consideration a 33% success rate at the tactical
level, a doubling of failed attacks (42%) in 2018 and a further downward figure
of 25% success rate in 2019, can be read as a result of the progressive
decrease in the operational capability of terrorists and the increased
reactivity of European security forces. But if the analysis suggests a
technical capability that has indeed been reduced, it is also true that the
improvised and unpredictable character of the new individual and emulative
terrorism has led to an increase in successful actions, growing from 32% in
2020 to 44% in 2021.
The real success is at operational level. The
“functional blockade”
Even
when it fails, terrorism gains, in terms of the costs inflicted upon its
target: e.g. by engaging the armed forces and Police in an extraordinary way,
distracting them from normal routine activities and/or preventing them from
intervening in support of the community; by interrupting or overloading the
health services; by limiting, slowing down, diverting or stopping collective
urban, air and naval mobility; by restricting the regular course of daily personal,
commercial and professional activities, to the detriment of affected
communities and, moreover, by significantly reducing the technological
advantage, the operational potential and resilience; and finally, more in
general, by inflicting direct and indirect damage, regardless of the ability to
cause casualties. Consistently, the limitation in the freedom of citizens is a
measurable result that terrorism obtains through its actions.
In
other words, terrorism is successful even in the absence of victims, as it can
still impose economic and social costs on the community and influence the
latter’s behaviour over time as a consequence of new security measures aimed at
safeguarding the community: this effect is what we call the “functional
blockade”.
The
ever-decreasing operational capability of terrorism notwithstanding, the
“functional blockade” continues to be the most significant result
obtained by terrorists, regardless of tactical success (killing of at least one
target). While tactical success has been observed in 34% of the attacks which
took place since 2004, terrorism has proven its effectiveness by inducing a “functional
blockade” in an average of 82% of the cases, with a peak of 92% in 2020 and 89%
in 2021: an impressive result, when considering the limited resources deployed
by terrorists. The cost-benefit ratio is, no doubt, in favour of terrorism.
Michele Brunelli (ed.), Understanding radicalisation, terrorism and de-radicalisation. Historical, socio-political and educational perspectives from Algeria, Azerbaijan and Italy (Book Review)
By Andrea Carteny,Elena Tosti Di Stefano
In recent decades, radicalisation and
terrorism have come to the forefront of International Relations, giving rise to
a wealth of conceptualisations and study perspectives, which shed light on the multiple,
diverse connections between terrorist phenomena, radical ideologies, and
global, regional, or local conflicts. Particularly relevant in this respect is
the need to consider factors such as ethnicity, religion, historical heritages,
as well as migration. Such consideration is even more salient if the military
dimension of counteraction is flanked – and sometimes replaced – by prevention,
deterrence, and integration strategies involving the educational, economic, and
social resilience spheres.
It is on this premise that the volume Understanding radicalisation, terrorism and
de-radicalisation. Historical, socio-political and educational
perspectives from Algeria, Azerbaijan and Italy was developed.Published
by Rubbettino in the editorial series “Laboratorio sull’Intelligence dell’Università
della Calabria”, the collective work presents the results of an intense and
fruitful two-year research activity carried out within the project PRaNet – Prevention ofRadicalisation Network (2019-2021).
The PRaNet project, led by the Italian
University of Bergamo, entails the creation of a university network between the
latter institution and two universities from countries belonging to the Organisation
of the Islamic Conference (OIC), Algeria and Azerbaijan, with the aim of deepening
knowledge and understanding of phenomena linked to radicalisation, as well as promoting
social inclusion and developing de-radicalisation policies for integration
purposes. Project activities have been implemented within the framework of the
multiannual programme “Strategy for the Promotion of Italian Higher Education Abroad
2017/2020”, jointly supported by the Italian Ministry of Education, University
and Research (MIUR) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International
Cooperation (MAECI). These include, in addition to research initiatives,
exchanges of students, teachers, researchers, and trainees through ad hoc
programmes, such as the MaRTe Master’s degree at the University of Bergamo in “Prevention
and Fight Against Radicalisation, Terrorism and for International Integration
and Security Policies”, as well as vocational activities at the University
Mohamed Lamine Debaghine (Sétif 2), in Algeria, and the ADA University fi Baku
in Azerbaijan.
The book draws on the consolidated
experience of Michele Brunelli, Professor of History and Institutions of
Islamic Societies at the University of Bergamo and Director of the Master
MaRTe, who has coordinated international projects concerning de-radicalisation
and prevention of violent extremism in Algeria, Azerbaijan and Burkina Faso, and
edited, also last year and for the same publishing house, the volume Prevention and countering of confessional
terrorism and radicalisation.
The scientific quality of the book derives not
only from addressing, through various perspectives, the main key-categories for
understanding terrorism (definition, causality, consequences, and response), but
also from analysing the historical, cultural, and socio-economic factors
relating to the phenomena of radicalisation, terrorism, anti-terrorism, and de-radicalisation,
taking as case studies three different confessional contexts: Italy, as a traditionally
Christian society; Algeria, a Sunni Islamic country; and Azerbaijan, characterised
by a Shia Muslim majority but a prevailingly secular society.
As the title suggests, the study revolves
around three concepts – radicalisation, terrorism, and de-radicalisation – which
are in turn the subjects of the three sections of the book respectively.
The first section scrutinises the complex
relationship between radicalisation and the question of minorities and identity
cleavages. Lala Jumayeva, Assistant Professor in
International Affairs at the ADA University of Baku with an expertise in conflict resolution, investigates the link between ethnic
minorities and radicalisation in the Caucasian area, while Naouel Abdellatif
Mami, Professor of Psycho-pedagogical Sciences and Foreign Languages at the University
Sétif 2, deals with the issue of identity and freedom of expression as drivers of
extremism in the Algerian context. Šeila Muhić, Researcher at the University of
Bergamo specialised in the field of human rights, explores the migration
phenomenon in Italy as a potential fertile ground for radicalisation. Further insights are offered by the second chapter of
the section, which brings together a series of essays on female radicalisation
and women victims or actors of terrorism. Anar
Valiyev, also a Professor at ADA University and an expert on history and
institutions of the post-Soviet space, discusses case of ISIS in relation to women
and children victims of radicalisation in Azerbaijan, with particular reference
to Salafist environments. Next, Naouel
Abdellatif Mami examines the condition of women in Algerian history, focusing
on the “black decade” (1991-2002) as well as on women’s role in the development
of approaches to resilience. The last study of the second chapter, carried out
by Emilija Davidovic – an expert on human rights in the post-Yugoslavian
scenario – concerns the involvement of women in extremist violence in the
European (Western and Balkan) context. The third chapter then provides a broad
overview of the phenomenon of political-religious radicalisation in post-Soviet
Azerbaijan, which mainly affects minority religious and ethnic communities
(Sunni and alloglot).
The second section of the book addresses terrorism
and its several conceptualisations. First, Ilas Touazi, Researcher at the University
Sétif 2 with an expertise in terrorism/counter-terrorism, presents an analysis
of the jihadist threat in Algeria, placing emphasis on the transnationalisation
of local terrorism. Professor Michele Brunelli subsequently explores the
evolution of politically and ideologically motivated terrorist crimes in the
European scenario, notably in Italy. The book
continues with the contribution of Aydan Ismayilova, a graduate of the MaRTe
Master’s course and an expert on jihadism, who examines terrorist phenomena in
the Caucasus area, focusing on Armenian terrorist movements and religious
extremist groups. Further food for thought is
provided by the fifth chapter, which includes research contributions on
critical infrastructure as the main targets of terrorist attacks. As such, Inara
Yagubova (Project Manager at the ADA University of Baku) deals with the
terrorist threat to energy infrastructure in Azerbaijan, while Nabil Benmoussa, Professor of Economics at the University
Sétif 2, analyses the economic implications of terrorism in Algeria and the related
policies of contrast. The essay written by Fabio Indeo, Analyst at the NATO
Defense College Foundation and expert in energy geopolitics of Central Asia, explains
the vulnerabilities and the strategies of protection of European critical
infrastructure, also in light of the new challenges posed by cybercrime. Afterwards,
Commander Mario Leone Piccinni, Officer of the Italian Guardia di Finanza and specialist
in cybercrime, outlines the intricate financing systems of terrorist
organisations at the international and local level.
The third and last section deals with de-radicalisation
policies and strategies. The seventh chapter hence investigates counter-terrorist
responses, with a first essay by Stefano Bonino, a criminologist expert in
terrorism and organised crime, who discusses Algerian counter-terrorist
strategies – from the most repressive ones to “soft” measures. As for the other
two countries under consideration, counter-terrorism and radicalism activities in
the Azerbaijani context are examined by Anar Valiyev, while the Italian case is
carefully analysed by Stefano Bonino and Andrea Beccaro, the latter being Professor
of Strategic Studies and War Studies at the University of Turin and the State
University of Milan respectively. The following chapter puts emphasis on the
role of education in preventing and responding to terrorism and radicalism, as
clearly emerges from the case study of Azerbaijan, here discussed by Valiyev. Likewise, Benmoussa outlines the recent educational
reforms in Algeria, conceived as part of the response to these phenomena; Šeila
Muhić, for her part, illustrates the programmes
of civil society involvement to counter violent extremism at the European
level. Last but not least, the ninth chapter closes the book with an essay by
Karim Regouli (Researcher at the University Sétif 2) on the delicate process of
reconciliation in Algeria after the decade of violence triggered by Islamic terrorism.
For the breadth of the topics it covers,
for the multiplicity of perspectives it offers and for the originality of the
comparative case studies, the book provides a significant contribution to research
on radicalisation and terrorism, representing, furthermore, an invaluable reference
for developing effective counteraction policies. Among recent studies, the
volume ranks amongst the most relevant on such topics, together with – inter
alia – Communities and Counterterrorism (Routledge, 2019), edited by Basia
Spalek and Douglas Weeks, Countering Violent Extremism. The international deradicalisation agenda (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2021) by Tahir
Abbas, as well as “Countering International Terrorism, with particular reference to the
phenomenon of foreign fighters” edited by the Società Italiana per l’Organizzazione
Internazionale (SIOI) in 2019.
Understanding
radicalisation, terrorism and de-radicalisation. Historical, socio-political
and educational perspectives from Algeria, Azerbaijan and Italy undoubtedly constitutes a point of
reference for scholars and experts, as well as for national and international institutions. The adopted multidisciplinary approach – historical,
political-institutional, economic, social, operational, and socio-educational –
provides for a comprehensive and articulated framework, which can be applied not only to religiously motivated
terrorism and radicalisation, but also to the many historical-political
expressions of such phenomena.
On a global scale, terrorism has (long)
tended to make fewer victims, despite a wider geographical spread and the fact
that, particularly in Syria and sub-Saharan Africa, the threat has grown. This
is the picture drawn by the Global Peace Index (GPI)
2021, which measures the impact of a series of indicators on the
peacefulness of nations. The same document depicts an international context where,
on the one hand, “the conflicts and crises that emerged in the past decade
have begun to abate”; on the other, COVID19 brought about new tensions.
Between January 2020 and April 2021, there were more than 5’000
pandemic-related violent events. The economic, social and even psychological
impact of the different measures put
in place to contain the spread of the virus helped create the conditions for a rise
in extremism and in the number of militants and supporters of various causes,
including conspiracy theories – be it
of a political, identity, anti-technological, no-vax nature – which found their
echo in anti-government protests and demonstrative actions, such as dozens of
attacks against 5G masts suspected of spreading COVID19; disruptions at vaccination centers; and threats directed at
scientists, politicians and even, as occasionally
reported in Italy, shopkeepers and restaurateurs requesting their clients to
exhibit Green Passes. On the Internet and in the streets, different orientations
more frequently happen to coexist and overlap, converging temporarily on common
causes and battles and/or driven by the aim of increasing their own visibility
and support base.
According to terrorism expert Ali Soufan, in
the future law enforcement, analysts and researchers might look to 2020 as a
watershed moment in terms of recruitment by non-state actors. It
should be emphasized, however, that the significant and progressive increase in
protests, civil unrest and political instability has been captured by the GPI since
2011; this is a particularly pronounced trend in the United States, where the
scale of the problem clearly came to light on 6th January, 2021 when
a diverse crowd of supporters of outgoing President Donald Trump, convinced
that they could overturn the outcome of the vote, felt legitimized by the
narrative of the “stolen elections” – which was pushed forth by some in the
political spectrum and the media – to storm the Capitol. The insurrection
against the transfer of power between the two American administrations, which caused
five victims and left a hundred others wounded, generated a greater, albeit
belated, awareness of the risks associated with an internal extremist drift which
has now become a priority issue for national security. The 700 plus individuals
who were arrested and prosecuted – including a 12% with a military background, according
to data gathered by the Program on Extremism at George Washington University – are
a jumble of exponents, supporters and sympathizers of various ideologies and
acronyms linked to the worlds of white supremacism, neo-Nazism, armed militias
and the conspiracy universe (QAnon above all), who were identified and
incriminated also thanks to their activities and interactions, fully visible on
social platforms. A substantial part of these citizens did not
appear to be officially affiliated to any organization; in this context, some experts today speak of mass
radicalization.
The new normal
of radicalization, shifting profiles and risks
Twenty years since the attacks of 11th
September, which opened a long chapter in the fight against terrorism at the national
and international levels that took various shapes – from military interventions
to the strengthening of police and intelligence measures, from legislative
changes to more interdisciplinary study of the subject, to prevention and
de-radicalization initiatives – not only has the threat not vanished; today, it
is more widespread, fragmented and complex to deal with. The ecosystem of
violent extremism is characterized by strong competition, but also by a growing
exposure to the strategies, tactics and “perceived victories” of ideologically
distant groups – analysts have not failed to point out, for example, the
attention paid by far-right circles to the “success” of the Taliban, whose
return to power after a long insurgency doesn’t merely motivate al-Qaeda and /
or fighters within the jihadist galaxy, but also other (armed) groups who make “traditional
society” their bulwark, oppose liberal values in the West and/or aspire to
civil conflict. The proximity and sometimes the cohabitation of themes – e.g.
jihadist vis-à-vis Accelerationst – narratives and symbolism does not entail a
watering down of ideological principles or beliefs but rather, as one can read
in a research on the subject (ICSR, January 2022), “an enhanced focus on
results over practice”. With reference to the Salafi-jihadist sphere, in
ReaCT2022 Michael Krona also explains that “supporter groups online are
expanding the terrorism universe by forming new entities that are less inclined
to attach themselves to a single organisation and instead promote wider
ideological interpretations (…)“. Today, the production of propaganda
and extremist narrative – but also calls for action – are no longer a
prerogative of terrorist movements’ media, but an operation which sees the
significant contribution of a large base of followers and militants acting on
their own, both with regard to the creation of new content – where topics might
differ from those addressed by the group’s official channels – and to its dissemination;
a large number of indictments and convictions for crimes related to terrorism
(not only of a jihadist nature) actually concern activities such as collection,
assembly and dissemination of material which might also be useful for planning
attacks. Because of this fragmentation, the tech giants’ battle to “clean up
the Internet” is far from easy, due to the skills of those “instigators” in
disguising the content of posts and accounts; in deceiving algorithms; in migrating
from platform to platform (including those popular with youngsters, like
TikTok) and in moving along grey areas and through encrypted Apps.
Britain is among
the European countries most affected by terrorism and radicalization and for
this reason, it anticipates and provides very important data and food for
thought. Recently Dean Haydon, Senior National Coordinator for Counterterrorism
Policing outlined the new profiles that are changing the equation in the
country: in short, according to the latest trend, it’s more common today to
come across individuals of British origins or nationality, increasingly young
and attracted to the ideologies of the extreme right, who self-radicalize
online and act on their own initiative. But 2020/21 data on referrals for
suspected radicalisation to the Prevent programme -which steps in when people are
thought to manifest early signs of extremism – reveal that 51% of the cases concern
“mixed, unstable or unclear ideologies” (MUU). Considering that there’s also a very high percentage,
a preponderance even of situations where mental health problems, addiction and/or
other difficulties might play a role – making youth particularly vulnerable to
online propaganda – violence prevails over ideology as a motivating factor, as
a channel for venting personal discomfort and – according to experts – as a
means to “acquire significance”. As a remarkable number of people suffering
from autism spectrum disorder have entered the Prevent circuit, the Independent
Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation Jonathan Hall stated that “it is as if a
social problem has been unearthed and fallen into lap of counter-terrorism
professionals.” Within this context, radicalization takes on the
connotations of a public health problem that must be studied and addressed from
a broader perspective than the one adopted till now, which placed a strong
emphasis on the role of ideology and consequently, with a view to countering
the phenomenon, on counter-narrative. An attack which took place in August 2021
in Plymouth, where a 22-year-old who was familiar with the incel
environment shot 7 people before taking his own life, is emblematic of the various nuances that make the
task of identifying what new forms of violence represent a terrorist threat
particularly difficult. Well-known in the United States and relatively new to
Europe, incels are “involuntary celibates”, individuals who fail to
establish a relationship with the opposite sex; scholars explain that within this
“bubble” – which is also dubbed incel
“culture” and is endowed with its own specific jargon – one can come across resentment
and hate speech spurring violence against women. More generally, it harbors a mix of misogynist, racist, anti-Semitic
and conspiracy beliefs. From March to November 2021, there was a
six-fold increase in visits by British users – which include children aged 13
and over – to the three main online forums linked to incel ideology (data
collected by The Times with the Centre for Countering Digital Hate). Official
statistics say that 2021 set a record in the number of children arrested for
terrorist offences.
The new horizons of
radicalization are not to be observed solely in the Anglo-Saxon world; with
reference to jihadism, the Swiss Federal Intelligence Service in their 2020
Report had already drawn attention to individuals “whose radicalisation and violent
tendencies are rooted more in personal crises or psychological problems than in
ideological conviction. The frequency of such acts of violence, which have only
a marginal link to jihadist ideology or groups, will in general remain the same
or possibly even increase.” Within the same year, the first two
such attacks in Switzerland took place in Morges and Lugano with the
perpetrators – a man and a woman – fitting this description.
Rethinking radicalisation with a view to prevention
Over the past 15 years, security policies and counterterrorism initiatives focused mainly on propaganda and recruitment by al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and related groups. Jihadism does remain the form of terrorism causing more victims; Europol itself reports that in 2020 – possibly also due to the pressure of the pandemic on security forces? – the number of attacks which were carried out exceeded that of foiled/failed ones and more than doubled, compared to the previous year. However, as previously highlighted, there’s today a new risk emanating from a post-organized reality, where militants and (potential) terrorists are only vaguely inspired by the Islamic State; they act independently and alone, yet “exalt” and encourage one another in group, within communities and ecosystems. Outside of the academic environment, this aspect of (re)socialization – the search for a sense of sharing and acceptance, be it in a real or virtual community – is not always sufficiently grasped; yet, it is paramount in order to fully understand the process of radicalization, which lists social exclusion among its most significant triggers. Today, society at large is characterized by similar dynamics of belonging and identification with a movement or cause, in opposition to others; concurrently with strong polarization and growing “social encapsulation”, these are all elements favoring the incubation of extremism. From this perspective, the battle against conspiracy theories and fake news, which are embedded in the narratives of many, more or less violent acronyms – especially those linked to the far-right – acquires strategic significance and calls for more awareness on the part of politics and the media. Due to the many facets of social problems which might lead to violence at this historical moment, it is the time to “rethink radicalization” by paying more attention to the sociological and psychological aspects, with a view to enhancing prevention – which does not consist in repression by means of security / Police interventions in the pre-criminal phase, but rather in being engaged on the ground and in planning activities aimed at strengthening support networks where social and personal hardships may manifest at the local level. As highlighted in ReaCT2021, this approach implies long-term collaboration among different actors (NGOs, public and private institutions, civil society, families) and constant dialogue among researchers, field operators, law enforcement agencies and legislators. Faced with terrorism’s creativity and adaptability, as well as with the new normal of radicalisation which defines the current era, updating approaches and tools at our disposal to counter this threat is of the utmost importance.
📌#ReaCT2023 The 4th annual Report on Terrorism and Radicalisation in Europe ⬇📈launches on 23rd May. Don't miss it! 📊📚Numbers, trends, analyses, books, interviews👇 pic.twitter.com/KLIWWlrJXS
🔴📚 OUT SOON! #ReaCT2023 Annual Report on Terrorism and Radicalisation in Europe | Start Insight ⬇ 16 articles by different authors discuss current trends and numbers. Available in Italian and English startinsight.eu/en/out-soon-r…
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